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Dedicated to the Memory

of my dear deceased brother

MUSHFIQUZZAMAN

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PREFACE

AUTOBIOGRAPHIES are the order of the day. Generally they are written by authors whose achievements deserve recounting as a guide and incentive to future generations. My Memoirs are, however, intended to provide source material for those whose mission in times to come will be to survey and unfold the life work of many great and forgotten personalities, but for whose efforts and devoted services a suitable environment for wider fields of activity and for healthy and constructive trends could not have been created. The human eye is prone to look at the edifice and ignore the foundation beneath; but serious students of history strive to probe deeper and it is for their benefit that I have decided to write my reminiscences which will, I hope, not only unfold the character and direction of Muslim movements in pre-partitioned India since the advent of the British, but will also disclose on the one hand the political conflicts between the Indian National Congress and the British for the independence of India. and on the other the unimaginative, halting and unsympathetic approach of Congress towards Muslim rights and interests.

Geography is subject to change, either by natural causes or human action or both; but not so history, which is immutable, pursuing nations and peoples through the ages like a shadow, often dim and blurred but always traceable in their social, religious and political make-up. Hindu-Muslim relations in India have suffered from this historical fatality.

Some of the basic facts of the history of the two people, whom fate had brought to live together as friends, foes, neighbours, rulers or strangers for centuries in the vast sub-continent of India, are common to both. The Aryans were just as much foreigners to the country over which they ruled for 2,000 years before the arrival of the Muslims in the country, who in their turn ruled in Sind for about 1100 years and in other regions of the country for some 700 years. The Aryans had the advantage of time, the pre-historic age and its long duration, in successfully bringing the whole sub-continent under their spiritual and cultural hegemony by imposing the caste system on the vanquished, a unique method of dealing with a subjugated people.

The Muslim period, on the other hand, started under the full glare of written record, and amongst a people spiritually and culturally united to look upon the invaders as foreigners. Unity of, faith between these two completely divergent spiritual systems and beliefs was not possible. Compromise in matters of belief between the Aryans and Dasyus had been achieved by the inclusion of Dravidian Gods in the Brahmanic Pantheon or by substituting the names of older ones; but a similar solution in the case of Islam and Hinduism was out of the question. They had therefore to live and exist in close proximity to each other, retaining their own beliefs and practices which for both of them covered the whole pattern of their lives. Hinduism is more a code of life from birth to death than a set of basic beliefs, while Islam is rooted in a clear-cut faith which finds its expression in the mode of life of its adherents. In such a situation only a certain measure of cultural unity could be secured between the two peoples with all their spiritual differences. But that precarious unity survived only so long as the third party, the British, did not enter the scene to subjugate both of them. It was during this period of British rule that the Hindu mass consciousness gradually began to exhibit itself in aggressive designs for securing advantages from the ruling power to the detriment of Muslim interests. The Urdu language had been evolved, not through the firmans of Muslim kings of Delhi but by the mingling of the two people, who had lived together as close neighbours and were under the painful necessity of understanding each other. This language was the first target of attack by the Hindu intelligentsia but as time wore on many other issues came into the forefront to disturb the relations between the two communities of India.

Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, father of the Muslim nation in India, who had on many occasions talked of Hindus and Muslims as two eyes of the country was so bitterly disappointed over the language controversy started by Saroda Charan Bannerji in 1869 that he told Mr. Shakespeare, the Commissioner of Banares, that there was no chance of restoring friendly relations with the sister community after the language controversy. No one need be surprised at the importance which the Muslims attached to the Urdu language; for the riots, murders and killings in Indian provinces over the language issue since partition, between the Hindus themselves, has fully justified the Muslim feelings, fears and apprehensions. The struggle started earlier between the two communities gradually rose to a pitch which ended in the partition of the country in 1947.

It is a great irony that the Muslims, who had endeavoured for

centuries to unify India and made untold sacrifices for the cause, even to the last day of Emperor Aurangzeb's life in 1707, were themselves forced by circumstances, so little of their own making, to seek the partition of the country. But it would be found on an impartial study of the deteriorating relations between the two communities from the early twentieth century that a major operation alone could have prevented the catastrophe of a civil war in the sub-continent. Indeed the large-scale killings before the partition in 1947 amply justify such an assessment. To those both in India and outside who still refuse to see the sheer justification of partition as the only solution of one of the most unusual, baffling and stupendous problems of the world, the assassination of Gandhiji at the hands of a Hindu youth, Godse, for his preaching and undaunted efforts to stop the slaughter and liquidation of the Muslims left in India, ought to serve as an eye-opener.

Various Congress historians describe in flattering terms the strength of the Indian National Congress, to mislead the reader into the belief that it had the whole country under its sway. A few decades later, when the revengeful spirit against Muslim history softens and gives place to a calmer atmosphere for cool and unbiased study of the Indian sub-continent, the Hindu youth may feel inclined to ask : 'If all was so well with the Congress policy and its strength in the country, how then came Pakistan?' The knowledge of a few facts mentioned in these Memoirs may provide an answer to his query and enable him to form his own opinion on the crucial question whether or not the Hindu leadership of the Congress was responsible for this catastrophe. But for the fact that Muslims themselves in 1937 accepted independence of India as their political creed, albeit not without partition, the independence secured by India might perhaps have still been hanging in the balance. Throughout the post-Mutiny period until the partition of the country, the Muslims of India had been invoking their history in the land as a factor which had to be taken into account in determining their political rights and providing adequate safeguards for their culture and language. That history and that culture has to be kept in view to enable the reader to appreciate not only the movements directly connected with them but also the violent outburst of emotions which they occasioned.

The only serious attempt made by a Muslim to write about Hindu-Muslim relations was by Maulana Tufail Ahmad. But his book in Urdu *Musalmanon ka Roshan Mustaqbil* suffers from an unmitigated anti-Muslim bias. With this partisan attitude of the author, which served the Congress well for a few years before partition, the book has little value as an authentic work of

historical reference. The history of the Muslim League written by the late Mohammad Amin Zuberi is incomplete, relating as it does only to a limited period. In any case it does not throw much light on day-to-day political trends of the Indian National Congress and its effect on Muslim people as a whole. Among other books written on the subject mention may be made of Abdul Wahid Khan's *Musalmanon ki Siyasi Zindgi* (1941), Mohammad Noman's *Muslim India* (1944-45) and Rajput's *Muslim League: Yesterday and Today* (1947). But they are mostly chronological accounts of a limited period and even so with little documentary evidence.

The latest book on the subject is Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's autobiography *India Wins Freedom*. Mr. Humayun Kabir, who was Secretary of the Maulana, has claimed that he took down notes from the Maulana and after rendering them into English language read them over to him, and that the book in its present form had the approval of the author. It pains me to describe the book as being dry and disappointing. The news that the Maulana's biography was soon to be published had raised great expectations both in India and Pakistan but when it did appear it failed to catch the imagination of people in both countries. One great drawback which attracts notice is the absence of any mention of his close association for a number of years with the Ali Brothers, or even a passing reference to the services of Dr. Ansari whose house in Daryaganj was for a number of years his address in Delhi. Hakim Ajmal Khan whom the Maulana always regarded as a guide in all his personal and political affairs is named only once in a manner which is derogatory to the memory of the President of the Indian National Congress of 192[illegible] Ahmedabad. It would have added charm and elegance to his autobiography if the Maulana had given some details of his work in the Khilafat organization, talked of his political rivals, the stages through which he had to pass, the struggles which he had to endure and the sufferings which he had to undergo in building up his reputation in the political field. The Maulana's story, however, begins practically from the year 1939 when he became the President of the Congress.

As for me he has given me a great compliment first by referring to the negotiations between the League and Congress in U.P. in 1937 and the stating*:

'If the U.P. League's offer of co-operation had been accepted, the Muslim League party would for all practical purposes have merged in the Congress. Jawaharlal's action gave the Muslim

India Wins Freedom, Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1959, p. 161.

League in U.P. a new lease of life. All students of Indian politics know that it was from the U.P. that the League was re-organized. Mr. Jinnah took full advantage of the situation and started an offensive which led to Pakistan.'

I had been entertaining the idea of writing my memoirs for quite a few years past but several considerations, political and otherwise, stood in the way of my making a decision. While I was still undecided over the idea, in June 1953 in Dacca, when I was the Governor of East Bengal, I received a letter from Maulana Abdul Haq, President of the Anjuman Taraqqi-i-Urdu. He is the oldest living student of Aligarh, a great and revered friend of mine and one who has devoted his whole life to the cause of Urdu. In his letter he said:

'After reading your speech in the Press I repeat to you again, as I told you when you were parting from me here at Karachi last time, to write your Memoirs and to write them fully without fear or favour. It is possible that something may hurt now but in future these things will be appreciated. The time that Providence has given you should be utilized now, for life is uncertain. Man dies but his work remains. If you finish this work it will be memorable and future historians will quote it as authority. I once more urge upon you to do it because no one else has the capacity for it nor has anyone else had those opportunities which fall to your lot.'

He soon followed this up by another letter in which he wrote:

'You should write down the events of your life without fear or favour. That was a period of serious struggle, feuds and complications. There may be many alive who know these things but very few who really understand them. He alone who has thrown himself into the deep dangerous waters, reached the bed, could write about the basic underlying realities of those fateful events.'

These two letters, coming in quick succession from one who had himself devoted his life to public causes and to fighting hard in defence of the Urdu language, made a great impression on me and led me to prepare myself seriously for the task.

Maulana Sayed Sulaiman Nadvi, the revered scholar of the East who made a great contribution to the Khilafat cause, also advised me to write my biography. There were many other friends and relations like Maulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi and Jamal Mian of Firangi Mahal who had been pressing me for a long time to write down my experiences. But above all was the pressure of my younger brother Mushfiquzzaman who had practically dedicated his life to my happiness and who kept reminding me all the time of my duty to my people. Whatever

authenticating material is found in this book was preserved by him, often without my knowledge, to serve the purpose he had long had in view. At my bidding he left India in 1947 and came over to Karachi to be with me. He was suddenly taken ill in July 1953 and died in the early hours of 5 August, leaving me, a helpless old man, with little experience of domestic responsibilities. It was only by chance that I happened to be in Karachi during his last days. A few days before he breathed his last I assured him that I would not let him down and would soon begin writing my memoirs. For various reasons it has taken me a long time to fulfil that promise, and now that I have finally done so I dedicate this work to his memory.

In the end I have to express my gratitude to Maulana Jamal Mian of Firangi Mahal for giving me the notebook of his father as well as a file of *Daily Hamdam* which proved to be of great value to me in refreshing my memory in respect of some of the events of the early period of my political life.

I am greatly indebted to Sadan Khan, Assistant Information Officer in the Indonesian Embassy of Pakistan at the time, for having helped me for months in taking down my dictation from day to day only for the love of the work which I had undertaken. My two youngest sons Jalaluzzaman and [illegible]haluzzaman helped me greatly in revising my manuscript.

To avoid repetition and to keep the book within reasonable compass, only a small selection of a considerable number of original letters and documents, sent by the author to the publishers, are reproduced as appendixes.

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ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

p. 4, l. 6, for Mr. Nasim *read* Mr. Mohammad Wasim.

p. 52, add f.n., Tendulkar, *Mahatma,* Bombay, V. K. Jhaveri and D. J. Tendulkar.

p. 69, headline, for Jeoprady *read* Jeopardy.

p. 118, f.n., for Nawajiwan *read* Navajivan.

p. 140, l. 2, for Ballab *read* Ballabh.

p. 164, for Tundulkar *read* Tendulkar.

p. 184, for Gollanez *read* Gollancz.

p. 185, add f.n., Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress,* Padma Publications.

I

MY FAMILY

SHAIKH ABDUR RAHIM of Lucknow was twenty-nine generations removed from the first Caliph, Abu Bakr Siddiq. During the days of Akbar he proceeded to Agra to try his luck there and became one of his Mansabdars. As said in *Swaneh-i-Salatin-i-Oudh* by Sayed Mohammad Mirza, published in Nawalkishore Press in 1896, the Emperor was very pleased with him and conferred on him the management of some *parganas* including Lucknow. He constructed the fort of Machchi Bhawan which existed till the Mutiny in 1857 when it was blown up by the British and on the ruins of which now stands Lucknow Medical College. Shaikh Abdur Rahim had only one son Shaikh Khalilur Rahman. The graves of Shaikh Abdur Rahim and one of his wives are still found in ruins in the Nadan Mahan Park of the city.

Shaikh Khalilur Rahman was married to Jia Bibi of Amethi, a town near Lucknow. One son was born from this alliance, known as Shaikh Mohammad Zaman, the author of *Gulshan-i-Mohammadi*. He also became a Mansabdar in the days of Aurangzeb, and spent most of his life in Delhi. After him his son also was granted a Mansab and twelve villages round about Lucknow as a *jagir* from Farrukhseer. One of these villages, Chilawan, is still named in official records as Farrukhabad Chilawan and has continuously remained in possession of our family.

My father Shaikh Mohammad Zaman was seven generations removed from Shaikh Mohammad Zaman I, his ancestor. My grandfather Shaikh Mehdiuzzaman was married to Sughra Bibi, sister of Choudhri Sarfaraz Ahmad, Taluqdar of Subeha, District Barabanki. He was a Tehsildar in the British service after the Mutiny, a post very much coveted in those days, being one of the highest executive posts open to Indians. He died in 1881 leaving three sons—Imtiazuzzaman, my father Mohammad Zaman and Moinuzzaman. Imtiazuzzaman was married to the daughter of Choudhri Sarfaraz Ahmad; Moinuzzaman died

unmarried. My father was first married to the daughter of Choudhri Murtaza Husain, a brother of Sarfraz Ahmad, and from her had three sons—Raisuzzaman, K.B. Matinuzzaman and Masihuzzaman. Soon after my grandfather's death, my father was appointed Naib Tehsildar. After the death of his first wife my father married Maqboolunnisa Begum, the granddaughter of Malik Ghulam Hazrat, in 1882.

About Ghulam Hazrat, Col. Sleeman who was the Resident of Lucknow and had undertaken a tour of Oudh, on the date 1 December 1849 in his *Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh** writes:

'The two purgunnas of Nawabgunge and Sidhore are under the charge of Aga Ahmud, the Amil, who has under him two naibs or deputies, Ghoolam Abbas and Mahumud Ameer. All three are obliged to connive at the iniquities of a landholder Ghoolam Huzrut, who resides on his small estate of Jhareeapoora, which he is augmenting, in a manner too common in Oudh, by seizing on the estates of his weaker neighbours.... He sent some men to aid the prisoners in the great jail at Lucknow to break out. Five of them were killed in the attempt, seven were wounded and twenty-five were retaken but forty-five escaped and among them Fuzl Allee, one of the four assassins who in April 1847 cut down the late Minister Ameen-Od Dowla, in the midst of his followers, in one of the principal streets of Lucknow. . . . The third, Afzal Allee, with some of the most atrocious and desperate of his companions, is now with this Ghoolam Huzrut, disturbing the peace of the country.

On my remarking to the King's wakeel, that these ruffians had all high-sounding names he said "They are really all men of high lineage and men of that class who become ruffians, are always sure to be of the worst description. As horses of the best blood when they do become vicious, are the most incorrigible, I suppose!"'

Proceeding further Col. Sleeman says†:

'On crossing the river Ghara, I directed Captain Banbury, (who commands a regiment in the King of Oudh's service with six guns, and was to have accompanied me,) to surprise and capture Ghoolam Huzrut, if possible by a sudden march. . . . He [Ghulam Huzrut] had returned to his fort with all his family on my passing and it contained but few soldiers, with a vast number of women and children. He saw that it would be of no use to resist, and surrendered his fort and person to Captain Banbury, who sent him a prisoner to Lucknow under charge of two companies commanded by Captain Hearsey. Malik Ghoolam Huzrut was sent to Andaman.'

Col. Sleeman had insisted to the King's Ministers that Malik Ghulam Hazrat's properties should not be allowed to pass

* Vol. I., p. 2. † Ibid., p. 21.



Th Author

on to his minor son Malik Bhikaree (Malik Asghar Ali), but it appears that, for fear of retaliation from Malik Ghulam Hazrat's companions, Col. Sleeman's orders were not carried out and Malik Asghar Ali came into possession of his father's properties. Malik Ghulam Hazrat had also left one daughter Salaran Bibi who was married to Choudhri Riyasat Ali of Bhilwal, and my mother was his youngest daughter. My mother had two brothers and two sisters. The eldest brother Mohammad Yusuf looked after the family properties and got his younger brother Mohammad Nasim educated even while he was in very straitened financial circumstances. Mohammad Nasim, after securing a Law Degree started practice in 1890 and by a phenomenal rise within four years became the leader of the Oudh Bar, a record accomplishment in the Bar of any country. Short and slim he was the very paragon of gentlemanliness and sincerity. His riches were always at the service of his father's family and for other deserving ones. He died at the age of 94 years at Lucknow in 1953 when many members of his family, including myself, had come over to Pakistan.

Mohammad Nasim left three sons, Mohammad Wasim, Mohammad Habib and Mohammad Mujib. Mr. Wasim, within a few years of starting practice, established his reputation and took his father's place in the profession. He was appointed Advocate-General of U.P. and at the behest of Mr. Jinnah came over to Pakistan in 1947, to take the appointment of Advocate-General of Pakistan. Professor Mohammad Habib, the second son of Mr Nasim, is a well-known historian of India and has been Professor of History for a long time at Aligarh. Mr. Mujib, the youngest son, is now the head of the Jamia Institution and is regarded as a great Nationalist.

As for my father's family, besides his three sons from his first wife we were six brothers from our mother, and two sisters. The eldest one Mr. Jamiluzzaman, after taking his B.A. Degree from Aligarh took to Law and hardly had put in seven or eight years' practice when he died at the age of thirty-two years. My second brother Samiuzzaman is an artist of great reputation in Mughal painting. Recently the *National Herald* of Lucknow in appreciation of his art remarked, 'Mr. Samiuzzaman is the only living artist in the Mughal style of painting. Tagore asked him to do the Mughal style painting and he fully came up to Tagore's expectations.' My next younger brother, Dr. Salimuzzaman, has the reputation of being a well-known scientist. He was, in India, before he came to Pakistan, the Director of the Scientific Research Institute and now he is the Director of the Scientific

Research Institute in Pakistan. Of my two youngest brothers Saiduzzaman, who was the Controller of Stores in Chittagong after the partition of the country, died in February 1953; the other Mushfiquzzaman, whom I have already mentioned in the Preface, died in August 1953. My eldest sister Zamirunnisa Begum was married to Mr. Nasim and the younger one Shakilunnisa Begum to Mr. Ismail, the second son of Mr. Mohammad Yusuf, my maternal uncle. A graphic description of my family has been given by Halide Edib, the great Turkish lady who, having played an important part in the making of New Turkey, came to India at the invitation of Dr. Ansari in 1933-34. She visited Lucknow and stayed at Dolly Bagh, my uncle's house, met him, my sisters and cousins and wrote her impressions of Lucknow and its people in her book *Inside India*.

II

EARLY YEARS IN LUCKNOW

1889—1907

I WAS born on the night of 25 December 1889 at Chunar in District Mirzapur where my father was Naib Tehsildar. A few years later he was transferred to another Tehsil namely Robertsganj of the same district. After a few years' service in this sub-division my father took long leave due to some property dispute in Lucknow and came over to stay with my uncle, Mr. Nasim, who had by now built a palatial house in Kaisar Bagh. The new house, being near the city courts and across the road to the Raja of Mahmudabad's House, was both easy of access and commodious. After a few months' stay in Lucknow my mother also arrived from Subeha, another town in Barabanki District where my grandfather had constructed a big house near the banks of the Gomti river after his marriage with Sughra Bibi, the sister of Choudhri Sarfaraz Ahmad.

Lucknow at that time was a city of Nawabs and Taluqdars of Oudh. There were more than three hundred Taluqdars of various grades, most of whom generally lived in Lucknow for it was both the *de facto* capital of the Province and a pleasure resort for them with immense opportunities for wasting money. The biggest Taluqa was Balrampur with an income of over five million rupees per annum. Next came two Muslim estates, namely Mahmudabad and Nanpara, with incomes of about two million each. Thereafter the Taluqdars varied in their incomes but none of them above a million. They differed in their tastes and habits not according to their status or income but according to their upbringing and natural aptitude, each with his own craze. Once a very well-known Doctor of Lucknow when asked how many kinds of insanity there were quickly replied, 'as many as the Taluqdars of Oudh.' There were honourable but very rare exceptions. Some of them were heavily in debt, some were about to be dispossessed of their property in the execution of money decrees against them. Well-known social figures amongst the Hindu Taluqdars were Raja Rampal Singh of Kalakakar who

had started taking an interest in Congress politics, the Rajas of Kurri Sidhauli, of Mankapur, of Ramnagar Dhameri and the Raja of Gonda, Kishan Dutt Ram. About the last named it came out in a court of law that he got his sepoy beaten with shoes mercilessly for having struck twelve on the gong before the Raja had retired for his meal.

Amongst Muslims there was Raja Shaban Ali Khan of Salempur, who was a great social figure and a close friend of my brother Raisuzzaman. Nawab Mohammad Ali Khan of Malihabad was also well known in society. Raja Tasadduq Rasool Khan was too fat to stir out of his house but for his riches he was sought for by the officials, the *Ulema* and the gentry. Above all Raja Amir Hasan Khan of Mahmudabad whose house was just across the road from ours was the most respected Muslim Taluqdar. His father, Raja Nawab Ali, had fought against the British during the Mutiny and his Taluqa was about to be confiscated, but the mother of the minor Raja petitioned to the Government for mercy. As her husband had already died she prayed that retaliation should not fall on the head of the innocent child. The Government relaxed and the Taluqa was saved. Raja Amir Hasan Khan was not given to sensual pursuits or to other vices.

Raja Amir Hasan Khan stayed generally at Mahmudabad but whenever he came to Lucknow his arrival was known from the cries of *Shohdas*, an institution which was a speciality of Lucknow. These are beggars who hunt in packs, crying, begging, mimicking, shouting and cursing all the time until paid. Their time came in the evening. The Raja came out for his drive with the Treasurer with a big purse sitting in from of him in the buggy, throwing cash on both sides, followed by *Shohdas* quarrelling and cursing each other to benefit from the loot.

Another big Muslim Raja was Raja Jung Bahadur who was succeeded by his son Raja Mohammad Siddiq who was half insane and had written a will giving away his property of over forty million rupees to a slave girl. On his death there was great litigation which continued for years. As for the Nawabs, very few had landed properties. Most of them lived on the *Wasiqa*, the interest paid by the British Government month by month on the money borrowed in the heyday of the Oudh kings, from Bahu Begum, the widow of Shujauddaulah; the stipulation having been that on the death of each heir recipient of interest, half of the *Wasiqa* would lapse to the Government, the remainder being divided amongst the heirs of the deceased. By this process after over a century some of them were receiving a paltry sum only. But

there were others who still got enough to live on as real Nawabs. They were a gentle lot, tall, graceful, very courteous and affable, provided you could get near them, for mostly they were either in the zenana or flying kites, if not taking opium. During the day they looked comparatively dirty but you could barely recognize the same people in the evening after dusk, in their white angarkha, tight pyjamas and fine white caps, with their mouth full of betelnut and their dress wafting a bewitching odour of oriental perfume as they walked towards the Chowk, where most of them had dancing girls in their pay, so long as the Taluqdars with bigger purses did not take them away from them. Feudalism with all its charms and evils reigned supreme in Lucknow.

If both these classes, the Taluqdars and Nawabs, agreed on anything, it was their liking for lawsuits. They might have to borrow money or mortgage their jewellery but the case had to go on from day to day, so that they might narrate the day's work in court to their Musahibs and their kept mistresses. That is how they were nursing a class of lawyers which was to end the very system which gave rise to them. The Nawabs of Shish Mahal and Wazir-ganj, Puttan Sahib, Jhumman Sahib, Sultan Bahadur and others were very well-known Nawabs in the city.

There were many big zamindars and Nawab families living in Lucknow at the time. Nawab Ali Hasan Khan and his brother Siddiq Hasan Khan were known as Nawabs of Bhopal. The former was a renowned Arabic scholar and patron of the Nadva Institution. He was a great admirer of Sir Sayed and Mohsinul Mulk and helped Aligarh College with money and moral support. Munshi Ehtisham Ali of Kakori was the son of Munshi Imtiaz Ali, once a Minister of Bhopal, and was looked upon with great respect. Mr. Athar Ali of Kakori was also a great figure in Lucknow society. Choudhri Nusrat Ali of Sandila was for a long time Secretary of the British-Indian Association. Among Qidwai families living in Lucknow were those of Shaikh Shahid Husain and Shaikh Nisarur Rahman of Bara Gaon. Raja Naushad Ali of Barabanki enjoyed great reputation as a poet and as a leader of Muslims. He attended the Dacca session of the League in 1906. The notable lawyers of the city were Mr. Mohammad Nasim, Babu Basdeo Lal, Babu Ramchandra, Sayed Nabiullah and Pandit Jagat Narain Mullah, Pandit Gokaran Nath Misra, Mirza Samiullah Beg and Sayed Zahur Ahmad. The lawyers were generally interested in politics and, among Muslims, Mirza Samiullah Beg and Mr. Zahur Ahmad took keen interest in the political affairs of U.P. and of the country as a whole.

Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, Secretary of the Aligarh College at the time, had held in 1900, at the invitation of the Muslims of the city, a conference in the defence of Urdu which was attended by many Nawabs with their 'Quail cages', to protest against the Governor's order recognizing Hindi. It was in this meeting that Nawab Mohsinul Mulk read the verse 'It is the coffin of Urdu let it be taken out with great eclat.'

Again in 1904 the session of the Mohammadan Educational Conference was held in December under the presidentship of Mr. Morrison and was attended by leaders of the time, Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan, Maulana Nazir Ahmad, Shaikh Abdullah, Maulana Hali, Nawab Viqarul Mulk and many others. It was in this session that Raja Mohammad Ali Mohammad Khan of Mahmudabad, who had succeeded his father, Raja Amir Hasan Khan, announced amidst resounding cheers, a donation to the Conference of one lac rupees. During the Conference I served as a volunteer along with many other Muslim students.

Lucknow had one Urdu bi-weekly newspaper, *Oudh Akhbar*, which had been brought out by Munshi Nawalkishore who had rendered great service to the Urdu and Persian languages. The other paper was *Oudh Punch* which is still remembered for its satirical and humorous writings. The editor was Sajjad Husain of Kakori. Some of its contributors were well-known men like Jawala Prasad Barq, Zarif, Tribhawan Nath Hijr and Akbar Allahabadi. They were not newspapers but views-papers catering to the tastes of the citizens of Lucknow. Akbar Allahabadi had made the Delhi Durbar held by Lord Curzon memorable by writing a satirical poem about the festive activities in Delhi. The Delhi Durbar also gave an opportunity to Nawab Mohsinul Mulk to invite H. H. the Aga Khan to preside over the Muslim Educational Conference. Maulana Nazir Ahmad, in introducing the young and handsome President to the audience, read a verse eulogizing him profusely.

The services of Lucknow to the cause of Urdu may be, if at all. matched by Delhi. The city was one of the cultural centres of the Hindus also with a large number of Brahmin families like the Bajpais, Shuklas, Misras, Choubeys, Dubeys and Tiwaris and a good number of Kashmiri Brahmins, the Chaks, Dars, Nehrus, Bhats and Mullahs. But after the glory of Delhi had faded into the background, Lucknow became the home of Muslim poets and artists. As a matter of fact it was not the migration of particular classes from Delhi to Lucknow but the migration of the Muslim cultural heritage. The well-known poets who migrated from Delhi to Lucknow or Fyzabad were Mir, Sauda, Mushafi,

Insha, Mir Khaliq and many others. The local talent, consisting of Nasikh, Atish, Wazir, Saba and others, also added to the poetic glory of the age of Lucknow. Mir Khaliq's son Mir Anis and his competitor Mirza Dabir excelled in epic-dirge poetry; Mir Anis has no equal in the art since his time. In fact the Moharram ceremony for which Lucknow is well known was evolved and developed under the poetic genius of epic-dirge poets. The art of *Masnawi* (connected poem) writing in improved form was introduced by Mir Hasan in Lucknow. He was later on followed by Daya Shankar Nasim who wrote *Gulzar-i-Nasim* and they are supposed to be even now without any competitors. Following them, Hakim Tasadduq Husain, known as Nawab Mirza Shauq, wrote *Masnawi Zahr-i-Ishq* which was banned by the British for its seductive effects on young lovers. Story-writing in Urdu was started by Mirza Rajab Ali Saroor in very grandiloquent style. Thereafter Pandit Ratannath Sarshar wrote *Fasana-i-Azad*, and sometime later *Tilism-i-Hosh Ruba* in several volumes was written by Ahmad Hasan Qamar. The first drama in Urdu language was written by Amanat in Lucknow. The art of story-telling *(Dastan Goi)* was also greatly developed by the Lucknow intellectuals. Mirza Toor was one of the pioneers of the art and next to him came Mir Fida Ali, his younger brother. Nawab Hadi Ali Khan had a superb style of story-telling. As a matter of fact it was not the story but the manner of narrating it, with suitable poses of the body, the rise and fall in the tone and the glim and glare in the eyes which by themselves were remarkable feats of expression.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, India had sufficiently been influenced by western literature to come out of its old grooves and take to novel-writing. But there again the first two well-known novelists, Maulana Abdul Halim Sharar and Hakim Mohammad Ali of Hardoi, belonged to Oudh and were illustrious in the art.

Lucknow was not a business centre and it did not believe in any other trade except manufacture of chewing tobacco or perfumery or such fruits or things as would have a large sale in the city of Nawabs. The perfumery of Asghar Ali and Mohammad Ali, having been established in 1839, and the tobacco-manufacturing firm of Ahmad Husain Dildar Husain are now the only two institutions which do not seem to have suffered the fate which has overtaken a large number of their customers.

The fertility of Lucknow soil both for grain and fruits, particularly mangoes and melons, is well known. Lucknow melons can compare with melons from any country and so far as the

mangoes are concerned Dasehri and Khajri are so renowned that the Prime Minister of India now takes them to distant countries as presents. The Pathans of Malihabad may be given the credit for having developed mango cultivation and this in particular goes to Abdul Hamid Khan and Safdar Khan of Malihabad.

As compared to Delhi the historical buildings of Lucknow are no match to the architectural beauty of Mughal structures either in sublimity of design or in beauty of execution; nevertheless, compared to other historical monuments of India, the Lucknow Nawabi architectural art is certainly not inferior. What it lacked in architecture, Lucknow compensated for by its greenery, with a large number of beautiful parks and gardens which won it the honour of being called, during the British days, the garden of India.

Pandit Jawaharlal in his book *Discovery of India* has acknowledged the fact that the Muslims encouraged Indian art and added to its grandeur. Lucknow may be said to have contributed greatly to Indian music, particularly during the days of Wajid Ali Shah who has written a book *Bani* wherein he has described in detail many *ragas* and *raginis* (tunes). It is said that he was the inventor of *Thumri* and *Dadra*.

Muslims did not take to dancing, Indian or any other, nor, as a matter of fact, did respectable Hindu families, Brahmin or Kshatriyas, ever cultivate the art. Whatever dancing we find now prevalent amongst both the Hindus and Muslims derives from the foreign influence of the West. The Indian dancing was confined to dancing girls or the Kathak family of dancers. The Oudh Kings extended their patronage to the family of Khushi Maharaj for three generations. Binda Din and Kalka, two brothers from the same family, had been richly supported by the Kings and Taluqdars of Oudh. Binda Din was the master of the art of dancing and Kalka, the younger, was known to be exquisite in playing instruments accompanying his brother's dances. I have seen Binda Din dancing several times. He used to give a public exhibition of dancing once a year in a Hindu fair. People from all over India would come to see him dance on that occasion. His three nephews Achchan, Luchchu and Shambhu are very good dancers but lack the blitheness and agility of their uncle. Shambhu, the youngest, was given the award of Padma Shree by the President of India, Babu Rajendra Prasad, in 1958.

In February 1907 when I was in my 10th class in Jubilee School, Lucknow, there was a students' strike in Aligarh College, which naturally upset the parents of the students and many of them ran up to Aligarh. Within a few days the strike ended but the

effect that it left behind pursued Aligarh politics for a number of years. About two months later Mr. Wilayat Ali came to stay in my uncle's house for the purpose of his legal studies, just as his cousin Mr. Nawab Ali had done before him in 1903. A few days later Raja Ghulam Husain also came to stay with his friend Mr. Wilayat Ali. Raja Ghulam Husain was the hero of the strike and from him I learnt that the students had begun to feel that the English staff of the College were acting rather as agents of the Government than as professors of the College. A group of Aligarh College Trustees also shared the views of the students. Nawab Mohsinul Mulk did not consider it politically sound to antagonize the English professors as a class, but the younger section of the Trustees, particularly Maulana Shaukat Ali and Mohammad Ali, in the heat of controversy wrote letters to Nawab Mohsinul Mulk in a language and tone which I deprecate.

The immediate cause of the strike was a quarrel between some policemen and students. Mr. Archbold, the Principal of the College, took a serious view of the matter and rusticated Raja Ghulam Husain, who was the Vice-President of the Union Club, Abdur Rahman Bijnori and five others. Thereupon the students went on strike. A hurried meeting of the Trustees was called which appointed a sub-committee consisting of Nawab Viqarul Mulk and Maulana Mohammad Ali and one other gentleman to inquire and report to them. In the meanwhile Mr. Archbold withdrew his order in respect of all except Raja Ghulam Husain. The Committee's report was not very favourable to the Secretary, Nawab Mohsinul Mulk. He was so heart-broken after the incident that he died at Simla leaving directions to his relations to take his dead body to Etawah to be buried there in his home town. However, the students and the Trustees decided to bury him near his friend Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan. They went to the station and brought his dead body to Aligarh Mosque to be buried there.

Besides many other services to the Muslim community the greatest boon that Nawab Mohsinul Mulk conferred on his people was the securing of separate electorates. As soon as he came to know that a fresh instalment of reforms was envisaged by the British Government, he organized in October 1906 a deputation to meet Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, which claimed and later secured the right of separate electorates and weightage for the Muslims. H. H. the Aga Khan read the address as the leader of the deputation. There is a section of people who think that the claim for separate electorates was a command performance, having been instigated by the British

Government through Mr. Archbold. But the facts do not justify such a conclusion.

Mr. Archbold indeed, after meeting the Secretary of the Viceroy, Mr. Dunlop Smith, had written to Nawab Mohsinul Mulk to the effect that the address should express loyalty to the Crown and that hope might be expressed that Muslim opinion would be given due weight in regard to the future initiation of reforms. He also suggested that in his opinion it would be wise for the Muslims to claim nomination or representation on the basis of religion; because the time for elections in the country had not yet arrived. Maulana Tufail Ahmad in his book *Roshan Mustaqbil* has done a great wrong to Nawab Mohsinul Mulk by saying that the demand for separate electorates was made at the instance of Mr. Dunlop Smith. He has quoted the Urdu translation of Mr. Archbold's letter to Nawab Mohsinul Mulk but cleverly enough he has avoided referring to the actual proposal of Mr. Archbold. Representation on a religious basis could be secured by nomination or reservation of seats for Muslims in the constitution, even in a joint electorate system. Separate electorates provided for separate electoral rolls for Muslims which completely protected the Muslim minority from any possibility of majority influence on their votes. This system of safeguard of minority interests was unique and unknown to a democratic system of representation in any other country at that time. That the Muslim policy of that period was pro-British no one need deny, but that the idea of separate electorates was the outcome of British agents in India is at once a calumny against the British and a slander against Nawab Mohsinul Mulk. Before his death H. H. the Aga Khan in 1955 made a statement that the idea of separate electorates was that of Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, which only tended to confirm me in my belief.

The Aga Khan advised the Muslims to establish a political organization of their own, if the policy initiated by the Simla Deputation was to be supported. Nawab Mohsinul Mulk invited the Muslim leaders from all over India to meet in Dacca in the last week of December 1906 to consider the question of formation of a political organization. Even before this Nawab Viqarul Mulk had once tried, in 1901, to start a new political organization but had failed. Now, however, it was under the presidentship of Nawab Viqarul Mulk that the first All-India Muslim League was formed at this gathering. This completed the life-work of the Nawab, who may rightly be called a great benefactor of Muslim India. A group photograph of Muslim

leaders who attended the first political conference for founding their own political organization, which was named the All-India Muslim League, was given to me by Mr. Mohammad Mahmud of Bengal, a very prominent old boy of Aligarh College who helped the leaders in organizing the conference.

I matriculated from Jubilee School the same year, 1907, and it was decided by my parents that I should go to Aligarh where my elder brother Jamiluzzaman had received his University education and where my cousin Mr. Wasim had also been educated for a few years before he went to England in 1904. Maqbool Husain and Haider Husain, two cousins who were my great friends in the school, had passed their examinations the same year and all three of us left for Aligarh in October 1907.

III

ALIGARH

1907—1912

GEOGRAPHICALLY Aligarh is the name of a town but in common parlance in Muslim society the name stood as an ideological symbol of Muslim educational, cultural and political aspirations. It conjured up visions of Cordova and Baghdad in their minds. It was the centre of Muslim renaissance covering all fields of activity. The alumni of the Aligarh College were students inside the precincts of the College but outside in the country every one of them was a messenger of hope in the future of the Muslim community in India. The name of Aligarh had a magnificent charm and was known in every Muslim home, town and village. Wherever these boys went, they were received with respect and admiration, particularly by Muslim students of the other institutions. Their black coats and their Turkish caps were not kept only for College hours but were worn by them generally whenever they went out to their homes. They were possessed of a self-confidence that was catching, for they believed they had a mission in life to fulfil—to raise the drooping spirits of their people, to inspire hope and confidence among them and to urge them to follow the path of progress and advancement. What Islam had lost, in its human appeal for a classless society based on equality of status and opportunity, during the centuries of Imperialism and Feudalism in India, through degrading prejudices of high and low class, of family, of clannish and tribal superiority, of sectarian schisms, dividing Muslims into Shias and Sunnis, Wahabis and non-Wahabis, Shafais, Hanafis, etc., these visionary soldiers of Muslim India had entered the arena not only to arrest the further progress of such evils which were eating away the very vitals of their social and intellectual life, but also to bring back the flock to the fold. They were not merely preachers of high ideals, but lived up to them in their boarding-house life and imparted them to others when they went out of College to take up their place in society.

They had successfully warned Muslims of Hali's forebodings

in the plaintive tunes contained in his *Musaddas* which exhorted them to emulate the glorious deeds of the heroes of Islam if they wished to survive; and now in this period they were boldly engaged in sounding the clarion call of Iqbal inviting them to self-introspection to discover that the fountains of mighty action were still surging in their breasts. They were not lost to themselves nor to the world, but destined to play a glorious part in the new social order, about which Iqbal had said: 'Whatever the eyes see cannot be uttered from the lips.'

This institution was started in 1875 by the father of Muslim India, Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan. Several books and articles have been written on the life-work of that great man, but for whose inspired leadership the future of Muslims in India after the complete collapse of Mughal power might have been dismal and bleak. To have faced with faith and courage the opposition of the entire Ulema group against imparting of English and a liberal education to Muslim boys speaks of the grandeur of his character and perseverance. If there had been no Aligarh, the Muslims would have been deprived of their share in the administration of the country and in all the other departments of life in which English education was required for filling the posts. Within twenty-five years of the foundation of the College, hundreds of qualified administrators, engineers, medical men and others had filled posts in several departments of Indian administration. Aligarh produced journalists, judges, advocates and a number of public-spirited men to fight for the cause of their community. The role of Aligarh has continued to expand from day to day and from year to year adding to the prestige, strength and honour of the Muslim community.

The reputation of Aligarh was not only confined to educational activities but its high standard in games also added greatly to its popularity. The Aligarh boys defeated the Patiala cricket eleven which had Mistry, the well-known cricketer of Bombay, as one of its members. Besides cricket, for a number of years the hockey eleven of Aligarh was considered to be invincible.

I was allotted room No. 47 in the Western Court with my two other companions Haider Husain and Maqbool Husain. As I was captain of the football eleven in my school-days my inclusion in the Aligarh eleven soon after my joining the College was assured. After some time I became secretary of the football eleven and then in 1912 captain of the team. My time was mostly spent in games and my studies suffered due to my other College engagements.

In 1910 Prince Hamidullah Khan, the third son of the Begum of Bhopal, also joined the institution. Room No. 23, Sir Sayed Court, which was occupied by my dear friend Nuruddin, hockey captain, and Sarwar Ali, brother of Asad Ali, the best hockey player that I have ever seen, became the rendezvous of football and hockey players, including Hamidullah Khan. Although Hamidullah Khan lived in a bungalow outside the boarding-house he stayed with us till late hours. He neither suffered from the morbid bashfulness born from a secluded harem life, surrounded by a host of toadies and sycophants, nor was he the victim of arrogance and pride, the only substitutes of the former trait in many cases. He was a prince only in name, otherwise his demeanour, his habits and his ideas of social equality, freedom of thought and of service to people were in every respect those of a common man. He was very sensible even then but the great qualities of head and heart which he showed as the Nawab of Bhopal, the second biggest Muslim state of India, overshadowed those of some of the best men in Muslim politics. He had to live and work under a great handicap. If he had been in the political life of the country, with his wide vision, his nationalist outlook, tempered by realization of the complexities of the Indian political tangle, he might have been able to help the solution of the communal problem. His misfortune was that he was a Nawab.

In College I had never dabbled in politics although I knew that Maulana Hasrat Mohani was in the forefront of Congress leadership and had been sent to jail for his anti-British activities. I was also aware that Maulana Mohammad Ali was opposed to the politics of Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan and they had their group in the Board of Trustees. It was in 1909 that I was introduced to Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali personally by my friend Nuruddin. They invited us to meet them again in the Guest House where they were staying. We had a long talk with them about College affairs when we met them there.

Under the patronage of the Aga Khan the drive for collecting a University Fund started in 1910 and Dr. Ziauddin then nominated me as the leader of the Student Delegation for collecting subscriptions from Oudh. The Raja of Mahmudabad who was the Vice-President of the Fund Committee again donated a sum of one lac of rupees to the Fund. This was his second big donation. The Aga Khan toured India making appeals for contributions to the University Fund accompanied by Maulana Shaukat Ali as his secretary. In early July 1910 I went to the Raja of Mahmudabad to discuss the programme of his

tour in Oudh. He was a great friend of my uncle Mr. Nasim and my eldest brother Raisuzzaman had worked for him as his secretary for a few years. The programme was chalked out and I accompanied him to Barabanki, Sultanpur, Bahreich and Gonda and several other districts where we collected a good amount for the University Fund. A few months later I was married to the daughter of my aunt Fasihunnisa.

It was during this period that the College precincts were rocked at the news of the Italian attack on the Turkish possession of Tripoli, now known as Libya. When Turkey desired to move its armies to Tripoli through Egypt, the British disallowed it. This caused great resentment amongst the students as it amounted to open support of the Italians by the British Government. We started holding daily meetings after evening prayers in the mosque and condemning in violent language the atrocities committed by the Italians against the small Turkish force fighting in Tripoli. Nuruddin and myself were leading the agitation. Hamidullah Khan was throughout with us regardless of his position. The *Comrade* which had now been started by Maulana Mohammad Ali from Calcutta strongly supported the Muslim cause. A few months later *Al-Hilal* which was also started from Calcutta gave its support to the Turkish cause. The *Zamindar* of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan from Lahore also supported us.

To add fuel to the fire a few months later King George V, in Delhi Durbar, announced the annulment of the partition of Bengal which gave the greatest shock of their lives to the Muslims of India. Nawab Viqarul Mulk who had succeeded Nawab Mohsinul Mulk as the Secretary of Aligarh College, hearing of the annulment of the partition, said, 'The policy of the Government is like a cannon which passed over the dead bodies of Muslims without any feeling whether amongst them there was anyone alive and whether he would receive any painful sensation from this action of theirs.'

The students' strike in Aligarh in 1907 had not been an isolated incident. Behind it lay the accumulated grievances of the students against the European staff which naturally resulted in creating in them anti-British sentiment. The heroic sacrifices offered by the youth in Bengal, in fighting through revolutionary methods against the partition of the Province under the policy of Lord Curzon, had spurred the latent urge of the Muslim youth to break through the shackles of British domination. Now the annulment of partition gave further impetus to the smouldering fire of Muslim youth in India.

Sir Salimullah, the Nawab of Dacca, who had full faith in the British promises that the partition would never be annulled, made a speech on 4 March 1912 in Calcutta, in which he said that the real reason for the undoing of partition lay in the fact that the Hindus fought against the Government through a revolutionary movement and Muslims were merely content with the British promises. A few months later he died, a disappointed and heart-broken man. The only Muslim leader who considered the annulment of the partition of Bengal as a boon for the Muslims was H.H. the Aga Khan. His attitude in this matter was subjected to adverse criticism by the *Muslim Gazette* of Lucknow of 4 March 1912. Finding his position in India inconvenient he resigned from the presidentship of the Muslim League.

The office of the Muslim League had already been removed to Lucknow from Aligarh in 1910 as a measure of policy, not to keep the political organization too close to the educational institution. Mr. Aziz Mirza, the Secretary of the League, died in February 1912 and Wazir Hasan succeeded him. Haji Musa Khan who had been the Joint Secretary of the League for a few years past remained in that office for some years more. The Raja of Mahmudabad accepted the presidentship of the Muslim League in 1913.

I had by now become a regular visitor to Mahmudabad House where I was always welcome. The Raja was now the recognized leader of Muslim India. The entire attention of Muslims in this period was centred round the establishment of the University for which the necessary funds had been collected and a Foundation Committee had also been formed of which originally the Aga Khan was the President. But on 12 August a meeting of this Committee was held in the Kaisar Bagh house of the Raja of Mahmudabad, and under his presidentship. In this meeting Maulana Mohammad Ali was the centre of attraction, for now his reputation as a strong, honest and able leader had been well established. The Raja of Mahmudabad had himself become very much attached to him and helped the *Comrade* financially also. The main difference of opinion between the Government of India and the University Foundation Committee related to three points:

1. That the University should not be an affiliating body.
2. That the name of the University should be Aligarh University and not Muslim University.
3. That instead of the Emperor of India, the Viceroy should be the Chancellor.

The members of the Foundation Committee felt very strongly on these questions but they agreed to adjourning the meeting to

enable the Raja of Mahmudabad to make personal contact with Sir Harcourt Butler, the Education Member of the Government of India, with whom he had most friendly relations.

IV

BALKAN WAR AND MEDICAL MISSION

1912—1913

I LEARNT, through a letter from a relation of his, that my friend Nuruddin had died after an illness of only three days. The death of friends has a much more instructive and inspiring influence on a youthful mind, untainted with worldly cravings, than on one who has become hoary with experiences and, insensible to the call of conscience, is sitting on the edge of a precipice without opening his eyes to the inevitable and beyond. On my return to the College precincts, sad and lonely, I used to go at night to see his grave and to pray for him for hours. While in this condition of mind, news was received which spread like wild-fire in the College of an attack of the Balkan powers on Turkey. We had already decided to give up meat diet during the Tripoli War agitation and now we took steps to collect funds between ourselves and sent the savings to the Red Crescent Society in Turkey.

During the early days of the Tripoli War I had drafted a statement, the first of my life, against a student who was suspected of carrying the proceedings of our meetings to the College authorities, and had posted the leaflets at selected places in the College, including the main gate. All the suspects, myself, Nuruddin, Mahbub, Alam and others had been questioned by Dr. Ziauddin but proof being lacking, proceedings were dropped. Now we started distributing leaflets which were thoroughly anti-British in very violent language. Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, who was President of the students' Union Club and a good speaker, after graduating from the College had joined the *Comrade* as Manager in Calcutta. But about a year later he decided to do his M.A. and read Law, and rejoined Aligarh College. A few days after his arrival Maulana Mohammad Ali who had transferred his paper *Comrade* from Calcutta to Delhi appealed to the Muslims to contribute to a fund. This was to enable him to organize a Medical Mission to proceed to Turkey to help the wounded. It was given out that Dr. Ansari of Delhi, who belonged to Ghazipur and was

a well-qualified doctor, having been House Surgeon of Charing Cross Hospital in London, had agreed to lead the Mission.

The idea of sending the Mission appealed to the students and some of us started sending petty sums of money to Delhi for the Mission Fund. One day while I was playing tennis in front of my room, bare-headed, bare-footed, my hair all dishevelled, I heard Rahman calling me, accompanied by a well-dressed, handsome gentleman standing by his side. I was introduced by Rahman as the football captain of my College eleven to Dr. Ansari. I expressed my joy and admiration for him for having undertaken the responsibility of leading the Medical Mission. He told me that he had come to Aligarh to find some young men to go with him to help him in the discharge of his duties. I said, 'I am not a doctor.' He replied, 'You can do managerial work as well as some nursing,' after which he left me seriously cogitating over the matter. By the evening I had made up my mind to join the Mission. A few days later Rahman, Shuaib Qureshi, Aziz Ansari and myself from the College, and Mr. Manzur Mahmud and Abdur Rahman Peshawari from the School, left for Delhi to join the Mission which was to start from Bombay.

The news of my departure from Aligarh reached my family, and my mother, accompanied by my wife and other members of the family came to see me off in Delhi. Before our departure to Bombay we were received by the Viceroy, Lord Harding, who shook hands with all of us. From Bombay we left in the Italian liner *Sardinia* on 6 November. We received a great ovation at Aden and Suez. From Alexandria we took another ship of a Rumanian Line for Istambul. Both on the *Sardinia* and the Rumanian ship, Dr. Ansari gave us lectures on first aid. After four days we entered the gates of the Dardanelles and early next morning, passing through Chanakıla and Gallipoli, we entered Istambul port, with a row of minarets staring at us from land. We were received by Basim Omar Pasha and other officials of the *Hilal-i-Ahmar* (Red Crescent) at the quay and were taken to Kadirga Hospital where we were to stay as guests of the *Hilal-i-Ahmar*.

Not knowing the Turkish language we felt very awkward in meeting people and talking to them only in broken phrases, composed of English, Urdu and a few words of Persian and Arabic. In spite of these shortcomings we learnt that the Turkish Armies had suffered a defeat at Kirk Kilesa which forced them to retire to Luliburgas. However, they were soon thrown back again on Chatalja Lines about sixty miles from Istambul. It was on everybody's lips that when these historic battles were being fought

Nazim Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of Turkish forces, was dancing in Pera with Greek girls.

Rahman was our General Manager and ran day and night to keep us provided with everything required by us. We engaged as our interpreter Haji Jilani, an Indian Muslim with connections in Singapore, Malacca, Egypt and Turkey. He could speak Turkish, but of the market place.

As soon as we heard a few days after our arrival that Anwar Bey had succeeded in returning from Tripoli in disguise, we, the College students from Aligarh, decided to go and meet him. He lived in a small house in Pera and we were greatly impressed by his personality. He was a handsome and yet very bashful man. Our difficulty was language; nevertheless, we conveyed to him our feelings and sentiments as well as could be expressed, through Haji Jilani. He assured us that he would spare no sacrifice to serve Islam, and to that end he held his life in the palm of his hand. Next Friday he came to visit us in the Kadirga Hospital where we were all photographed with him.

Although there was now an armistice, it was feared that the war would restart and consequently we established our hospital about two miles behind the Chatelja Lines at village Umerli. The Balkans are very cold in winter but this year it was simply terrible. I had to work in snow and cold winds the whole day for some time, to get our hospital ready to receive the wounded from the front lines. In Istambul our rendezvous was the house of Shaikh Schavish, a well-known figure in the political life of Egypt. He had warned us that Kamil Pasha's Government had agreed to hand over Adrianople, and all the Turkish land up to that city, to the Bulgarians as a price for peace and that the document was about to be signed. The same evening there was a military coup in which Nazim Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces, was shot dead by an A.D.C. of Anwar Bey The A.D.C. of Anwar Bey was fired at by the A.D.C. of Nazim Pasha and both of them were hit with the result that three corpses lay in Babe Aali. When Anwar Bey left it the whole area round us was ringing with the cries of 'Long live Anwar Bey and long live Union and Progress!' The Prime Minister, Kamil Pasha, was confined in his house and the document for the secession of Adrianople and the area up to the town lay unsigned. In the evening Sultan Rishad V issued a firman appointing Mahmud Shaukat Pasha, a renowned general of Arab origin from Iraq, as the Prime Minister and War Minister. Izzat Pasha succeeded as the Commander-in-Chief. Nuri-us-Said, who later became Prime Minister of Iraq, became the A.D.C. of Izzat Pasha. We met both

of them and we expressed our delight at what had happened.

When the Mission arrived at Umerli the period of armistice had expired and the booming of guns had started reverberating in the maze of hillocks, and the thunder of guns from a distance of two miles kept us sometimes awake even at night. We started receiving the wounded from the firing line in our hospital where necessary treatment was given to the patients, but serious cases, after first aid, were sent to Constantinople whenever possible. After a few days' working of our hospital at Umerli, Dr. Ansari was requested by *Hilal-i-Ahmar* to divide the Mission into two sections, one to remain in Umerli and the other to proceed to Constantinople for service at a destination to be named later. There was a rumour that the other section would be sent with Anwar Bey who was to open a new front in some unknown theatre, and everyone was anxious to be included in that section.

Ultimately Dr. Ansari decided to put Dr. Mohammad Naim Ansari in charge of the Umerli Hospital with Dr. Raza of Hyderabad, Dr. Bari of Bihar, Dr. Mahmudullah of Bengal with Shuaib Qureshi as Manager of the Umerli section, while Ansari, Dr. A. Rahman of Bihar, Dr. Faizi of Bombay and Dr. Fuad of Egypt, with myself as Manager, were to go with the other section wherever ordered by the *Hilal-i-Ahmar*. Abdur Rahman Siddiqui was to remain in Istambul as the General Manager supplying both wings with their requirements. After a few days' stay in Istambul, Dr. Ansari received orders to send all the paraphernalia for the other hospital section to a ship which was to be found at a given quay. After cruising for a whole night we stopped near Gallipoli town. Dr. Ansari went to see Anwar Bey who was there at the time and was informed by him that we were to establish our hospital about three miles away in Chanakila. The same ship took us to our destination and we went to the Turkish hospital at Chanak as their guest till such time as we had established our own hospital. The doctor in charge of the Chanak Hospital, Dr. Rushdi, became very friendly to us and to me particularly. I hardly imagined then that later on he would be Dr. Rushdi Aras, Foreign Minister of Ghazi Mustafa Kamal Pasha. Amidst snow and rain we worked day and night to have our hospital established in a Greek school building quite spacious and imposing. We started receiving patients and our work was greatly appreciated by many foreign doctors who came to visit our hospital. Chanakila was a small town and but for a row of fortifications facing the Dardanelles there was not much to see there. We continued to work in this hospital till about the end of March when it began to appear that the war was about to end because

the attitude of the British Government towards Bulgarian enterprise had changed and no more material help was forthcoming from their side. We wound up our hospital in April and left for Constantinople.


During the period of our stay in Turkey we had made several friends. Dr. Ansari and some of us met the most intelligent and clever politician of Turkey, Talaat Pasha, who was very much impressed by our ideology of Islamic regeneration and assured us that in future he would try to accommodate the Arabs and make amends for the past policy of union and progressively forcing the Turkish language on the Arabs. The President of *Hilal-i-Ahmar*, Basim Omar Pasha, was another personality who attracted us to him. His brother Kamal Bey was equally obliging and tried to keep us happy and comfortable. Apart from individuals, to our great pride we found the Turkish people most disciplined, courteous and patient, with a great regard for their traditions and history. It was a wonder to us that the scions of Turks and Turanians, after accepting Islam, had imbibed all the virtues of personal grandeur and national pride of a people. Brave on the battlefield, they are meek and docile in their home atmosphere. That the times had changed for them was due mostly to their economic and scientific backwardness, as they were now up against the western renaissance, giving the latter improved methods of steam-propelled means of communication both on land and sea. In Turkey there were no guilds or corporations or big companies for trade and commerce. The State had to float ships, had to import manufactured goods from outside, had to construct railways, bridges, etc. They paid for these shortcomings by agreeing to the Capitulations which created rights of different nations within the Turkish Empire and limited the sovereignty of the Sultans.

Istambul of 1912-13 was in certain respects similar to Delhi; both had seen the glory of Turkish rule of the sixteenth century to their downfall in the eighteenth century and both could take pride in their mausoleums, mosques, and fortifications built by them in the past. Istambul was still a cosmopolitan city of Arabs, Greeks, French, British and Russians, yet with all its majesty and natural beauty it looked sombre and dull. The women were still in *charchef* and the men as gentle and brave as ever.

We were all introduced to the Sultan before the Mission left Turkey. Four of us, Rahman, Shuaib, Aziz and Dr. Ghulam Mohammad, did not return with the Mission but stayed for two months more. Abdur Rahman Peshawari did not return to India



The Brothers : Sitting L. R.: Ch. Khaliquzzaman, Saiduzzaman. Dr. Salimuzzaman.



Family Portrait : Jalaluzzaman, Nihaluzzaman, Mohd. Mazhar Khan. Sitting L. to R: Naheed Khaliquzzaman. Ch. Khaliquzzaman with Duria, Begum Zahida Khaliquzzaman.

Plate 2



Medical Mission to Turkey : Ch. Khaliquzzaman, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui and Shuaib Qureshi. Seated in R. H. Photograph are Rauf Bey and Dr. Ansari.

at all. He joined the Military Academy, became an army officer and fought for the Turks in the battlefields of the first World War. Thereafter he used to live with Rauf Bey in the same house, but one night in 1923 he was found dead, having been shot by someone near his house; someone who wanted to play foul with the life of Rauf Bey mistaking Rahman for him is suspected to have killed him.

After the Mission left we went to see Smyrna for a few days. On our return to Istambul the famous march of Anwar Pasha on Adrianople had begun, and he had thrown back the Bulgarians by the historic speed of the march which did not give the Bulgarians time to remove over one hundred cannons and their other war material. Adrianople had been in Bulgarian possession for over a year and it was now Anwar Bey who snatched it from them. We proceeded to Adrianople by the next train on which also was the Wali of Adrianople. While there we had one more occasion to meet Anwar Bey who could snatch a few minutes to come to bid goodbye to us.

On our return to Istambul, a most gruesome tragedy occurred which cost the life of Mahmud Shaukat Pasha, the Prime Minister, who was shot by one Topal Taufiq (Lame). Topal and eleven others were arrested and hanged in the early hours of morning after a summary trial. The last words of Mahmud Shaukat Pasha were 'Millat Hainlar' (The people are ungrateful). We reached the place where the conspirators had already been hanged, their bodies exposed to public view, hanging in a semi-circle. The arch-conspirator, a Turkish Prince in Russian pay, had taken shelter in a Russian warship, quite safe from the clutches of the law due to provisions of the Capitulations—the curse of Turkey during the old regime.

We left Turkey for Egypt and it was a sheer piece of good luck that when we reached Alexandria we saw *Hamidia*, the famous Turkish destroyer under the command of Rauf Bey. We had heard of his exploits during the Balkan War when he had most skilfully and bravely managed to bring out his ship from the Dardanelles Straits which were guarded by the Greek battleship *Avarof*. Once in the open sea *Hamidia* retaliated for the losses suffered by the Turkish ships by doing great damage to the Greek shipping. We went over to *Hamidia* to meet Rauf Bey whom we found full of life, energy and smiles. We expressed our deep gratitude for his services to the cause of Islam which he thankfully acknowledged. As there was not much time for us to stay, with a heavy heart we left him not knowing whether in our lives we should have any chance to meet him again but,

as Providence worked out, in 1933 Dr. Ansari invited him to lecture in the Jamia Millia at Delhi. From Delhi he came to Lucknow and stayed with us for a week. We learnt from him a lot about Turkey and Mustafa Kamal Pasha. In spite of his differences with the Ghazi Pasha he cherished a great respect for him and told us that he would never like a hair of his head to be touched.

Rauf Bey is still alive and I met him again in 1939 while returning from England as a member of the Palestine Delegation, and once again during my tour of the Middle-East countries as President of the Pakistan Muslim League, preaching my ideal of Islamistan. All of us safely returned to India from Egypt at a time when we could celebrate the Eid in our homes.

During my absence abroad another meeting of the Foundation Committee had been held which was rather a stormy one, because one section of Muslim educationists was not prepared to accept the Government terms, while the Raja of Mahmudabad and many others were not prepared to reject them. Maulana Mohammad Ali at first had expressed himself strongly for the rejection of the Government offer; but later on he gave in to the advice of the elders. It was on this occasion that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad read a verse in Urdu, 'He took wine with me and said prayers with the devotee.' The reference was to the Government House dinner given to the Raja of Mahmudabad and many other dignitaries on this occasion.

The other event of importance during my absence was the firing on Muslims in Cawnpore on 13 August 1913 in connection with the demolition of a portion of a mosque. Maulana Azad Subhani was arrested along with many other respectable Muslims. The incident created a sensation amongst the Muslims of India. Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, backed by the Raja of Mahmudabad and Maulana Mohammad Ali, strongly advocated the Muslim cause and started an India-wide agitation. A deputation was also organized consisting of Sayed Wazir Hasan and Maulana Mohammad Ali to represent the Muslim cause in England. However, Lord Harding the Viceroy of India, accompanied by Sir Ali Imam, the Law Member, came down to Cawnpore and found a way out for the solution of the problem and the matter ended. But the wound inflicted remained fresh for a long time and it had also a share in the change of Muslim League policy towards the British Government at that time, coming as it did soon after the Tripoli incident and the Balkan War.

The Muslim League, when under the presidentship of Sayed

Nabiullah of Lucknow, in 1910 had drawn the attention of Muslims to the necessity of developing better relations between the two communities, the Hindus and Muslims of India, and some negotiations had been started at Allahabad with the object of finding a solution. Mr. Jinnah represented the Congress in these talks which paved the way for further discussions. In such an atmosphere of goodwill, a special session of the Muslim League was held on 22 March 1913 at Lucknow, under the presidentship of Sir Mohammad Shafi. A far-reaching change in the Constitution of the Muslim League was adopted, as the object of the Muslim League so far had been 'to promote feelings of loyalty amongst the Muslims towards the British Government,' but now instead of the words 'British Government' the words 'the Crown' were introduced. In clause 3 of the Objects, the following words were added: 'to secure suitable self-government under the British Crown.' For the first time in this meeting many Hindu Congressmen were present, including Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.

After staying a few days at home I went back to Aligarh where Rahman and Shuaib had already arrived. I suspected that Dr. Ziauddin was purposely delaying allotment of a room to me in the College precincts and complained to Nawab Ishaq Khan, who had succeeded Nawab Viqarul Mulk as Secretary of the College. He passed immediate orders that I should be given a room in Sir Sayed Court. In this room, No. 48, my room-mate was Ehtesham Ali of Kakori who used to have his own brand of cigarettes, the 'Ehtesham Cigarettes'. After dinner many of my friends used to come daily to enjoy these cigarettes. Both of us passed our B.A. the same year.

After our return from Turkey, Shuaib, Rahman and myself were constant visitors to Delhi to meet Maulana Mohammad Ali and Dr. Ansari to discuss the political situation with them. After my B.A. I shifted to another boarding-house, Sahib Bagh, where my room-fellows were Aziz Ansari and Mirza Sultan Ahmad Beg. Aziz was a cousin of Dr. Ansari and had gone with us to Turkey but Mirza Sultan Ahmad Beg was a new acquaintance. However, both of them were very affectionate and tolerated my odd eating and sleeping habits with patience. Aziz started practice at Barabanki after obtaining his LL.B. and Mirza Sultan Ahmad Beg joined as Deputy Collector in Government service.

V

POLITICAL DEBUT AND FIRST WORLD WAR

1914—1916

I WAS in Lucknow when the first World War broke out on 4 August 1914. It was generally apprehended that Turkey if it should join any of the two belligerents, Britain or Germany, it would be the latter. I at once left for Delhi to discuss the situation with Maulana Mohammad Ali and Dr. Ansari. Maulana Mohammad Ali wired to Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal who was the President of the *Khuddam-i-Kaaba* organization advising him to send a telegram to the Sultan of Turkey to avoid taking sides in the war. On 31 August 1914 Maulana Abdul Bari sent the following telegram to the Sultan :

'Placing our faith and confidence, which we the Indian Muslims have in the Khilafat, we respectfully urge upon your Majesty either to support Britain or to keep neutral in this war.'

We also decided that the medical stores and instruments which we had brought back with us from the Turkish Mission should be given to the British Government as a mark of sympathy with the British arms against Germany. On 4 November 1914, Turkey joined Germany.

Soon after, the Commissioner of Lucknow informed Maulana Abdul Bari that Great Britain would spare the holy places from being brought into the vortex of war and was negotiating with France and Russia also to that effect. But the same day a notification was issued by the Viceroy which described the action of Turkey as ill-advised, unprovoked and deliberate. The Viceroy further said that he was authorized by His Majesty's Government to make an announcement in regard to the holy places of Arabia, including the holy shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda so that there might be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's most loyal Muslim subjects in regard to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this war, in which no question of a religious character was involved. These

holy places, he said, would be immune from attack or molestation by the Naval and Military forces so long as there were no interference with Indian pilgrims. The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, on 9 November 1914 confirmed this assurance. At the instance of His Majesty's Government the Governments of France and Russia also gave similar assurances.

Although Turkey had thrown in its lot with Germany we could not forsake it. Some pro-Government men in the community, and even men like Sir Raza Ali and Mazharul Haq, started criticizing the Turks publicly. In Lucknow Maulana Abdul Bari agreed to attend a meeting organized by the Government, if merely a resolution expressing loyalty to the Crown was passed but no speeches condemning the Turks were allowed. The British officials agreed to this condition and secured their object, for they did not want anything more than an expression of loyalty. Shaikh Mushir Husain, a great Muslim, was trying to represent the Muslim cause in London through the Aga Khan but the matter was so delicate that neither Mr. Mushir Husain nor H.H. the Aga Khan could help submitting to hard facts.

The Muslims of India were seething with discontent and anxiety as the war was taking its reckless course. Some of the loyalists went so far as to advise the British Government to take possession of the holy places. Maulana Mohammad Ali could not refrain from writing to the Viceroy advising against any such proposal. In his letter to Maulana Abdul Bari on 21 December 1914, Maulana Mohammad Ali informed him that the reply of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy was not very encouraging. He also wrote that he had heard that the British Government had taken Egypt under its protection to destroy the remaining link with the Khilafat. After these events he thought that the situation had assumed dangerous aspects and considered it proper that, after taking into account every factor, we should inform the Government of our feelings and sentiments in clear and unambiguous language. Proceeding further he said:

'Ordinarily in political affairs there are leaders in every community and in our lives the most important question is religion and in this matter any move which may be taken by us cannot succeed while someone from the venerable group of *Ulema* is not our leader.'

I have quoted the contents of this letter to show how the *Alims* were brought to the public platform after a long period of separation from public life in the history of Muslim India.

Never before in their history had Muslims been faced with such a crisis in India. After the Mutiny they had been totally disarmed and not allowed to keep even a long knife, much less a sword. Their society, which for centuries had been modelled on a military basis to defend itself and its possessions, completely broke down after the British occupation, leaving Muslims as feudal lords, without any responsibility to the people, for whose benefit large grants of property had been made to their ancestors. They had become generally the allies and friends of the British in return for titles, big and small, and to earn for themselves an easy and comfortable life.

Without arms or a rallying centre for any big action, the Muslims could only look to the new democratic leadership of the Muslim League. But it was so weak that they could see no hope from that side. In their helplessness they turned towards the few well-known persons in their society, to voice their feelings and sentiments and to take necessary measures to save their old historical institution, the Khilafat, from disruption. Thus a few centres of activity cropped up, without any organized effort or well-defined common programme, round the personalities who had public confidence, Maulana Abdul Bari in Lucknow, Maulana Mahmudul Hasan in Deoband, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari in Delhi, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in Calcutta and the Ali Brothers representing the younger section of Muslim opinion. These simultaneously started to act individually, but seldom collectively or with determination, to take all possible measures to help the Turks. It should be no wonder then that, in the beginning of the Khilafat movement, co-ordination of effort and coherence in activities were lacking when every leader was working on his own responsibility and according to his own lights.

One night in December, the Ali Brothers entered my room in Sahib Bagh, Aligarh, and whispered to me that it was time that we started sounding our strength to defy the British should they ever intend to finish Turkey and the Khilafat, and suggested that we should find some way to explore the condition of the arms factories in the Tribal Area and what would be their maximum production at any given time. Next day I discussed the question with Shuaib, Rahman and Aziz and we decided to go to Toru which was the home of a common friend of ours, Aminullah Khan. He was known more in the College by the nick-name Mastan which I had given him than by his real name. He was the brother of the ruling Nawab of Toru. We stayed at Toru for a week, but there we found that the real place to go to was

not Toru but Shiva, which was the home of Fateh Mohammad Khan, the well-known hockey player of Aligarh and nephew of Mastan. At Shiva we were able to secure the services of the Manager of F.M. Khan to take us to the Tribal Area just for a visit. He had a relation of his in charge of the police station near the Tribal Area border and we faced no difficulty in reaching the village where we found many mud-huts which were supposed to contain factories. They made some rifles according to the old method and they produced some for our inspection. They were the exact copy of the British Enfield Rifles containing the inscription also, with the exception that in some cases E was spelt as F and F as E. There was a large number of Pathans who had come from different villages to make purchases. We were asked by the Tribal people to make some speeches, which we did, inciting them to fight the British. We returned in the evening to Shiva and proceeded to Peshawar on our way to Aligarh, after taking our dinner with Sir Abdûl Qayyum Khan, a great figure in frontier politics at the time.

Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali had gone to Jamrud and Ali Masjid where they fraternized with the ferocious-looking Pathans to no purpose as all through they were surrounded by the C.I.D. Days rolled by in helpless anxiety while Muslims were passing through great agony which proceeded from the bottom of their heart, not from any sense of political gain. The defeat of the Russian army by Von Hindenburg and drive of Von Mackenson towards Austria and Romania at times filled us with hope, but we could not be certain of German success. The defeat of the British army at Quttul Amara was heartening enough; nevertheless, the strength of the Allies could not be ignored.

I had been a sportsman in my early life and had won many trophies in races, but not realizing that I had passed that age I entered the annual hurdle race and not only lost that event but got hernia, which obliged me to go to Delhi to consult Dr. Ansari in February 1915. He said I would have to undergo an operation. As my first year Law examination was going to be held in April, it had to be delayed till I was free from my examination.


On this occasion my cousin Istafa Karim, who, after graduating from Aligarh had joined the Arabic Institution *Nazaratul Maarif* started by Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi, at Delhi, asked me to meet the Maulana in the Fatehpuri Mosque. I found the Maulana as full of anti-British sentiments as myself. In his talk he argued and tried to convince me that the time for *Jihad* had arrived. He impressed me at the time as a great Muslim but a

visionary like myself. He was a pupil of Maulana Mahmudul Hasan of Deoband, who was in close touch with Dr. Ansari, the Ali Brothers and Hakim Ajmal Khan. They were all agreed that nothing could be done in India during the war to fight the British, unless the Germans attacked India with the help and co-operation of the King of Afghanistan, so affording an opportunity to Muslims to revolt openly and finish the British raj. When analysed the whole scheme depended on so many uncertain factors that it could be dubbed a chimerical day-dream, but we at that time refused to discern in it any flaws or insurmountable difficulties. Money was collected in different centres to feed the revolutionary activities but the principal centre was at Delhi where Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari with their great influence on the Nawab of Rampur, Begum of Bhopal and the titled gentry, big and small, all over India, were exerting every nerve not to allow the movement to suffer from lack of funds. Mian Chotani of Bombay, Mr. Umar Sobani of Bombay, Seth Abdullah Haroon of Karachi and Seth Jamal Mohammad of Madras were contributing generously to help the cause.

Maulana Mohammad Ali wrote an article in the *Comrade*: 'Choice of the Turks,' one of his masterpieces, in justification of Turkish action in joining Germany. It was very warmly applauded by the Muslims generally and in Aligarh in particular. But the Government thought it dangerous, suspended publication of the *Comrade* and not only was its security confiscated but the Ali Brothers were interned in May 1915 and sent first to Mehroli, a town near Delhi, and then transferred to Lansdowne. As it always happens the policy of repression seldom pays and in this case the Muslims were greatly shocked at the arrest of their leaders, and started preparing themselves for some big action. The Government had also a charge against the Ali Brothers that they were conspiring against the British with the help of some of the leaders of Kabul. About this time Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was interned in Ranchi.

From the secret funds that had been collected, messengers were sent to Afghanistan and Arabia to convass opinion against the British. Maulana Shaukat Ali, a few days before his arrest, had handed over an envelope containing 5,000 rupees to my cousin Istafa Karim, to be passed on to Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi. With that money in his hand the Maulana first proceeded to Sind, in August 1915, and then to Kabul to persuade the King of Afghanistan to side with the Turks and in case German armies marched on to India to give easy passage to them.

Plate 3



Dr. Allama Iqbal.



Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan—Father of Muslim India.

Plate 4



Omar Sobani.



The Ali Brothers.



Mohammad Naseem.



The Raja of Mahmudabad.

Maulana Mahmudul Hasan too left India for Mecca, in September 1915, in order to try to secure the goodwill of the King of Afghanistan for the Turks through some leading Arab notables. It appears that one of the students of Maulana Obeidullah's school reported to the C.I.D. about the money that had been passed to him by Maulana Shaukat Ali. In 1917 two police officers in mufti came to my house in search of my cousin and took him to Allahabad under arrest. Istafa Karim refused to admit that the envelope contained any money and after a lot of questioning he was allowed to return home.

Dr. Ansari had rented a house in Mussoorie and came down to Lucknow to take me with him there for my hernia operation. My brother Samiuzzaman and Shuaib also followed me to Mussoorie. The operation was quite successful and after about a fortnight Shuaib and myself, on my way to Lucknow, broke our journey at Najibabad from where we had to take another train for Lansdowne. At the Najibabad platform there were some other friends who were proceeding to Lansdowne to meet the Ali Brothers. One of them was Said Mohammad Khan, a cricketer of repute during his Aligarh days and at the time a Superintendent of Police, in disguise. After all others had left we stayed with the Brothers for a few days more discussing the future programme. The Ali Brothers thought very highly of Gandhiji and asked us to contact him as early as possible. They regarded him as a dynamic personality, and gave their opinion that 'he alone can be our man.' The incident which impressed them very greatly about Gandhiji's views was his address to Calcutta students, in March 1915, in which he had said, 'Politics cannot be divorced from religion.' and had gone on to emphasize that 'if I were for sedition I would speak out for sedition and think loudly and take the consequences.'

We agreed that we had not heard before of any person in India talking so fearlessly and honestly and we thought that if he had the leadership of the Congress in his hands we might be able to get support from him for the Turkish cause, which the Muslims of India considered a religious question of the greatest importance to them. As for the attitude of the Muslim League towards the Congress the fact that Mr. Jinnah had now joined the Muslim League, having been persuaded by Maulana Mohammad Ali and Wazir Hasan in London, might help the Nationalist section amongst the Muslims towards a Hindu-Muslim concordat. The Ali Brothers were strongly of the view that every bullet used in the western trench warfare by Germany was money and energy wasted; the only chance of

Germany lay in attacking India and closing the Suez Canal for the British. In the pursuit of this policy Maulana Mahmudul Hasan had sent letters from Mecca through Mohammad Mian of Muradabad to King Habibullah of Afghanistan and to Ghalib Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in Kabul. This was later described by the Government as the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy.'

The annual session of the Muslim League was held that year under the presidentship of Mr. Mazharul Haq, a staunch Nationalist who was totally opposed to separate electorates. The anti-Congress Muslim element in Bombay, encouraged by Government officials, created hooliganism in the session led by Seth Sulaiman Kasam Mitha. There was so much rowdyism that the opening session had to be adjourned and next day it met in the Taj Mahal Hotel where a Committee was appointed to discuss the settlement of communal matters with the Congress. The Congress session was also held in Bombay and directed the All-India Congress Committee to negotiate with the All-India Muslim League for the purpose of framing a scheme of reforms.

As the *Comrade* stopped publication in Delhi, Raja Ghulam Husain, its sub-editor, came to Lucknow and was appointed joint editor of the Raja of Mahmudabad's paper, the *Indian Daily Telegraph*. Raja Ghulam Husain, a most brilliant writer and a right-hand man of Maulana Mohammad Ali, was a great admirer of Mrs. Besant and B. G. Tilak, who had started the Home Rule League. The English editor of the *Telegraph* held quite contrary views and therefore there was always conflict of opinion between them. Raja Ghulam Husain was on the lookout for an opportunity of starting his own paper.

The Congress and League Committees which had been appointed at Bombay had come to a unanimous conclusion and had prepared a draft of the scheme of reforms which was to be approved at Lucknow in their respective sessions. Pandit Motilal Nehru jumped into the limelight in politics by succeeding in bringing the Congress and the League to agree to a common stand. The meetings were held at Anand Bhawan, Allahabad, in the last week of April 1916.

The war was not going on well with the Germans. Their progress had been slowed down in the west and they had definitely failed to break through the Verdun defences. The Turks in the early stages had made an attack on the Suez Canal in the first week of February 1915 but they had also failed to make any headway. The only news which heartened the Muslims was the failure in 1916 of the British naval attack to force a passage

through the Dardanelles, which had ended in a loss of seven cruisers and warships of the British fleet.

After appearing for the final LL.B. I left Aligarh for good and returned to Lucknow in April 1916. One day when I went to see the Raja of Mahmudabad, quite unexpectedly he suggested that until I should start my practice I should help him as his Education Secretary, he being now the Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh College. I readily agreed; for a few months Rs. 350 a month, with a horse and carriage, was quite attractive, more so because I had only to cross the road to reach my office in the Mahmudabad House. There was hardly any work for me worth the name and I thought that the Raja wanted me to keep engaged in some work and to feel independent.

As the time of the Congress session approached Raja Ghulam Husain, Pandit Harkaran Nath Misra, Bar-at-Law, and my friend Ranga Ayer, editor of the bi-weekly *Advocate* of Lucknow, persuaded me formally to join the Congress and become a member of the Reception Committee with Pandit Gokaran Nath Misra as Chairman and Dr. Naziluddin as Secretary. A Muslim League meeting was also held in July 1916 which decided to invite Mr. Jinnah to preside over the Lucknow session. In this very meeting I was elected Joint Secretary of the All-India Muslim League, a very great honour for me at my age of twenty-seven years. I appointed Abdul Wali as Assistant Secretary while Sayed Shamsul Hasan was already there as Office Secretary.

In May 1916 the news of the revolt of Sharif Husain was received in India, greatly disappointing the Muslims and causing great grief to them. A few of us, Raja Ghulam Husain, Wasim and myself from Lucknow with Wilayat Ali Bambooque, Nawab Ali and Matinuddin from Barabanki went in deputation to the Raja of Mahmudabad to seek his advice as to what was to be done in the matter. He advised the holding of meetings in different places and also gave me a letter to Sir Ali Imam, Law Member, which I carried myself. On my return from Simla I stopped at Bareilly and Shahjehanpur to hold meetings but due to Government pressure they were not very successful.

VI

MUSLIM LEAGUE, CONGRESS AND MONTAGUE REPORT

1916—1918

AS THE TIME approached for the League session, the Raja of Mahmudabad had asked Raja Ghulam Husain to draft the address for Mr. Jinnah which, when ready, was sent to Bombay and returned after a few alterations. The Congress President for the session was Ambika Charan Mojumdar, which was a name unfamiliar to me. However, the session was attended by all the well-known Congressmen including Mrs. Besant, Malviaji, B. G. Tilak, Pandit Motilal, Tej Bahadur Supru and others. Gandhiji was also there in the Pandal but did not occupy any significant place in the national leadership, although, in February 1915, he had made a speech in the Hindu University at Banares which had irritated the title-holders and Maharajas and perturbed them so much as to make them walk out of the meeting. Muslims also attended the Congress session in large numbers; fraternization was going on apace.

The Muslim League session was attended by practically all the Muslim leaders of India, Fazlul Haq, Rasul, Maulana Akram Khan and Abul Qasem from Bengal, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Sir Fazle Husain, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and others from the Punjab, Sayed Raza Ali, Mohammad Yaqub, Aley Nabi, Aftab Ahmad Khan from U.P., Hasan Imam and Mazharul Haq from Bihar and a host of others. Mr. Jinnah arrived two days before and by the same train Mrs. Naidu, Miss Ratanbai and Omar Sobani also arrived. Mr. Jinnah stayed in the Raja's palace.

The main question before the Congress and the League was in regard to separate electorates and weightage for Muslim minority provinces. When in the meeting of the Council of the Muslim League Mr. Fazlul Haq, on behalf of Bengal, agreed to accept only forty per cent Muslim seats to enable the minority provinces to secure weightage on a separate electorate basis and then the Punjab delegates agreed to a fifty-fifty basis of

representation for the Muslims and for the non-Muslims, with separate electorates, the matter for all practical purposes was settled, because the Hindus were in no mood to pick holes in the Muslim League demand. As other common subjects concerning the reforms for the future constitution had been accepted at Allahabad by the Congress and the League a memorandum had been submitted to the Viceroy by nineteen members* of the Indian Legislative Council in anticipation of agreement between the League and the Congress.

According to the Congress-League Agreement the Muslim representation was reduced by 13 per cent in Bengal and 5 per cent in Punjab and in return they got 33 per cent in Bombay, with a population of 20 per cent; 30 per cent in U.P. with a population of 14 per cent; 29 per cent for Bihar for a population of 13 per cent; 15 per cent for Madras for a population of 7 per cent and 15 per cent in C.P. for a population of 4 per cent.

The seeds of partition of India were thus duly laid there in Lucknow when due to their inexperience the Muslims agreed to have equality in the Punjab and a minority in Bengal and other provinces. If a straightforward course had been adopted and representation on a population basis had been agreed upon, the Muslims would have started with a majority in the Governments of Punjab and Bengal and all the questions which poisoned the relationships between the two communities in the years following 1924 would not have arisen. Whether the Hindus agreed to this self-denying ordinance of the Muslims from a baser motive or from a real desire on their part to settle the differences that existed between the two communities can only be guessed. However, this led ultimately to Pakistan's losing large portions of Bengal and the Punjab at Partition.

As mentioned before Raja Ghulam Husain was discontented with his position in the I.D.T., and as we managed to collect money between ourselves we deposited a security of Rs. 1,500 for a newspaper *New Era*, taking good care not to ask for any assistance from the Raja of Mahmudabad for this purpose. But we thought that before actually starting the paper we should get the blessing of the Ali Brothers and consequently Raja Ghulam Husain, Wilayat Ali Bambooque and myself left for Chindwara where the Ali Brothers had been transferred from

*Signatories were Manindra Chandra Nandy of Kasim Bazar, D. E. Wacha, Bhopendra Nath Basu, Bishan Dutt Shukul, Madan Mohan Malvia. K. V. Rangaswami Ayangar, Mazharul Huq, V. S. Srinawasan, Sir Tej Bahadur Supru, Ebrahim Rahimtoola, Babu Narasimbeswara Sarma. Mir Asad Ali, Kamini Kumar Dutta, Krishna Sahai, R. N. Bhanjudev of Kanika, M. V. Dadabhoy, Sita Nath Roy, Mohammad Ali, Mohammad Khan of Mahmudabad and Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Lansdowne. Meeting the Brothers was like gulping wine; it made us fresh and lively. When we were not talking the Brothers generally sang poems of Iqbal from *Shikwa, Shama aur Shair, Sicily, Fatima*, etc. These were of course the poems which had made Iqbal the idol of Muslim youth. Till then the Allama had not taken to the writing of the philosophical verses and poems which later became the subject of discussion in Punjab society over cups of wine. We loved Iqbal the Revolutionary, calling upon his people to rise to action, the Iqbal who introduced Muslim heroes in their true glory, the Iqbal who by his new interpretation of Quranic injunctions put life into what had been made stale by philosophical ponderings. After a few days' stay we returned to Lucknow to start our new venture.

I had started my practice in Lucknow in April 1917, setting up my own office at Sher Darwaza. My uncle Mr. Nasim had not completely given up his practice and there was not a Taluqa case in which he was not engaged from one or the other side. Besides my brother-in-law Mr. Wasim had also by now made a mark in the profession and as junior to one or the other I started earning quite enough to live a decent life. A few months after I had started practice in the law courts the Raja of Mahmudabad one day handed over to me six bundles of a hundred rupee notes and asked me to give them personally to Maulana Mohammad Ali as arrears of the aid which he used to pay to the *Comrade*. After a tiring journey of two days and nights I reached Chindwara early in the morning. I was received with kisses by the Brothers and when I broke the news that I had brought Rs. 6,000 cash for them the merriment was re-doubled. The Government's niggardly allowance was insufficient to keep their bodies and souls together, much less to feed a large family. Their property in Rampur had been taken away by the Nawab of Rampur to please the British Government. Invitations were immediately issued for a dinner at night to the leading citizens of the place.

The Brothers thought that Mr. Achenwall, a German chemist from Lucknow, had been brought there as an internee like themselves. They said now that we were three we would be able to keep watch and talk with him because there was a rumour that he was shortly to be sent to Germany in an exchange of prisoners. In the evening we went out for a walk and Mr. Achenwall, as usual, came from the other side. Maulana Mohammad Ali accosted him and talked to him for a minute. Maulana Mohammad Ali told us that he would come to see us at eleven o'clock at night in disguise.

The dinner was served early and after the guests dispersed we began anxiously waiting for the arrival of Mr. Achenwall. After a long and anxious wait we found him, completely muffled, moving slowly from the garden side to the main entrance. We opened the doors to receive him in the room in which there was only candle light. He was trembling from head to foot. But Maulana Mohammad Ali refused to take pity on him and with his usual vehemence started impressing upon him the dire necessity of shifting the theatre of war from the west to the east and attacking India. The Maulana described the war policy of the belligerents like a well-qualified soldier. Mr. Achenwall listened patiently to the Maulana's long lecture on war strategy, nodding his head off and on to show his agreement. Maulana Mohammad Ali also assured him that as soon as German strategy was changed and its armies started advancing on India he would defy the internment regulations and declare open revolt, from his headquarters somewhere in Bhopal. Mr. Achenwall after giving an assurance of carrying his message to the German High Command left the room muffled and quietly as he had entered. I departed from Chindwara with a message from the Ali Brothers to Prince Hamidullah Khan of their resolve to make Bhopal their headquarters in case of revolt. It may be mentioned here that on account of his anti-British activities Nawab Hamidullah Khan's claim of succession was vehemently opposed by the Indian Government but owing to the great influence of his mother the British authorities in London waived their objection and agreed to his nomination as heir to the State.

It was not long afterwards that Ghulam Husain was returning to his house when a stray horse knocked him down rendering him unconscious. He was removed to the Balrampur Hospital where I stayed for three days to look after him. All his friends from Barabanki came to Lucknow to see him in this precarious condition. We decided not to allow *New Era* to cease publication should Ghulam Husain die. I wired to Shuaib at Bhopal to come and take over charge of the paper. He was dumbfounded when I asked him to go to my office and see that the paper came out as usual on the next Saturday. He said he had never written anything for the Press in his life and to take charge of a paper which was edited by Ghulam Husain would in the circumstances be an impudence. But finding me adamant he yielded. On the third day of his illness for a few moments Ghulam Husain became conscious, called me by name and asked for water. I told him that the Doctor had forbidden him to drink

or eat anything. He said, 'It means that hunger and thirst should be ruled out of our conversation.' However a few hours later he started raving and by the next morning he died. His younger brother at first thought of taking his dead body to his home-town in Punjab but later on dropped the idea. I got a pucca grave built in his memory which existed till I came over to Pakistan in 1947. Maulana Mohammad Ali was greatly shocked at the news of his death and wrote a poem in his memory.

The security which we had filed for *New Era* was confiscated on his death and I had to run to Prince Hamidullah Khan at Bhopal to ask for his help, which he gave in a suitable way. As Shuaib did not ask any remuneration and the *New Era* office was located in a room in my office building the expenses were covered by its income. The paper lived till about the end of November 1917 when one evening Shuaib came down to the Rifah-i-Am Club where I was playing tennis to inform me that the police had raided my office and had taken away all the copies of the *New Era*. He also told me that a fresh security would have to be filed if we desired to continue the paper.

The All-India Congress Committee at its meeting held in April 1917 elected me as one of its members. A few months later another meeting of the Congress was held to demand the release of Mrs. Besant, a demand endorsed also by the Muslim League. It was also decided that a deputation should be sent to England to plead the cause of Mrs. Besant. However, she was released in September 1917, after Mr. Montague, the Secretary of State, announced the British policy of reforms on 20 August 1917. The policy enunciated promised increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India, as an integral part of the British Empire. Soon after Mr. Montague toured India and met a large number of leaders of Indian opinion.

The Congress and League sessions were held in December 1917 at Calcutta. The Congress session was presided over by Mrs. Besant, but the Raja of Mahmudabad read the address for Maulana Mohammad Ali, elected President of the League, in absentia. Although nothing of particular importance happened in these Calcutta sessions there was great fraternization between the delegates of both the organizations.

The Montague-Chelmsford Report was published in June 1918. It was a masterpiece of literature for which the credit goes to Sir William Marris, a very able I.C.S. Officer of U.P.

Inter alia it provided for cabinets depending for their existence on the confidence of the House and not fixed executives as claimed by the Congress-League scheme. Some leaders of India thought it an improvement on the Indian proposal and looked upon the removable executive as the nearest approach to responsible Government. The main subjects, revenue and law and order, were to remain reserved subjects in the provinces, while education, local self-government and some others were to be dealt with by the Ministers as transferred subjects. It was in a sense diarchy. By his recommendations Montague had certainly succeeded in dividing the Congress opinion into two sections and the special session of the Congress, which met on 29 August at Bombay under the presidentship of Mr. Hasan Imam, reaffirmed its stand for the Congress-League scheme and declared that nothing less than self-government within the Empire would satisfy Indian opinion. It demanded simultaneous advance also in the Centre which had been completely left out of consideration in the Montague recommendations. Another section of leaders held contrary views and thought that as a first step towards responsible Government it was certainly worth working.

VII

KHILAFAT AFFAIRS

1918—1919

THE MUSLIMS of India had started talking of saving the Khilafat and Turkey but very few Ulema had enunciated the real character of the Khilafat from the religious point of view. They referred to a *Hadith* (saying of the Prophet) which made it incumbent on the Muslims to have an Amir (leader), but they did not point out any passage in the Quran in support of their stand. Even some of those who included the Khalifa in the words of Quran 'Ulil-Amr' did not confine the interpretation of the words to the office of the Caliph alone. Both from the earliest history of the office and the fact that never before had any prophet left his caliph except in Islam, I personally thought that it was a God-ordained office. As such I agreed with Maulana Abdul Bari that a *fatwa* of the Ulema should be prepared and sent to the Viceroy informing him of the real Khilafat position and the anxiety of the Muslims for its maintenance intact. The Maulana succeeded in securing the support of nearly five hundred Ulema to this *fatwa* which was duly sent to the Viceroy.

While we were engaged in defending the Muslim position in regard to the Khilafat and the preparation of the *fatwa* our missions in Kabul and Mecca led by Maulana Obeidullah and Maulana Mahmudul Hasan had failed to win over the King of Afghanistan. Maulana Obeidullah had to leave Afghanistan, while in Arabia the Sharif handed over Maulana Mahmudul Hasan and his staunch followers, namely Maulanas Uzer Gul, Husain Ahmad Madani and Nusrat Hasan, who were sent to Malta as internees. We were not daunted by this misfortune and were all the more determined to continue our struggle to the bitter end.

Having lost Raja Ghulam Husain, the next misfortune suffered by our group was the death of Wilayat Ali Bambooque, another star of the firmament of *Comrade*. He died of cholera at Barabanki despite all our endeavours to save his life. I had

taken Dr. Ansari who happened to be in Lucknow to Barabanki when I learnt of his illness. He gave a saline injection and for a time it appeared that the patient's condition was improving. Suddenly a change came and by evening he was no more. He left three sons, Mustafa Kamil, Midhat Kamil and Jamal, all of whom are alive in India. His humorous contributions, such as 'The Patwari,' 'England returned' and 'Chowkidar' in the files of *Comrade* speak for his command of the English language. His Urdu writings were also of a style and quality which was superb.

Rahman, Shuaib and myself prepared Dr. Ansari's address as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the League for the Delhi session in 1918. We took care to review in this address the whole Khilafat situation and the problems that were to be faced by the Muslims in India after the victory of the Allies which had been secured on 11 November 1918. Many problems affecting the Khilafat and Turkey had to be faced as a result of the defeat of the Turkish arms. The League session, therefore, was of supreme importance to the Muslims of India and it was rightly presided over by Mr. Fazlul Haq. The Raja of Mahmudabad, Sayed Wazir Hasan, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and all other prominent Khilafat leaders of Muslim India attended. The most significant feature of the session was that Maulanas Abdul Bari, Azad Subhani, Ibrahim Sialkoti, Sanaullah Amritsari, Ahmad Said, Kifayatullah and Abdul Latif attended the session and forcefully expressed their views on the question of the Khilafat and Turkey.

When the opening session was over, the Council of the Muslim League held its meeting in the spacious drawing room of Hakim Ajmal Khan. As soon as proceedings started Maulana Zafarul Mulk moved a no-confidence motion against Sayed Wazir Hasan, the Secretary of the League and brought a charge of embezzlement against him. As the Joint Secretary of the Muslim League I thought the attack absolutely uncalled for and grotesque and in my speech I had to use strong words for this misguided attack on the Secretary of the League. Maulana Zafarul Mulk shouted: 'He has gone over to the other side; he does not represent the Ali Brothers now,' and walked out. When quiet was restored Dr. Ansari moved his resolution for protection of the Khilafat.

Mr. Jinnah then raised a Point of Order and gave his opinion that under the Muslim League Constitution it had no right to dabble in the foreign politics of the Government. Everyone was taken aback. Both Rahman and I joined issues with him on the

question and finding the members opposed to his views he left, followed by the Raja of Mahmudabad. Fazlul Haq and Wazir Hasan remained seated and did not join the walk-out. Next day Shuaib moved the resolution on the Khilafat which was opposed by Mr. Mohammad Yaqub of Muradabad. He was hooted down and the resolution was passed in the open session with great enthusiasm. After the session ended there was another meeting of the Council to elect the office-bearers for the next year. On my advice, Sayed Wazir Hasan was again elected as the Secretary to the great disappointment of Nawab Zulqadar Jung who had been aspiring to replace him. Besides me the only other persons alive now who attended this session of the League are Fazlul Haq, Shuaib and Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary of the League.

The Congress session at Delhi was presided over by Malviaji. Hakim Ajmal Khan was the Chairman of the Reception Committee in this session. There was a bitter struggle between the two sections of the Congress, one for acceptance of the Montague Report and the other for rejection. Mr. Shastri expressed himself strongly against the use of the words 'disappointing and unsatisfactory' but he was defeated.

In February 1919 two bills known as the Rowlatt Bills came before the Central Legislature—one was to be taken in the Spring session and the other to be taken up immediately in substitution for the Defence of India Act. Vast powers were given to the High Court judges to deal with anarchical offences. They were the most retrograde and repressive measures ever introduced in the Assembly. On the introduction of the Bill by Sir William Vincent on 6 February 1919, Gandhiji notified his intention to meet the situation by starting a campaign of Satyagraha if the Government passed the bills.

When the Rowlatt Committee's report was read by Gandhiji in Ahmedabad, he drafted a pledge of resistance against it. Hurriedly some members of the Congress were invited for consultation and for signing the pledge. It was signed on 24 February by all those who had been invited to attend and sign.*

The pledge was that the 'Signatories affirm that in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as

*Their names are:
Abul Kalam Azad, Ajmal Khan, Lajpat Rai, Motilal Nehru, Mrs. Naidu, Abbas Tayabji, N. C. Kelkar, V. J. Patel, Vallabhbhai Patel, M. R. Jayakar, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gangadhar Rao Deshpande, Mr. Sobani, Jamnalal Bajaj, M. S. Aney, Dr. Ansari, Khaliquzzaman, Abdul Bari, Rajagopalachari, Jatindra Lal Bannerji, Rajendra Prasad, Hasrat Mohani, Yaqub Hasan, Dr. Moonje and Jairamdas Daulatram.

the Committee hereafter to be appointed may think fit.' Subsequently hundreds of others signed the pledge. In Lucknow it was signed by Pandit Harkaran Nath Misra, Mulana Zafarul Mulk and Fazlur Rahman. Originally 6 April was fixed for the observance of the day. In Delhi however a procession taken out on 20 March was fired upon by the police. On the second day the procession was led by Swami Shardhanand who offered his chest to the British soldiers to shoot him. In their silly excitement the Muslims took him next day inside the Jamai Mosque of Delhi and heard his speech from the pulpit. In Lucknow a great demonstration was made after a huge public meeting addressed by others and myself.

The Punjab had always been looked upon by the British as a nursery for the supply of Indian sepoys—Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims. They naturally wanted this province of India not to be besmeared with Khilafat and Congress slogans. As such when a meeting in connection with the Satyagraha movement was announced for 10 April 1919, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar called Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal to meet him in connection with the Congress meeting. They did not return from the D.C.'s bungalow and were whisked away to an unknown destination. A procession was formed to proceed to the District Magistrate. The military stopped them and there was stone throwing by the mob. The military retaliated by opening fire on them. The city was thus in the grip of fever heat which resulted in five Englishmen being killed. The town was made over to the military. The same day there were disturbances in Bombay, Lahore, Calcutta and Ahmedabad and Nadia. On 12 April a meeting was held in Jallianwala Bagh which was surrounded by a wall with only a wicket for entrance and exit. General Dyer with one hundred Indian and fifty British soldiers entered the compound and no sooner than Mr. Hansraj started speaking General Dyer gave orders to fire. Four hundred fell dead and the number of wounded was also large due to the stampede. The bullets stopped when ammunition ran out; altogether 1699 rounds were fired. British India was aghast and stunned. An Inquiry Committee was appointed on 17 October by the Congress, consisting of Gandhiji, Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, Fazlul Huq and Abbas Tayabji but soon after Pandit Motilal Nehru, having been elected President of Amritsar Congress, resigned and was replaced by Mr. Jayakar.

The Viceroy warned Gandhiji that due to the Afghan war which had started on 4 June he should not resume Satyagraha activities and Gandhiji agreed, although a few Congressmen like

Pandit Motilal Nehru and Malviaji went to the Punjab in the last week of June to inquire into the happenings there.

Two hundred and ninety-eight persons appeared before the Martial Law Commissioners and out of this fifty-one were sentenced to death, forty-six to transportation for life, two for imprisonment for ten years, seventy-nine for seven years and ten for five years. These happenings in India roused public opinion in England with the result that the Indian Government was obliged to appoint the Hunter Committee to inquire into the Punjab disorders. General Dyer, to a question put by Mr. Justice Rankin, member of the Hunter Committee, 'Excuse me putting it this way, General, was it not a form of frightfulness?' replied, 'No. It was not. It was a horrible duty I had to perform. I think it was a merciful thing. I thought that I should shoot well and shoot strong so that I or anybody else should not have to shoot again. I think it is quite possible I could have dispersed the crowd without firing but they would have come back again and laughed and I should have made, what I consider to be, a fool of myself.' To add to the misery of the situation General Dyer's action had been approved by the Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

While Punjab affairs were thus dragging along, on the Muslim side Maulana Abdul Bari succeeded in securing the support of a large number of Ulema for forming an organization of the Ulema to help the Khilafat cause and to work for the release of Maulana Mahmudul Hasan, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and the Ali Brothers. In his letter to Dr. Ansari he gave twelve names of Ulema who had expressed their willingness to join the organization as its initial members.* Although it took some time to bear fruit, ultimately the Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Hind was formed with which I shall deal later.

Mr. Iqbal Shaidai brought a letter to Maulana Abdul Bari from the Ali Brothers to help him financially to go to Afghanistan. The Maulana showed the letter to me and his reply to the Ali Brothers. Later Shaidai came from Chindwara with a letter to me. Although I had not much faith left in Afghanistan, nevertheless, Maulana Abdul Bari and I managed to give him the assistance he required. Iqbal Shaidai stayed with me but the C.I.D. got scent of it and a Bengali Inspector, Mr. Haldar, came to me slyly under a pretext, looking for Shaidai. After he left

*Haji Ishaq of Malabar, Maulana Azad Subhani of Cawnpore, Maulana Nurul Hasan, Maulana Mohammad Shuaib, Mulana Mohiuddin, Maulana Sayed Sulaiman Nadvi, Maulana Akram Khan, Maulana Mohammad Munir-uzzaman of Islamabad, Maulvi Mohammad Halim, Maulana Mohammad Mukhtar, Maulana Mohammad Sajjad and Hakim Ajmal Khan of Delhi.

Mohammad Mian, a brother-in-law of the Raja of Mahmudabad, sent word to me to see him before going to court. He told me in whispers that Haldar was sitting in the next room and requesting him to find out from me the whereabouts of my guest, Shaidai. I avoided giving any clue. During the day Shafiqul Hasan, the Kotwal of the city, also found a pretext to visit me and Shuaib who was also staying in those days in Lucknow, when Shaidai was in the bathroom. The same evening Shaidai left for Punjab. We met after about twenty years in 1939, in Italy.

In the beginning of September 1919 Earl Grey, British Foreign Secretary, in a statement said, 'Germany had justice; Turkey will have sterner justice.' I thought it was a most ominous statement, presaging dire consequences for Turkey. I expressed my fears to the Raja of Mahmudabad and suggested to him to agree to the holding of a conference under the aegis of the Muslim League to impress upon the British Government the determination of the Muslims to resist any injustice to the Turks and the Khilafat. He agreed with me. I prepared a notice of the meeting and asked Sayed Wazir Hasan and Nabiullah to sign it; but both of them avoided signing it. I complained to the Raja regarding their attitude and asked him to sign the notice which he did. Next day I went to him again to see if I could get the signature of Shahid Husain who generally used to dine with the Raja Sahib, but he was not there. Realizing perhaps the responsibility which he was undertaking, he told me, 'You have been telling people that my interest in politics is due to a sense of rivalry against H.H. the Aga Khan,' and that Altafur Rahman of Bara Gaon informed him of this in the presence of Maulana Abdul Bari. Unfortunately when both Shaikh Altafur Rehman and Maulana Abdul Bari came to visit the Raja Sahib at dinner time, there was an ugly scene between us and in a huff I left the Raja's residence in spite of his telling me not to go. I spent a sleepless night and early in the morning I went to my uncle Nasim and narrated to him the previous night's story and asked him to advance me Rs. 5,000 for the Conference. Without a word or questioning he ordered his factotum to pay me the amount. With that money in hand I sent Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, the Editor of *Jamhoori*, who was my guest at the time to proceed to Simla to ask Sir Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer, a Member of the Council from Poona, to accept the presidentship of the Conference for which he had nothing to do but read the address which he would find ready in Lucknow. Sir Ebrahim accepted the offer. The news of the Conference spread like wild fire in

Muslim India. Letters and telegrams started pouring in from all parts of India, giving the names of the delegates who had been duly elected in public meetings. It is not possible for me here to give all the names of persons elected as delegates. Suffice it to say that practically every province and city was represented. Among the notable personalities were Abul Qasem, Fazlul Huq, Maulana Akram Khan, Tasadduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Abdul Aziz Ansari and Maulana Hasrat Mohani. When my guests, Dr. Ansari, Tasadduq Ahmad and Abdul Aziz were ready to go to the Conference which was being held in the Rifah-i-Am open space, they asked me to accompany them. I explained to them that it would be impossible for me to be present in the Conference as I had definite information that attempts would be made to disturb the meeting by some elements in the city, who were not against the object of the Conference but were opposed to me personally. So I begged them not to spoil the show by insisting on my presence; it did not matter if I were not there.

The President-elect's train being late Maulana Abdul Bari was voted to occupy the chair in his absence. He made some remarks which most of the people could not follow because they did not know the context. After a few speeches the meeting dispersed to meet again in the evening when the President-elect was to preside.

The President had brought with him a letter from Muslim members of the Imperial Council dated 19 September 1919, expressing their full sympathy with the Khilafat cause and requesting the British Government not to disrupt the Turkish Empire. It was signed by Sayed Nawab Ali, Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Seth Abdullah Haroon, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Choudhri Mohammad Ismail of Bihar and others. The Raja of Mahmudabad also attended the meeting. Several resolutions concerning the Khilafat and Turkey were passed and by one resolution an All-India Central Khilafat Committee was formed, with Bombay as its centre at the request of Seth Chotani. After the resolutions had been passed a deputation from Firangi Mahal came to me to request me to draft the Constitution of the Khilafat Committee. I agreed to do it and went with them and prepared a draft Constitution of the Central Khilafat Committee which was approved as a provisional Constitution by the Conference.

Seth Chotani was elected President of the Central Khilafat Committee and Haji Siddiq Khatri of Bombay Secretary, but on the release of Maulana Shaukat Ali two months later he became

the Secretary. In Oudh, Mumtaz Husain was elected President and Maulana Salamatullah Vice-President, with Shaikh Shaukat Ali as Secretary.

The Conference being over I went with my uncle to Mussoorie on 24 September. Before I left for the station Maulvi Zahur Ahmad, now the Acting Secretary of the All-India Muslim League, took me to his house for some consultation and when we reached there he went to change his clothes asking me to wait for him in the drawing room. As soon as I entered the drawing room Maulana Abdul Bari, who was sitting there all alone in his white angarkha and black turban, came near me, placed his turban on my feet and asked me to forgive him for the scene at the residence of the Raja of Mahmudabad. I embraced him in tears. None but Maulana Abdul Bari could have done so. He was a great man and had a very pious soul.

In an interview by the Editor of *Hamdam* with the Raja of Mahmudabad on 12 March 1920 and published on 17 March the Raja said, 'Although after the unpleasant incidents during the Khilafat Conference of Lucknow I have not been taking interest in the day-to-day matters of Khilafat, yet I have been associating myself with all the major policies and will continue to serve my people and country as before.' The incident referred to by the Raja concerns the unpleasant event which took place at his house about the holding of the Conference. It pains me to remember the event even now which caused a rupture in the relations of the Raja of Mahmudabad and Maulana Abdul Bari, leading to the Raja's grievance against him that he made up with me without consulting or informing him.

The Lucknow Khilafat Conference had opened the gates for the outburst of pent-up feelings of the Muslims on the Khilafat question. A second Khilafat Conference was held in Delhi presided over by Fazlul Huq. Large numbers of Hindu leaders attended this Conference, Gandhiji, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Pandit Madan Mohan Malvia being the most prominent visitors. Amongst Muslims Abbas Ali Beg, Hasan Imam, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Haji Mohammad Musa Khan, Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi of Amritsar, Mumtaz Husain and a host of others were present. Several resolutions expressing sympathy with the Khilafat and Turkey were passed. A resolution for the boycott of peace celebrations was opposed by Gandhiji who said that boycott was not the proper remedy. Maulana Hasrat Mohani said that we were not Satyagrahis; he wanted to hurt the British by boycotting peace celebrations. The boycott of peace celebrations was accepted next day. A special meeting of the Conference was

held, presided over by Gandhiji. His name was proposed by Khwaja Hasan Nizami, Mr. Abul Qasem, Dr. Savarkar, Maulana Sanaullah, Dr. Ansari, Seth Abdullah Haroon, Seth Chotani, Maulana Wilayat Husain and Maulana Fakhir.

In his speech Gandhiji said:

'Asif Ali issued an invitation which mentions that side by side with the Khilafat cause the question of cow-protection will also be decided, but we Hindus relying on our traditions do not consider it honourable to take something in return for offering our sympathy in a righteous cause. If there are any Hindus here who have come with that idea in their mind they should discard it because any help that the Hindus will offer to the Muslims at this time will be purely on the basis of their national and moral obligations; it should be without any consideration. The Turkish cause is based on justice; we will support it.'

The Ulema Conference was held two days afterwards at Delhi. Mufti Kifayatullah and Maulana Ahmad Said were elected as President and Secretary of the Conference. The first meeting of the Ulema was held at Amritsar next month over which in one sitting Maulana Abdul Bari, the mover of the idea, presided and in the next Maulana Mahmudul Hasan, who had by now been released from Malta and had returned to India, presided.

VIII

KHILAFAT AND CONGRESS: NONCO-OPERATION

1919—1921

THE ALI Brothers were released from Chindwara jail in December 1919 which enabled them to reach Amritsar in time to join both the Congress and the League sessions. On their way to Amritsar they received the ovations of thousands of Khilafatists at every station. For the first time in their life they took part in Congress deliberations. Pandit Motilal Nehru presided over the Congress session in which Mr. Das moved a resolution rejecting outright the Montague-Chelmsford reforms. Gandhiji moved an amendment omitting the word 'disappointing' from the resolution of Mr. Das. Mrs. Besant was dissatisfied with the resolution and made an alternative proposal nearly accepting the reform scheme, but this was lost. In this congress the liberal group did not take any part and formed themselves into a party called the Liberal Federation, the most prominent figures of this party being Sir Tej Bahadur Supru, Mr. Shastri and Seetalwad.

When our leaders got free from the first day's Congress activities they came to attend the League meeting. As soon as he arrived, Maulana Mohammad Ali took out a note from his pocket and handed it over to Sayed Zahur Ahmad, who after reading it gave it to me. It was the draft of a resolution on Independence which the Maulana wanted to move. I said, 'Maulana, under the rules of the League, you cannot move it because you have not given any notice of such an important change in the Constitution. Apart from that even the Congress has not yet gone to that length; how do you consider it reasonable for the Muslim League to make such a declaration?' He started shouting but I did not yield. Maulana Shaukat Ali sensing the situation intervened and said, 'Let me have it; we will consider it later.' He took from my hands the paper which did not see the light thereafter.

The Khilafat Conference at Amritsar was very lively because for the first time the Ali Brothers came to attend it. They were fully aware of the sacrifice I had made in bringing this organization into existence, and they showered their felicitations on me in unmeasured language. In this conference it was decided to send a deputation to London consisting of Maulana Mohammad Ali, Maulana Sulaiman Nadvi, Mr. Abul Qasem and Mr. Sayed Husain with Hasan Mohammad Hayat as Secretary to explain the feelings and sentiments of the Muslims of India in regard to the Khilafat and Turkey to the British Government.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, having been interned since 1915, was released on 1 January 1920. The Amritsar Khilafat Conference had ended and the Ali Brothers thought of taking a deputation to the Viceroy to seek his help in impressing upon the British Government the need for a just policy towards Turkey. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad reached Delhi on the 18th when Gandhiji and Mr. Tilak were also there at the time. Although the Viceroy received the deputation, he did not commit himself to anything except offering facilities to the deputation to proceed to England. In his autobiography *India Wins Freedom* Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has dealt with this matter in a manner not very favourable to the Khilafat leaders. On pages eight to nine of his autobiography he mentions :

'A meeting of Khilafat was held on 20th January, 1920, at Delhi in which nonco-operation programme was discussed and decided. . . . A meeting was held in which Mr. Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Maulvi Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal of Lucknow were also present. Gandhiji presented his programme of nonco-operation, etc., etc. As soon as Gandhiji described his proposal I remembered that this was the programme which Tolstoy had outlined many years ago. . . . others reacted according to their background. Hakim Ajmal Khan said that he wanted some time to consider the proposal. He would not like to advise others till he was willing to accept the programme himself. Maulana Abdul Bari said that Gandhiji's suggestion raised fundamental issues and he could not give a reply till he had meditated and sought divine guidance. Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali said they would wait till Maulana Abdul Bari's decision was known. Gandhiji then turned to me. I said without a moment's hesitation, "I fully accept the programme." '

It pains me to dispute Maulana's facts but history is no respecter of persons and I am obliged to quote his own story mentioned at page 344 of *Mahatma*, the life of M. K. Gandhi, by Tendulkar. About the same question the Maulana is reported to have said :

'I happened to meet Gandhiji first time in Delhi in January,

1920. All Hindu and Muslim leaders had assembled there in order to wait in deputation upon the Viceroy and place before the Government the sentiments of the Indian Muslims. Lokmaniya Tilak too was in Delhi. As a member of the deputation I had already put my signature on the memorial to be submitted to the Viceroy but I could not bring myself to consent to go to Government House. . . . The deputation did wait on the Viceroy, however, and, as was but to be expected, with little result. . . . I was ready to go but another question now arose, whether the Muslims should be content merely with sending this deputation or whether there was any more to be done. I was of the opinion that these methods of begging, petitioning, waiting in deputation could not be of much avail. We had to try to find some means of exerting direct pressure. But most people fought shy of this line of thinking. They had no constructive suggestion to offer but were ready to pick holes if anything concrete was proposed.

The matter was discussed for six long hours in Hakim Ajmal Khan's drawing room but without any result. Gandhiji thereupon proposed that a sub-committee of two or three people should be appointed to decide the matter in consultation with him. Their decision would then be placed before the bigger committee. Hakim Ajmal Khan Sahib and I were selected to form this sub-committee. We accompanied Gandhiji to Principal Rudra's house and were closeted with him for three hours. It was here that nonco-operation was conceived. Gandhiji placed before us a detailed programme, and I had no difficulty in agreeing with him in every detail. Next day members of the deputation met again and Gandhiji explained to them his proposal. There was still hesitancy on the part of Maulana Abdul Bari. Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali could not make up their minds and wanted time. Hakim Sahib however gave me his full support.'

The story given in his autobiography materially differs from the story given by him as quoted earlier, particularly in regard to the part played by the venerable personality of Hakim Ajmal Khan and the appointment of a sub-committee without the Ali Brothers.

It cannot be imagined how the Ali Brothers could have fought shy of accepting Gandhiji's proposal when they were the spearhead of the fight and were lion-hearted leaders. Maulana has said that three days after, a Khilafat Conference was held at Meerut where the nonco-operation programme was formally adopted. I myself attended the Meerut Conference and stayed at Mustafa Castle, Nawab Ismail Khan's residence, where the Ali Brothers were also staying. How could a nonco-operation resolution have been passed in this Conference three days after the Delhi meeting if the Ali Brothers were opposed to it?

Another Khilafat Conference was held at Calcutta on 20 February, under the presidentship of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad

himself, where, besides a resolution on the nonco-operation movement, a Khilafat Day was fixed for observance throughout India. Such conferences became the order of the day. A number of them were held particularly in Bombay, Allahabad and many other places.

I was elected President of the Lucknow Congress Committee and Harkaran Nath Misra at the same time was elected President of the District Congress Committee in March 1920. Generally in the beginning there were more Khilafat Committees established than Congress Committees but progressively Congress Committees began to be established in large numbers with the advance of time. We were also both members of the Central Congress Committee and of the provincial with headquarters at Allahabad, where we had to go very often to attend the meetings. I used to stay at Anand Bhawan with Pandit Motilal Nehru. Pandit Motilal was the one person in U.P. who more than anyone else not only helped to popularize Gandhiji but brought him to the forefront of Indian politics. But he was not a man to follow anyone blindly and to entrust his judgment to others, while his son Pandit Jawaharlal was full of youthful enthusiasm for fire-works, meetings, processions, hartals, etc., associated with Gandhiji's movements. The elder Pandit at times gave vent to thoughts and feelings full of doubts and misgivings about some policies of Gandhiji, which often provoked discussions between the father and the son. As I was wholeheartedly for Gandhiji's policies at the time and knew too well that but for him both the Khilafat and the Congress work would suffer a reverse, I always tried to pacify Pandit Motilal in my own way, which was not to contradict him but to soften him, and generally I succeeded in my efforts.

After the Amritsar session of the Congress Gandhiji often discussed his programme with Malviaji and Shastri, for he had immense confidence in himself and tried to win over opponents by his sweet arguments and methods. I do not, however, know of any instance in which he allowed his opinion to be influenced or dominated by them. The rift between the Liberals and the Congress was very distasteful to Gandhiji; nevertheless, he never thought of pacifying the Liberal leadership by compromising the Congress position. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has done a service to his father, rather late in the day, by publishing two letters of Pandit Motilal to him, which throw a flood of light on the character and moral stature of the elder Pandit. These letters were written from Arrah on 27 and 29 February 1920.

First Letter. 'As to the formulation of Gandhiji's political views, which, much as I respect him, I am not prepared to accept simply because they are from him, I have already warned Das that we must be prepared for a big tussle. Gandhiji is going to Delhi for a talk with Shastri. His constant association and general agreement with Malvia are no good omens for our party. Neither are they good omens for Gandhiji himself. There is such a thing as trusting too much to one's own popularity. Mrs. Besant is paying for it and others have done the same.

It will be great grief to me if Gandhiji follows suit.... But I cannot shut my eyes to the manner in which the country is shaping itself. Any attempt to compromise with the authorities or the moderates is bound to result in disaster, by whomsoever made.'

Second Letter. 'Gandhiji is going to make an important pronouncement about his position in politics. I have already written to you on the subject. Das agrees with me in what I have said.... That Gandhiji is going to take up an attitude not in complete accord with Congress resolutions is fairly clear. Our only grievance is that while he has evidently taken Shastri and Malvia into his confidence he has left us severely alone.'

Motilalji's fear did not prove true, as Gandhiji did not alter his programme.

A special session of the Congress was held on 8 September at Calcutta where Gandhiji placed his resolution for the acceptance of the nonco-operation programme by the Congress. I had sent my younger brother Salimuzzaman to London to take his M.B., B.S. on 4 September and on the 6th I left for Calcutta with a determination to vote for the nonco-operation resolution of Gandhiji. Lala Lajpat Rai presided over this special session of the Congress. Mr. Das had shot up in politics like a meteor when he proposed rejection of the Montague-Chelmsford scheme in Amritsar. Before this his work was confined to helping the revolutionary movement in Bengal but he was not very much known in India as a politician. Lala Lajpat Rai and Bipendra Chandra Pal were trying to dissuade Das from supporting Gandhiji and they thought they would succeed because Gandhiji's resolution of nonco-operation was based only on the Khilafat cause. As soon as Gandhiji's resolution came under discussion Mr. Bipendra Chandra Pal, under a misconception that Muslims would not accept it, proposed that along with the Khilafat the word Swaraj might also be introduced. Gandhiji was not prepared for it for he said, 'there should be no question of bargaining; if we have to express our sympathy with the Muslim cause we should do it without any thought of recompense.' The Muslims, who had attended this session in very

large numbers, rushed to Maulana Shaukat Ali to ask him to beg Gandhiji not to oppose the amendment. Maulana Shaukat Ali persuaded Gandhiji after some reluctance to accept the amendment. There was thus no occasion for Das to oppose Gandhiji. The resolution having been put to vote I voted for it along with Mr. Omar Sobani, who was sitting by my side, having been left by his friends like Sayed Wazir Hasan, Mr. Jinnah and the Raja of Mahmudabad on account of the nonco-operation movement. He asked me after I had voted for the resolution as to what I would then do to earn my living. I replied that if possible I should take to some business.

On my return to Lucknow I went with my uncle to Mussoorie where I received a frantic telegram from the Ali Brothers to attend the Moradabad Khilafat Conference. With my uncle's permission I went to stay there for a day or two and then to come back to Mussoorie. I was received by the Brothers at Morababad station along with thousands of persons who took out a procession in my honour, the first of its kind in my life. When I was alone with the Brothers they asked me to announce my decision of boycotting the Law Courts next morning. I assured them that I would do it but with the permission of my uncle to whom I had already given an indication of my resolve. Next day when the proceedings of the Conference started Maulana Shaukat Ali announced that I had given up my practice in the Law Courts. There were cries raised by the public that I should stand up and show myself to them which I did. I had no courage now left to go to Mussoorie; so I left for Lucknow, the same evening.

Some enthusiasts inquired from Maulana Abdul Bari whether Hijrat from India had not become a duty for Muslims in view of the anti-Muslim policy pursued by the British Government. The Maulana gave the *fatwa* in a very guarded language but generally it was taken in a different sense which I am sure the Maulana never meant to convey. A meeting was held at Allahabad in November 1920 where the question came up for discussion. Maulana Mohammad Ali spoke in its favour but I opposed it and said: 'I consider it as the outcome of a defeatist mentality. If we eighty million here cannot force the British to concede our demand, the going out of a few thousand from the country will not cut any ice; we may be the poorer for them but that would not bring a solution.' Such a hue and cry was raised against me that I left the meeting and went to take my breakfast. Later I heard that the resolution was passed by a large majority. About 20,000 Muslims marched towards Kabul;

but the King of Afghanistan finding himself unable to receive such a large body of men, closed the doors on them. Many poor Muslims had proceeded there with their wives and children after selling their properties and had to return emaciated, starving and unhappy.

The Congress session for the year, in Nagpur, was almost a Muslim session of the Congress for I believe the number of Muslims was so large as to give it a Muslim colour. The only question before the Congress was the acceptance of the non-co-operation movement. Gandhiji's resolution was opposed by Mr. Jinnah as he thought it to be totally unconstitutional. Maulana Mohammad Ali in reply to his speech said, 'You talk too much of the constitutional way. It reminds me of a story of a young Tory who came out of the Carlton Club one evening and walked up to Picadilly Circus where there was a Salvation Army meeting in progress. The speaker was saying, "This way is God's way." The young Tory interrupted him and said, "How long have you been preaching this?" "Twenty years," said the Salvationist. "Well," was the answer, "if it has only got you as far as Picadilly Circus, I do not think much of it."' The nonco-operation resolution was passed and Mr. Jinnah left for Bombay the same evening. The President of this session of the Congress was Vijaya Raghuva Acharya.

After the Congress session of Nagpur the Ali Brothers went to Aligarh to request the Trustees to stop taking a Government grant. They were vehemently opposed by Dr. Ziauddin who wired to the parents of the students to warn their children not to fall a prey to the nonco-operation movement. Nevertheless about a hundred students came out of the University and lodged in a bungalow outside the University Compound. Maulana Mohammad Ali laid the foundation of the new University which was called Jamia Millia. I attended the first meeting of the Trustees of the Jamia Millia. Maulana Mohammad Ali became the Shaikh of Jamia Millia and Dr. Alam the Principal. Later on in 1925 Jamia Millia was removed from Aligarh to Delhi, where it started facing financial difficulties due to the weakness of the Khilafat organization. Dr. Ansari became the Shaikhul Jamia and through his efforts he was able to keep the institution alive. Fortunately for this institution three young men, namely Dr. Zakir Husain, my cousin Mr. Mohammad Mujib, and Dr. Abid, offered their services to the Jamia, after having taken their degrees in foreign universities. Dr. Zakir Husain is perhaps one of the best products of Aligarh College—sweet, intelligent, honest and very charming. Mujib has a reputation as a historian

and a linguist. Similarly Dr. Abid is also greatly respected.

A deputation, led by Maulana Mohammad Ali, went to London in February 1920, returning in October. In reply to Maulana Mohammad Ali's demand that the Turkish Caliph must remain in possession of *Jaziratul Arab*, including Iraq, Syria and Palestine with all the holy places situated therein, Mr. Lloyd George, then the British Prime Minister, said that the Arabs could not be deprived of the freedom which they had won for themselves. He did not give any definite assurance that even Turkish lands would be left intact with the Turks. In fact he had encouraged the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. The deputation thereafter suggested a kind of federation of the Turkish and Arab lands under the Caliph, but nothing transpired although hundreds of meetings were held by the Muslims of India in support of the deputation.

India was in a ferment and a clash between the people and the Government appeared to be inevitable. Gandhiji's tour from province to province, accompanied by the Ali Brothers with a large number of Khilafat leaders and colleagues like Maulana Abdul Majid Badauni, Akhtar Ali and Mian Firozuddin, better known as Naqeeb Khilafat, to infuse a spirit of defiance in the people had created a situation which could become explosive at any moment. The resentment of the people gained further impetus against the Government, for having passed orders of restraint against Mr. Das, Rajendra Prasad, Mazharul Haq, Seth Yaqub Hasan and Lajpat Rai in respect of entering certain areas. In this atmosphere, in the Bezwada meeting on 31 March 1921, Gandhiji declared that Swaraj would come within a year if a crore of rupees in cash were collected for the Tilak-Swaraj Fund, Hindu-Muslim unity was secured and untouchability removed. This resolution was passed with great enthusiasm.

After the Congress Committee meeting was over Hakim Ajmal Khan asked Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and me to go with him to Calicut. We stayed at Madras for a day where for the first time I met Seth Mohammad Jamal and his young manager Mohammad Ismail. On our way we also stayed at Erode where we addressed a huge gathering. We were at Calicut for three days. In about 80 miles radius of Calicut the country is populated by Moplas, descendants of Arabs who settled in the country in the seventh century. They are a very excitable people, which made us afraid that they might indulge in violence should a programme of civil disobedience be taken up. The Tilak-Swaraj Fund was subscribed by 31 July. Mr. Omar Sobani played

a great part in the collection of the fund, when he told a gathering of Hindu and Muslim Sethias that he would sell his properties for the cause if they failed to open their purses to his satisfaction as forty lakhs had still to be collected from Bombay. Mr. Sobani himself donated three lakhs and within the time limit the rest of the amount was collected.

As I had thought of starting a business, I went to Bombay to purchase cloth and open a big Cloth Emporium in Lucknow, investing about 50,000 rupees. When the Emporium was opened there were plenty of purchasers, mostly nonco-operator friends who took away cloth worth about Rs. 12,000 on credit. Apart from them there were other purchasers who also avoided payment in cash. It was altogether a bad venture due amongst other reasons to my business inexperience. When I went to jail in November 1921 it had been shifted from the big house to a smaller shop and on my return from jail it had practically ceased to exist.

It could be very well seen that the Government could not remain a spectator to the rising tide of public enthusiasm which was destroying all respect for law and order. The Government started using sections 144 and 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code to stop meetings and initiated criminal proceedings very frequently. But the more the Government resorted to legal proceedings the more was the determination of the people to defy. A surging mass was moving headlong towards anarchy and revolution. It was under such circumstances that Lord Reading, who had taken over from Lord Chelmsford as Viceroy of India, informed the British Government that it would become increasingly difficult to maintain India if the policy with regard to Turkey were not modified.

IX

REPRESSION AND IMPRISONMENT

1921—1922

REPRESSION in full swing started in U.P. Maulana Fakhir was sent to jail and Tasadduq Ahmad Khan was arrested in August 1921, soon followed by Maulana Zafarul Mulk. Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali along with Dr. Kitchlew, Sankrachariya of Sarda Peeth. Maulana Nasir Ahmad, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid and Maulana Husain Ahmad were tried in Karachi for having proposed or supported the resolution declaring it unlawful for any faithful Muslim to serve in the Army or to help or acquiesce in their recruitment. In the Khilafat Conference of 8 July 1921, at Karachi, it was also declared that if the British Government fought the Angora Government, the Muslims of India would start civil disobedience, establish their independence and hoist the flag of the Indian Republic at the Ahmedabad session of the National Congress.

Maulana Mohammad Ali's speech on this occasion was repeated on 16 October 1921 from thousands of platforms in India in accordance with the instructions from the Congress and Khilafat High Commands. Maulana Mohammad Ali was arrested at Voltair on 14 September and Maulana Shaukat Ali at Bombay, under sections 121 and 124 of the Indian Penal Code. Gandhiji, on their arrest, issued a statement on 24 September calling upon the Muslims to remain non-violent but not passive; we were to repeat the formula of the Ali Brothers regarding the duty of soldiers and invite imprisonment; we need not think that the struggle could not go on without even the best of us. He also convened a meeting of the leaders in Bombay on 4 October to issue a manifesto defying the Government to do their worst. I went to Bombay and stayed with Mr. Sobani and signed the manifesto. Dr. Rabendra Nath Tagore was dissatisfied with the language of the manifesto and in an article 'Recall to Truth' he invited the people to notice that culture and reasoning were being abdicated and blind obedience only reigned; so simple was it to crush in the name of some outward liberty the real

freedom of the soul; emotion and enthusiasm were required but also science and meditation. No pressure, either open or hidden, he wrote, should weigh on intelligence.

Nevertheless there were, and there still are, some people persisting in the declaration that Gandhiji lured the Muslims to weaken them. However, the Ali Brothers stood firmly on their ground, and were sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

I had gone to Karachi to meet the Ali Brothers in jail and on my return I went to Bombay where Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari were also staying with Omar Sobani to collect funds for the Khilafat. It was on this occasion that Sir Fazil Bhoy taunted Mr. Sobani as to why he could not subscribe the whole of the Angora Fund himself, to the great chagrin of Mr. Sobani. In an attempt to give a crushing reply to Fazil Bhoy by subscribing the whole amount of the Angora Fund, he went headlong into cotton speculation resulting in a crash in February 1922 wherein he lost his all.

On my return from Bombay to Lucknow both Harkaran Nath Misra and I received a message from the Home Minister, the Raja of Mahmudabad, to meet him. For the first time he met us at his official table and picked up two files for each one of us to read. In my file there was a note of the Legal Remembrancer 'Prosecute,' and below it the Governor's order, 'Prosecute.' Similar was the case of Harkaran Nath. After we finished reading our files the Raja wanted us to offer some explanation to strengthen his hands to plead with the Governor. Both of us said we would prefer to court arrest while he was at the helm of affairs rather than when he was not in office; there could be no question of any explanation when we ourselves wanted to court arrest. There the matter ended.

The Prince of Wales was coming to Lucknow on 9 November 1921, and we had decided to boycott his visit. Jawaharlal came from Allahabad on 3 November and both of us distributed leaflets from an open car, propagating boycott. The same evening there was a meeting of the Khilafat Committee at Victoria Road to consider whether the Khilafat volunteers should be disbanded in accordance with the Government's order banning the Khilafat Corps. There was a section in the meeting which was being presided over by Maulana Salamatullah who were prepared to show weakness by accepting the Government order. But after my speech against yielding, it was decided to retain the Corps as before.

On the morning of 5 November 1921 I was awakened by my cousin Mahmuduzzaman at Dolly Bagh with the news that the

police had come to arrest me. In a hurry I dressed, took my breakfast and accompanied the Police Inspector to jail. It was indeed a great relief, for the life that I had been living for the last three or four years had become very strenuous and as a matter of fact there was not much left to be done by me either. While my particulars were being taken down, a big van came to the gate of the jail and the first man to descend was Maulana Salamatullah, followed by Shaikh Shaukat Ali, Secretary of the Khilafat Committee, Abdul Wali and others.

Pandit Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal were arrested at Allahabad on the evening of the 4th and were brought to Lucknow to stand their trial. I was tried by K.B. Mohammad Shafi and sentenced to one and a half years' imprisonment with the remark that 'He is a dangerous agitator.' All the others of Lucknow got one year or six months. Pandit Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal were sentenced to six months each. In the jail compound there were two buildings, a bigger one in two unequal parts and a smaller one. Pandit Motilal and Jawaharlal were given the small building. My eight companions, Maulana Salamatullah, Shaukat Ali, Abdul Wali, my nephew Badruzzaman, Gopinath Srivastava, Ali Abbas, Hakim Ashufta and Mohammad Nawab, were given the bigger portion of the other building, the smaller having been given to Pandit Shyamlal Nehru.

I used to take my midday meal with Pandit Motilal who used to cook his food in a cooker, and my dinner with the rest of my companions. Jawaharlal was a very early riser and a voracious reader too. Nevertheless I could get time to talk to him every day for some while on current affairs. It was an irony that from an early age people had started looking upon him as a 'Desh Bhakt' (servant of the country), and to satisfy public expectations he had to sacrifice his youth and its charms at its door. No Hindu of his age could talk to him on any other subject except politics and with the Muslims generally it was the same. It was a little bit different with me and I sometimes talked on subjects other than non-violence and nonco-operation. His father Pandit Motilal Nehru was a different man altogether. He used to play 'Gulli-Danda' with us and talked and laughed and read *Dewan Hafiz*.

Bengal was closely following U.P. in the matter of arrest. C. R. Das was arrested along with many who were exhorting the public to boycott the visit of the Prince of Wales on 25 December 1921. Lord Reading, the Viceroy, was anxious to avoid any bloodshed in Calcutta during the Christmas week. Malviaji tried to arrange a settlement between the Government

and the Congress and the Viceroy expressed his willingness to come to terms with Gandhiji on the condition that only the Criminal Law Amendment prisoners would be released. Gandhiji did not agree because under those terms of compromise the Ali Brothers and many others who were not convicted under the Criminal Law Amendment Act would have been excluded from its purview. In the jail we were receiving all the news about the talk of compromise, although nothing transpired. Then came the Congress session at Ahmedabad over which Hakim Ajmal Khan, in the absence of C. R. Das, presided. The main resolution re-affirmed the Congress policy laid down at Calcutta and Nagpur. Maulana Hasrat Mohani moved a resolution for the independence of India in the Congress session, but Gandhiji opposed it and it was dropped. After the Congress session, the All-India Congress Committee decided to begin a 'No-Rent' campaign confined only to Bardoli Taluqa.

While preparations were being made for starting mass civil disobedience, on 5 February in Chouri Choura, near Gorakhpur in U.P., eleven constables and the Sub-Inspector were rushed by the mob into the police station and all of them were burnt to death. Before this occurrence, on 17 November 1921, fifty-three persons had died and four hundred were wounded in the demonstrations held at Bombay. On 13 January 1922 a similar riot had taken place at Madras costing many lives. In view of these happenings the Congress Committee which met at Bardoli on 12 February 1922 suspended the civil disobedience movement. The Congressmen were asked to stop all activities.

Pandit Motilal was furious when he woke me up early the next morning and expressed his deep resentment and anger at what had happened. He handed to me the *Leader* which he had in his hand and shouted, 'Look here what has happened.' He further said: 'This ends the movement; there was no need to call off the movement because some people in a big country like India have lost their balance of mind and committed violence.' Jawaharlal was also standing by his side but he did not say anything at that time. However, I could see from his face that he also did not like it and shared his father's views.

Lorry-loads of civil resisters which had been coming from the city every day stopped from the next day. Apart from the question whether Gandhiji was right or wrong in having called off the movement, it must be confessed that it had a very bad effect indeed on the mass mind. It would not be a far-fetched conclusion that fissiparous tendencies in the Hindu and Muslim sections of the people thereafter found opportunity to develop

in the enforced quiet and self-imposed restraint, raising fears and doubts about the capacity of India to win freedom through civil disobedience.

No better opportunity could have been found by the British Government to arrest Gandhiji, which it did on 13 March 1922. His trial began on 18 March at Ahmedabad and he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Shankerlal, one of his admirers and companions, was also tried and given one year's imprisonment. By this time Shuaib had returned from England after doing his Bar. He became Editor of *Young India* after Gandhiji's imprisonment but a few months later he also was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Aziz Ansari, another dear friend of mine, had also been arrested and was lodged with Maulana Ahmad Said, Abdul Majid Salik and others in Montgomery jail, having been sentenced to three years'.

Pandit Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal were released after the expiry of their sentences, but Jawaharlal was again arrested and this time he was kept separately in another barracks along with many other Congressmen. After the release of most of my companions I was shifted to another barracks where my companions were Mr. Nawab Ali, Rafi Ahmad Qidwai, Shafi, Shabbar, Nasim, Mian Abdul Ali of Bhayara and many other friends from Barabanki. Near by was the Hindu barracks which was occupied by Gopalnarain Saxena, Jaggannath Parshad Aggarwal, Babu Pershotamdas Tandan and many others. Babu Pershotamdas Tandan was the most queer personality in the jail. He always started his speech with a 'but' and never entirely agreed with anything. He did not believe in allowing resolutions to go through without amendments and generally took that onerous duty on his own shoulders, shrugging them all the time. Meat, of course, he never took but whatever he ate he took frugally. He never wore a sherwani or angarkha in my knowledge; a kurta and dhoti were always enough for him; left to himself he might have discarded even the latter. In jail he used to take a mud bath; since how long he had been indulging in this extravagance I cannot say. He despised Urdu and never made a secret of it, but Urdu was in good company for he despised water and salt too. Twenty-five years later when once we were travelling together in the same compartment from Lucknow to Delhi, on a very hot day at Cawnpore station I asked my servant to get for me a very cold glass of water. Tandanji was greatly shocked and abruptly asked, 'Why do you take water?' Before I could reply and it was not easy either to

reply to such a question, he added: 'It is perhaps because you still eat salt. Look at me; I do not eat salt and as such I do not take water for days.' It was my turn now. I asked him, 'Why do you deny yourself these, God's precious bounties? If it has anything to do with health, I am healthier and stronger than you are—bones and skin.' He is still alive and so am I.

I could see in jail that after the civil disobedience movement was called off the happy relations between the Hindu and Muslim inmates of the jail began to cool down; but I must confess that on the whole these people were the finest specimens of the Nationalist group. They had courted arrest only out of a sense of sacrifice, for they had before them no ambitions of going to the Legislature or accepting offices. The British were too strongly entrenched to give them any hope of emoluments or worldly gains. No doubt when the news of Mopla atrocities came to be known in jail some Hindus started a tirade against the Muslims, completely ignoring the fact that the atrocities committed by the Moplas on the Hindus were due to their pro-British activities.

In August news had reached India about the defeat of the Greeks in the battle of Sakaria, after which their army retired, completely disorganized, towards Smyrna where the Turks captured 90,000 of them as prisoners. Mustafa Kamal Pasha's hold on Asiatic Turkey thus became undisputed. The British Government by now made up its mind not to help the Greeks, in order to avoid antagonizing Muslim sentiment in India; so a peace move had already started for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres.

Pandit Motilal and C. R. Das had revised their opinion on the question of civil disobedience in the changed situation in the country and favoured Council Entry as an alternative programme. I also came to know that there was disagreement on the point between Hakim Ajmal Khan who favoured a change in the programme and Dr. Ansari who was against it. I had almost made up my mind to support Motilalji for I had great personal respect for him besides having faith in his political leadership. As I got some remission, I was released on 22 December 1922.

X

SWARAJ DISPUTES AND END OF THE KHILAFAT

1922—1924

I WAS released very early in the morning, nevertheless, many friends and co-workers were present to receive me at the jail gate. Hardly had I finished my breakfast at home when most of the members of the Congress Committee arrived to discuss the burning question of 'change' or 'no-change'. I found from discussion with them that most of my Lucknow Congressmen shared my view that there should be a change in the programme of the Congress. Next day I left with Pandit Harkaran Nath Misra and Maulana Masud Ali Nadvi to attend the Congress session at Gaya.

For the first time there was feverish activity amongst the members of the Congress in convassing each other for the future programme of the Congress, each according to his own light, so that it was very difficult to assess the situation. Mr. Rajagopalachari who belonged to the 'no-change' group was marshalling his forces very cleverly to give fight to Motilalji and Das and on the final day of counting of votes he won hands down and we were defeated by a big majority.

Completely disillusioned and dissatisfied with the decision of the Congress, the 'pro-changers' assembled next day in the Pandal to form the Khilafat-Congress-Swaraj Party with a view to giving a fight to the 'no-changers'. Mr. Das was elected President, Motilalji as General Secretary, myself and Tasadduq Ahmad Khan as additional secretaries.

There was also a Khilafat Conference held with great enthusiasm at Gaya because of the victory of Ghazi Mustafa Kamal Pasha over the Greeks. There was, however, resentment that in the Lausanne Conference the attitude of the British Government towards the Turks was disappointing, and a resolution to that effect was passed. Mr. Omar Sobani also attended the Gaya session. He had come to see me in Lucknow

after the crash but I had little courage to talk to him about the great business losses that he had suffered and which had ruined him. But now I heard from him how due to the attitude of George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, he had come to grief in his business. He did not however show it from his face, but continued as self-confident as ever; Omar the millionaire had been finished but Omar the man still survived.

Under the Municipal Act of U.P. of 1916, which for the first time provided for a non-official Chairman, the Lucknow Municipal elections were boycotted by the Hindus and the first Board was composed only of Muslims. This lasted from 1917 to 1920 with Sayed Nabiullah, Barrister, as its Chairman. On the expiry of the term of the first Board the Hindus contested the elections and came in. Pandit Jagat Narain Mulla became the Chairman of the Board but after he became a Minister in the provincial Government, his place was filled by Babu Bisheshwar Nath Srivastava. Now in the forthcoming elections both the Khilafat and Congress Committees authorized me to nominate all the twenty-seven members of the Board, sixteen being Hindus and eleven Muslims. Only one Hindu and one Muslim seats were bitterly contested by the Ministerial Party, namely Mr. Abdul Wali's seat from Chowk Ward and Dr. Shivraj Narain Saxena's seat by the retiring Chairman, Mr. Bisheshwar Nath, in Wazirgunj. But we won both seats in spite of Firangi Mahal's support to Sayed Ahmad Husain who was defeated by Wali. With such a majority it was obvious that the Khilafat-Congress Party would have the Chairman and consequently I was elected unopposed. Throughout the province of U.P. and other parts of India, the Congress-Khilafat Party captured many other local Boards, Town Areas and Committees. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru became the Chairman of the Allahabad Board, but he resigned after a year. Dr. Murari Lal was elected Chairman of Cawnpore Board. The Calcutta Corporation was captured by the Congress. Mr. Das became the Mayor and Subash Bose the Executive Officer. Vallabhbhai Patel became President of the Ahmedabad Municipality and his brother Vithalbhai Patel the Mayor of Bombay. Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected Chairman of the Patna Municipal Board. In Madras also the Congress captured the Corporation.

It will serve no useful purpose to narrate the squabbles within the Congress organization between the 'pro-changers' and 'no-changers'. The strength of the Swaraj Party within the Congress may be judged from the fact that a few months after the Gaya session, Mr. Rajagopalachari himself moved a resolution,

on 3 August at Vizagapatam, for the holding of a special session in September 1923 to give its mandate on the issue. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad presided over this special session, which was held in the third week of September, in which the party favouring Council entry secured a permissive resolution from Congress to the effect that such Congressmen as had no religious or conscientious objection against the Council entry could stand as candidates and exercise their right of vote in the forthcoming elections. As a necessary consequence the session decided that propaganda against Council entry should be suspended by the 'no-changers'. It was a complete victory for Mr. Das and Motilalji. The Ali Brothers who had been released by now from Bijapur jail attended this session.

After attending the special session at Delhi, Maulana Mohammad Ali came to Lucknow where I presented an address of welcome to him as Chairman of the Municipal Board. During his stay I had occasion also to talk to him about the future of the Khilafat movement and pointed out to him that the National Assembly at Ankara had decided, on 21 November 1922, to separate Khilafat from the State which clearly indicated that the future not only of Abdul Wahid, the Caliph, but that of the Khilafat itself was in jeopardy. The replacement of Abdul Wahid by Abdul Majid Effendi, who was nominated as Khalifa, had failed to bring about any material change in the policy of the Ankara Nationalists. They had earlier under Ismet Inonu, representing Ghazi Pasha, boycotted the Lausanne Conference, but on being invited again, in July 1923, had come to terms with the Allies. On these facts I expressed my doubts whether the Khilafat organization could be maintained when the Turks were themselves throwing it away. No one could undo what the Arabs had already done. The Arab portion of Turkey had been divided into five small states, Iraq going to Amir Faisal, Transjordan to King Abdullah, Hijaz to Sharif Husain and Syria and Palestine to be under French and British mandates, respectively. These territorial redistributions were made with the consent of Amir Faisal who was negotiating in the Lausanne Conference on behalf of the Arabs. I asked Maulana Mohammad Ali where the Muslims of India came into this picture. Whatever we might have to say about the Arab policy the fact remains that the Khilafat organization had become to my mind an anachronism. No one could imagine that the Arabs, when they revolted against the Turks, did not foresee that, if Mustafa Kamal Pasha had not succeeded in repulsing the Greeks, not only would the Arab zone have been lost to the Turks but they

would also have been deprived of purely Turkish national territory including Adrianople and Constantinople which would have been divided between Russia, Bulgaria and Greece. The Maulana agreed with most of what I said but he was not a man to accept facts as facts. He was a born revolutionary aiming to destroy all that did not conform to his ideal, even though he might not be able to reconstruct what he had destroyed. He did not share my pessimism. He said, 'Keep the Khilafat Committee alive and continue to fight against the British to concede real independence to the Arab world with a view to "liberating the liberated." '

I had to run between Lucknow and Allahabad in connection with the selection of candidates for the Swaraj Party, and also to work for Swarajist candidates during the course of the elections. In Lucknow our candidate was Babu Ramchandra Sinha, a raw youth who had just come out of the University and had been to jail. He defeated Pandit Gokaran Nath Misra, a successful lawyer of great standing and influence. Altogether we got twenty-three seats for the Swaraj Party candidates in U.P. Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant, later the Indian Home Minister and for a long time the Premier of U.P., was one of those elected and became leader of the U.P. Swarajist Group in the Council. For the Central Assembly forty-five Swarajists were elected, including some Muslim candidates. The Muslim League did not set up any candidates.

For a few days there were jubilations in our camp over our success in the elections; then came a spate of riots throughout India as a result of the Shudhdhi and Sanghtan movements, started by Swami Shardhanand, Dr. Moonje and Lala Lajpat Rai. Even Lucknow could not escape the curse of a communal riot. Communal riots in India had been generally ascribed to the British policy of 'divide and rule' and, strange as it may seem, even Gandhiji in the Round Table Conference made the same charge against the British policy and in his support referred to the absence of riots in the Muslim period. There could be no room for riots during the Muslim rule which was not based on democracy. There could be open revolt of the Hindus against the Muslim kings and subedars but there was no room for any communal riot in the sense in which riots occurred in British India. After the British disarmed the entire population of India they deprived the Muslims of the weapons which had been their mainstay in life. Although this measure was taken to protect the British dominions against any mutiny in the future there could be no doubt that the policy completely undermined the

Muslim political power and position which was bound up with military occupation ever since their conquest of India.

During the British period the first communal riot came in 1804 in Banares but after 1893 when there was a big riot in Bombay in connection with the Ganpati procession, communal riots became a feature of Indian life. Generally communal riots occurred in places where the Muslims were in a very small minority. In the eastern part of U.P. where the Muslim population varied between four and seven per cent, the riots were more frequent than in western U.P. where the Muslim population was over twenty per cent. It means that the aggression always came from the majority in areas where the minority was too weak to protect itself. There may have been exceptions to this rule but generally it may be said to have held good.

It was greatly to be regretted that the number of riots increased after the Hindu-Muslim Pact of 1916 and the only reason which can be attributed to the increase in riots was the Shudhdhi movement which was started by Shardhanand for the conversion of Muslims to the Hindu fold. A little later Lala Lajpat Rai also started a movement for the organization of Hindus known as the Sanghtan which also added to the bitterness between the communities. It has been said that Swami Shardhanand had been propped up by the Viceroy who had met him after the Mopla riots. But apart from this I am inclined to think that a feeling of jealousy was also aroused from seeing the Muslim awakening for a religious cause, which suddenly brought them into the fold of Congress politics as was evident in the Nagpur session. The Muslims on their part started Tabligh and Tanzim movements to counteract the Hindu offensive movements. In 1924 there were riots at Gulbarga, Delhi, Nagpur, Lucknow, Shahjehanpur, Allahabad and Jubbulpore. There was also a riot in Kohat in the N.W.F.P. on account of which many Hindus had to leave the place and go to other provinces. This riot was the cause of disagreement between Gandhiji and Maulana Shaukat Ali regarding the assessment of blame between Hindus and Muslims. After the assassination of Swami Shardhanand in 1926 by a Muslim, the number of riots considerably increased, prominent among them being the Bihar Sharif, Multan, Bareilly, and Nagpur riots. Altogether twenty-five riots occurred in this year, ten in U.P., six in Bombay, two in Punjab, one each in C.P., Bengal and Bihar. The situation became so exasperating that Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, had to take notice of it in his address to the Indian Legislature on 29 August 1927 when he informed the members that during the previous eighteen months

the total loss of life resulting from the riots amounted to 250 killed and over 2,500 injured.

The general atmosphere in India at that time was so thick with suspicion that even Lucknow could not escape a mild riot. There was at first a riot in the town of Amethi close to the city and as a result of it the relations between the two communities began suddenly to deteriorate in Lucknow. The Muslims used to pray in Aminabad Park where there was a temple also. The Hindus began to claim to have a right of Puja when the Muslim evening prayers were on. I, accompanied by Harkaran Nath Misra, went to urge the Trustee of the temple not to disturb the age-old convention, by which the Hindus did not start their Puja till a few minutes after Muslim prayers were over. The Trustee of the temple did not agree. On the same evening there was a meeting in the Dharamsala near Aminabad where violent speeches were made. When the meeting dispersed a violent mob attacked some Muslim shops in Aminabad, in which one Muslim was killed. Next day section 144 was imposed by the Government while the riot continued to envelop the city. Pandit Balmakund Bajpai, a leading Congressman, telephoned to me to convene a meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders to bring about a settlement between the two communities. I convened a meeting at my place where representatives of both the communities were well represented and they decided to proceed to different mohallas requesting the people to maintain peace in the city. Our efforts succeded and from next day the riot ended.

Some communal-minded Hindus thereafter complained to the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner, Mr. Castle, that under municipal rules the Muslim prayers could not be offered in the municipal park. At the request of the authorities I agreed to discuss the matter with them and they were convinced by my arguments and issued an order that during prayers Puja would not be observed. One of the members of the Board, Dr. Laxmi Sahai, took into his head to move a resolution that the municipal bye-laws applied to the case and the prayers should be stopped by the Board. I informed my Hindu friends of my views and offered them my resignation if they disagreed with me. They had a separate meeting in which they unanimously decided not to support the motion of Dr. Laxmi Sahai. Consequently the motion was not supported by any member and it was dropped. I have quoted this instance to show that at no stage did the British come on the scene, and all through their effort was directed to maintain peace in the city. The obvious reason for the riots in India and that the Hindus believed that during

their rule the Muslims had secured many rights in regard to the observance of their religious ceremonies and hence during the British days the Hindus were anxious to improve upon and add to their rights. It was difficult for the Muslims during the British rule even to maintain the rights which they had, much less to add to them.

The worst riot, and the first political riot in my view, was that in Cawnpore in 1931. I was ready to go to Karachi to attend the Congress session, when I received a telegram from Pandit Jawaharlal to look to Cawnpore where a serious riot had broken out, rather than come to Karachi. Next morning I proceeded to Cawnpore with Maulana Zafarul Mulk but due to the violence prevailing in the city we had to stay in the civil lines in Mr. Vikramajit's house, where we could with great difficulty get a few Party leaders to devise means to bring about an end to the riot. Hafiz Hidayat Husain, M.L.C., and Maulana Hasrat Mohani represented the Muslims while Dr. Jawaharlal, Pandit Daya Shanker Nigam and a few other Hindus came from the other side. It was unanimously decided to tour the city next day to bring about peace. I went back to Lucknow and returned again next day to continue our efforts for the restoration of peace. As more than forty-eight hours had passed the riot was subsiding and the general atmosphere aided us to control the violent elements. It was in this riot that Ganesh Shanker Vidyarthi was killed to the great regret even of the Muslims. He was a real nationalist and many times came to Lucknow to plead the cause of a Muslim. Dr. Jawaharlal requested me to come next day to join his cremation ceremony. The cause of this riot was purely political. Maulana Mohammad Ali had died on 4 January 1931 and the Muslims closed their shops as a mark of respect for him but the Hindus, in spite of the former's request, did not close their shops. When, however, Bhagat Singh and two of his associates were executed on 23 March, the Hindus took out a procession and wanted to force Muslims to close their shops which resulted in the riot. Not less than 500 lives were lost in this bloody riot. As a result of the riot some purely Muslim mohallas came into existence as well as some purely Hindu mohallas. In later years, as we know, political riots were far bigger than the non-political ones on questions of religious observances such as Moharram or Ramlila, music before a mosque, etc. As an instance the Calcutta and Bihar riots of 1946 and the Noakhali riot in Bengal in the same year may be mentioned. The Chandur Biswa riot of C.P. and Lahore and Amritsar riots of Punjab may also serve as instances. The fact that riots in India

still go on, occurring off and on when there are no Englishmen to encourage them, is proof positive of the fact that the people alone were responsible for what happened in India.

On 10 March 1924 the Turkish Government renounced the Khilafat. To explain the situation to the Indian Muslims, Kamal Bey, brother of Basim Omar Pasha, President of the Turkish Red Crescent Society, was sent to India. He profusely thanked the Indian Muslims for the help and brotherly affection shown towards Turkey in its hour of need, and assured us that our agitation and sacrifices in money and life had been of great value to the Turks, and had obliged Lord Reading, the Viceroy of India, in 1921, to write to his Government at home that if the anti-Turkish policy of the British Government continued it would become increasingly difficult to hold India. All this was very gratifying; nevertheless, the fact that a centuries' old institution had come to an end deeply hurt Muslim feelings and sentiment. It appears that originally there had been no idea among the Turks of discarding the Khilafat, as is borne out by Article 4 of the National Pact announced on 28 January 1920 which had provided for the security of Constantinople as the 'City of the Caliphate.' When however Sultan Abdul Wahid issued a *fatwa* of Ulema outlawing the leaders of the national movement followed by a *firman* to the same effect, a counter *fatwa* was signed by the Ulema of Anatolia. Thus the foundation for open rupture between the Nationalists and the Caliphate was laid, which brought about disastrous consequences. In a proclamation issued earlier by Mustafa Kamal Pasha it was said:

'We shall have won the applause of mankind and shall pave the road to liberty which the Islamic world in yearning for, if we deliver the city of the Caliph from foreign influence and defend it with a religious fidelity in a manner worthy of our glory....God is with us in this holy war which we have entered upon for the independence of our country.'

Later a circular of the *National Assembly proclaimed*:

'Securing the independence of our country and the deliverance of the city of the Caliphate and Sultanate from the hands of enemies. The solemn character of this day will be profited by our offering solemn prayer in the course of which the light of the Quran and the call to prayer will be poured forth over all the believers.'

Later, however, the situation changed and the grand institution of Khilafat came to an end, in 1924.

A Khilafat Conference was hurriedly called which decided to send a deputation to England. Among other matters it accepted

the Hindu-Muslim settlement scheme of C. R. Das of Bengal which provided for representation in the Legislature and services for both communities in Bengal on a fifty-fifty basis. Mr. Das had gone to Coconada with this scheme to place it before the Congress but due to the opposition of Hindu members from U.P. he dropped the idea. There was another Khilafat Conference where Muslims were found actually weeping and crying at the abolition of the Khilafat institution which, with all its weaknesses, anti-Islamic trends and digression into pure imperialism, during its long history, had served as a symbol of Muslim political unity and a powerful inspiration for the Muslim mind in India to retain its international character. As a result of this catastrophe, for practically one decade they suffered from deep inertia and pessimism and were incapable of any organized mass action either for the freedom of India or for the protection of their own Muslim interests in the country. The Khilafat Committee continued for a few years more but it ceased to have a mass appeal or backing and was confined to a section of people who were sincerely struggling to retain the name of the organization rather than to achieve its purpose.

As time went on their energy also began to be misdirected and found its escape in fighting for offices in the organization or for the formation of new parties with new names but no programmes. The Khilafatists who were once known as Khilafat-Congressmen became Congress-Khilafatists and some, after some time, purely Congressmen. Others remained nothing but Khilafatists with no work. The history of the next sixteen years of Muslim India is a mass of confusion and a chapter of political benightedness. The disruption of the Khilafat organization was like a breach in the embankment of the flowing stream of Muslim mass emotion, which diverted it into several petty streams, some leading to desert lands there to dry up, some flowing by zig-zag routes to meet the original bed in their headlong march and some others rushing towards the mighty flowing ocean to drown themselves. To try to find any consistency, sound reasoning or logical method in Muslim politics during that period would be utterly futile. We were divided between ourselves, some rushing recklessly towards the Congress, without sufficient safeguards for the Muslims of India, some others raising their head to cling to the British raj with redoubled satisfaction. One section accused the other as the henchmen of the Congress and the Hindus. The other section attacked its opponents as the slaves of the British, and within each group there were different shades of opinion which even in their

pettiness were regarded as of great significance. The reader will have to judge for himself the history of these years with great caution and forbearance.

After an attack of appendicitis Gandhiji was released on 5 February 1924. He went to Juhu on the Indian coast near Bombay for recuperation. Mr. Das and Pandit Motilal Nehru, accompanied by me and a few other Swarajists, went there to discuss the Swaraj Party affairs with him. After discussion Gandhiji issued a statement in which he said: 'I am sorry to have to say that I have not been able to see eye to eye with the Swarajists. I retain the opinion that Council entry is inconsistent with nonco-operation as I conceive it.' Nevertheless, he expressed his opinion that the Delhi and Coconada resolutions having permitted Council entry, the Congress should not interfere in their programme of 'obstruction in the Legislatures.' This statement very much hurt Pandit Motilal and C. R. Das and they were obliged to issue a rejoinder to Gandhiji. They were particularly dissatisfied with the portion of Gandhiji's statement wherein he had indicated the lines of work in the Assembly. They said if they proceeded on those lines it would amount to complete obstruction for which they did not enter the Assembly, and pointed out that they did not use the word 'obstruction' in their programme in the technical sense of English parliamentary history. 'Obstruction' in that sense is impossible in a subordinate and limited legislative body. What they meant by 'obstruction' was 'resistance to the obstruction placed on their party' by the bureaucratic Government. When I glance at past history I wonder what would have been the situation if Gandhiji had given his blessing to the Swaraj Party. Anyone knowing Indian affairs can see that what the Congress secured in 1947 was not due to its civil disobedience movements, courting of imprisonment and passing 'Quit India' resolutions; it was the inevitable result of the acceptance by the Muslims of the creed of independence in 1937, which was soon after followed by the second World War. My assessment of the British mind is that they were more afraid of anti-British speeches in the Legislatures or a criticism of their policy in the Press than of a threat of law-breaking, for in that they found it their righteous duty to protect the law, whomsoever involved. Apart from the attitude of the British, the Council entry programme could have enabled the Congress to come to terms with the Muslims, as they had done before in connection with the Lucknow Pact.

XI

CONGRESS-SWARAJ CONTROVERSIES

1924—1925

SAYED Zahur Ahmad, Secretary of the Muslim League, consulted me as to whether the time had not come to reinforce the Muslim League as the Khilafat Committee appeared to be on its last legs. I concurred with him. We decided to invite Mr. Jinnah, who had attended only one meeting of the Council of the League in Calcutta in 1919, after his walk-out from the Council in December 1918, to preside over the Muslim League session at Lahore on 24 May 1924. It was a very well-attended session, more so because both the Khilafat and the League groups had come in large numbers. By this time a section in Punjab had already begun to realize the grave mistake committed at Lucknow by sacrificing Muslim majorities in Punjab and Bengal. In fact, some people in the minority provinces also felt the same way. In the Subjects Committee I proposed a resolution which after some amendments received the assent of the majority:

'(a) The existing provinces of India shall be united under a common Government on a federal basis so that each Province shall have full and complete provincial autonomy, the functions of the Central Government being confined to such matters only as are of joint or common concern.

(b) The basis of representation in the Legislature and in all other elected bodies shall be population, except that very small minorities may be given representation in excess of their numerical proportion in those cases in which they would remain entirely unrepresented in the absence of such exceptional treatment, subject however to the essential proviso that no majority shall be reduced to a minority and even to equality.'

Sir Abdul Qadir, who had taken a leading part in the drafting of the Resolution in the Subjects Committee, moved it in the open session also. After it had been duly seconded Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad moved an amendment to substitute the following clause in connection with the question of weightage:

'The mode of the representation in the Legislature and in all

other elected bodies shall guarantee an adequate and effective representation to minorities in every Province subject to the essential proviso that no majority shall be reduced to a minority or even to equality.'

Ghazi Abdur Rahman of Punjab opposed the amendment. He was followed by me and Maulana Mohammad Ali who also strongly stood in favour of the resolution and against the amendment. It was obvious that if the minority provinces stuck to the number of seats allocated to them in the Lucknow Pact, the Hindus would naturally refuse to allow Muslims to get their majorities in full in Bengal and Punjab. As Sir Fazle Husain threw his full weight in support of the amendment it was carried by a majority of 126 against 83. Providence was working for a different future else we would have thrown away our weightage to secure our majorities in Punjab and Bengal. In fact later on Sir Fazle Husain himself complained of the meagre majority secured by the Muslims in the Punjab after the first Round Table Conference.

Another resolution was passed, setting up a committee of the All-India Muslim League to consult with the Working Committee of the Central Khilafat Committee in framing a scheme in conference for the purpose of organizing public activities, etc. This Committee like many other such committees of the League never met nor ever conferred with its opposite number. In this session I was again elected Joint Secretary of the Muslim League, for three years.

After a big riot in the second week of September at Kohat, Gandhiji decided to observe a fast of twenty-one days from 18 September 1924, while he was a guest of Maulana Mohammad Ali in Delhi. In later days his fasts lost much of their significance amongst Muslims generally, but in those days he still occupied a place of great honour and prestige and the anxiety of Muslims for his life was very real. In spite of remonstrances from the Ali Brothers, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, Gandhiji remained adamant. Hurriedly a conference of leaders was called at Delhi, held under the presidentship of Pandit Motilal Nehru. During the discussions Muslims were asked to give their views. Maulana Ahmad Said who was a sweet speaker and a cool debater said that it would be better if some Hindus were asked this question as it was for them to explain what the Muslims had done since 1916 to deserve the treatment which they were meeting now at the hands of Shudhdhi and Sanghtan leaders. He pointed out that since 1920, when the Muslims threw in their lot with the Hindu majority without any reservation or de-

mands, they had not anticipated that most anti-Muslim movements would be headed and led by respected leaders of the Congress. No Hindu leader made any counter charge. However the conference adopted certain broad principles to be observed by both parties. The resolutions there referred to fundamental rights relating to liberty of holding and expressing religious beliefs, music before mosques, cow sacrifice, etc. The decisions were conveyed to Gandhiji with a request that the fast be now given up, to which he agreed. A day of rejoicing was observed on 8 October 1924.

One evening Sayed Wazir Hasan who had been appointed a judge and was now the Acting Judicial Commissioner of Oudh Court came to me and abruptly asked me: 'Why, when Tasadduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Khwaja Majid and Harkaran Nath have re-started their practices in the Law Courts, are you still continuing your boycott?' I replied that some sort of apology would be asked from me if I applied to be re-admitted to the profession. He assured me that I should have to do nothing more than to send my application to him in court, which I did. It was a great relief to me in those days because I was hard pressed for money both for my domestic needs as well as for my political activities.

While at Gaya I had been approached by a revolutionary group of Bengal to join their party, as the Congress civil disobedience had miserably failed to win freedom for India. I had expressed to them my inability to do so as I did not believe in their methods of work. Now a young gentleman came to see me at night with a request that I should give him some employment in the Municipal Board of which I was the Chairman, to provide for him some obvious means of livelihood in the town. I recognized him as one of the members of the party which I had seen in Gaya. I promised to give him employment if he brought a letter of recommendation from some Bengali gentleman whom I knew. He brought to me a letter of recommendation from Dr. Pathak who was known to me and he was given an appointment. After three or four months an express train running on the main line from Saharanpur to Lucknow was detrained between Kakori and Lucknow main station, a distance of nine miles, and the railway treasury looted, one man being killed in the process. It surprised the public to learn that Khan Bahadur Tasadduq Husain, the head of the C.I.D., who was supposed to have the ears even of the Viceroy, unearthed the conspirators in a mere five days and roped in Ram Prasad Azad and several others. The young man, named I believe Jogesh, whom I had

given a post in the Municipal Board, sent me a message that he would like to be defended by me. I made arrangements however for his defence by a Congress lawyer. The case was tried by Mr. Ainuddin who was the elder brother of my very dear deceased friend Nuruddin. I went to the court on the first day of the trial and was seated near Tasadduq, the C.I.D. chief. When I asked him to give me the names of the accused, pointing to Jogesh he said, 'Surely you know him; Choudhri Sahib, you gave him a post in the Municipal Board.' I was rather nonplussed and replied, 'I give posts to so many others also.' Shafiqullah, one of the main accused, who had absconded was later arrested. Several of them were hanged and many given long terms of imprisonment. In the Congress session in 1927 a resolution was passed condemning the inhuman sentences passed against the Kakori dacoity prisoners.

With Gandhiji's opposition disclosed in the Juhu talks on the one side and the Maharashtrian leaders' attempt to use the Swaraj Party as an instrument of opposition to the Gandhian philosophy, the Swaraj Party was in a tight corner. Besides Pandit Motilal Nehru was constantly opposed in his policies by Jawaharlal for the two could not see eye to eye on many problems with which the elder Pandit had to deal to satisfy the clamours of the Maharashtrian group. A perpetual conflict at home in the circumstances was very distasteful to the father who could not be dictated to by his youthful son. I often witnessed such scenes during my visits to the Anand Bhawan and wondered how long the father could stand the continuous strain of Jawaharlal's opposition.

In addition to all these difficulties Motilal's great discomfiture also came from the Muslim members of the Swaraj Party who after the loss of prestige of the Khilafat organization became sceptical about the wisdom of supporting that Party in all its activities within the Legislature. The attitude of the Congress towards the Swaraj Party became more hostile as Das on one occasion at Madras went so far as to declare that Gandhiji had bungled and mismanaged the negotiations with Lord Reading just before the Ahmedabad Congress in 1922. In fact he had been expressing such views in private talks since his release from jail, but in Madras he gave an open challenge to the 'no-changers' by criticizing Gandhiji's policy. Das was not keeping good health and a few days before his death he wrote to Pandit Motilal Nehru: 'The most crucial hour in our history is coming. There must be solid work done at the end of the year and the beginning of the next. All our resources will be taxed and here

we are both of us ill. God knows what will happen.'

A few days later, on 16 June 1925, Das expired at Darjeeling and closed the chapter of a life full of success, pathos, charity and goodwill. Before his death he had given away almost all his property as a legacy to the nation for charitable purposes. He earned lakhs and he gave them away to the revolutionaries, to the poor, to the needy and to all and sundry. He was too big a soul to be communal as is demonstrated by his desire to come to terms with the Muslims on a fifty-fifty basis both in the legislature and in the services in Bengal.

Once in June 1924 Mr. Das and Motilalji were staying in a house just in front of Dr. Ansari's residence in Daryaganj. While Motilalji was away Mr. Das suddenly asked me how many years' practice I had put in before I boycotted the Law Courts. I said three and a half years. He replied, 'Motilalji and I did it when we had made our pile but you did it at a very early age; you must be facing financial difficulties and as such you should not hesitate in letting me know if I can be of any service to you.' I thanked him profusely for his regard and assured him that I did not need any assistance. Nothing but human sympathy and a desire to give encouragement to his young co-workers could have induced him to make such a suggestion. His death was a great loss to India, and to me personally.

Sharif Husain was ousted from the Hijaz and he had to leave on a British ship for Malta. In India it was believed that the British were responsible for his exit, and the reason suggested was that the British Foreign Office was not satisfied with the arrangement in the Middle East, for the Sharifian family had secured not only the Hijaz but also Jordan and Iraq, thus acquiring a lion's share. So the Balkanization of the Middle East was now complete. King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia took full advantage of this situation and succeeded in defeating the Sharifi forces. On account of the triumph of the Saudi army, Sufis and Sufi Ulema in India became champions of Sharif Husain, he being a Hashmi of the Prophet's family, while the Wahabis with the help of a Sunni section in India started backing Sultan Abdul Aziz of Nejd. The Ali Brothers, relying on the assurance of King Abdul Aziz that he was not fighting Sharif Husain to become the King of Hijaz but to clear the country from one whose rule was most oppressive and brought about by treacherous means, extended their support to him with the additional backing of the group of Khilafat stalwarts, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Maulana Abdul Qadir Qasuri. Now the Khilafatists were openly divided into two groups, one

Saudi and the other Sharifi, this being another nail in its coffin for the Khilafat Party.

While this controversy was going on news was flashed on 23 August 1925 about the desecration of tombs including the tomb of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him) by the Saudi armies. The Central Khilafat Committee sent immediately a deputation to Ibn Saud consisting of Maulana Shafi Daudi, Maulana Irfan, Maulana Alim Siddiqui and Mr. Qamar Ahmad to explain to Sultan Abdul Aziz the point of view of the Indian Muslims, with regard to the future of Hijaz and the demolition of graves and monuments.

The Sufi Ulema however were not satisfied with this. I advised Maulana Inayatullah of Firangi Mahal not to hold a public meeting to denounce the Saudi action before the authenticity of the news was confirmed and full details were known. In spite of this a public meeting was held at the instance of Raja Nawab Ali of Akbarpur and the Raja of Salempur to denounce Sultan Abdul Aziz. Maulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi, the well-known Alim and writer, and Maulana Zafarul Mulk resented the action of Firangi Mahal Alims and rushed up to the Ali Brothers to bring them to Lucknow to address a rival meeting. As a matter of practice the Ali Brothers always stayed with their *Pir* (guide) Maulana Abdul Bari but this time both of them stayed with me on 20 October 1925. I think tactically it was wrong on our part because it caused a personal grievance against me in the Firangi Mahal section. The meeting was held the same evening but Maulana Mohammad Ali was not allowed to speak because of hooliganism in the meeting. As President I tried to pacify the audience as much as I could but there was a section which had come determined to make a disturbance. Finding it a hopeless task I dissolved the meeting, with the intention that it should be held later on at another place.

On 8 November 1925 the Ali Brothers again came and again stayed with me. In the meantime another delegation consisting of Mr. Shoaib Qureshi, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Maulana Irfan was sent by the Khilafat Committee to inquire and report on the extent of the damage done to the monuments and to find out the views of King Ibn Saud about the future of Hijaz. The next meeting was held in Mumtaz Orphanage, but there again the Sufi Ulema had sent their forces to prevent the meeting being held, and in this they succeeded. I had again to postpone the meeting because there was danger of a free lathi fight. Later on opposing groups agreed that if I did not preside

but someone else took the chair, the meeting would be allowed to be held. So Sayed Zahur Ahmad, Secretary of the All-India Muslim League, presided next day and Maulana Mohammad Ali was allowed to have his say. A full story of these incidents has been written by Maulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi in his *Diary of Maulana Mohammad Ali.*

After the death of Mr. Das the responsibility of keeping the Swaraj Party intact and under discipline had fallen on Pandit Motilal Nehru to whom Gandhiji wrote that since the Swaraj Party had a majority in the Congress and since Panditji was the President of the Swaraj Party he should also become President of the Congress. This clearly implied Gandhiji's dissatisfaction with Swaraj Party affairs.

The Muddimen Committee was appointed in 1924 and its report was considered on 17 September 1925 by the Central Assembly, wherein Pandit Motilal Nehru tabled an amendment to the Government motion, calling upon the Government for a declaration in Parliament, embodying fundamental changes in the constitutional machinery on the administration of India, as well as making the Government of the country fully responsible. He suggested that a Round Table Conference or some other suitable agency adequately representing Indian, European and Anglo-India interests, should be summoned to frame, with due regard to the interests of the minorities, a detailed scheme on the foregoing principles. The amendment was carried in the Assembly against the Government by seventy-five votes to forty-five. It should be noted here that the Muslim League resolution in its Lahore session on 25 May 1924 had demanded a Constitution based on federation, but the amendment to the Muddimen Committee report proposed by the Swaraj Party fell far short of that.

About the same time a committee was appointed by the Government under Lt. General Sir Andrew Skeen, Chief of Staff, to inquire whether it was necessary to establish a military college in India on the lines of Sandhurst. Pandit Motilal Nehru, Mr. Jinnah, and the Raja of Mahmudabad and others were members of this committee. Great objection was taken by Congressmen against Panditji for having accepted membership of this committee although looked at from a non-partisan spirit the committee was of very great importance to India and its aspirations for the independence of the country. Some of the Indian members of this committee including the Raja of Mahmudabad wrote dissenting notes.

While the Swaraj Party was doing all it could in the circum-

stances to keep the banner of the party aloft, the attitude of the Maharashtra group was dragging the party into a mess. Taking advantage of its attitude Tambay, a Maharashtrian of C. P., accepted Ministership under the advice of Dr. Moonje and Khaparde which gave a great blow to the Swarajist prestige.

The unfortunate tussle between Swarajists and the Congressmen had its effect on the general condition of Congress Committees, U.P. being no exception. As President of the Town Committee I found that members were reluctant to pay their subscriptions which often made me meet the expenses on salary of its employees, and the rent of the office, etc., from my own purse. Gandhiji fully realized the situation, so much so that he wrote in his paper in August 1925:

'I must no longer stand in the way of the Congress being developed and guided by educated Indians rather than by one like myself who has thrown in his lot entirely with the masses and who has fundamental differencies with the mind of educated Indians.'

Such utterances coming from Gandhiji were duly interpreted in the country as an indictment of the Swarajists and gave its opponents an opportunity to diminish their prestige.

These were the political trends when the Cawnpore Congress met under the presidentship of the well-known poetess of India, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu. When the members had taken their seats Pandit Jawaharlal whispered in my ear that Maulana Hasrat Mohani had taken up the cause of labour. who wanted to force their way to meet the leaders of the Congress to explain their grievances. They were stopped at the gate but they were threatening to break it and enter the Pandal. Jawaharlal, myself and Aziz Ansari went out to see what was happening. By this time the gate had been crashed and a large number of labour leaders had entered the compound. Aziz got a *danda* blow on his hand and I got a blow on my head and by the time that I realized the situation, I found that Maulana Hasrat Mohani was already inside the Pandal arguing with the President. However the matter was amicably settled and the Maulana was satisfied.

By the main resolution of the Congress in this session the Swarajists were called upon to vote for rejection of the Finance Bill and thereafter to retire from the Central Assembly for the reason that the Government had done nothing to settle terms with the Swaraj Party according to its resolution dated 18 February 1924. By another resolution, strange as it may seem, instead of the Swaraj Party selecting candidates and fighting

elections, authority was given to the Congress Party who were to select candidates for the Provincial and Central Legislatures.

Maulana Abdul Majid and Maulana Zafarul Mulk were bent on their demand for disbanding the 'Firangi Mahal Khilafat Committee,' and for the election of a new one. This Khilafat session was very well attended because of the sectarian quarrels. I supported Maulana Abdul Majid and the old Khilafat Committee was dissolved and a new one with Maulana Abdul Majid as President was formed, although Maulana Mohammad Ali was opposed to it.

Most of the Khilafatists and Muslim Congressmen soon after left for Aligarh where along with the League session the Golden Jubilee of Aligarh was also to be celebrated. The struggle between the two groups, the Khilafatists and the Muslim Leaguers, continued to haunt us even in this session. The main resolution proposed by the Muslim Leaguers consisted of a demand for a Royal Commission to formulate after due inquiry and investigation, a scheme aimed at placing the Indian constitution on a sound and permanent basis; provisions were to be added for automatic progress to establish full responsible Government in India and thereby secure stability in the Government and the willing co-operation of the people. The provisos in the resolution consisted of safeguards for the Muslim minority. Maulana Mohammad Ali proposed an amendment to the resolution by which he called upon the Government of India to concede Swaraj, for any constitution which fell short of it would be considered extremely unsatisfactory. Further he also called upon the Government of India to convene a Round Table Conference of the representatives of all communities and political parties in India, in terms of the demand made in February 1924 by the Legislative Assembly, for the purpose of framing a constitution of Swaraja Government etc. This amendment was disallowed by the President, Sir Abdur Rahim, who held that it was out of order because it was a substantive motion and not an amendment.

Maulana Abdul Bari passed away on 19 January 1926. As soon as I learnt of his illness I went to see him, and found that he had been suffering from an attack of paralysis from 7 January. I had often had some differences with him but I have never met a man with such a transparent heart and noble qualities. Being always immaculately dressed, with a charming smile on his face, with great erudition and a burning faith in Islam he was a true and last renowned descendant of the great family of Maulana Qutubuddin Shaheed of Sihali, District Bara-

banki. He was a man of property and spent his income on feeding poor and rich alike. I have already dealt with his services to the Muslim cause in the foregoing pages.

In the budget session of 1926 in accordance with the Cawnpore resolution Pandit Motilal Nehru staged a walk-out, but in spite of this step he could not bring about unity in the Swarajist camp in or outside the Assembly. The Maharashtrian Swarajists formed the Indian National Party on 3 April 1926, with the avowed object of accelerating the establishment of Swaraj on a Dominion pattern. It was an open challenge to Pandit Motilal Nehru and the Swaraj Party. A joint conference was held in which Mr. Kelkar, Mr. Jayakar, Dr. Moonje and Lala Lajpat Rai met Pandit Motilal and some other Swarajists and took certain decisions which were later disputed between the groups. Pandit Motilal Nehru declared that he had agreed to acceptance of office by the Swarajists on condition that the Ministers be made fully responsible to the Legislatures. The Maharashtrian group felt that Pandit Motilal Nehru had let them down by his interpretation of the proceedings. Thereupon Pandit Motilal declared the Pact to have fallen through. In consequence of these differences Lala Lajpat Rai resigned from the Swaraj Party within the Assembly.

XII

GENERAL ELECTIONS AND JOINT ELECTORATES

1926—1927

THE GENERAL elections took place in November 1926. We have seen before that the first elections under the 1919 Constitution had been boycotted by Congress and it was not represented in the U.P. Council from 1920 to 1923. There was great agrarian trouble during this period due to the after-effects of war. The elected members had no courage to face the public in meetings or conferences to explain their policy in the legislative sphere. Whatever good was done during this period, the public was apt to ascribe to the strength and power of the Congress and the Khilafat outside the Assembly. The amendment to the Oudh Rent Act, which gave the security of tenure for a tenant's life and for five years after his death and by which he could be ejected from his holding only for non-payment of rent, had been ascribed by the masses to the influence of the Congress nonco-operation movement. They thought that otherwise neither the Government nor the landlords would have allowed the bill to be passed. There were some very respectable, honest and sincere members in the Council like Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, Iqbal Narain Gurtu, Sir Raza Ali, Mohammad Ismail and Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan who would have made their mark in any Assembly. But the cries of *Jai* and *Murdabad* drowned their fluent and well-prepared speeches within the dome of the Council Chamber and the credit for all good work done went to the nonco-operators. In short the Councils were looked upon by the masses as stalking horses for titled gentry and landlords.

With this background it was hoped that in the 1926 elections we should fare better, but our estimates did not turn out to be correct. Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant who was a forceful and eloquent speaker, perhaps the best in the Indian Legislatures, was elected and again chosen as the leader of the U.P. Council.

Among the Muslim new-comers there was Raja Sayed Ahmad Ali Alvi. The Raja of Mahmudabad had retired as Home Member in 1925 and he was succeeded by Nawab Chhatari. Nawab Mohammad Yusuf became one of the Ministers.

Pandit Motilal stood for the Assembly from the Allahabad constituency and ultimately won the seat though at a very great cost; he won the election but lost considerably himself. It was a tragedy. To our great surprise when his nomination paper was about to be filed news was received that Malviaji was going to contest him in the same constituency. I was afraid that if that happened we would lose Motilalji's seat in view of the atmosphere prevailing after the crop of riots from 1923 to 1926. Talks of compromise were started and Malviaji agreed to contest some other seat; nevertheless he set up a Mahant from the Allahabad constituency to fight Panditji. With regard to the pattern of the propaganda that was carried on I can do no better than quote Panditji's own version in the Congress session of Gauhati:

'There has been a veritable rout of the Swarajists; defeat is not the word for it. But this was not because they were Swarajists but because they were Nationalists. The political programme of the various parties had nothing to do with the elections. It was a fight between the forces of nationalism and those of a low order of communalism, reinforced by wealth, wholesale corruption and terrorism. Religion in danger was the cry of the opponents of the Congress, both Hindus and Muslims. I have been fully denounced as a beef-eater and destroyer of cows, an opponent of prohibition, of music before the mosque, and one man responsible for stoppage of the Ramlila procession in Allahabad. I could only contradict this in public meetings but they permeated hamlets and villages which I could not reach. Staying in Dak and Inspection Bungalows and eating food cooked in European style was taken to confirm the lying propaganda.'

If big and respectable Hindu personalities could be so run down for their toleration of some of the practices enumerated above, what must be the fate of those in independent India who believe in and follow them. Such were the bricks and mortar on which the foundation of Pakistan was being laid.

I was not willing to stand as a Swarajist candidate because I knew I would be defeated. Separate electorates were looked upon by Muslims as their valuable safeguard. If I stood, I would have to plead for joint electorates and that would destroy my chances of success. Pandit Motilal would not allow me to stay away; so I yielded. I was opposed by Raja Ahmad Ali Khan of

Salempur who defeated me by over 700 votes. However on the whole in the Central Assembly we were able to maintain our strength though in the provinces we had suffered reverses.

After this defeat of the Swarajists the Congress session was held at Gauhati in December 1926. The news that a Muslim had killed Swami Shardhanand had naturally caused great resentment in the Hindu camp. Mr. Srinavasa Aiyangar who presided over this session condemned the acceptance of office in unequivocal terms. The one important thing that was effected in this Congress was to call upon the Working Committee to take immediate steps in consultation with the Hindu and Muslim leaders to devise means for the removal of the present deplorable differences between the two communities and to submit their report to the A.I.C.C. not later than 31 March 1927.

The Muslim League session of 1926 was held in Delhi under the presidentship of Sir Abdul Qadir and here again a big committee to draft a Constitution was appointed. There was nothing else of any importance done in this session except the decision to shift the Central All-India Muslim League office from Lucknow to Delhi. As I could not perform my duties as Joint Secretary there, I resigned from the office that I had held continuously for ten years.

On 6 July 1926, Mr. Sobani died at Bombay at the early age of thirty-six years. I left by the first available train to Bombay and reached there on 8 July. Usman Sobani, his younger brother, had come to receive me. A great Muslim soul had passed away. I have already mentioned how he ruined his fortune in his efforts to raise money for the Angora Fund. He had a great, charitable disposition and works of art of all kinds were patronized by him often not so much for the art itself but as a measure of charity towards the artists. Neatly dressed but always in his *sherwani* and tight pyjamas he looked a model of refinement and decency. Gandhiji was sad at his death and wrote the following about him in *Young India*:

'His untimely and sudden death has removed a patriot from the country. There has been no movement in this country in which before the financial crisis, he did not make magnificent contributions. He never cared to come on the public platform but he loved to remain the stage manager. He was very popular in his business community. In one month he doubled his wealth but in the next lost everything. He bore his losses bravely and his proud nature did not permit him to serve the country after the loss of millions of rupees. If he could not be the first on the list of subscriptions then he thought it was better for him to retire from public life. His life is an example for wealthy

young men and we all should have love for the country like Umar Sobani. Whatever example he has left us may God give us strength to keep.'

Gandhiji had retired from politics from the first week of November 1926 and after a year of inactivity he was invited by the Viceroy to meet him in Delhi so that he might be informed of the Secretary of State's proposed announcement of 8 November 1927, regarding the appointment of the Simon Commission. Pandit Motilal Nehru, who was in London at that time, expressed his complete disapproval at the appointment of the Commission consisting only of Englishmen and no Indians. The Commission was charged with the duty of inquiring into the working of the system of Government, the development of representative institutions in British India and matters connected therewith, and reporting whether and to what extent it was desirable to establish the principle of responsible Government, etc., etc. All the Indian parties, Congress, Muslim League and the Khilafat Committee decided to have nothing to do with the Commission.

Khilafatists who stood for Swaraj without any conditions were naturally wedded to the joint electorates but to the great surprise of all, in a conference at Delhi of Hindu and Muslim leaders on 20 March 1927, as a result of the Congress Gauhati Resolution which had recommended negotiations between the communities, a manifesto was issued in which the Muslim League accepted joint electorates with reservation of seats on a population basis in the provinces and with one-third of the total number of seats in the Central Legislature. The condition was made that reforms should be introduced in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan and that Sind should be formed into a separate province. The Muslim side was led by Mr. Jinnah. Sir Shafi, however, was very much shocked at the attitude of Mr. Jinnah for having accepted joint electorates and as we shall see later he formed the 'Shafi League' in the Punjab. These peace proposals were later submitted to the A.I.C.C. on 16 May 1927, at Bombay. In this most important meeting Dr. Moonje, the then President of the Hindu Mahasabha, Mr. Kelkar, the ex-President of Hindu Mahasabha, Mr. Jayakar and Mr. Aney, the other two greatly trusted Hindu leaders, were not only present but also expressed their views. It should be noted that Mr. Kelkar in his presidential address at Cawnpore Hindu Mahasabha session had said that there should be reservation of seats on a population basis in every province. Mr. Kelkar had been advocating separation of Sind from Bombay for the previous

thirteen years before this was claimed by the Muslim League in 1925. In this Bombay meeting of the A.I.C.C. Pandit Motilal Nehru moved the following resolution:

'The A.I.C.C. approves and adopts the Resolution of the Working Committee on the Hindu-Muslim question and the recommendation contained therein and calls upon the Congress organization to take necessary steps to have the same recommendation carried out.'

In his speech he said: 'I am of opinion that nothing better could have been proposed under the circumstances to remove the unfortunate communal rancour and animosity.' Dr. Moonje on 16 May 1927 issued a Press statement even before the A.I.C.C. meeting. This was to the effect that the 'Hindu Mahasabha emphasizes the principle of joint electorates and reservation of seats on a population basis.' He also declared that he 'had no objection to the resolution of the A.I.C.C. if it is being voted upon as a whole.'

Mr. Kelkar in the A.I.C.C. meeting said that, as the amended resolution stood, his conscience was clear in the matter and he voted for it. Mr. Jayakar 'very willingly supported the amendment.'

Dr. Ansari was to preside over the Madras session. The Ali Brothers, myself and many of his friends travelled by the same train with Dr. Ansari to Madras. Before the open session began, private negotiations between Dr. Ansari, ourselves and Malviaji took place. When Malviaji endorsed the Bombay A.I.C.C. resolution, he was embraced by the Ali Brothers. Thereafter the resolution of the Congress declared that the goal of India was 'Independence'. A resolution for boycott of the Simon Commission was also passed.

Soon after the Madras session was over all of us started for Calcutta. At Bezwada we learnt of the sad and sudden demise of that great physician Hakim Ajmal Khan, who had died of heart failure at Delhi. As trustee of the Aligarh College and later of the same University he belonged to the advanced group. The Khilafat organization had been nursed by him with the zeal worthy of a great Muslim. It was under his benign influence that the Ulema organization was formed of which he was a very respectable member. Like the Ali Brothers he had thrown in his lot with the Congress and served it most sincerely. He belonged to a renowned family of physicians of Delhi and was respected throughout the country for his professional proficiency and knowledge. People from all over India used to come to Delhi to consult him medically. With a charming personality

and immense devotion to his profession he had an influence in the country possessed by very few Muslims. After the crop of riots during the years 1924-26, he had lost hope of any real concord between Hindus and Muslims and ruefully talked about it to me on one occasion while on a journey to Rampur. This was my last meeting with my dear and respected friend.

Sir Mohammad Yaqub presided over the Calcutta Muslim League session, and a resolution on the lines of the Delhi decisions of the Muslim League of 20 March 1927 was passed. The Shafi League came in for adverse criticism and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan went so far as to demand Sir Mohammad Shafi's elimination from the League. When I look back to our politics of that period I sometimes wonder what we were aiming at and whether we had left any sense of proportion in the heat of controversy between the Muslim groups. The only valuable right won for the Muslims, by Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, the worthy successor of Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, was the right of separate electorates against which not only were we arrayed but also we actually cursed those who stood by this demand.

XIII

SIMON COMMISSION AND ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCES

1928—1929

IN EARLY 1928 Lord Irwin had announced that a Joint Select Committee of the Central Legislature chosen from its non-official members would be appointed to convey their views to the Simon Commission, as a measure to soften Indian opposition. The Government, having failed to get this proposal endorsed by the Central Legislature, nominated seven Indian members who agreed to work with the Commission. The Simon Commission arrived in Bombay on 3 February and there was a *hartal* there. In Madras police had to open fire, in which two persons died and similarly in Calcutta there was a clash between students and police. In Delhi also there was a big demonstration on the arrival of the Commission there. When the people assembled in Lahore to demonstrate against the Commission the police attacked the demonstrators with lathi blows. Lala Lajpat Rai was one of the victims of this assault and later on succumbed to his injuries.

The Raja of Mahmudabad had whispered in my ear a few days before the visit of Simon Commission that something novel must be done in Lucknow to show our opposition and suggested kites and balloons with paper posters in bold letters 'Simon Go Back.' As President of the Congress Committee of Lucknow I had arranged a meeting of the Congress at Narhi near Hazratganj which was addressed by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant and myself. After the meeting we proceeded in a procession towards Aminuddaulah Park where we had to address another meeting. Hardly had we gone about half a furlong when from the other side mounted police waving their long sticks appeared. Jawaharlal received a blow. Pandit Pant and myself got our share. Some others were also injured. We squatted down on the ground and refused to move. After some time we were allowed to proceed to Aminabad.

Nothing further happened that evening. Next morning we assembled near the Maidan, on Station Road, which was cordoned off from the main road, as it was decided to take the Commission by that road to the Government House. Here again horsemen suddenly appeared and began to disperse the crowd from the Maidan. My brother Dr. Salimuzzaman and I myself narrowly escaped being crushed. By the time the ground was cleared the Commission had moved on to Government House. There was pelting from both sides before finally the crowd was dispersed. I had arranged another meeting to be held, after the incident at the station, at Hazratganj, but the roads were blocked and I was not allowed to proceed there. While returning to my house I stopped at Pandit Harkaran Nath's place, and told him that the best place to show a black flag to the Commission would be the second storey of Babu Basdeo Lal's house as it overlooked the lawn where the Commission was to be given a tea party by the Taluqdars, in the Kaisar Bagh quadrangle.

From my house I started flying 'Simon go back' kites, of which, the wind favouring, I cut the thread to make them drop over the party ground. It became a tamasha for all the guests at the party, the kites falling there one after the other on poles and on roofs. After the kites I began the flight of balloons with bold letters 'Simon Go Back,' which also were a sight for Lucknowites and the Taluqdars. As arranged with Pandit Harkaran Nath Misra, he along with Pandit Jagannath Prasad Shukla and several others went to the house and showed black flags. They were arrested but later released. My house was surrounded by police under a sergeant who wanted to arrest me. I asked him to bring a warrant of arrest, but sunset came without his return.

To give effect to the Madras Congress resolution an All-Parties Conference was summoned at Delhi in February 1928. It is interesting to note that with regard to the reservation of seats for the majorities in Punjab and Bengal, in spite of previous agreement as indicated in the foregoing pages, it was again discussed in this Conference. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh leaders were now found to be strongly opposed to any reservation for the Muslims, while the Muslim League was equally strongly in its favour. Instead of sticking to the original position of the Congress resolution, discussion began of the principle of proportional representation by single transferable vote, or some similar method, as a substitute for Muslim reservation of seats. The Conference was attended by Mr. Motilal Nehru, Mr. Jinnah, Maulana Mohammad Ali, Pandit Malvia, Nawab Ismail Khan, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mrs. Naidu, Srinavasa Aiyangar, Pandit

Jawaharlal Nehru, Seth [illegible]
The services of Mr. Shuaib Qureshi as Secretary of [illegible]ference were appreciated. Dr. Moonje had appended a [illegible] 9 March 1928 in which he expressed views, which if followed would have rendered the separation of Sind from Bombay an impossibility. The Hindu leadership lost the chance of securing their pet theme of a joint electorate, to which even the Muslim League under Mr. Jinnah's guidance had committed itself on 20 March 1927, and subsequently by the decision of the Calcutta All-India Muslim League session. Let the Hindu youth of India ponder over these bunglings of their leadership at that time before they blame Muslims for the partition of the country.

In accordance with the decision of the All-Parties Conference, a meeting again took place on 9 May at Bombay, presided over by Dr. Ansari. Here a Committee consisting of Mr. Aney, Sir Ali Imam, Mr. Shuaib Qureshi, Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, Mr. Jayakar, Mr. Joshi, Mr. Pardhan and Sardar Mangal Singh with Pandit Motilal as its Chairman was appointed to report its recommendations by 1 July 1928.

I had not been keeping good health and had gone to Simla for a change of climate. Not being a member of the Committee I was surprised when Shuaib Qureshi and Maulana Shaukat Ali wired to me to come to Allahabad, but when I received a similar message from Pandit Motilal Nehru, I thought there was something serious adrift; so I decided to go. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had come to receive me at the station as I always used to stay with him but Shuaib insisted on my staying with Tasadduq where he was also staying and Jawaharlal smilingly agreed to release me. At Tasadduq's residence I learnt that a few non-members had been invited by the Committee and I was one of them. Dr. Ansari on the one side and Shuaib and Maulana Shaukat Ali on the other were vehemently opposed to each other's views. Shuaib thought that as the fifty-one per cent reservation for Punjab Muslims had been agreed upon, there should be no change under any circumstance, for in his opinion Punjab Muslims being very much in debt to the Hindu money-lenders, there was danger of undue influence on Muslim voters from the Hindu side. Dr. Ansari did not agree with him. So far as the reservation of fifty-one per cent was concerned, I looked at it as mere eye-wash. With joint electorates being there, it was impossible to conceive that there would be no election contests between the Muslim candidates themselves and each one would seek the support of the Sikh or the Hindu voters

to win the [illegible]. Besides I thought that we should at least agree to give up our weightage in the minority provinces so as to be able to claim that the weightage given to the Sikhs from thirteen to twenty per cent should also be withdrawn, which might give us a workable majority; a proposition for which I had been fighting since the Lahore session of the League in 1924. In the meeting, when the question of representation and weightage came up, I opposed weightage for the Muslim minority and also for the Sikh minority in Punjab. It was accepted. So far as the revision of the decision about fifty-one per cent reservation for Muslims was concerned, the matter was not discussed on that day in my presence. Everything happened to have gone well on that day and next morning I left with Shuaib for Lucknow. On 20 July, Pandit Motilal Nehru issued a circular letter to the members of the Committee followed by a personal letter dated 24 July stating the reasons which led to the necessity of reconsideration of the decision arrived at on 7 July 1928. The circular letter read as follows:

'It was on the morning of 8th July when some of the non-Members who attended an informal conference had already left, one of them, Mr. T. A. K. Sherwani, drew pointed attention to the reservation of the Muslim minority in the Central Legislature.... The communal question is essentially a Hindu-Muslim question and must be settled on that basis. We shall indeed be doing poor service if in our attempt to settle it we let it loose on the country, to swallow up communities and sub-communities most of whom had not even dreamt of it.... But as I have already pointed out the Muslim minority stands on a different footing from others. The question we have to ask ourselves is "Are we doing any injustice to other minorities?" I hope I have shown above that we are not.... We have already arrived at a common understanding to do away with separate electorates and reservation of seats for Muslim majority and weightage for other minorities, three greatest obstacles in the way of our political advancement. As we cannot have the opportunity of discussing this important question across the table I have dealt with it more fully than was perhaps necessary.'

When the circular letter was received Shuaib was still staying with me at Lucknow. He thought that Pandit Motilal Nehru had no right to hold another meeting to revise the decision of 7 July. I disagreed with him. Every Committee has a right to revise its decision; as such we could not allege illegality against the proposal. There were only two courses open to him, either to let the Committee do whatever it liked or to go there again and fight for his point of view. Shuaib wrote a letter to Panditji explaining the standpoint for which he had been fighting all

along and that the question of representation of Muslims in the Central Legislature had not been discussed nor decided upon. The Committee, however, accepted Pandit Motilalji's views.

After the Allahabad Conference it was proposed by Pandit Motilal Nehru to hold a Nationalist Conference at Calcutta in support of the Nehru Committee Report. But about the end of July Dr. Ansari came to Lucknow and asked me to hold the Conference there. Later on Pandit Motilal Nehru also wrote to me to that effect. The Conference was held on 28 August in the Kaisar Bagh under the presidentship of Dr. Ansari.*

In this Conference the Muslim representatives from Punjab and the Sikhs accepted joint electorate without reservation of seats for the majority or the minority, a point on which I had laid stress at the Allahabad meeting of the Nehru Committee. Maulana Shaukat Ali who was staying at Lucknow at the time did not attend the Conference and along with Shuaib issued a separate statement opposing those portions of the report which were in dispute at Allahabad. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose accepted the report with a proviso that they did not give up their demand of complete independence for India. In his speech Jawaharlal Nehru made a remark against the titled gentry, as unnecessary in the modern set-up of society, which was very much resented by the Raja of Mahmudabad and Raja Sir Rampal Singh who left the Conference. With great difficulty they were prevailed upon to attend the next session where a resolution was passed that 'All titles to private and personal property lawfully acquired and enjoyed at the establishment of the commonwealth are hereby guaranteed.' The Nehru Report, after two days of discussion, was passed in this Conference. It should, however, be noted that the Sikhs who had accepted the withdrawal of weightage in the Punjab, a little later resiled from their position.

As a result of these incidents the relations between Maulana Shaukat Ali and Shuaib on the one side and Dr. Ansari on the other were so rudely shaken that for some time they were not even on speaking terms. I do not know why I was spared, for the same fault for which Dr. Ansari was made the butt of Maulana Shaukat Ali's anger.

The Nehru Report was again discussed in the A.I.C.C. meeting on 4 and 5 November 1928 and was accepted.

The Congress session was held at Calcutta in December under

*Amongst those present were Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Ali Imam, Sir C. Sankaran Nair, Mr. Sachita Nanda Sinha, Sir C. P. Ramaswamy, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Choudhri Fazlul Haq, the Raja of Mahmudabad, Raja Nawab Ali and Abu Husain Sarkar.

the presidentship of Pandit Motilal Nehru. Once again the All-India Muslim League session under the presidentship of the Raja of Mahmudabad and the Khilafat Committee under the presidentship of Maulana Mohammad Ali were held about the same time at Calcutta. From their very nature these sessions were very stormy. As for the Congress the younger section was determined to end co-operation in the Legislatures, demanded complete independence for India and resumption of civil disobedience. In the Muslim League there was a division between the supporters of the Nehru Report and its opponents. In the Khilafat Committee, the Punjab Group led by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, and the Bengal Group led by Maulana Akram Khan, Ashrafuddin Choudhri and Fazlul Haq, were in favour of compromise with the Congress, while the new Khilafat Committee of Calcutta, with Shaheed Suhrawardy leading it, was against any compromise with the Congress on the reservation for the majority in respect of Punjab Muslims. As for the Muslim League, I shall deal with it after I have discussed the Congress resolution. Gandhiji moved a resolution in the Subjects Committee of the Congress as follows:

> 'This Congress having considered the Constitution recommended by the All-Parties Committee Report welcomes it as a great contribution towards the solution of India's political and communal problems and congratulates the Committee on the virtual unanimity of its recommendations, and whilst adhering to the resolution relating to complete independence passed at Madras the Congress adopts the Constitution drawn up by the Committee as a step of political advance, especially as it represents the just measure of agreement attained amongst the important parties in the country, provided however that the Congress shall not be bound by the Constitution if it is not accepted on or before 31 December 1929, and provided further that in the event of non-acceptance by the British Parliament of the Constitution by that date the Congress will revive non-violent nonco-operation by advising the country to refuse taxation and every aid to the Government.
>
> Nothing in this resolution shall interfere with the propaganda for familiarizing people with the goal of independence, in so far as it does not conflict with the prosecution of the campaign for the adoption of the said Report.'

A convention was also held, in which leaders of all parties were represented, including the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah opened the discussion by calling upon the conference to accept the proposals of the Muslim League which were contained in the All-Parties Conference held on 20 March 1927, laid stress on the value of settling Hindu-Muslim problems, and expressed

his disapproval of the recommendations of the Nehru Report. For the first time Maulana Mohammad Ali and Mr. Jinnah appeared on the same platform to plead for a common cause and to speak on the same subject and to voice the same sentiments. Maulana Mohammad Ali's speech was like the burst of a crater, emitting lava, smoke and dust, full of hard hits, insinuations and threats. He was followed by Sir Tej Bahadur Supru, the most sedate and non-communal leader in India, whose fairness in communal matters proceeded also from the fact that he was attached to the Liberal Party which gave greater importance to the settlement of communal matters than even to independence. He expressed his opinion that without reservation for the Muslim majority in the Punjab, with joint electorates they could expect to secure about sixty per cent seats in the local legislature. In spite of whatever he said, he ultimately advised the Convention to accept the Muslim demands. Mr. Jayakar who followed Sir Tej was no better. He made all-round personal attacks against both Mr. Jinnah and Maulana Mohammad Ali and appeared to be more communal in his approach than even the worst communalists. Many others spoke but the fate of the country was sealed after these four speeches. The heavens would not have fallen if a few amendments that were proposed had been generously accepted and the sad chapter of communal bickering and disharmony closed. The shortsightedness of Hindu politicians on this occasion could not be surpassed. The Muslims had offered to deprive themselves of the most valuable right of separate electorates in favour of joint electorates, which far-sighted statesmanship would have tried to secure at any cost, but events were leading up to something else which fate had ordained. It is true that Muslim opinion was divided, but Congress by one stroke of genius could have brought cohesion among them and used the entire mass of Muslim opinion in their struggle for independence.

The Khilafat Committee session was a battle-ground between two sections of Khilafatists, the supporters of the Nehru Report and its opponents. There was such tension in the atmosphere, each suspecting the other of favouring one or the other side, that a peaceful discussion of the issues appeared to be impossible. Both Ansari and myself left the meeting because it had become a market place. We learnt later that the majority rejected the Nehru Report but the defeated group next day held a separate meeting, accepting the Report.

As we have seen before the Raja of Mahmudabad had already voted for the Nehru Report in the Lucknow Conference.

Consistently he could not be expected to oppose it in the League session. Mr. Jinnah was the President of the Muslim League and was opposed to the Nehru Report. How he hoped that the Raja of Mahmudabad, presiding over the session of the League, would change his views about the Nehru Report was a surprise to me. As a result of this duality in the League policy there was no address from the Chair and no controversial issue was raised from any side, in order to avoid voting. Never before in my life had I seen a more meaningless and vague direction given by a political party to its delegates, there being a clear-cut division between the members of the Council. As a result everyone was left free to follow his own line of policy at the All-India Convention. However, one fact came out clearly during this meeting, that there was no one to plead for the retention of separate electorates and both the groups were committed to joint electorates. Now looking back thirty years it will appear that what was left was more foam than reality. The following resolution was passed:

'That the following gentlemen be appointed delegates to represent the League and to take part in the deliberations of the Convention called by the Indian National Congress. These delegates will take into careful consideration and attach due weight to the views on the communal question expressed in the Sub-Committees and the open session of the League and will endeavour to bring about an adjustment of the various outstanding questions between Hindus and Musalmans arising out of the Nehru Report. These Delegates will report the result of their labour to the League by 28th or 29th instant, for the League to take its decision thereon. The names of the delegates are:

The Raja of Mahmudabad, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, Mr. M. C. Chagla, Malik Barkat Ali, Maulvi Abdul Hamid, Maulvi Mujibur Rahman, Dr. Mahmud, Maulvi Hisamuddin, Maulvi Mohammad Akram Khan, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Seth Yaqub Hasan, Ghazi Abdur Rahman, Abdullah Barelvi, Tasadduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Choudhri Khaliquzzaman, Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan, Maulvi Mazhar Ali, Shah Mohammad Zuber, Maulvi Abdul Karim, Maulvi Mohammad Islam, Maulvi Azizul Haq, Maulvi Faiz Noor Ali.'

No report was submitted to the League and no meeting of the organization was held thereafter.

Muslim mass opinion was definitely against the acceptance of joint electorates by Mr. Jinnah in the Peace Conference of 20 March 1927. In consequence the Shafi League was formed. As a further expression of their desire to show their opposition to acceptance of joint electorates, Nawab Chhatari, the Raja

of Salempur, Nawab Yusuf and several other members of the League, Taluqdars and zamindars invited H.H. the Aga Khan to preside over the Muslim All-Parties Conference at Delhi on 31 December 1928. This date was specifically chosen to facilitate the attendance of those members of the Muslim League who had gone to attend the Calcutta Convention. Both Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali left Calcutta for Delhi to attend this Conference; even Nawab Ismail Khan did the same. After three days' deliberations the following decisions were taken by the Conference:

1. The Government of India should be federal.
2. Residuary power to vest in the Provinces and States.
3. Any Bill opposed by three-fourths members of any community present shall not be proceeded with.
4. Right of separate electorates of Muslims to remain intact till they themselves give it up.
5. One-third representation of Muslim members in the Central Legislature.
6. Retention of the present basis of representation in the provinces where the Muslims are in a minority.
7. No majority to be converted into minority or equality.
8. Reforms be introduced in Baluchistan and in the N.W.F.P.
9. Separation of Sind.
10. Reservation for Muslims in the services.
11. Protection of Muslim culture, language, religion and education, personal laws and *auqaf*.
12. Proper representation to Muslims in Education Department of the Government.
13. No change in the Constitution of India to be brought about without the willing consent of the provinces.
14. No change in the Constitution of India to be brought about without the willing consent of the Indian States.

This Conference would also have been a failure if it had not stuck to separate electorates, for therein lay the real safeguard for the Muslims of India in the minds of the Muslim public. Democracy is like a creeper, which, if allowed to grow uncontrolled, in time envelops every branch of political life, and had once joint electorates been brought into the Constitution it would have been impossible for the Muslims to secure Pakistan. One can understand H.H. the Aga Khan's attachment to separate electorates, for it was under his leadership that the Muslim deputation to the Viceroy in October 1906 had claimed that right, under the advice of Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, and finally won acceptance by the British Government in 1909.

Three months after the Muslim All-Parties Conference at Delhi the Muslim League session which was postponed at Calcutta met again, in the last week of March 1929, under the

presidentship of Mr. Jinnah at Delhi. The Khilafatists had gone fully prepared to fight for the Nehru Report and others were equally determined to see it rejected. Mr. Jinnah was very late in coming to the session as he was negotiating with the Sir Shafi group their acceptance of the fourteen points of the All-Parties' Muslim Conference and in the meantime we voted Dr. Alam to take the chair. Immediately after the election of the President, discussion on the Nehru Report started and was in full swing when Rafi Qidwai called me outside to inform me that there was a danger that there would be a mass raid on the hall. Hardly had he finished talking when hundreds of people from outside knocked down the doors of the hall and threw out the supporters of the Nehru Report one by one, clearing the hall. Mr. Jinnah came in soon after and in this meeting the fourteen points which were originally propounded by the Muslim Conference held at Delhi in December were accepted by the Muslim League, with the modification that when all the other points had been accepted by the Congress the League might agree to joint electorates. These points were later described by the Hindu Press as 'Mr. Jinnah's fourteen points.'

The mob which had burst into the hall was led by Sayed Shamsul Hasan, Assistant Secretary of the Muslim League, who is still alive in Karachi. Some of those who had been thrown out of the hall attributed it to the policy of the Muslim League High Command and started thinking of forming a Muslim Nationalist Party. There was a meeting of the A.I.C.C. in Allahabad on 5 July 1929, where the question of forming a new party came into the forefront. The Congress was naturally anxious that the Nationalist Muslims should have an independent organization to support the Congress programme and the Nehru Report. Since 1923, when the Civil Disobedience programme had been suspended. a large number of new Hindu and Muslim faces had come into the Congress ranks. The Hindu entrants were generally imbued with the Sanghtan spirit and came into the Congress fold with *khaddar* on their bodies and *tilak* in their hearts; while many of the Muslims, whatever may have been their strength of conviction for the freedom of India. were losing their self-respect and were more interested in securing Congress offices than offering honest guidance. Not only were they discarding their traditions to suit the colour and bias of Hindu cultural trends but also they were degrading themselves by sycophancy and utter humility, each individual however claiming to represent Muslim thought. As there was no body of opinion inside or outside the Congress for ventilating

organized nationalist views frankly and honestly, I hoped that the establishment of this organization might serve to arrest such an undisciplined exhibition of loyalty to Congress, misleading its leaders and dragging it into dark alleys. I talked to Dr. Ansari about my views and we decided to form the organization with the idea that it would serve as a check on the personal ambitions of some who were out to gain personal ends.

We met at Tasadduq Sherwani's house on 27 July 1929, where we found many Punjabi and Bengali representatives also. Dr. Alam first insisted that every Muslim Nationalist member of the party should be also a member of the Congress, but I vehemently opposed it. I pointed out the case of the Raja of Mahmudabad who was in many respects a much better Nationalist than many others but who for reasons well known could not join the Congress organization. Ultimately my view prevailed. The party was formed with Dr. Ansari as President and myself as Secretary. In *Roshan Mustaqbil*, it is averred that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was the President of this organization and Tasadduq Ahmad was the Secretary which is utterly baseless. As a matter of fact there were two Muslims particularly in the Congress who, although they did not oppose the formation of the party, yet kept themselves quite aloof from it, and they were Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Rafi Qidwai.

The new party was formed and subscriptions from the members present were announced. By its very nature it could have no roots in Muslim society and it did not make much headway either. Under its name no doubt several conferences were held as we shall see hereafter but it had no rules or regulations, no separate membership and no separate office. Being backed by the Hindu Sabha Press it lived in the newspapers all right but beyond that it had no positive existence. My idea that it might serve to bring about some discipline in Nationalist Muslim ranks did not materialize because the remedy was not potent enough to eradicate the evil.

Lord Irwin issued a statement on 31 October 1929 in which he said:

'The goal of British policy was stated in the declaration of August 1917, to be that of providing for the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to progressive realization of responsible Government of India as an integral part of the British Empire. . . . Ministers of the Crown moreover had more than once publicly declared that it is the desire of the British Government that India should in the fullness of time take her place in the Empire in equal partnership with the Dominions.'

Proceeding further the Viceroy announced the intention of the Government to hold a conference of leaders of parties to discuss matters relating to the Constitution. The Congress unfortunately started making immediate demands for a change of policy by grant of an amnesty to political prisoners. The Congress also declared that the conference should meet not to discuss as to when Dominion Status was to be established but rather to frame the scheme of a Dominion Constitution for India.

Pandit Motilal accepted the 'Simri Taluqa' case in the Chief Court of Oudh which brought him to Lucknow where he stayed for three weeks in December 1929 at Mahmudabad House. I used to meet him daily after my court work and took him out for drives in my car. As he had been advised by a yogi to undertake a particular kind of exercise, which he did every day by raising his legs up and head down with the help of a wooden structure, he prescribed the same exercise for me also. After the exercise I generally used to stay for dinner with him, when he used to discuss the political situation with particular reference to the Hindu-Muslim question. He was not happy with the Calcutta Congress resolution which had given the British Government one year to satisfy the Indian demand and felt a great burden on his mind which added to his anxiety and fears. One day whilst I was driving him in my car he said: 'I sometimes feel that someone is going to throw a bomb at me in the coming Lahore session of the Congress.' It should be remembered that Bhagat Singh and one other had thrown a bomb in the Assembly a year before and that I think was fresh in his mind. In reply I said, 'Panditji, I do not think anyone will be so callous-hearted as to think of doing harm to you, although in this world many honest, earnest and sincere patriots have often met that fate.' I interpreted him to mean that he was in those days opposed to the withdrawal of Congressmen from the Assemblies and wished to take up a straight fight against the Congress young men and hot-heads, Pandit Jawaharlal included.

Panditji left Lucknow to attend a conference called by the Viceroy which was attended by himself, Gandhiji, Sir Tej, Vithalbhai Patel and Mr. Jinnah. The Viceroy had arrived the same morning, his train having been hit by a bomb placed within a few miles of New Delhi. The conference misfired and there was no agreement between the parties. Three days afterwards Congress met at Lahore under the presidentship of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and passed a resolution for complete independence. Gandhiji extended his full support to the President of the Congress.

The Ali Brothers, Dr. Ansari, Tasadduq and myself were staying as guests of Mr. Ghulam Mohammad who was then the Accounts Officer in the E. I. R. We found the atmosphere in Lahore very secretive, and when in private talks the leading Congressmen decided to throw the Nehru Report into the Ravi, even Dr. Ansari was not consulted. Pandit Motilal Nehru was very reticent and non-communicative and I did not want to broach political issues with him myself. I felt that he sacrificed himself at the altar of his affection for his son by allowing the Independence Resolution to be carried with an overwhelming majority. Dr. Ansari, Tasadduq and myself were leaving Lahore in the evening for our destinations, humbled, disappointed and angry. As both the trains to Lucknow and Delhi left about the same time, at the station we had enough time to decide between ourselves that, the Nehru Report having been drowned in the Ravi, we could not take the responsibility of shouldering the burden of fighting for the independence of India, for the Muslims were bound to consider it to be purely a Hindu fight. We agreed to remain only four-anna ordinary members of the Congress and resign our membership of the A.I.C.C.

I stood for election again after the expiry of the term of Babu Triloki Nath and began a second term as Chairman of the Lucknow Board. My opponent was Sayed Husain Rizvi, the biggest tobacconist of Lucknow. Two days before the election he was persuaded by the Raja of Mahmudabad to retire in my favour, which he did.

The most prominent members of this Board were Babu Bishambernath Srivastava, Babu Hargovind Dayal, Pandit Rahasbihari Tiwari, Shaikh Habibullah, Hakim Shamsuddin, Mahmud Ali, Ehsanur Rahman Qidwai, K. B. Nasrullah and K. B. Mansur Ali.

XIV

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCES

1930—1932

A FEW DAYS after my return from Lahore I read in the papers that Tasadduq Ahmad Khan attended a meeting of the Congress. I was naturally shocked by his breach of faith with me. A few days later he came to stay with me and admitted that he had shown great weakness but that was due to the fact that he could not refuse Pandit Motilal Nehru when he personally came to invite him to attend the meeting and told him that most of his Mussalman friends had left him, making him feel very lonely. After what he said I felt appeased. It is very difficult to end a life-long friendship particularly at an age when new friendships are very difficult to make.

By virtue of the Congress decision asking the members of the Central Assembly to resign, Rafi Ahmad Qidwai sent in his resignation. As I was opposed to the Congress decision I decided to contest the seat. Mr. Mushir Husain Qidwai also wanted to oppose my election but ultimately he withdrew and came to inform me of his decision when Dr. Ansari happened to be staying with me in Lucknow. I attended one small session of the Assembly only to take the oath, and stayed there for two days more to show my dissent against the Congress decision rather than to serve as a member. I was firmly of the view that with Muslims sulking and not having faith in the Congress policy any fight for independence was a colossal blunder.

Congress celebrated on 26 January 1930 the passage of the Independence Resolution, in which members signed a pledge expressing their faith that India must sever the British connection and attain complete independence. Some time later the Viceroy announced the holding of a Round Table Conference in London but making it clear that 'the Conference which His Majesty's Government would convene would not be such a conference as would be desired by those who claimed that its

duty should be to proceed by way of a majority vote to the fashioning of an Indian constitution which should thereafter be accepted unchanged by Parliament.'

Gandhiji was not satisfied with this statement of the Viceroy and in consequence put ten demands before the Government, including the total abolition of salt tax, total prohibition, a protective tariff on foreign cloth, discharge of all political prisoners, abolition of the C.I.D., etc. One may wonder how many of these demands have found favour in the independent India of today. Later a Working Committee of Congress, which met from 14 to 16 February 1930, authorized Gandhiji to start civil disobedience as and when he desired. A few who expressed doubt about its success were laughed at. Gandhiji wrote a letter on 22 March 1930 to the Viceroy informing him of the step which he was going to take, i.e. to start civil disobedience on the salt issue, and assured the Viceroy that it was not intended to be a threat.

A few days later arrangements for a march to Dandee to manufacture salt were made. Vallabhbhai Patel was the forerunner in the Dandee march but he was arrested in the first week of March. Gandhiji's march began on 20 March 1930 and continued from day to day for about twenty-four days and all this time Lord Irwin's Government was watching unmoved as a mere spectator. Thousands and thousands used to assemble to see this famous march and ultimately Gandhiji was arrested and taken to Yaravada jail on 5 April 1930.

Jawaharlal was arrested on 14 April 1930 and was convicted for six months. At one stage of civil disobedience when Pandit Motilal Nehru was also in jail, Mr. Slocomb, a representative of the *Daily Herald*, London, started negotiations with Gandhiji in Yaravada jail and later on met the Nehrus in jail. Nothing came out of these negotiations although the Government had allowed Mr. Slocomb to meet the Nehrus.

Some time before, the Government had declared the Working Committee of the A.I.C.C. unlawful and arrested Pandit Motilal on 30 June and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment. On 23 April 1930, there was a great disturbance at Peshawar where thirty Pathans had been killed by the military without giving previous warning to disperse. At several other places also large numbers of arrests were made. Pandit Madan Mohan Malvia was arrested in Bombay. Vallabhbhai Patel, after being released, three months later was again imprisoned and Mrs. Kamla Nehru and many others were arrested.

After Gandhiji's arrest Abbas Tayabji had replaced him. On

27 April 1930, the Working Committee of the Congress had been declared unlawful as already stated. When Patel was arrested a second time he nominated Maulana Abul Kalam Azad; when he was arrested in August he nominated Dr. Ansari and when in September Dr. Ansari was arrested, he nominated me. I could never have imagined that I would be nominated as Dictator of the Congress after having resigned from the presidentship of the Lucknow City Congress and membership of the All-India Congress Committee. When the news was brought to me early in the morning by Ramchandra Sinha, an ex-M.L.A. I was astonished. Nevertheless I did not want to let down the Congress and my friend Dr. Ansari. I started making arrangements for handing over my court case files to others. As I had heard that Pandit Motilal Nehru was opposed to the holding of any other meeting of the Working Committee, I went on 5 October to Mussoorie where he was staying after his release from jail, to discuss matters with him. I had wired Mr. J. N. Sen Gupta in Calcutta and Mr. Nariman in Bombay who were prominent members of my Working Committee to make it a point to meet me at Mussoorie. When we three met Pandit Motilal Nehru we found that he was definitely not in favour of holding any other meeting of the Working Committee before the release of Pandit Jawaharlal. On my insistence he agreed to exchange views with him in jail through a reliable source. Later on he informed me that Jawaharlal was also of the same view, that no meeting should be held. I had found Panditji quite pulled down in health and even the Mussoorie climate was not doing him much good. He was not half the man he had been in Lucknow in December 1929 and I began to entertain serious anxieties regarding his life.

Mr. Sitaramayya in his *History of the Congress* has completely eliminated the period of dictatorship of the Congress for the last three months of 1930, perhaps in an attempt to exclude the mention of my name. But in the process Dr. Ansari also suffered the same fate as his name also does not appear. This reminds me of the history of Aryan India wherein the Brahmins excluded from computation a period of 280 years of Nanda dynasty which was not purely Aryan. In this case Mr. Sitaramayya had to skip over only a short period of three months.

Jawaharlal was released from jail on 11 October 1930 and after a day or two he came to Lucknow and stayed with me at my Khiyaliganj House and was to leave for Allahabad by the night train at 11 p.m. Rafi Qidwai brought news to me that the police had got a warrant of arrest for Jawaharlal and they proposed to

execute it at the railway station when he went there to board the Allahabad train. The Government decision to arrest him at the station was obviously meant to add insult to injury and I decided to defeat their object. I insisted on Jawaharlal taking dinner early and leaving by car which would take him to Allahabad by about 9 p.m. Thus the police attempt to arrest Jawaharlal was defeated, although he was arrested at Allahabad four or five days later.

No settlement having been reached with the Congress, the Viceroy nominated fifty-seven delegates from British India and sixteen from the States for the Round Table Conference which began its deliberations on 12 November 1930. Prominent amongst the Princes were the Maharajas of Bikaner, Alwar and Bhopal. Sir Akbar Hyderi represented the Nizam. Muslim India was represented by H.H. the Aga Khan, Mr. Jinnah, Maulana Mohammad Ali, Sir Mohammad Shafi, Mr. Fazlul Huq, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad, Sir Zafrullah and Nawab Chhatari. Prominent amongst the Hindus were Sir Tej Bahadur Supru, Mr. Jayakar, Mr. Shastri, Dr. Moonje and others. The Conference was presided over by Lord Sankey.

Anyone knowing the political conditions of India at that period could foresee that the unitary form of Government had become impossible for the future constitution and as such it was no wonder that all the delegates representing different parties and interests agreed to have a federal constitution for India. The first Round Table Conference finished its deliberations in December 1930.

The Muslim League session this year, over which the great poet, Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, presided, was held at Allahabad. It is needless to recount his services to the country for they are too well known. He had not only inspired the Muslim leaders but awakened the masses through his poetic gift to a growing sense of pride in their history and a keen desire for the evolution of a dynamic ideology. He had already given so much to Indian Muslims which they could never forget, but at Allahabad in a provoking address he again called upon them to open their eyes and look round:

> 'I would like to see Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state, self-governing within the British Empire or without the British Empire. The formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.'

It is a wonder that when this clarion call was made from the Muslim League platform no one took any notice of it and no one

moved any resolution in the session approving the scheme enunciated at Allahabad.

On 25 December 1930 I married Zahida Khatoon, the niece of Haji Istafa Khan, proprietor of the well known perfumery firm of Asghar Ali Mohammad Ali of Lucknow. She had a poetic gift from her early age but most of it suffered in my life-long prosaic companionship in which there was hardly any room for the cultivation of her genius in Urdu poetry. I confess with pride that she never interfered in my political activities and patiently bore many hardships which she had to go through as a result of the vicissitudes of my political career.

A great calamity happened to Muslim India on 4 January 1931 when Maulana Mohammad Ali died in London after a prolonged and serious illness. He had been suffering from diabetes for a very long time, but had never had the will nor the time to follow the directions of his medical advisers, to take rest to recoup his failing health. In his last oratorical performance in the first Round Table Conference, addressing Lord Sankey, at the end of a long speech he said: 'My lord, divide and rule is the order of the day, but in India we divide and you rule.' In one sharp and brilliant sentence he condensed the entire political panorama of India involving all the three parties, the British, the Hindus and the Muslims. If Maulana Mohammad Ali had not left behind him the files of the *Comrade* and hundreds of other speeches which he made during the course of his stormy life this one sentence was enough for Muslim progeny to remember him by and to be proud of him. In the same speech he had also said that he would not like to go back to slave India. By his death Providence helped him to fulfil his desire for his dead body did not come to India but was buried in Jerusalem, at the call of the Muslim leaders of several Middle Eastern countries. Allama Iqbal could not have paid greater tribute to him than what he said about his burial in Jerusalem: 'He has gone to Heaven by the path through which the prophets have passed.'

As for his work in life these pages are replete with the sacrifices and ideals for which he lived, worked and died. Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, the father of the Muslim people in India, rescued them from ignorance, lethargy and hopelessness by putting them on the road to progress in science, literature, history and mathematics, and by inculcating in them a desire for a life of advancement on modern lines in all directions, keeping their religion, their tradition and their culture intact. Maulana Mohammad Ali, a true son of Aligarh, taught his people to discard foreign influences in life, to learn self-reliance, live for causes

and die for them. As we shall see it was this progeny of the Ali Brothers which fought the battle of Pakistan and won it.

After the Round Table Conference the British Prime Minister appealed to Congress not to prejudice the advance of India and asked those engaged in civil disobedience to respond to the Viceroy's appeal to put their shoulders to the work of framing a constitution in co-operation with other parties at the Round Table Conference. Sir Tej Bahadur Supru and Mr. Jayakar were encouraged by Mr. McDonald's appeal and they started negotiations with the Congress leadership from London, laying particular stress on the assurance of the Viceroy that the members of the Congress Working Committee would enjoy full liberty of discussion between themselves and also offering the withdrawal of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the release of Gandhiji and the members of the Working Committee. The Viceroy by his statement referred to above, dated 19 January 1931, also made it clear that no conditions would be imposed on the release of political prisoners.

While matters stood thus, Pandit Motilalji's condition got very much worse and he was brought to Lucknow for X-ray examination and treatment. Gandhiji also came to Lucknow and stayed in Kalakakar House on the trans-Gomti side. All that could be done to save the life of Pandit Motilal was done but his time had come and he died on 31 March 1931. Jawaharlal's grief at his father's death can be well imagined. For me the loss was not only that of a great son of India who was possessed of a towering personality, extraordinary strength of character, ability and sincerity of purpose, but also of an affectionate friend and guide with his charming manners, jovial temperament, sweet humour and wide sympathy. It is sad to find that in India he is only remembered as the father of Jawaharlal. What an irony! If his politics had been allowed by the Congress to be pursued without let or hindrance, India would perhaps not have been partitioned. Gandhiji thought of bringing about the freedom of India through civil disobedience, forgetting the fact that in India there were three parties and so long as there was no honest and sincere co-operation between the Hindus and Muslims there could be no freedom of India as a whole. Pandit Motilal was fully conscious of it but after 1926, when he was opposed in his own constituency on the Swaraj Party ticket and had to compromise with Malviaji, he had lost the vigour and self-confidence to continue to fight for freedom in his own way and according to his own conception. I do not know of anyone else except C. R. Das worthy to share the renown with him of

sacrifices for the cause of the country. He gave away Anand Bhawan, his palatial building to the Congress; but apart from that his sacrifice lay in joining the Congress, which meant not only a change in political affiliation in those days, but to him it meant a change in his whole life, a life spent in luxury, ease and comfort. It meant a change in his cultural outlook, social standards, life-long habits and mental make-up. He gave away everything to Congress, his wealth, riches and even his son. He had brought Gandhiji into the arena in the initial stages in U.P. but later on he did not hesitate to recognize him as his leader. This was the biggest sacrifice which he made.

It was during this stay of Gandhiji in Lucknow that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan came there and stayed with me and asked me to introduce him to Gandhiji. I took him with me and remained there for some time so that Khan Sahib might finish his talk. The impression that I formed of him during his three days' stay with me was that he was sincerely devoted to the cause of the country but he was all the same very much ill-informed about the conditions of Muslims in the minority provinces and ignorant of the issues involved in those provinces regarding the future of Muslim India. Later on as we know he became a great Congress leader and was known as the Frontier Gandhi.

On 7 February 1931, twenty-six Round Table Conference delegates appealed to the Congress to make a solid contribution to the scheme of federation which had been accepted by the British Government and to give it complete shape and form. Sir Tej Bahadur Supru and Shastri were the most zealous supporters of the idea of the Congress going to the Round Table Conference. A meeting of the Working Committee was called at Allahabad on 13 February, when Gandhiji wrote a letter to the Viceroy for an interview, which took place on 17 February, lasting for three days. I happened to be in Delhi when Gandhiji was staying at Dr. Ansari's house and to my great surprise I used to see many inveterate enemies of Congress and well-known supporters of the British raj, both Hindus and Muslims, hovering round Dr. Ansari's residence. In the interview with the Viceroy he made clear to Gandhiji that the scheme of federation outlined in the Round Table Conference formed an essential part of the proposals. While Gandhiji doubted that the acceptance of federation by the Princes was not genuine, in the sense that they would not be prepared to favour unbiased elections, he pointed out that 'undiluted autocracy, however benevolent it may be, and undiluted democracy are an incompatible mixture bound

to result in explosion.' However, the Congress which met at Karachi was jubilant at the opportunity of representation of Congress at the Round Table Conference. As a prelude the Congress passed a resolution on fundamental rights of the people and to satisfy the minorities gave the lines on which a national solution could be obtained:

(a) Application of fundamental rights to all minorities.
(b) Protection of personal laws.
(c) Protection of political and other rights of minority communities in various provinces.
(d) Adult franchise.
(e) Joint electorates.
(f) Preservation of minority representation in provinces where they were less than twenty-five per cent on a population basis, with the right to contest additional seats.
(g) Appointments in the services to be made by a non-party Public Service Commission.
(h) In the formation of federal and provincial Cabinets the interest of the minority community should be recognized.
(i) Reforms in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan Province.
(j) Sind to be constituted a separate province provided that the Province were able to bear the financial burden.
(k) The future constitution of the country should be federal and residuary powers should vest in the federating units.

Now an analysis of the provisions of this resolution shows that besides the demand of separate electorates which was of prime importance the demands of the fourteen points of the Muslim Conference had been accepted here, with the exception of three:


(1) Relating to the reservation for Muslim majorities in Bengal and Punjab.
(2) One-third seats for Muslims in the Centre.
(3) Provision that no resolution or bill would be passed in the Legislatures, which was opposed by a three-fourths majority of any community.

So far as the last provision was concerned it had become outdated after the political struggles going on between the two parties. The provision would have been used as an obstruction against legislative measures. As regards No. (1) I have already given my opinion that the reservation of a simple majority with a provision for joint electorates could not be considered as a safeguard for Muslim interests. No. (2) should have been accepted by the Congress if it meant settlement with the Muslims of India.

Gandhiji was anxious to take Dr. Ansari with him to the Round Table Conference but the Muslim group was dead-set



Pandit Motilal Nehru.



Pandit Jawahurlal Nehru.



Mahatma Gandhi.



Quaid-e-Azam, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

against this and would not allow a Muslim Nationalist to be nominated by the Government. Pandit Madan Mohan Malvia and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu were included by the Government as representatives of India at the request of Gandhiji. Gandhiji left in the month of September 1931; he stayed in Kingsway Hall in the East End with Miss Muriel Lester.

In his speech in the Federal Structure Committee of the Round Table Conference he dilated upon the history of the Congress and paid tribute to Mr. Hume who assisted in its birth. Speaking in the Minority Committee he claimed that the Congress represented eighty-five per cent of the population of India and was the only party which was free from communalism, having its door open to everyone without distinction of race, colour or religion. He expressed great resentment against the idea of untouchables being classified as a separate class. The Muslims refuted the claim of Congress to speak for them and stood by their own demands. There was thus a deadlock. Mr. Jinnah told me some time later that at one stage even Sir Shafi agreed to joint electorates if the Muslim majorities in Bengal and Punjab were secured. He said he went himself with the proposal to Gandhiji but due to the resistance of Malviaji and other Hindu and Sikh delegates, Gandhiji expressed his inability to go against the expressed desire of the mass of Hindu and Sikh opinion.

At one stage a telegram was received by Dr. Ansari from Mrs. Naidu in London, advising him to wire to Gandhiji not to come to any settlement with the Muslims on the basis of separate electorates. Ansari convened a meeting of some of us. About ten of us—Congress Muslims—were taking our lunch with him when he read the telegram. Before anybody could say anything I butted in and said: 'It is very unfair to Gandhiji to tie down his discretion by an advice from a distance of six thousand miles, without having a living picture of the conditions prevailing between the Indian parties in England.' The idea was nipped in the bud.

As there was no agreement in the second Round Table Conference it concluded its deliberations on 1 December 1931. Hindus and Sikhs led by Malviaji sent a letter to the Prime Minister calling for arbitration on disputed matters between the Muslims and the Hindus and Congress. Gandhiji did not sign this letter. In the closing stages of the Round Table Conference Mr. McDonald, the Prime Minister, had expressed his regret at the policy of the parties not to come to a settlement. He said:

'We shall soon find that our endeavours to proceed with our plans are held up; indeed they have been held up already—if you

cannot present up with a settlement acceptable to all parties as the foundations upon which to build. In that event His Majesty's Government would be compelled to apply a provisional scheme for they are determined that even disparity shall not be permitted to bar progress.'

And yet we never fail to put the blame on the British for delaying the grant of rights to Indians. The disaster of the failure of the Round Table Conference was purely Indian-made.

Lord Irwin, who had left India just a few days before Gandhiji went to London, had been succeeded by Lord Willingdon who seems to have come prepared to deal with a high hand against disorders and civil disobedience. A 'No-rent' campaign had been started in U.P. and some big issues had been raised in Bengal. Jawaharlal, Tasadduq Sherwani and Pershotamdas Tandon were arrested five days before the arrival of Gandhiji from England. Gandhiji did not realize that Lord Irwin, the Christian Viceroy, had left and now he had to deal with a different person altogether. Gandhiji soon after his arrival had wired to the Viceroy against the arrests, on 29 December. But the reply was sent by the Private Secretary to the Viceroy on 31 December, curtly saying:

'His Excellency wishes me to say that he and his Government desire to have friendly relations with all political parties. . . . Co-operation however must be mutual. His Excellency and his Government cannot reconcile activities of Congress in U.P. and N.W.F.P. with the spirit of friendly co-operation which the good of India demands.'

The tone and language of this telegram was in sharp contrast to what had been the practice of his predecessor, Lord Irwin. On 14 January 1932, Gandhiji and Vallabhbhai Patel were arrested.

The Raja of Mahmudabad suffered an attack of paralysis in December 1930, only a few hours after I had left him quite hale and hearty. Although he got over the attack he became very weak and could not walk without assistance. In May 1931, he went to Mahmudabad, his home-town, and expired there.

For a period of practically fifteen years Muslim politics and educational activities had revolved round his person and he loved to bring up and push capable men to the forefront to see that the future of his community would not suffer for want of capable leadership. Mr. Jinnah was brought into the League by him. Wazir Hasan owed much of his political career to his help. To Mohammad Ali he was greatly attached and *Comrade* received generous assistance from him. Aligarh University had magnificent support from him, amounting to lakhs of rupees. Lucknow

University and Medical College were both his handiwork and he had made generous contributions towards their establishment. A whole volume is required to narrate his munificence and charitable disposition.

After the arrest of Gandhiji the new ordinances promulgated by the Viceroy began to have their full impact. All the Congress Committees ceased to function, their offices were locked up and civil resisters were not only sent to jail but also their properties were confiscated. The new Viceroy had devised this new method for dealing with the civil disobedience movement. For the few Muslims who used to court arrest as a matter of discipline now jail-going was less palatable for they could not afford to leave their families outside starving. To many of them death would have been more welcome than a three years' term of imprisonment in jail. This civil disobedience movement had from its very inception been a much tamer affair than the previous ones. Once in my talk with Dr. Sayed Mahmud and Rafi Ahmad Qidwai at Allahabad I had pointed out to them the impending failure of the movement due to the harshness of the ordinances for which the middle classes were not prepared. In later stages the movement became so stale that it was derogatory for the Congress to call it a civil disobedience movement. Although I did not occupy any office in the Congress, still I tried to encourage the end of this movement as it was bringing the name of the Congress into ridicule.

Gandhiji started a fast in jail on 20 September 1932, regarding the Scheduled Castes dispute between him and the Government, which had given separate electorates to them. The matter was settled through the shrewd efforts of Rajagopalachari who brought round the Scheduled Caste leaders to agree to a formula which was accepted by Gandhiji on 26 September. Due to Gandhiji's weakness, on 7 November 1932 all restrictions regarding visitors, etc. were removed.

Sir Mohammad Shafi, another great patriot and a staunch Muslim Leaguer, died on 6 January 1932 To him goes the credit, when President of the Muslim League in 1913, of bringing about a healthier change in the Constitution of the League by modifying 'loyalty to the Government' to 'loyalty to the Crown' which in those days was positively a very important and bold change. After a few years he became the Law Member in the Government of India which office he held from 1921 to 1925. Sir Mohammad Shafi was a staunch supporter of separate electorates and to my mind the only leader who throughout his career never wavered in his faith in the utility of that system. He had the courage to

form a separate League when, in March 1927, Mr. Jinnah accepted joint electorates in the Delhi Peace Conference, and later on got the principle approved in the Calcutta League session presided over by Sir Mohammad Yaqub. The wonder is that all this was being done from the League platform which was specifically meant by its founders to protect the interests of Muslims. So far as we, the Khilafatists, were concerned we were fighting, rightly or wrongly, for a cause which we considered of supreme importance and value to the Muslims of India, and to that end we were doing everything possible to win over the Hindu side. It passes comprehension how those people who were not in favour of the Khilafat agitation nor of Independence and stood for the protection of Muslim rights thought to serve them by giving away separate electorates, which to my mind were the only true and real safeguard for the Muslims. When Sir Shafi raised the banner of revolt in a righteous Cause even many pets of Government like Nawab Chhatari, Nawab Yusuf, the Raja of Salempur, Sir Zulfiqar and others kept quiet and did not support him and he was left alone high and dry. The All-Parties Muslim Conference presided over by the Aga Khan, where separate electorates were considered as most valuable, was attended by most of these gentlemen but soon after the Aga Khan left the country all of them became lukewarm in propagating their favourite them, separate electorates. Mr. Jinnah told me that Sir Shafi had agreed in the Round Table Conference to accept joint electorates under certain conditions but I think only when he found himself alone and that many of those big guns who talked of Islam and Muslim interests had been hovering round Dr. Ansari's residence to have *darshan* of Gandhiji, did he give in. Before Sir Shafi went to London for the Round Table Conference, he must have sadly felt that the game was lost and that he alone could not protect the Muslims from their doom.

XV

COMMUNAL AWARD AND UNITY BOARD

1933—1934

AFTER THE All-Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi the Aga Khan left India, never to return to Indian politics. The organizers of this Conference, like the Dutch Army, were all generals but no soldiers. Most of the leaders belonged to the titled landlord class and none of them was prepared to spearhead the movement or to follow the other. Maulana Mohammad Ali alone would have been able to put life into it, but he had expired in 1931 in London. Some of those like Nawab Ismail Khan, Sayed Zakir Ali and Hasan Riaz who endeavoured to continue the work of the Conference found themselves unable to rally the rest to active assistance for the cause. Like them, many others of the Muslim Conference Group began to think of some other shelter under which they could work for the safeguard of Muslim interests. Mr. Jinnah, after the appointment of Lord Willingdon as Viceroy, had made up his mind not to return to India after the Round Table Conference. As I had differences with some of the Congress policies I was equally anxious to bridge the gulf which separated those of the advanced Muslim Group who had really no serious differences between themselves on marjor issues. After the death of the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Rajā of Salempur was the only clear-headed politician amongst the titled gentry and he also was very much dissatisfied with the leadership of the Muslim Conference. In my talks with him I found him willing to take the lead in bringing the Muslim Conference to unite with the real Muslim Nationalists who would not barter Muslim interests either to please the British on the one side or the Hindus on the other. The Raja of Salempur at first invited Maulana Shaukat Ali, Sayed Zakir Ali, Hasan Riaz and Nawab Ismail Khan to discuss the problem with me at his house and we found that there was complete agreement between us.

The question of the Communal Award was perturbing us

because we thought that Mr. McDonald, being a Laborite, would be inclined to favour Congress at the cost of the Muslims. On the other side Malviaji also had become hopeless of the U. K. Prime Minister's Award being in his favour because of the civil disobedience movement which had been started even before Gandhiji's return to India. Thus there was anxiety on both sides and in this small meeting we decided to call a big conference in Lucknow in July 1932, to be presided over by Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan. This was attended by Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Mr. Hisamuddin and the members of Jamiatul Ulema and many of the Nationalist Muslims. As a result of this conference it was decided to have a Unity Conference at Allahabad in early August 1932.

Nawab Ismail Khan led the Muslim Conference side, while Tasadduq and I represented the Nationalist Group in this Conference. The leading Hindus and Sikhs were also represented. Pandit Madan Mohan Malvia occupied the chair.

The first question taken up by this Unity Conference was in respect of the quantum of representation of Muslims in the Central Government. The Hindus started with twenty-five per cent and wasted five days to come to accepting thirty-two. The Muslims still remained unsatisfied. Next day, 17 August 1932, *Reuter* wired from London that the Muslims by the Award had been given thirty-three and a third per cent in the Central Legislature and that separation of Sind from Bombay had been decided upon. The fate of this Conference was sealed. On these facts Mr. Pyarelal writes* :

'An outstanding instance was in 1932 when the Hindus and Muslims had all but arrived at agreement amongst themselves in the Unity Conference at Allahabad; the only important issue that remained to be settled was the re-constitution of Sind, which at electorates on the condition that Sind was constituted a separate Muslim-majority province and the adoption of the system of joint electorates in place of separate electorates. But just when the Muslim representatives in the Conference had agreed to joint electorate on the condition that Sind was constituted a separate province, Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India, went out of his way to concede the same demand without joint selectorates. As a result the Conference failed.'

The Conference actually had not decided any issue. The discussion was still continuing on the question of representation of Muslims in the Central Legislature when Sir Samuel Hoare's announcement was made. Notwithstanding this announcement I

**Mahatma Gandhi—the Last Phase*, Ahmadabad, Nawajiwan Publishing House, Vol. I, p. 78.

persuaded Malviaji not to close the Conference but to continue our efforts towards a settlement. It was felt that under the Award the Bengal position had been made very complex. The Hindus there had been given eighty seats (fifty Caste Hindus and thirty Scheduled Castes) while the Muslims instead of getting even a nominal majority were given only 119 out of a total of 250 seats; the lion's share had gone to the Europeans and Anglo-Indians, who got thirty seats in the Bengal Legislature. Malviaji agreed to go to Bengal but when I reached there I learnt that he was not coming; nevertheless I persisted in holding a meeting of Hindu and Muslim parties over which I myself presided. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had assured me in Lucknow that he had a formula in his pocket for settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question in Bengal, did not turn up nor did he inform me of his magic formula. The Hindu side offered to fight against the allotment of thirty seats to Europeans if the Muslims joined them in the fight. Mr. Fazlul Haq was evasive and non-committal. There being no chance of any further discussion I dissolved the meeting and returned to Lucknow.

The Muslim seats provided in the Communal Award were:

	Province	*Total No. of Seats*	*Muslim Seats*
1.	Madras	210	29
2.	Bengal	250	119
3.	U.P.	228	66
4.	Punjab	175	86
5.	Bihar	175	42
6.	C.P.	112	14
7.	Assam	108	34
8.	N.W.F.P.	50	38
9.	Bombay (excluding Sind)	175	30
10.	Sind	60	34

These seats were given to the Muslims on the basis of separate electorates. In the Punjab only eighty-six seats had been provided by separate electorates but by a process of manipulation a bare majority was secured for Punjabi Muslims by giving three seats to landholders and *tomandars* under joint electorate, where the Muslims being in a majority, they were sure to be returned. In the Centre, Muslims were given one-third.

All my efforts to bring about a settlement having failed I held a meeting of the members of the Muslim Conference and Nationalist Groups* over which the Raja of Salempur presided. I opened

*Those present were the Raja of Salempur, Nawab Ismail Khan, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mufti Kifayatullah, Maulana Ahmad Said, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, Mufti Inayatullah of Firangi Mahal, Hakim Abdul Hasib, Ehsanur Rahman, Syed Zakir Ali, Hasan Riaz and Maulana Karam Ali.

the Conference in a speech inviting both groups to agree to a joint basis of co-operation which in the circumstances could only be the creed that 'the only alternative to a Communal Award was an agreed settlement between the parties themselves.' The members whole-heartedly welcomed it. Nawab Ismail Khan congratulated me on this simple formula and Sayed Zakir Ali in his speech showered tributes on me. Maulana Shaukat Ali was similarly overjoyed. The name of the Party was decided to be the Muslim Unity Board with the Raja of Salempur as its President, myself as Secretary and Sayed Zakir Ali as Joint Secretary.

The Congress session was held on 31 March 1933 and presided over by Mrs. Motilal but she was not allowed to proceed to Calcutta. My views on civil disobedience had been made very clear since my release from jail in December 1922. I knew that many Congressmen held the same view but due to their weakness many who swore by civil disobedience in public yet condemned it in private talks. The present struggle of the Congress had very little support from the people but due to personal respect for Gandhiji and Congress leadership the smaller leaders could not freely speak their mind. Not only mass gatherings but even smaller assemblies of men have a tendency to create a mass or collective mentality, which gives democratic institutions strength and fire. However, there is a danger that a surfeit of it may serve to crush democracy by the forceful suppression of the expression of one's conviction and that was what one could see in the Congress meetings. The Indian mind, according to my analysis, at the time suffered from this malady. I ran from place to place, to Allahabad, Banares, Cawnpore, Delhi and other places, trying to persuade Malviaji, Sir T. B. Supru and Dr. Ansari to exert their influence on Gandhiji to end the civil disobedience movement. As it happened, on 8 May 1933, Gandhiji decided to observe a twenty-one-day fast and thereupon the Government released him from jail. In a conference held at Poona on 12 July 1933 Gandhiji put forward his views on the Constitution for India and the main topic discussed was whether mass civil disobedience was to be suspended and individual civil disobedience started to replace it.

The Conference advised Gandhiji to seek an interview with the Viceroy to come to a settlement with him. The Viceroy declined to grant an interview unless Congress first withdrew the civil disobedience movement. In spite of this unhelpful reply the mass civil disobedience was suspended by Congress and individual civil disobedience started.

On 16 January 1934, the great earthquake in Bihar occurred and all the energies of the Congress were diverted to helping the afflicted people and the families of about 20,000 persons who had lost their lives. Pandit Jawaharlal also went to Bihar and from there to Calcutta where he made a speech dealing with terrorism for which he was arrested again and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

The fact is admitted in Congress history that, since the Poona Conference of July 1933, increasing number of Congressmen had begun to cogitate that the situation in the country demanded, as a result of rule by Ordinances, a programme of legislative activity and described the condition as 'stalemate'. The fact is correctly stated but the 'stalemate' was due to the low political morality of the Congress rank and file at the time, which exhibited itself outwardly in talking big while not prepared to risk confiscation of their properties. Gandhiji himself had made a note of it and had already substituted individual civil disobedience for mass disobedience at Poona. Now, however, circumstances led to the suspension of individual civil disobedience also. How it was done is another story.

In the last week of March 1934, I was staying with Dr. Ansari discussing the bleak political situation in the country. One morning Dr. Ansari woke me up and quite jubilantly read to me the news that the Government was going to hold Central Assembly elections in November. He thought that now was the time to finish the civil disobedience movement and take to a Council entry programme. As it happened the same evening Bhulabhai Desai and K. M. Munshi, arrived in Delhi and stayed with Dr. Ansari. After dinner we four discussed the question of a Council entry programme till late at night.

Bhulabhai and K. M. Munshi were returning from Patna and had stayed at Delhi on their way to Bombay. After our talks Bhulabhai went back to Bihar to talk with Gandhiji and from there he wired to us to go ahead. A few Congressmen assembled in a meeting at Dr. Ansari's place on 31 March 1934, and decided to send a deputation to Gandhiji to re-start the All-India Swaraj Party. That done, Dr. Ansari, Bhulabhai Desai and Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy proceeded to Patna to discuss the matter with Gandhiji. In his letter written to Dr. Ansari dated 5 April 1934, Gandhiji said: 'I have no hesitation in welcoming the revival of the Swaraj Party to take part in the forthcoming elections to the Assembly which you tell me is about to be dissolved.' Later, on 7 April 1934, Gandhiji issued a statement from Patna in which he said *inter alia* :

'During the informal conference week at Poona in July last I stated that while many individual civil resisters could be welcomed even one was sufficient to keep alive the message of Satyagraha. Now after much searching of the heart I have arrived at the conclusion that in the present circumstances only one and that myself and no other should for the time being bear the responsibility of civil resistance.'

After his statement of the previous year it was easy for him to put off individual civil disobedience also and to take the entire burden on himself.

Finding that ultimately the policy in regard to the Council-entry programme was succeeding I began to think of a proper leader for the Swaraj Party when it came into existence, to lead the country towards the attainment of its goal. After the death of Pandit Motilal Nehru the choice could only fall on Bhulabhai Desai or Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. I thought of sounding Sir Tej whether he would agree to serve the Swaraj Party as its leader, in case he should be elected to the Assembly and I wrote accordingly to him on 7 April 1934. In reply Sir Tej wrote to me on 11 April:

'My dear Choudhri Sahib,

I am much obliged to you for your letter of 7th April. I can assure you that I have been very much pleased with the success of the mission of Dr. Ansari and others to Patna and although I regret that Mahatmaji could not have foreseen the result of his policy last year, if not earlier, yet I admire his courage and the spirit which he has shown on this occasion....

I wish your party every success and have no doubt that it will have a genuine practical programme and if you can exercise effective discipline over your members you can do a lot of good to the country and bring us sensibly near the goal. . . .

I recognize that the credit is in no small measure due to you personally and to Sherwani, for I have known at least for the last two or three years what your views on the question have been and will you very sincerely accept my congratulations.

It is extremely generous of you to write in such flattering terms about myself and to say that it would be really unfortunate if you fail to secure my leadership of your party. I should have considered it an honour if that were possible in any case. But I am afraid that it is not to be. My reasons are. . .

Our continued failure to achieve unity considerably strengthens the position of the die-hards that so long as it is necessary for a third party to keep us from flying at each other's throat, so long there must be safeguards and powers reserved to that third party to enable it to discharge its duty. If there was any practical sense among us and if we did not feel ourselves overborne by mere theories and abstract principles we should not have made all the fuss that we have been making about the Communal Award. But bad as it is I am afraid it must continue

to flourish until we are able to replace it by an agreed settlement. If we are unable to arrive at an agreed settlement let us in God's name cease to talk about it and work on its basis until co-operation in Council teaches us and persuades us to come to a settlement. That is my attitude. If I had to give any message to you and to your party I would say: "Talk less of self-government and do more for the Indian Unity."

Here perhaps I disagree with many of my countrymen who think that unity will follow in the wake of freedom. This point of view overlooks the realities of the situation. We must take men and things as they are and work with the imperfections that we have got in our hands, as the Persian saying is: "*Ba Hamin Marduman Be Bayad Sakht*" [After all it is with these very people that we have to live].

This is strictly a private letter which I have written to you out of my personal regard for you.... I am going to be in Lucknow for a case in the Munsif's court on Saturday the 14th April and then I should like to meet you. Most probably I shall be staying at the Carlton Hotel.

Yours very sincerely,
T. B. Supru.'

We decided to arrange a meeting of leaders at Ranchi on 2 and 3 May 1934 to revive the Swaraj Party. From Lucknow I took with me several of my friends, prominent among them being Pandit Harkaran Nath Misra, Gopinath Srivastava, Pandit Pushkar Nath Bhatt and Jagdamba Narain Saxena. The conference approved the Delhi Resolution for reviving the Swaraj Party and contesting Assembly Electionse on the issue of the rejection of the White Paper, etc.

At a meeting of the A.I.C.C. called at Patna on 12 May 1934, the civil disobedience movement was suspended and a resolution for reviving the Swaraj Party was passed. By this resolution Dr. Ansari and Pandit Madan Mohan Malvia were authorized to form a Board with Dr. Ansari as Chairman, to be called the Congress Parliamentary Board consisting of not more than twenty-five members. This Board was subject to the control of the All-India Congress Committee and had the power to frame its constitution and make its own rules and regulations. The Board was also authorized to select candidates. The resolution was opposed by Pershotamdas Tandon but he was the solitary speaker. This was the happiest day of my political life as I had succeeded after years of patient waiting in bringing about the abandonment of the civil disobedience movement, hoping that it would never be revived again.

In the Board formed at Patna there were five Muslims out of a total of twenty-five. Mr. Asif Ali was appointed the Secretary of the Board, the Muslim members being Dr. Ansari, Asif Ali,

Tasadduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and myself.

A Working Committee meeting was held at Bombay on 14 May 1934 wherein the Parliamentary Board members were also present to chalk out a policy in regard to the White Paper and the Communal Award. On my way to Bombay Shuaib accompanied me from Bhopal. The meeting was held at 8 Laburnam Road, where Gandhiji was staying. But it was unfortunate that at the time Dr. Ansari had gone to Austria for heart treatment. However, before leaving Lucknow for Bombay, I had cabled Dr. Ansari that he should inform Gandhiji of his intention to resign from the Parliamentary Board if the Communal Award were repudiated without a settlement between the parties. I had asked Mrs. Naidu to inform Gandhiji of my position also.

When the meeting started Gandhiji suggested that we should have some draft resolution before us as a basis for discussion and he wanted half an hour's time to prepare the draft. When he had finished reading his draft Mr. Aney took it from his hand and threw it in anger towards him saying, 'This is worse than the preamble to the Communal Award,' and started making a speech. At one stage he said: 'The Hindus have rejected it, the Sikhs have rejected it.' Here I interrupted him and said: 'Mr. Aney, you want to rejct the Award because of the Hindus and Sikhs but you would not take into account what the Muslims have to say.' Before I could proceed further Gandhiji remarked: 'Mr. Aney, you have walked into Khaliq's parlour. It is for this reason that the Congress cannot reject the Communal Award.' I sat down for I had gained my objective. Discussion thereafter continued till about eight at night when Malviaji gave notice that he would propose an amendment to Gandhiji's draft the following morning. Next day I arrived a little late. Asif Ali met me at the door and said, 'Tasadduq has not yet arrived and you have also come late. The discussion has already started.'

When I entered the room Gandhiji handed over to me Malviaji's amendment and said: 'Khaliq, read it carefully because you have sent a message to me through Mrs. Naidu similar to the one which I have received from Ansari that if the Communal Award is rejected by the Congress you will also resign from the membership of the Paliamentary Board.' Hurriedly I went through the amendment. It was a political trap. In the amendment Malviaji proposed that as the Congress was opposed to the White Paper and had rejected it, the Communal Award being part of that scheme also necessarily fell to the ground. Quietly I said to Malviaji: 'I accept your amendment with a proviso: it

being that if the Congress at any time resorts to the working of the provincial or the Central scheme of the White Paper, the Communal Award will have its full play and the number of seats allotted to Muslims in the Central and provincial Assemblies will remain intact.'

Malviaji was greatly shocked on hearing of the proviso. As there was no agreement, votes were taken on the formula and as a result the Congress decided that it neither accepted nor rejected the Communal Award. With this done, I left for Hyderabad. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, to my great surprise, had not attended the meeting.

On my return I received a letter from Asif Ali dated 26 May 1934:

'My dear Khaliq,

I have had no rest or sleep for the last three days and you can imagine why.

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter I have written to Mahatmaji which will explain my frame of mind. I can realize your agony but we have to do our best to discharge our duty till Dr. Ansari's return. I am doing all I can to rein things in. I have also written to Malviaji and I am also in touch with others. I am writing this to request you to have patience and not to be despondent. Believe me I can fully realize your state of mind and I am doing all I can to remedy the situation. Dr. Ansari's statement was wholly unassailable as I have explained in my letter to Mahatmaji. More later on. . . .

Yours sincerely,
Asif Ali.'

Now my agony was that, after the defeat at Bombay, Malviaji and Aney started attacking the statement which Dr. Ansari had issued prior to his departure for Austria. In that statement he had said no more about the Communal Award than every one of us had said in the Working Committee meeting at Bombay. Serious attempts were being made to upset the decision of the Bombay meeting. Soon after I received another letter dated 30 June 1934 from Asif Ali:

'My dear Khaliq,

I dare say you have already noticed the trend of various events and statements appearing in the Press which clearly indicate that the crisis we managed to avoid at Bombay is again threatening us. In fact my latest information is that it may be precipitated long before our meeting at Banares, possibly in the next few days. I feel extremely unhappy over it, but apparently there is no help for it. I wrote to Bidhan [Mr. B. C. Roy] also about it and he too while agreeing that we may have to face a crisis at any moment says: "It cannot be helped." So far as I can see Mr.

Aney, Dr. Moonje and even Mr. Jayakar are exercising their influence over Malviaji in spite of Kelkar who is reported to be against a split. . . .

I heard from Ansari last May. He says he sent a cablegram just in time to strengthen Mahatmaji's hands and yours. . . . We must contest every Muslim seat irrespective of results and we should preferably put up candidates who accept our ticket openly. It is extremely essential. I shall be obliged if you will let me know what you propose to do in this direction. I have also written to Dr. Alam and I hope to write to other friends in other provinces. . . . I have written this letter with the greatest care and I hope you will agree with its contents. But there is very little hope of this view being accepted, unless it is urged by someone in whom Malviaji may have full confidence. At present he seems to be under the impression that even the Muslim Nationalists have changed the convictions and are for the acceptance of the Award because they find it favourable. He does not seem to realize that just as it is possible for him to say that it is unjust to the Hindus, Iqbal and others insist that it is unjust to the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal. . . .

Yours sincerely,
Asif Ali.'

Another letter from Asif Ali dated 12 July 1934 reads as follows:

'My dear Khaliq,

I notice from the Press that the U.P. Provincial Congress Committee and the Cawnpore Congressmen have made certain suggestions and have appointed a Provincial Parliamentary Board and I wonder what it all means. I have not received even an acknowledgement of the various letters I have addressed to the President and Secretary of the P.C.C. and I wonder if they ever reached their destination.

The question of Muslim candidates seems to remain unsettled and all sorts of complications seem to be threatening from different directions. N.W.F.P. has none to elect. Punjab seems to be sleeping over the whole thing. I do not know what has been decided by you for U.P. . . . Coming to Delhi it is practically certain that now the Hindu Mahasabha will contest the seat if I am put up and it is also equally certain that the Muslim reactionaries will contribute their quota to the same. The greatest objection of the Muslims to me is that I am a Congressman and a pro-Hindu and have married a Hindu lady and the greatest objection of the Hindu Mahasabha is that I have married a Hindu lady; so the two sections seem to share this objection in common, failing to find any other. . . . Under these circumstances to enter the contest is to waste at least Rs. 10,000. I can ill afford it and I see absolutely no fun in contesting a seat at this cost without the certainty of success. But it is practically certain that if Dr. Ansari contests this seat the wind of both the Hindu and Muslim opposition will be taken out of their sails, and the Board will have won the seat. . . . I must therefore ask you to write to Dr. Ansari and to persuade him to agree to contest the Delhi seat,

and in case he refuses you must look for a Hindu candidate and leave me out of consideration, unless it is possible for you to secure conditions which may reduce my risk to a manageable magnitude, which can only be done if:

(a) Mahatmaji makes it a point of honour for the Congress to support me, and

(b) the Hindu Mahasabha is persuaded to desist from opposition. . . .

Yours sincerely,
Asif Ali.'

On 18 July 1934 I wrote a letter to Asif Ali in reply:

'My dear Asif Ali,

Your letter is painful reading. I can very well imagine your feeling in the matter of your election. I am very doubtful if Dr. Ansari will consent to stand from the Delhi Constituency. But even if he did, we have to consider whether we should ask him to be dragged into the election mire when we know that the Hindu Sabha is sure to enter the fight. I do not share with you in your optimism that the Hindu Sabha will not put up a fight against Ansari. That being so it would not be wise to bring Ansari's name in the struggle.... If however we find it impracticable you must stand from Delhi even at the risk of losing the fight.

As for securing co-operation of Mahasabha you know it more than I that it is simply impossible. The political situation in the country was never so confused and chaotic as it is today and but for the silver lining that I see in the horizon I would have left everything in utter disgust. The hopeful feature is the bold Congress stand against the Mahasabha. It does not matter if the Congress loses the elections, for it is bound to win over the confidence of the Muslims, whose co-operation alone can make the future of India glorious and successful....

The question of Muslim candidates in the Assembly is a very difficult one indeed. Our Hindu friends do not seem to realize that it would not be possible for us to persuade Muslim candidates to stand on the Congress ticket because they know that it would be a dead weight for them in the election. The effect of the gesture made at Bombay will not be so sudden as to bring about a change in their mentality to have an effect in the present elections. No doubt in due course it will pacify the Muslims but it would take time. Therefore the only thing we can do is to try to wrest the leadership of our community from the hands of the reactionaries by fighting some test elections on the Muslim Unity Board ticket which is an organization ready to co-operate with the Congress. I had all along been working on these lines which is perhaps the only course open to us in the present circumstances. We are holding the Muslim Unity Board meeting again in the first week of August.

Yours sincerely,
Khaliquzzaman'

To oblige Pandit Malviaji, a Working Committee meeting was

again held at Banares on 27 July 1934. Gandhiji did his best to seek an agreement with Pandit Malviaji and Mr. Aney on the question of the Communal Award but could not succeed. I argued with Malviaji and tried to pacify him but to no effect. As a result, Malviaji resigned from membership of the Congress Parliamentary Board, followed by Mr. Aney. Asif Ali wrote me another letter dated 3 August 1934:

'My dear Khalique,

Enclosed is a copy of Dr. Ansari's letter received by the last mail....

I have seen your statement in the Press. It is excellent; we must maintain the spirit. After you had left, further talks went on between the various parties and when all of us excepting Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad had left, Malviaji and Aney are reported to have called on Mahatmaji with a view to reach some sort of a settlement to avoid a conflict. Mr. Rajagopalachari who has come to Delhi for a day or two has given me a full account of the talk.... Malviaji asked for twenty-two seats in various provinces and later on he sent a message that twenty would be sufficient. This demand was considered preposterous by both Mahatmaji and Vallabhbhai Patel. The negotiations, if they can be called negotiations, fell through....

In the new circumstances it is absolutely essential that you should definitely decide to stand for the Assembly also. Please do not allow any other considerations to stand in your way.... It is a matter of duty and you can follow exactly the same course as Dr. Ansari. But you must stand. Otherwise we shall be in a most awkward position. Let there be no hesitation about it now to decide and act.

Yours sincerely,
Asif Ali.'

Following that, Malviaji made many attempts to form a new party to contest the Swaraj Party candidates and with that end in view he held a conference in Calcutta to form a separate party but he did not find a favourable atmosphere there.

As I had decided to set up Muslim candidates on the Unity Board ticket I was anxious to find out whether I should secure some candidates from Bengal to apply for our ticket. I went to Calcutta and stayed there with Abdul Rahman Siddiqui who had joined the Eastern Federal Insurance Company in 1931 and had since then formed a circle of young friends and co-workers, prominent among them being Khwaja Nuruddin and Mr. Hasan Ispahani. I met Mr. Fazlul Haq, Maulana Akram Khan, Ch. Ashrafuddin and many other Nationalists but they were thinking of fighting the election on the Krishak Praja Party ticket.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad informed me that Malviaji had great objection to my continuation as a member of the Swaraj

Plate 7




Mr. C.R. Das.



Subash Chandra Bose.



Dr. Bhalavan Das.



Sri C. Rajagopalachari.



Dr. Rajendra Prasad.



Pandit G. B. Pant.



Sri Prakasa.

Party Board as I was the Secretary of the Unity Board. On my return to Lucknow I received a message from Gandhiji to meet him at Wardha. As I had already fixed a meeting of the Muslim Unity Board for deciding the election issue for 19 August 1934 I left for Wardha to be able to return in time to attend that meeting. I reached Wardha on 15 August and stayed with Asif Ali. In other rooms the Khan Brothers and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were also staying. In my talks with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad I could not divine what he was really after; did he want me to resign from the Swaraj Party Board or from the Unity Board? I could not guess. However I told him plainly that to my mind there was no anomaly in my being a member of the Swaraj Party Board as well as of the Unity Board, because the Congress had not rejected the Communal Award which the Muslim Unity Board had accepted. There could have been inconsistency only if the Congress had rejected the Communal Award.

The Maulana thereupon said that the final decision rested with Gandhiji who would have a talk with me. In the evening I met Gandhiji who told me frankly that I need not resign from the Unity Board as Malviaji wanted, and I should continue to serve on the Swaraj Party Board. Thereafter Gandhiji showed me a letter written by Jawaharlal Nehru soon after his release from jail, dated 13 August 1934, in which he had expressed his dissatisfaction with the current Congress policy in regard to social and economic matters. This now finds mention in *A Bunch of Old Letters* (page 112) issued by Pandit Nehru himself. After I had finished reading it, Gandhiji asked me whether the time had not arrived for him to retire from the Congress and leave the field to younger people to shoulder the burden. I replied: 'I do not consider it in the interest of the country that you should resign from the Congress, but I do surely feel that you should have nothing to do with the day-to-day administration of the Congress.' He said, 'Yes, Vallabhbhai is also of the same view.' I said, 'I don't attach much value to Vallabhbhai's opinion as he is your "Yes man" and would ditto anything which comes from you.' I have narrated this talk in detail because after thirteen years came an occasion when Gandhiji reminded me of my remarks. That occasion will come in these pages at a later stage.

The Communal Award being there, the elections were to be on the basis of separate electorates and as such I was fully convinced that Muslim candidates on the Swaraj Party ticket would have no chance. I could not ignore the history of Hindu-Muslim relations of the previous ten years beginning with the

1924 riots, the failure of a number of peace conferences and the rejection of Muslim demands by the Congress on several occasions. These had created a wedge between the two, which required solid and substantial evidence of a change of heart before a common platform could satisfy the Muslims.

In the atmosphere in which the Unity Board meeting was held on 19 August 1934 there was no difficulty in carrying through my proposal for fighting the election on our own ticket. This important meeting was attended by Nawab Ismail Khan, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Maulana Kifayatullah, Maulana Ahmad Said, Maulana Husain Ahmad, Mufti Inayat Ullah and many other Ulema and Nationalists, under the presidentship of the Raja of Salempur. A few candidates were selected in this meeting and a small committee consisting of the Raja of Salempur, Nawab Ismail Khan, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Sayed Zakir Ali and myself was authorized to select at a later date other suitable candidates.

In the United Provinces I hoped to secure a majority of seats in the election. We had thought of putting up Nawab Ismail Khan for the seven-city seat comprising Lucknow, Banares, Cawnpore, etc., but he declined as he was the honorary treasurer of the Muslim University, Aligarh, which required his presence there. As such we decided to shift Maulana Shaukat Ali from the Rohelkhand constituency to the seven-city one, more so because Maulana Shaukat Ali's name did not appear on the list of the Rohelkhand constituency. We secured practically five seats out of six Muslim seats from U.P. for the Central Assembly, namely Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mr. T. A. K. Sherwani, Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi and Azhar Ali. Dr. Ziauddin requested the Unity Board not to oppose him as he was not a party candidate and stood for the protection of Aligarh interests.

From other provinces also we got about seven seats more. It will be interesting to note that when the Muslim League found that the Unity Board was putting up candidates for the election, a few titled gentlemen met hurriedly and, strange as it may seem, nominated two candidates from the same seven-city seat, namely Dr. Shafaat Ahmad and Haji Wajiduddin. As it should have been, both of them were defeated.

Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant who was at that time the President of the Congress Parliamentary Committee of U.P., later to be the Home Minister of India, wrote to me a letter as follows:

'My dear Khaleeq,

Allow me to congratulate you on the success of your efforts. The credit for securing the return of a good number of Nationalists to the Assembly from among the progressive Muslims

belongs to you and I appreciate the able manner in which you have piloted the delicate machine of the Muslim Unity Board. It marks the triumph of your statesmanship....

Yours sincerely,
G. B. Pant.'

Mr. Brelvi, Editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*, more or less paid me a similar compliment on 26 August 1934 when he wrote to me a letter about giving a ticket to Dr. Abdul Hameed from Bombay to contest Mr. Jinnah's seat which I declined to do because even Congress had decided not to contest Malviaji's and Mr. Aney's seats. It was in this letter that he wrote: 'I find that you had to tread on very thin ice during the session of the Unity Board and, as usual, you have managed to get out of it tactfully.'

Brelvi was right in thinking that I was really riding a very high horse and treading dangerous ground, being pulled from many opposite directions by people with different motives, as was bound to happen in a party consisting of various groups not bound by any rules of conduct or basic creed. I always thought politics to be a simple game if you have the patience to play it unruffled. Those who spin too thin often fall down by their own weight.

The Raja of Salempur who happened to be in Delhi in February 1934 had invited Mr. Jinnah to a dinner at the Hotel Cecil and had extended an invitation to me also. I met Mr. Jinnah after three years, having met him last in Lucknow in December 1931, where he had come to attend the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Mahmudabad Estate of which I was also a member. At the dinner table we talked of the political situation existing at the time but when I took my leave from my host to catch my train for Lucknow, Mr. Jinnah came talking with me to the balcony and just before parting he caught hold of my hands and said: 'If you do not promise to stand by me now I will not return to India.' He had expressed similar ideas in 1931 when I had met him on the occasion of his visit for the meeting of the Trustees. I replied: 'After the stand that I have taken on the Communal Award we have come very close together and who knows that in future we may not be co-operating in a common cause.'

After selecting our candidates on the Unity Board ticket I thought it necessary to write a long letter to Dr. Ansari who, as stated before, had gone to Austria for medical treatment. Follows a letter which I wrote to him on 1 September 1934:

'My dear Doctor Sahib,

... I understand that Asaf Ali has been posting you with

the march of the events here. I shall therefore try to avoid narration of facts for I take it that you are very well aware of them. There are some who feel that Malviaji's secession from the Congress is a very serious loss to the Congress, if not actually a calamity. It may be so from the point of view of some immediate gains but taking a proper view of the matter I am inclined to think that Malviaji's action is a blessing in disguise. The Nationalist Muslims were once faced with such a situation when they had to stand up and fight their community openly in support of the Nehru Committee Report. No honest Hindu can have the courage to say that we had spared ourselves the agony of suffering and bitterness of facing the odds, I mean the story of alliance of the reactionaries and the Government, and the ordeal was not of short duration either; starting from 1927 it has continued up till now with varying degrees of relaxation. The majority of Hindus instead of truly appreciating our sacrifices were disposed to treat us only as pawns and use us as ready instruments for their own ends as the events now happen to confirm and our eyes amply testify.

So long as we stood by them we were Nationalists, applauded and raised to the skies; no sooner we took up the position that nationalism did not consist only in fighting against the Communal Award we are—even Ansari—branded in the Hindu Press and condemned as Communalist. . . . The most honest and fair attitude taken up by the Congress in Bombay under the wise and able guidance of Gandhiji has put the Hindus' sense of nationalism to acid test. The Congress-Malviaji fight may end in victory for the latter but I am sure the struggle will serve to widen the vision and outlook of many of our Hindu Congressmen who were wont to appraise nationalism in their own terms. Indian nationalism cannot live on the crumbs of foreign countries. If it is to be a living force in the country it will have to evolve its own meaning and significance in the light of the peculiar position which the communities occupy in the country. If Malviaji and Aney can claim to be Nationalists, I think every Communalist Muslim who honestly fights for the rights of his community without making it a cloak for official favours and personal gain from the Government is a Nationalist. . . . When recently I went to Calcutta I learnt from Maulana Azad there, that in private circles in the Hindu community the success of Malviaji is mostly due to the nefarious propaganda that a few Nationalist Muslims in the Congress had captured the Congress and are out to use it against Hindu interests. It is no wonder therefore that some of the Hindu Congressmen in our Province may be raising a storm of opposition to the activities of the Congress Parliamentary Board, which succeeding would inevitably affect the elections and allow Malviaji practically a free hand so far as this Province is concerned. . . .

The meeting . . . is coming off on 9 September in Cawnpore and if by that time no compromise is reached—I am carrying on a talk of compromise through Gopi—I have no doubt that in the Provincial Congress Committee Pt. Gobind Ballabh Pant

and Mohan Lal Saxena who are now fighting the other group will lose heavily. You can very well understand what the effect of this revolt would mean to the Parliamentary Board. I would have hesitated in asking you not to agree to the elective system of the Parliamentary Board but in view of the general Congress mentality I am afraid very few Hindus of the present Board and no Muslim who has pleaded for the acceptance of the Ranchi position by the Congress will have any chance in the election and the new Board which will come into existence would consist of the so-called Socialists who are more Hindus than Socialists and less Socialists than Communalists, with whom co-operation even from a separate platform would be impossible. But with all this I am happy that there are Congressmen who are holding aloft the banner of true patriotism, who would not yield to any communal cry from whatever quarter raised. Our duty is obvious. We must stand by them and give them our best co-operation and support.

Now to come to the Muslim side of our politics: soon after the resolution of the Working Committee and the Parliamentary Board meeting I took Shaukat to Gandhiji and I am glad to tell you that both embraced each other and seem to be reconciled. Shaukat had a long talk with him on the future programme and expressed the hope that after the resolution of the Congress on the Communal Award Muslims would join the Congress in much larger numbers than they have done hitherto and would also take their due share in the struggle for freedom. He, however, told Gandhiji that he should not expect immediate results. Having thus secured Shaukat's co-operation I had a meeting of the Unity Board in Lucknow in July in which the Board passed a resolution of approval of the Congress policy. Later we met in Lucknow on August 9 to draft our manifesto and to nominate candidates. We have already announced the following names: Nawab Ismail Khan, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Sherwani and Azhar Ali from U.P., Nawab Murtaza Bahadur, Shah Maswood and Badiuzzaman from Bihar. I hope I shall be able to announce three or four names from other Provinces. The Ulema in the Unity Board were insisting that every candidate of the Board should pledge himself not to move any Bill in the Assembly if in the Jamiat's view it was necessary to protect the Shariat but I did not agree to it.... Now lastly about your election from Delhi Constituency, etc. Asif wrote to me several letters asking me to write to you to contest it, particularly when he found that his position was absolutely insecure. I wrote to Asif in one of my letters that we should not drag Ansari into the mire. I am decidedly of opinion that Asif should stand from that Constituency even at the risk of being defeated.'

The Bombay session of the Congress held on 4 October was presided over by Babu Rajendra Prasad. Gandhiji, as has been stated before, had been thinking of withdrawing from Congress and accordingly he issued a statement to the Press most strongly indicting the Congress rank and file for lip loyalty to the Congress

creed and praying for their purification. With a view to pleasing him the Congress Working Committee agreed to make many changes in the Party Constitution, e.g.

'1. The Congress Committee members were to do manual labour of spinning 2,000 yards of yarn as a substitute for a cash fee of four annas per month.

2. Habitual wearers of khadi alone were to be allowed to become Congress Committee members.

3. The Congress delegates to the session were not to exceed a thousand, with a view to giving preference to quality over bulk.'

Gandhiji had diagnosed the disease but the remedies suggested opened a wider door for corruption and fraud in the Congress elections. Many got special khadi dress made for meetings, and some used to call to their bearers *'Hamara meeting ka kapra lao'* (Bring my meeting clothes), before proceeding to Congress office. Their opponents on the other hand would not only examine the cloth of their pyjamas but would refuse entry on the ground of their not being habitual wearers of khadi.

Congress endorsed the Bombay decision of the Congress Working Committee on the Communal Award and fixed the life of the Congress Parliamentary Board as one year.

XVI

REVIVAL OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

1934—1936

ON THE basis of the White Paper the Joint Parliamentary Committee Report was prepared, passed by both Houses of Parliament and became law. It was put before the Central Assembly in March 1934, where Mr. Jinnah moved his well-known amendment in three parts:

'1. That this Assembly accepts the Communal Award so far it goes until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities concerned.

2. As regards the scheme of Provincial Governments, this House is of the opinion that it is most unsatisfactory and disappointing inasmuch as it includes various objectionable features particularly the establishment of Second Chambers and Extraordinary and Special Powers of the Governors, provision relating to Police rules, Secret Service and Intelligence Departments, which render the real control and responsibility of the Executive and Legislative ineffective, and, therefore, unless these objectionable features are removed, it will not satisfy any section of Indian opinion.

3. With respect to the scheme of the Central Government, called All-India Federation, this House is clearly of opinion that it is fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable to the people of British India, and, therefore, recommends to the Government of India to advise His Majesty's Government not to proceed with any legislation based on this scheme and urges that immediate efforts should be made to consider how best to establish in British India alone a real and complete Responsible Government, and with that view take steps to review the whole position in consultation with Indian opinion without delay.'

Congress proposed an amendment to the White Paper resolution emphasizing the Congress attitude of neutrality on the question of the Communal Award. This amendment was lost there being forty-four votes for the amendment out of one hundred and forty. After the Congress amendment was lost the Congress group became neutral on the question of the first part of Mr. Jinnah's amendment which was carried by the Muslims and the Government both voting in favour. On the second and

third parts of Mr. Jinnah's amendment which were put together, Congress voted with the Muslim bloc and carried it by seventy votes against fifty-eight. Thus Mr. Jinnah got the Communal Award accepted by the House with the help of the Government bloc.

At this time I was greatly surprised at the attitude taken by Mr. Jinnah regarding Federation which as we know had been demanded under his presidentship in the Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1924. Thereafter in the All-Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi the demand was reiterated and subsequently included in Mr. Jinnah's fourteen points which were taken from the All-Parties Muslim Conference demand. In the first Round Table Conference it was accepted as the basis of the future Indian constitution and no Muslim member had opposed the scheme there. How Mr. Jinnah had suddenly changed his mind regarding Federation is hardly understandable unless we take it that he was afraid that his Independent Party, which consisted of Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs and Muslims, all told twenty, was not prepared to support him on the issue. One could understand Congress opposing Federation because Gandhiji and other Congress leaders had never relished the idea and were opposed to it because they thought that the representatives of the Indian States would almost always support the British as against Congress. But the same considerations could not have held good in the case of the Muslims because the Indian States would not have supported the Hindu Sabha in an attempt to browbeat the Muslims against the policy of the British Government. No doubt the independence of India might have been delayed if the States had been brought in, but Mr. Jinnah in his speech in the Assembly talked only of a Responsible Government. However after a few years I also began to oppose Federation, but only when I began to think in terms of the partition of India.

The worst feature of the debate in the Assembly was the attitude of Congress and the Independent Party of Mr. Jinnah in decrying the Governor's powers for the protection of the minorities and the backward areas and services. We had two main Muslim provinces, Bengal and the Punjab, and neither would have suffered if the Governor's powers had been retained, for in the Punjab the Muslims had only a nominal majority of three and in Bengal they had been given in the Award only 119 seats in a House of 250.

When a few years later we began to suffer under the heels of the Congress Government and I went to make a complaint about the attitude of Congress towards the Muslim minority, to the

Governor of U.P., he referred me to Mr. Jinnah's speech in the Assembly in 1934. The entire value of the Communal Award was conditioned on the powers of the Governors. Mr. Jinnah got the Award but lost all its advantages. The Communal Award without the Governors' powers was like a roof without any structure underneath. And even that roof could give no shelter because there was no official bloc in the Provincial Assembly to give it sustenance.

It is possible that, apart from the loose nature of the Independent Party, Mr. Jinnah may have been obliged to follow the Congress line because the Muslim League had by now become almost defunct. It was dominated by the titled gentry, Nawabs, Landlords and *Jee Huzoors* who were generally well-meaning gentlemen but wanted to serve the Muslim cause only so far as it did not affect their position either socially or in Government quarters. Since its very birth in 1906, the Muslim League's activities had always been confined to indoor political shows. Even its annual sessions were held either in well-decorated Pandals or in big halls where a few honourable visitors were allowed by special cards. Mass public meetings were unknown to the Muslim League organization. From 1906 when it was founded in Dacca, its Central Office remained in Aligarh till 1910, where it was an adjunct of the educational institution and could hardly be said to be a separate Muslim political organization, as Aligarh had been the centre of all Muslim activities including political ones. After its transfer to Lucknow it started meddling with political issues but within very safe bounds. The income from membership and annual subscriptions was not sufficient even to maintain a decent office, much less to work among the masses. It began to live on a grant from the Raja of Mahmudabad of three thousand rupees annually. This was its main fixed income.

During the Khilafat days it merely lived on paper, holding its session wherever Khilafat conferences or Congress sessions were held. After the break up of the Khilafat a new set of Nawabs took up the guardianship of this auspicious child which offered them vast opportunities of acquiring honours and titles through their association with the institution. The measure of sacrifice for these custodians of the political citadel of the community consisted in their attending annual sessions, receiving a chorus of praise from their equally honourable hosts in some big city for having undertaken the journey in a first class railway compartment at great inconvenience to themselves, and their staying as guests in good, well-decorated buildings with the most delicious

dishes to devour and plenty of pans (betels) and cigarettes to chew and smoke. The proceedings, after the session, were duly sent to the Press, but long before that the British officials received from their own inner sources news of every word spoken in the meeting. The end of the session was the end of the organization for the year and no one took notice of what had been said except in the official record of the Government of India.

The blame for such a moribund condition of their political organization could by no means be laid on the Muslim public, for it was the same human material which had been roused to feverish and mercurial activity during the Khilafat agitation between 1914 and 1922, under a leadership which believed in action and sacrifice for the cause. When the Khilafat organization broke up due to causes beyond its control, and the leadership again passed into the old hands, they refused to take any lesson from the demonstration of the potentiality of the people for sacrifice in life and property for a justifiable cause and resumed the same system of armchair politics in Muslim affairs, now more complicated through the increased mass-consciousness in the Hindu community.

Although the Nawab leaders had a sincere desire to serve their people, yet they failed to appreciate their own limitations and the increasingly doubtful patronage of their British friends in India who had themselves lost faith in the soundness of their own political policies, the purpose of their administration and the direction of their goal. As a result there was a regrettable confusion in the Muslim ranks which was ever-increasing in proportion to the awakening of the Hindu mass-consciousness on the one side and the growing weakness of the British administration on the other.

As an instance, the condition of the Muslim League of the years 1931 to 1934 may be cited here. It has been stated in these pages before that the 1931 session of the League in Delhi could only be held in a gentleman's house for fear of Qadiani agitation. Nobody can say what happened in 1932, but in 1933 Mian Abdul Aziz, a Barrister of Peshawar, managed to become the President of the League and wanted to hold a session in support of the Communal Award, but the Calcutta Muslim League was so much opposed to the idea of welcoming the Award that there was danger of a lathi fight. With the help of the Police, Mian Abdul Aziz held a meeting in which the Award was approved. In spite of this Mian Abdul Aziz was so unpopular that many members combined to hold another meeting of the League on 25 November 1933, under the presidentship of Khan

Bahadur Hafiz Hidayat Husain, in New Delhi, for which Nawab Mohammad Yusuf, the Minister for local Self-Government in U.P., took with him a large number of his Council friends and admirers, all by first and second class rail plus all found. Thus there were now two presidents, one Mian Abdul Aziz and the other Hafiz Hidayat Husain. Thereafter another meeting of the Muslim League was held on 4 March 1934, when Mian Abdul Aziz resigned and Mr. Jinnah was elected permanent President and Hafiz Hidayat Husain, Secretary. On this background whatever Mr. Jinnah did in 1934 can very well be explained.

Another attempt was then made a little later to replace the Award by a settlement between the parties themselves. This time the talks started at Dr. Ansari's house between Mr. Jinnah and Babu Rajendra Prasad on 23 January 1935. On the first day they sat in an open verandah with volunteers all round to guard against disturbances from any quarter. I happened to be staying with Dr. Ansari at the time and waited for three or four days to see what would come from it and then left for Lucknow. After about three weeks it was declared that the negotiations had fallen through on the ground that Babu Rajendra Prasad expressed his inability to speak or to make any commitment on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha.

There was no session of the Muslim League in 1935, and as far as the Khilafat Committee was concerned it had long ceased to hold sessions. Inside the Central Assembly, however, the members of the Muslim Unity Board and the Congress jointly defeated the Government on many occasions. On one occasion the Prince of Berar was brought to Delhi to influence the vote of Maulana Shaukat Ali on the sterling ratio issue, but he stood firm and voted with the other members of the Unity Board and the Swaraj Party.

Before I pass on to the election talks I have to record a serious loss which we suffered on account of the death of Mr. T. A. K. Sherwani in early January 1935. After his election to the Central Legislature on the Unity Board ticket he stood for the presidency of the Assembly against Sir Abdur Rahim but was defeated by a narrow majority. While he was still at Delhi he fell ill and within four days expired. I have tried to bring out his services to the country and to the Muslims and his activities as a staunch nationalist. He had a genial personality and was loved and respected by his friends and foes alike. I knew him from my college days when he was Football Captain of M.A.O. College Eleven and I was one of its members. Since then we had been together in many walks of life and always I had found him to be a good

and sincere Muslim. He died at the early age of forty-seven.

It was in December 1935 that Pandit Govind Ballab Pant along with Rafi Qidwai came to my house at about half past nine at night. He told me:

'The Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey, has already persuaded the landlords of U.P. to form an Agriculturist Party which will contest the Congress in the forthcoming elections and use all the zamindari influence and the official prestige in defeating its opponents. The Muslims' elections will be fought by the Muslim League landlords on Muslim ticket. They will be returned to the Assembly in most cases unopposed. As a result we shall be nowhere. If you do not take up the question seriously as you did in the case of the Unity Board elections you may advise us not to contest the elections at all.'

I assured him that I had a mind to contest the elections on the Muslim Unity Board ticket and would take steps in the near future to hold a meeting of the Unity Board to decide the issue, at which he seemed satisfied.

In early January Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant accompanied by Mr. Mohan Lal Saxena again came to me to complain that so far I had done nothing to hold the meeting of the Unity Board in connection with the forthcoming elections. I told him that I had been very busy with my professional work but I would now take early action in the matter. Thereafter, I wrote to Maulana Ahmad Said in Delhi to arrange for the holding of a meeting on 8 February 1936 and issued notices to the members to attend this very important meeting without fail. When I reached Delhi a day before the meeting I learnt from Dr. Ansari that Maulana Ahmad Said had been talking with Mr. Jinnah about election matters and that they were very near to each other in regard to the future policy of Muslims. When I went to attend the meeting which was being held in a Pandal, just in front of the Juma Mosque, Delhi, I found our Jamiat friends were present in full force. From Punjab also some representatives had come. The Raja of Salempur and Nawab Ismail Khan, for unavoidable reasons, could not attend this meeting although Maulana Shaukat Ali was present with a few of his followers. Before the proceedings started under the presidentship of Mufti Kifayatullah, Abdul Matin Choudhri came to the meeting and sat by my side and in whispers told me that Mr. Jinnah was anxious to meet me and a few other leaders of the Unity Board that very evening to talk about a compromise between the Muslim League and the Unity Board. Matin further said it would do no harm to anybody if we were to postpone the meeting on that day and hold it the following day after discussions with Mr. Jinnah. I assured him that I

would have the meeting postponed and would meet Mr. Jinnah in the evening along with four other members of the Board, Mufti Kifayatullah, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Maulana Husain Ahmad and Maulana Ahmad Said. I informed the members of the talk that I had with Matin and advised the acceptance of Mr. Jinnah's invitation. Maulana Ahmad Said told us that he had already had talks with Mr. Jinnah and had found him prepared to go very far to satisfy us. My proposal was accepted and the meeting was postponed to the following day. On my return I told Dr. Ansari what had happened.

In the evening we met Mr. Jinnah as arranged. Mr. Jinnah began by telling us that he himself was very much dissatisfied with the Muslim League leadership which consisted mostly of big landlords, title-holders and selfish people, who looked to their class and personal interests more than to communal and national interests and who had always been ready to sacrifice them to suit British policy. He said:

> 'I would like to see the Muslim League organization purified and revived, and with that end in view I am going to hold a Muslim League session on 10 May 1936 at Bombay where I would ask the Muslim League to give me a mandate to form a Parliamentary Board for the forthcoming election purposes. And I promise to you that in that Board I shall give people of your party a majority. If we have to fight elections on the Muslim ticket, it would not be in the interests of either of us to split out votes. Let us therefore fight from the common platform of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board.'

This was exactly what I had been feeling for a long time about the League and its shortcomings. I was happy to see that Mr. Jinnah realized, though late, the weaknesses of the organization of which he had been the President since 1920. I took no time in telling him that I found the offer reasonable and accepted it. Maulana Husain Ahmad said: 'We are committed to the claim of India for complete independence for the country while your organization does not approve of it. How are we to reconcile our differences?' Mr. Jinnah replied: 'When I give you a majority in the Parliamentary Board you can do everything.' Thereafter all of us agreed and assured him that we should defer any decision with regard to elections in our meeting of the Unity Board till after the League session of 10 May 1936.

From 1909, when Mr. Jinnah entered the Imperial Legislative Council as a member from Bombay, to March 1919 when he resigned his membership as a protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Bill, the Central Legislature had only an official bloc which voted according to the behest of the Government but the

people's representatives were all independents with no party label. If these representatives of the people ever combined on any political issue it was from regard for public opinion outside and not under any party discipline. Things, however, had changed when Mr. Jinnah re-entered the House in 1923 and found himself pitched against the Congress-Swaraj Party consisting of Hindus and some Muslims, who voted *en bloc* for their point of view. In this new situation, Mr. Jinnah was obliged to have a party of his own in the Legislature consisting of Parsis, Sikhs, four or five Hindus and Muslims, numbering in all about twenty. By the very nature of the composition of the party it had to be on the look-out for a chance to intervene in the debates, supporting either the Government or the Nationalist Wing represented by the Congress-Swaraj Party. Taking of any initiative by this party was out of the question on communal issues which were few and far between in the Central Legislature and the members of the Independent Party voted according to their individual conscience. But communal issues were at times indirectly involved in many of the political matters that came before the Assembly and the difficulties of Mr. Jinnah arose on such subjects, as I have already pointed out in connection with his amendment to Government's motion on the question of Federation and the Governors' powers in the provinces.

The Muslims outside were so hopelessly divided between themselves that there appeared to be no chance of a joint effort to present a united front, in the central or the provincial legislatures through a well-knit party. I believe it was this great drawback which induced Mr. Jinnah to start negotiations with Maulana Ahmad Said, who was Secretary of the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind and had great influence on his colleagues in the Unity Board, to consider the advisability of fighting the 1937 elections from a common Muslim platform. But it could only be done if the Muslim Unity Board could be brought round to compromise with the Muslim League, because for the first time the Board had fought and won one-third of the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly in the 1934 elections.

Of the Unity Board representatives who negotiated the settlement with Mr. Jinnah, four of them, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mufti Kifayatullah, Maulana Husain Ahmad and now also Maulana Ahmad Said, are dead and gone; I happen to be the only person alive to narrate to our progeny both in India and Pakistan the story of how through unity we put life into our old organization, the Muslim League. Poor Matin, although he was the youngest of all and played a part in these momentous negotiations, is also

dead. I had narrated to Dr. Ansari the talk that we had with Mr. Jinnah but he doubted very much whether it would be possible for him to give a majority in the League Parliamentary Board, but somehow I did not doubt his dominating position in the Muslim League and told him so.

The last time when I met Dr. Ansari was on 19 April 1936 at Delhi. He had also invited that evening Gandhiji's youngest son, Devdas Gandhi, who had recently married Rajagopalachari's daughter. As Begum Ansari still used to observe a kind of purdah we four of us took our dinner inside the *zenana* portion of the house. I had to leave the same night for Lucknow. Ansari came out with me to the verandah of his house to see me off. Before finally parting I asked him: 'How long will you keep yourself aloof from the Muslim Unity Board and continue to put the entire burden on my weak shoulders?' He sweetly replied: 'Have I ever disappointed you?' It meant a lot not in words but in significance.

On 9 May 1936 my dear old friend Dr. Ansari died at the age of fifty-three of a heart attack in a railway train. So long as he lived, as we all know, he lived for others. Dr. Ansari started his life as a medical man of great reputation and had been House Surgeon of Charing Cross Hospital, after taking his M.D. in London. After a few years' practice at Delhi he led the Medical Mission to Turkey and since his return from there had thrown himself heart and soul into the fight for the freedom of India. His house in Daryaganj, Delhi, became a regular guest house for both Hindu and Muslim guests. He was a handsome man with great charm and gravity of manners, coming from a very respectable family of Yusufpur in district Ghazipur, U.P. His eldest brother Hakim 'Nabina' was a very well-known physician, at one time the physician to His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad. His second brother was also a very well-known Hakim, Abdur Razzaq, and a younger brother was a Commissioner in Hyderabad State. Amongst his friends, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali were the earliest; Rahman, Shuaib and myself came next. But I think by the time of his death his affection for me was greatest as was mine for him. He loved his country dearly with a craving to serve it to the best of his capacity. He spared no sacrifice that came in his way to help the cause of freedom, although often he had to displease friends and break personal relationships for the cause of his country. His life is a complete answer to any charge that there were no patriots amongst the Muslims, and he was not alone. But what has India done to commemorate his services?

On hearing the news of his death I went to Delhi and stayed in the same room as Jawaharlal who had arrived earlier in the day. I had a long talk with Jawaharlal about our compromise with Mr. Jinnah and his promise to give us a majority in the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. I could see from his talk that he did not like the idea but he did not ask me to go back on what I had already agreed to.

The Muslim League session promised by Mr. Jinnah was held on 10 May 1936, presided over by Sir Wazir Hasan. I was informed recently by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who was an old friend and colleague of Mr. Jinnah, that Maulana Shaukat Ali was very much opposed to Sir Wazir Hasan's presidentship for the Bombay session of the League but through his intervention Maulana withdrew his objection. Maulana Ahmad Said had also gone to Bombay to attend this session. It would be interesting to note that for this session the big landlords did not take the trouble of going to Bombay; firstly because many had joined the Agriculturist Party in U.P., and secondly because they had come to know of the settlement which had been reached between Mr. Jinnah and the Unity Board.

Mr. Jinnah was given the right by the League to nominate a Parliamentary Board, of at least thirty-five persons from all over India which was to prepare its own election manifesto and to take all steps to fight the forthcoming elections. Mr. Jinnah announced the names of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in May 1936 and fixed a meeting at Lahore for the preparation of the manifesto as well as to frame rules for the conduct of the business of the Central and provincial Parliamentary Boards to be held on 8 June 1936. The personnel of the Board as announced was very good indeed and all of us were satisfied that he had done his best in excluding undesirable elements from the Board. From a perusal of the list* contained in the League's proceedings it will be noticed that not only the five members of the Muslim Unity Board who had entered into a pact with Mr. Jinnah were included in this list but a large number of old Khilafatists and Ahrars had also been brought in. Mufti Kifayatullah was nominated from Bihar, Maulana Ahmad Said from Delhi, Maulana Husain Ahmad, Maulana Shaukat Ali and I were included in the list of seven members from U.P.

Most of the members of the Parliamentary Board, including the Raja of Salempur and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, attended the Lahore meeting on 8 June 1936. After a general discussion a Drafting Committee was appointed, consisting of Nawab Ismail

*Appendix I.

Khan, Abdul Matin Choudhri and myself, which submitted its proposals to the Board which then passed them with some modifications. Besides rules and procedure for the guidance of the Central and provincial Parliamentary Boards it had also prepared an election manifesto which was unanimously accepted. There was only one issue on which there was at first disagreement between the Ulema group and others, that is the weight which was to be attached to the opinion of Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind in legislative matters. The Ulema had claimed that their opinion should be taken to be final but many of us were opposed to the idea of giving such *carte blanche* to any one group of Ulema, although it may have been objectionable even to give such a right to all the Ulema combined together. Ultimately the Ulema agreed to the words 'due weight shall be given to the opinion of Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind.'

The U.P. Central Board members were seven, namely, the Raja of Salempur, Maulana Shaukat Ali, the young Raja of Mahmudabad, Nawab Ismail Khan, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Maulana Husain Ahmad and myself. This Board, according to the rules framed at Lahore, had the power to form a provincial Parliamentary Board and I was taking steps to give effect to this when to my great surprise Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan proposed to Mr. Jinnah that the Provincial Board should consist of Muslim representatives from the Municipal and District Boards of U.P. I thought that the acceptance of his proposal would mean handing over the Provincial Parliamentary Board to Nawab Yusuf and Chhatari again, because Nawab Chhatari was the Home Member and Nawab Mohammad Yusuf was the Minister for local Self-Government, having the control of all the Municipal and District Boards in U.P. with the ability to exercise great influence over their members.

Mr. Jinnah held a meeting at Bombay in July 1936 to discuss this matter with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and me. I frankly told Mr. Jinnah that I would not accept Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan's proposal and expressed my great surprise that he, being the Secretary of the League for the year, should make a proposal contrary to the whole object of the formation of a Central Parliamentary Board. Mr. Jinnah gave his verdict against Nawabzada who became so much annoyed that he resigned from the Parliamentary Board and went away to England as member of a Government delegation for a few months. He issued a statement to the Press explaining the reasons for his resignation, but discreetly enough did not mention the Bombay meeting.

The line was now clear for the formation of a provincial

Parliamentary Board for which we held a well-attended meeting of provincial leaders who decided to form a Board consisting of twenty-five persons. We all worked together with a team spirit and succeeded in setting up thirty-six candidates for sixty-six Muslim seats in U.P. As the selected candidates were mostly those who commanded respect in their constituencies but did not belong to the moneyed class, they were in need of financial assistance from the Provincial Board. We invited Mr. Jinnah in December 1936 to address a meeting for raising funds for the election. The meeting held in Ganga Parshad Memorial Hall was a very poor show which speaks of the interest of the Muslims in the Muslim League at that time. A sum of twenty-one thousand rupees was announced as donations, of which three thousand came from the Raja of Mahmudabad and three thousand each from the Raja of Salempur and Mr. Wasim, my brother-in-law. The remainder was made up of small donations.

Before announcing the names of the Central Parliamentary Board, Mr. Jinnah had gone to the Punjab to sound public opinion on the question of fighting the elections on the Muslim League Parliamentary Board ticket. Although at one time, when Sir Shafi had formed the 'Shafi League', Sir Fazle Husain had stood by Mr. Jinnah with whom he had very good personal relations, yet on this occasion Mr. Jinnah had to stay with Mr. Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana and did not receive any encouragement from other politically-known people whose support also could have meant something for the cause. The Ahrar section on whom he had to fall back for support, in face of coldness shown from the Muslim leaders of the Punjab, could not be of great value to Mr. Jinnah, for the Ahrars had sufficient influence only in the urban areas but cut no ice in the vast rural area of the Province.

Sir Fazle Husain's attitude towards the Muslim League was purely due to the political conditions created after the Communal Award which had given to Muslims only eighty-six seats from separate electorates in a House of one hundred and seventy-five. The three seats which were given to the Punjab from the landlord and *tumandar* class in which Muslims were in an overwhelming majority were joint electorate seats. As such the Muslims were only in a nominal majority in the Provincial Assembly. Sir Fazle Husain was not sure that all the Muslims would accept the Muslim Parliamentary Board ticket and any division between the Muslims in the House would greatly damage the Muslim cause. He was therefore in favour of forming a party consisting of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims for the protection of people of the rural areas who were being impoverished by the moneylenders

of the Punjab. He had named this party the Unionist Party.

A meeting had been arranged between Sir Fazle Husain, who was very ill in those days, and Mr. Jinnah at the intervention of some well-wishers of the Muslims. Sir Fazle Husain expressed his serious doubts as to whether the Muslim League would be able to keep all the Muslims together to form a stable Ministry; for in case of division among them there was a danger that the Congress would be able to take away not only the minorities but also a good number of Muslim-elected representatives.

Mr. Jinnah also went to Bengal to find out the chances of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board's position there. The two well-known leaders of Bengal, Mr. Fazlul Haq and Khwaja Nazimuddin were pulling in different directions; Fazlul Haq was preparing to fight the elections on the Krishak Praja ticket while Khwaja Nazimuddin and his group were willing to fight on the Muslim League ticket.

The Government of India Act, passed by Parliament, received the Royal Assent on 2 July 1935. It was to be considered by the Congress at Lucknow in April 1936. The A.I.C.C. meeting held at Lucknow on 29 March elected Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as President for the coming session. The main issues before the Congress were firstly whether or not to boycott the elections held on the basis of the 1935 Constitution and secondly whether to accept office or not. Congressmen were acutely divided on these issues. One section thought that the working of reforms would inevitably lead Congress to moderation and association with Government machinery in all branches; while the other was of opinion that it would be politically unsound to think of wrecking the Constitution and doubted whether if undertaken it would be effective. However, there was a preponderance of opinion for fighting the elections and the Lucknow Congress decided in favour of doing so and agreed to prepare an election manifesto. One could clearly see from this step that ultimately the Congress would have to work the Constitution and all talk of wrecking the Constitution was futile. A party which fights an election on a democratic basis cannot, after election, start wrecking it from within. Many such attempts had been made before in the Central Legislature but none of them had succeeded. No doubt in the 1935 Constitution there was no official bloc in the Provincial Legislature, therefore a majority party could prevent any work from being done in the Legislature constitutionally; but for such emergencies there was section 93 which empowered the Governor to take over the administration and run the Government with advisers or without them. Congress

had therefore to make up its mind to accept office, if it gained sufficiently large numbers to have its policies implemented, as that appeared to be the only course that was open to it after having decided to fight the elections. I was personally certain that it would accept office but only after some coquetry.

During the Congress session at Lucknow Dr. Ansari and Mrs. Naidu were staying with us at Dolly Bagh and both were very much alarmed at the leftist bias disclosed in his presidential address by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. His mind had been working in that direction for the previous few years and after the death of Pandit Motilal and his wife Kamla Nehru this tendency had become very much pronounced in his utterances. In his Working Committee which he announced after the session, Mrs. Naidu did not find a place while quite a good number of Socialists were included therein. Bhulabhai Desai who was staying with me at Khiyaliganj House during the Congress session was also alarmed at the trend of thoughts of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. On this, the first occasion for us to be together for four days, I found that he was far from having any communal bias in spite of his being a close friend of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.

In February 1935 the four-year term of chairmanship of Babu Bishambernath Srivastava expired and the election of the new Chairman for a term of four years became due. On the previous two occasion covering the period of 1923-1925 and 1929-1932, I was not very particular about my election as the Chairman of the Lucknow Municipal Board but on this occasion I was very serious about it; more so because Assembly elections were also going to take place at latest in 1937. Sayed Ahmad Husain was equally serious to contest this election. But a few days before the elections it was discovered that his name was not on the list. He, either himself or at the instigation of others, formed the opinion that I must have manoeuvred to get his name out and on that suspicion he took a very inimical attitude towards me and started supporting Sayed Ali Zahir, the son of Sayed Wazir Hasan. It became a tough fight but friends like Hakim Khwaja Shamsuddin and Ehsanur Rahman on the Muslim side and Pandit Prithi Prakash Misra, son of Pandit Gokaran Nath Misra, aided by his uncle, my dear friend Pandit Harkaran Nath Misra, gave a successful fight to the opponents which ultimately ended in my victory. Due to the War the life of the Board continued to be extended, reaching a total number of ten years; thus I was the Chairman of Lucknow Municipal Board altogether for sixteen years.

Dr. Pannalal who became the Adviser of the Governor for

local Self-Government after the resignation of the Congress Ministry viewed with great concern the continued support I received from the Hindu members of the Municipal Board, who constituted a majority, even though I was preaching the gospel of Pakistan. He made many attempts to undermine my influence in the Board but they did not succeed in depriving me of the support of my Hindu friends on the Board for which even now I feel obliged and proud.

Before I pass on to 1937 a few words about the Shia-Sunni dispute in Lucknow may be worth while recording. The Nawabs of Lucknow had been pioneers in spreading Mughal culture and traditions and were refined people. Generally speaking they were backward in modern education but in the Urdu language and Muslim history and traditions they were sufficiently advanced. Most of the Urdu poets like Mir, Sauda, Ghalib, Anis and Dabir were Shias and their contributions to the Urdu language have been most valuable. Similarly the Hindus in the U.P., while contributing their own great part to the cultural make up of the Province, also adopted the basic shades of the Nawabi culture and were at one time proud to call it an Indian culture. But with all this the Shia population in Lucknow which was their stronghold in U.P. was in the neighbourhood of one-fourth of the total Muslim population. Relations between the two sects had been quite cordial, and even inter-marriages were common in Oudh and changes from one sect to the other had not been infrequent. However differences started and assumed an acute form from the year 1903 when the Sunnis were obliged to have a separate Karbala. After this separation, as it was bound to happen, the Moharram of the Shias lost much of its attraction and that of the Sunnis became all the more divorced from ceremonial. Sectarian preachers started making attacks against each other and in consequence there was a riot in 1908 and from then on relations began to grow increasingly bitter. Inter-marriages ceased and an era of animosity began to disfigure the placid atmosphere of Lucknow where relations between the Hindus and Muslims, barring the riot in 1924, had been always excellent. The climax was reached in 1934-35 when on the occasion of Moharram there were some skirmishes between the Shias and Sunnis in the city. As a result of the bitterness engendered, the Sunnis claimed the right to praise in public processions the four Caliphs, three of whom are the target of attack by the Shias. The Ahrars took up the Sunni cause and started throwing all their weight in favour of *Madhe-Sahaba*.

I should here explain who were the Ahrars. When the Khilafat

Committee was on its last legs after the abolition of the institution by Ataturk, there was no basis left for any dynamic activity. There is no room for stagnation in mass movements. Once the forward march suffers a set-back, the leaders of the movement themselves become its victims and they are eaten up by the rot which necessarily brings in its wake petty quarrels, divisions and dissensions. This fate was also met by the Khilafat organization after 1926. There was discontent in the Punjab against the Ali Brothers and in consequence Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Ghazi Abdur Rahman, Choudhri Afzal Haq, Maulana Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi, Maulana Habibur Rahman Ludhianvi, Maulvi Mazhar Ali and above all Maulana Abdul Qadir Qasuri left the Khilafat organization and started a party known as the Ahrar Party. Out of these leaders I can say confidently that Choudhri Afzal Haq, formerly in the Police Service, was very sincere, honest and clever. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan after some time could not pull on with this group and on the issue of the Shaheedganj Mosque he broke away from them and formed another organization known as Niliposh.

It cannot be denied that the Ahrar Party included some very active members and good platform speakers. In October 1931 they started the Kashmir agitation and succeeded in rousing the people in the Punjab to the extent that thousands courted arrest and were sent to jail by the Kashmir Government. They stood for the independence of India and took a keen interest in the Nationalist Party as well as in the Congress. But they suffered from some basic difficulty which they could not overcome in the Punjab. There was a three-cornered struggle between the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in that province with the result that at no time did either Congress or the Muslim League have predominance and consequently the British had an easy time there. As for the Sikhs it was the only province where they had thirteen per cent population. There they were the pets of the British Administration, having received twenty per cent representation under the Communal Award. Although there were some big Muslim landlords, yet their number was very small as were their estates, and the bulk of the zamindari property belonged to small landlords who were the backbone of the Punjabi Muslims. In the Darling Report, a few years before the partition of India, it was shown that out of a total revenue-paying zamindar community in the Punjab numbering 16,16,000, more than 15,65,000 paid Rs. 250 or less revenue to the Government. From these figures it becomes apparent that the agrarian question in the Province had no reasonable chance of serving leftist parties. As such the Ahrars

had their centres only in some of the big towns of the Punjab and even there they were confined to certain classes. In the Shia-Sunni dispute in Lucknow they espoused the cause of the Sunnis, and with their powerful oratory succeeded in creating a good atmosphere for themselves. With this background my own position in Lucknow was open to severe test, particularly in view of the fact that I had to fight my election from the city. Apart from my own personal position I had to think also of saving the Muslim League from the effects of the bitter controversy that was raging in my city.

Jawaharlal again presided at the Faizpur Congress session in 1937, where he declared himself to be against acceptance of office. Although the general opinion in Congress was against this view, more particularly in the group of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, there was such a division of opinion that Pandit Jawaharlal in one of his statements had to say before his election as President that 'it would be absurd for me to treat this presidential election as both for socialism or anti-office acceptance.' The issue was again left undecided.

XVII

ELECTIONS AND CONGRESS-LEAGUE OVERTURES

1937

WITH MORE funds, I might have been able to secure more candidates to stand on the Muslim League ticket. However we entered into the election fight against the landlords who had formed the Agriculturist Party, which contested Congress Hindu candidates by setting up Hindus and the Muslim League candidates by putting forward Muslims with the backing of the Ministers. Thus we had a very uphill task as the entire Government machinery was working against us. There was no general opposition to the Muslim League from Congress as the League manifesto had practically been modelled on the Congress economic programme, and secondly, because of the Nationalist character of the Muslim League candidates. Nevertheless Rafi Ahmad Qidwai set up two Muslim candidates to oppose the League and one to oppose Nawab Chhatari, to which I took very strong objection.

We had the good fortune of having with us Maulana Shaukat Ali, the hero of the Khilafat agitation with all his influence on the Muslim mind. He toured the Province like a soldier to help the League cause. Maulana Husain Ahmad and Maulana Ahmad Said from the Jamiat side and Mufti Inayatullah and Maulana Jamal Mian, son of Maulana Abdul Bari, who had now grown into a very sensible, energetic and powerful speaker, Maulana Hamid Badauni, Maulana Karam Ali and several others put their heart into the work by visiting practically all the important centres from which Muslim League candidates had been set up.

Within a few months the amount of donations to the League was spent up and the election began to suffer for want of funds. To save the situation I executed pro-notes in favour of banks for over Rs. 20,000 to meet the demand from all quarters for more money to carry on the work.

We won twenty-nine seats out of thirty-six on the Muslim

League ticket (about 80%). No Muslim was elected from U.P. on the Congress ticket. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has memtioned in his book that only twenty-six seats were secured by the Muslim League. This is absolutely wrong.

The tenantry of the biggest agriculturist province of India, U.P., *for the first time in history* decided to record a protest against the prevailing conditions in the villages and suppression of their rights. Since the British assumed the administration in 1859, they had passed no Rent Act until 1886 in which the tenant was treated as a mere tenant-at-will. About two decades later the Oudh Rent Act was amended to give the tenant the statutory right to remain in possession of his holding for seven years and to be ejected only for non-payment of rent. This was again replaced in 1922 by another Act which gave the tenant a right to hold his land for life and thereafter his heir to hold it for five years. In all elections before 1937 he merely went to vote for the zamindar's candidate but on this occasion he refused to be influenced. Thus it took the tenant seventy-eight years of the British rule before revolting against the landlord and asserting his existence. The landlords were so ignorant of the impending catastrophe that to the last day they were keeping Sir Harry Haig, the Governor of U.P., well convinced that the Congress would not be able to secure more than sixty out of the one hundred and forty-four Hindu seats. The Civil Service also gave a similar estimate of Congress strength in the election. When the actual result was declared Government House became a mourning-den. In U.P. Congress secured 134 seats out of 144.

My election result was announced on 12 February 1937 and the same day Babu Rajendra Prasad in a Press statement said that Congress would not co-operate in the legislatures with any other group or party. Why Rajen Babu should have issued his statement in such a hurry when even the results of elections in some other provinces had not yet been announced passes comprehension. Besides, although there was no written pact between the Muslim League and the Congress for a coalition between the parties in the Legislatures, yet the amicable manner in which the elections had been fought both by Congress and the League presaged a future settlement. However the atmosphere was greatly poisoned by this hasty statement.

There was naturally great jubilation in the Congress circles and immediately a demand was made that the provisions of the Government of India Act relating to the powers of the Governors for the protection of minorities and the Services, etc., be deleted. We found ourselves in a hopeless position regarding the issue

because only three years before Mr. Jinnah had emphatically opposed the powers of the Governors under the Act of 1935. I could visualize what would be the effect of the Congress demand particularly after the statement made by Babu Rajendra Prasad, referred to above. For the time being, however, the Government did not agree to the demand of the Congress voiced in the Congress convention of legislators held at Delhi on 20 March 1937.

In a meeting of the Provincial Parliamentary Board in the first week of March 1937, I was elected leader of the Muslim League party in the U.P. Assembly. Mr. Jinnah had also come at the time to Lucknow and during his stay he had some talks with Nawabs Yusuf and Chhatari. As already Jamiatul Ulema friends had begun to suspect a clash between the League and the Congress; they interpreted Mr. Jinnah's discussions as an attempt to bring reactionary forces into the Muslim League, which was wholly baseless. Nawabs Yusuf and Chhatari were anxious to meet Mr. Jinnah to ask to be taken into the League but he refused their request because I was totally against it.

To our great regret the Taluqdar of Talibnagar, in District Bahraech, who had stood on our ticket, died a few days after the declaration of the result and the Government gave a month and a half for filling the vacancy. We decided not to contest this bye-election against the Congress nominee Mr. Rafi Qidwai, particularly as our only applicant had asked for the huge sum of Rs. 20,000 which under the circumstances I could not manage to collect, having already borrowed money for the Muslim League election from the banks. To our great surprise an independent candidate, Ali Hasan Khan, on the date of filing his nomination paper disappeared, perhaps having been influenced by the Raja of Nanpara's not wishing his Manager to contest a Congress candidate.

By now the results of elections in all the provinces were known. Out of a total number of 482 Muslim seats in India, Congress put up only fifty-eight candidates. They had some candidates returned in N.W.F.P. and a few each from other provinces, but none from U.P.

On 29 March while I was still asleep, Shah Mohammad Husain Usmani, Advocate of the Chief Court of Oudh and a common friend of mine and Nawab Chhatari, woke me up to tell me that Nawab Chhatari was at his house waiting anxiously to meet me. When I reached there the Nawab informed me that the previous evening he had met H.E. Sir Harry Haig, Governor of the U.P., at the Cawnpore railway station and had been asked by him to form an Interim Government in the U.P., and that I was the first

person to whom he was offering a seat in his Cabinet. I replied:

'If I refuse to accept this great honour which would give me a fat salary, a big car and a palatial residence, you will be justified in doubting my wisdom but surely not my sincerity. You know I am now the leader of the Muslim League party and as such I cannot accept any office without consulting my party. If I had been in agreement with you in principle I might have decided to hold a meeting of the Parliamentary Board but I consider joining the Interim Government to be fatal to my party and my community. You must therefore excuse me if I decline your offer.'

He wanted to argue it out with me but I assured him that my decision was final and no arguments would induce me to change my opinion. As I came out to go to my house a representative of the A.P.I. accosted me at the door and asked me whether I had accepted Nawab Chhatari's offer. I replied 'No!'

During the day I heard that there had been a meeting between Nawab Chhatari and the Raja of Salempur but I hardly imagined that the Raja would fall easily into the trap and accept a place in the Cabinet. Next day came the announcement that the Raja of Salempur would hold the portfolio of Education in the Chhatari Cabinet. Needless to say it gave me a great shock because for the previous few years the Raja of Salempur had been a source of great strength to me. To stop further indiscipline in the party I held a meeting of the Provincial Board and expelled the Raja from the party. After a few days from his defection Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant came to see me and told me about the Congress attitude towards acceptance of office. His visit was very brief and short; so I did not think it proper to start discussion on the subject of a coalition myself.

A Jamiat Conference was held on 5 May 1937 to which I was also invited although I was not a member of the Jamiatul Ulema. It was held in the residence of Mr. Abdus Salam, a leading zamindar of the district, and there a considerable number of Ulema of all types had assembled to take part in the important deliberations. Mufti Kifayatullah presided over the meeting and one after the other the Ulema started speaking about Azadi and Azadi (Independence; independence) while I knew most of them were those whom I had never seen in the Congress meetings or Congress gatherings. They were all dressed in khaddar to add to their demonstration of craving for independence. This went on for about three hours when I got up and told them: 'I feel like a stranger in this gathering because all of you seem inclined to think that I had never had anything to do with the Congress and

that independence had never crossed my mind.' I warned them that in the present political situation there was not question of independence involved. When we threw in our lot with the Congress during the Khilafat days, not asking for any safeguards for the Muslims in independent India, we never thought of a situation in which Congress would accept office even while the British Government held power. A new situation had arisen in which we had to decide the fate of the Muslims of India, taking into full account the fact that we had come to the Assembly on the basis of separate electorates proclaiming that we would protect the interests of Muslims, and in that task they had been our friends and co-workers travelling from place to place assuring the Muslims by reciting Quranic verses, about the value of unity and Jamaat. If we were now to agree to go to Congress without any safeguard for our interests we should be betraying our community. I declared that I was not prepared to take shelter behind the Congress benches without an assurance from Congress about the future of the Muslims in India. As a result of my warning the Ulema did not decide anything contrary to my wishes and when in the evening I asked Maulana Husain Ahmad as to why he had made no contribution in the morning session, he said, 'What you said was quite right. We have to think of independence on the one hand and of the Muslim interests on the other.'

Next day Mr. Jinnah was to arrive in Lucknow but he missed his train and could not meet Maulana Husain Ahmad who had had to leave for Faizabad the same day. Later on Maulana Mohammad Mian of Allahabad informed me that another Ulema Conference had been called by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad on 17 May and that I had also been invited. I told him that I would not go to Allahabad as in the Ulema meeting at Muradabad I had said whatever I had to say.

Babu Mohan Lal Saxena was still anxious that there should be a coalition Government in U.P. and with that end in view he came to me one day and advised me to discuss the matter with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself. I went to meet Pandit Jawaharlal on 12 May 1937 and that was the last time for me to meet him at Anand Bhawan. He was ill with fever and I could talk to him only in the evening. With him it was not necessary for me to start from the beginning, because he knew all the circumstances in which the Muslim League Parliamentary Board was formed, Muslim League elections were fought and every effort had been made to make the Muslim Parliamentary Board manifesto as near to the Congress economic policy as

possible. I had, thus, only to impress upon him the necessity in the Legislative Assembly of co-operation between the Congress and the Muslim League which in my opinion would once and for all put an end to British interference in Indian affairs and pave the way for the complete independence of the country. Quite contrary to my views he believed that really the Hindu-Muslim question in India was confined to a few Muslim intellectual landlords and capitalists who were cooking up a problem which did not in fact exist in the mind of the masses. He ridiculed the idea of Muslims having any separate organization carried on within the precincts of the Legislature. In support of the dangers involved in keeping party factions alive he cited the civil war in Spain and instances in other countries of Europe. I pointed out to him that the Muslim problem of India was unique, that no parallel could be found anywhere in the world and that a difference in magnitude and dimensions often makes a difference in kind. Drawing parallels from what might apply to Canada or other western countries was completely to ignore the history of India and the magnitude of the Muslim problem in the country. I further said that democracy was for the good of the country but the country should not be sacrificed at the altar of a system of Government borrowed from the West, which had never had to face a problem approaching in similarity to that presented by India. We could not agree and I had to leave disappointed.

The Allahabad meeting of the Ulema was held on 17 May and the next day I read in the Press that the Ulema had decided to leave the Muslim League Parliamentary Board and to go over to the Congress unconditionally. This happened a mere five days after my meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru. It was a great success for Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as he had managed to get a contrary *fatwa* from the Ulema within twelve days of their meeting at Muradabad in which they had decided to remain with the Muslim League.

Maulana Husain Ahmad wrote a letter to me after the Allahabad meeting of the Ulema in which, so far as I remember, he said that by this means he was preparing ground for a coalition with the Congress and for securing ministerships in the Cabinet. Nothing could have hurt me more than this narrow and petty approach to a crucial problem concerning the Muslim future in India.

However, a letter from Maulana Ahmad Said, the Secretary of the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind, which he had written in reply to a letter of mine, had fallen into the hands of my brother Mushfiq

which speaks volumes about the mental disequilibrium of the Ulema in relation to the events which they had to deal with. Here is the translation of the original letter:*

'Dear Respected Choudhri Sahib,

Assalam Alaikum. I am thankful to you for your detailed letter. I have a complaint against my friends that those who ran from city to city and town to town (to work for the Muslim League), after the elections, were forgotten altogether. Mr. Jinnah when he decided to unite the Agriculturist Party (with the Muslim League) also did not care for them and when some of our selfish friends started negotiations with the Congress for Ministries and Speakerships, they also did not care for us. Look at my behaviour that I courted bad terms with all my friends and co-workers but I continued to repeat to them to come to terms with the Muslim League; whatever I did in the Allahabad Conference you will not be ignorant of it and what my friends there did with me will also be known to you. Nevertheless I stand by my opinion. If the matter of Hafiz Ibrahim had not come in then it would have been possible for me to bring the whole Ulema group to my view of thinking. However a detailed talk can only take place when we meet. Your League will do nothing and is not capable of doing anything. If it had been capable of doing anything the Muslims would not have been facing the present deplorable condition.

Yes, do let me know how far it is true that if seats for yourself and Nawab Ismail Khan could be found in the Cabinet a settlement might have been possible with the Congress, and Congress was ready to give one seat but you were not prepared to leave Nawab Ismail Khan behind and there was no room for him. Therefore, an agreement could not be reached. Is it also true that Rafi Ahmad Qidwai to whom you had offered full help and did not put up a candidate against him proved disloyal to you? I shall be obliged if you will kindly give me correct information about these matters.

Ahmad Said.'

I received this letter when I had already started leading the Opposition against the Congress. It speaks for itself and does not require any comment from me.

While behind the scene such a rueful display of political immorality prevailed, the Muslim mass conscience outside had begun to be pricked even without full knowledge of the situation in the country and a wave of fear of the approaching danger and a determination to face adversity was daily growing. Up to now they had never realized the real significance of elections in democracy but after the staggering success of the Congress they vaguely realized that it might mean in time a purely Hindu raj. They could never imagine that such a revolutionary change

*See Appendix II.

in the Government could be brought about by mere manipulation of votes, for in their past history in India the fate of dynasties followed the success of arms on a battlefield. Most of their political lethargy and their lack of activity had been due to their ignorance of the march of time and of the change in the method of struggle for power. The absence of any political organization to educate them regarding creeping changes in the political sphere, and the unfortunate lack of an Urdu Press worth the name in U.P. were other factors which held them back.

To add to our anxiety, K.B. Habibullah, who had been returned from Jhansi constituency, expired about this time and a bye-election was declared for June 1937. Now that a complete break had followed between the Muslim League and the Jamiatul Ulema the latter rushed to Jhansi in full force to teach us a lesson and to impress upon Congress the value of their strength and the measure of their influence. The Muslim League organization had no funds and at that period there were very few in Muslim India eager to help the League. However, the young Raja of Mahmudabad, Amir Ahmad Khan, whose estate had been released from the management of the Trust only a year earlier, rose to the occasion and opened his purse to meet the election expenses whatever their amount.

Maulana Shaukat Ali, a giant in physique with all his popularity, rushed to Jhansi with a team of League Ulema and workers like Maulana Jamal Mian, Mufti Inayatullah of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Abdul Hamid Badauni, Maulana Karam Ali, A. B. Habibullah, Manager of the Mahmudabad Estate, and Sayed Zakir Ali. It was a very tough fight but ultimately to our great jubilation the Muslim League candidate won.

In the last week of June the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, issued a statement that the question of interference of the Governors in the provincial sphere was primarily the concern of the leader of the party in power and the Governor; but in view of the fact that genuine apprehensions and misunderstandings existed in that matter, the Government of India wished to make it clear in a most unmistakable manner that the responsibility falling upon the Governors of the provinces would be discharged in the spirit which those Governors were expected by Parliament to show and they would work in that spirit with their Ministers. This was taken generally by Congress to be a gentleman's agreement of non-interference in the work of the provincial Governments. Following this statement a meeting of the Congress Working Committee was held at Wardha presided over by Pandit Jawaharlal on 5 July.

Rafi Qidwai brought me a message from Pandit G. B. Pant that on his way to Wardha he would stay in Lucknow to meet me for a talk. Pandit Pant, when he met me in the morning, asked me how many seats in the Cabinet I would demand in case of a coalition between the Congress and League. I replied: Three in nine and two in six, i.e. one-third of the total strength of the Cabinet whatever it may be.' Then he asked whether he would have any voice in the selection of the Muslim League Ministers. I replied: 'As much voice as I should have in your selection.' Then came the question about the salary of the Ministers. I said: 'I have heard with some surprise that the Congress is talking of Rs. 500 as salary for the Congress Ministers. I consider it as one more slogan added to the list of the Congress platitudes. No one will be able to live on this salary decently and to avoid it you will give them a number of allowances such as car allowance, house allowance, electricity allowance, fans allowance, garden allowance and so on. Please be practical and don't go in for mere sham public applause.' After a few minutes more I left him.

On 5 July 1937 the Congress agreed to accept office and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad came to Lucknow where he met me on 12 July. He asked me: 'What would be the attitude of the Muslim party in the assembly if, on any issue between the British Government and the Congress, Congress decides to leave the Assembly and resign?' I replied: 'If we are a coalition Government, surely it will be our moral duty to leave the Assembly with the Congress. Coalition presupposes co-operation on a wider basis.' Then suddenly he asked me: 'Will you have Hafiz Ibrahim as your colleague in the Cabinet?' I said: 'No! My colleague in the Cabinet will be Nawab Ismail Khan because he enjoys the confidence not only of my party but of the Muslims in the Province.' He said: 'But he is a Nawab.' I replied: 'Maulana you ought to know more than myself that he has inherited this title from his grandfather Nawab Shaifta, the well-known poet and a friend of Ghalib.' Thereafter he said: 'Will you give it to me in writing that the League will also leave the Assembly if the Congress decides to retire?' I said: 'My word should be enough. If, however, the Congress wants it, it is here.'

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad returned to Lucknow on 15 July, stayed in the same hotel and had another talk with me. But this time he was not alone; Pandit G.B. Pant was also there with him. After some preliminary talk the Maulana handed over to me a two-page typed note which I was supposed to sign as a price for Muslim League Coalition with the Congress. Here is the note:

'The Muslim League group in the United Provinces Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group.

The existing members of the Muslim League Party in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party and will fully share with other members of the Party their privileges and obligations as members of the Congress Party. They will similarly be empowered to participate in the deliberations of the Party. They will likewise be subject to the control and discipline of the Congress Party in equal measure with other members and the decisions of the Congress Party, as regards work in the Legislature and general behaviour of its members, shall be binding on them. All matters shall be decided by a majority vote of the Party, each individual member having one vote.

The policy laid down by the Congress Working Committee for their members in the Legislature along with instructions issued by the competent Congress bodies pertaining to their work in such Legislatures shall be faithfully carried out by all members of the Congress Party including these members.

The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces will be dissolved, and no candidates will thereafter be set up by the said Board at any bye-election. All members of the Party shall actively support any candidate that may be nominated by the Congress to fill up any vacancy occurring hereafter.

All members of the Congress Party shall abide by the rules of the Congress Party and offer their full and genuine co-operation with a view to promoting the interests and prestige of the Congress.

In the event of the Congress Party deciding on resignation from the Ministry or from the Legislature the members of the above-mentioned Group will also be bound by that decision.'

To the typed statement of these terms Maulana Azad appended a short note: 'It was hoped that if these terms were agreed to and the Muslim League group of members joined the Congress Party as full members that group would cease to exist as a separate group. In the formation of the Provincial Cabinet it was considered proper that they should have representatives.'

After going through it I said: 'Maulana, this is a very strange document. You want me to sign the death warrant of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board as well as the Muslim League organization, which I am representing there. I have no other capacity in which to talk to you except as the representative of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. Besides there are many other matters in this note which are very objectionable. I cannot sign this document.'

Then a long discussion was started, word by word, sentence by sentence, and it continued till about eight o'clock. When I was leaving Pantji said: 'Well, I shall let you know the final

position of the Congress in a day or two.' From there I went straight to Nawab Chhatari where I was invited to dinner and narrated to him the talk which I had at the hotel. He was happy at the talk but unhappy over future consequences; that is how a big landlord's mind works.

On the evening of the 7th my old and revered uncle Mr. Nasim and I were discussing the ugly situation which had developed, when I was informed that a gentleman had come in a car and wanted to meet me outside. I went there to find that he was none other than Pandit Pant. He asked me to get into his car and go for a drive for a few minutes to discuss matters. As soon as the car started he informed me that he had come to me straight from Government House after having been sworn in as Premier of the U.P. He further said: 'You have been in the Congress for such a long time and you know us very well. Our main problem in the Assembly will be confined to purely bread and butter questions and the economic uplift of the people. Where is the harm if you sign the document and work with us inside the Legislature as friends and co-workers?' I explained to him my reasons for not agreeing to enter into a coalition on such terms and warned him that the consequences of a fight in the Legislature would be distasteful to me and would not be in the interests of India. I further told him that India was a country where unfortunately even the bread and butter question in some respects became a communal question. There was nothing left after this talk to urge us to drive further so he dropped me at my house.

I do not know what led Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to send Babu Jagdamba Narain, a friend of mine, to me again on 24 July with a message that he would like me to see him. I was leaving that evening for Meerut and there being a very short time before my train left I went to meet the Maulana again. The Maulana had, since we met last, dotted the 'i's' and cut the 't's' so as to make the death warrant of the Muslim League organization more acceptable and handed the result over to me to have a look at it again to satisfy my conscience. I told him that I was going to Meerut and would discuss the document with Nawab Ismail Khan also. He handed over a copy of it and I left for the station. After discussing with Nawab Ismail Khan, who was in agreement with me in all that I had so far done, I telephoned to Maulana and asked him whether he would agree to the following proviso to the agreement: 'Provided that the Muslim League Party members in the U.P. Assembly will be free to vote in accordance with their conscience, on communal matters.' The Maulana

seemed to have been very much upset over this message on the 'phone, and told me that a reply to this would have to be considered and to be conveyed to me after some time. In the evening Pantji asked me on the 'phone, 'What do you mean by communal matters?' I replied: 'Pantji, we have had enough to deal with in our lives over communal questions and you know what they include. But for your information I can say that they include religion, religious ceremonies, languages, culture, services, etc.' He asked when I would be returning. I replied, 'Next morning, both Nawab Ismail Khan and I shall be reaching Lucknow.'

From Lucknow station we went straight to Pantji's residence where we found Maulana Abul Kalam Azad taking his tea. We handed the document back to Maulana and told him that on 27 July when the Assembly session started we should be sitting in the opposition and would face the consequences.

Congress had started making attempts to win over some of our members and a very good old friend of mine, Saiduddin, an advocate of Partabgarh, had gone over to the Congress and it appeared that a few more were thinking of doing the same. It was a real trial to my nerves. But God gave me strength to meet all these troubles with equanimity. The same evening my uncle came to see me and while about to leave he asked my younger brother Mushfiq why I seemed to be rather unusually quiet. He inquired whether it had anything to do with the loans I had taken from the banks. Mushfiq replied in the affirmative. He told him to tell me not to be worried about it. The whole amount with interest would be paid by him. It was by such quiet, unostentatious service to the cause that the foundations of a Muslim State were being laid even while the ship was tossing in a stormy sea.

From 1923 to 1937 there were occasions when Congress entered the Legislature to carry on the struggle against the British Government from inside with the confidence that it possessed a powerful organization behind it outside in the country. While the Congress strength outside gave their representatives moral strength to speak emphatically to impress upon the Government its power and prestige, with us it was quite the reverse. I have already mentioned the moribund condition of the Muslim League organization to which even Maulana Ahmad Said has referred in his letters to me, quoted before. Tactically I thought that by downright opposition to Congress in the Assembly we might be able to put life not only into the Muslim League organization but also into the masses who had already become very restive, and that with our opposition to the Congress policies the mass

mind would begin to rally round the Muslim League; for they had also been making a note of the changes not only in the political field but also in the cultural and social relationship between the two communities. It is true that western influence had greatly undermined the old cultural foundation and introduced many new features, more in consonance with world forces than some of the static cultural wealth of the olden days, but what the Muslims objected to were the changes in the cultural and social outlook directly traceable to the Hindu 'back to the Veda' cult, the most unfortunate aspect of this being that even Congress leadership had begun not only to connive at this, but in some cases to encourage it. Whether in services or games or other common social activities a change in the mental attitude of Hindus generally was markedly visible.

India had always loved fairs and pilgrimages but for a few decades Hindu Sabha volunteers had begun to look with disfavour upon Muslims' attending such fairs and so far as the Muslim pilgrimages were concerned they discouraged Hindus from going to Ajmer, Delhi, Pakpattan, Rudauli or Bahreich. The most distressing feature of this aggressive movement against the visits of Hindus to the mausoleums of Muslim saints and Sufis who had made a great contribution to the propagation of the doctrine of monotheism and the inculcation of a belief in the Ultimate Reality, and Truth was in sad and most lamentable contrast to the respect paid by them to Tulsidas, Kabirdas and Guru Nanak. It was in this sphere of thought that unity between the two peoples—the Hindus and Muslims—had been very prominent. In fact it is alleged that Sankarachariya, Ramanuja and Ramananda had been influenced by Muslim saints of south India in their Vedantic philosophy. The yogis as a rule have invoked and offered their devotion only to Him. Even Gandhiji had never hesitated in confessing that he believed only in one God, by whatever name we might call him. On one occasion he said: 'Rama whose name he prescribed as the invaluable remedy of all ills is neither the historical Rama nor the Rama of those who use the name as a charm or black magic. Rama whose name he prescribes as a cure-all was God, by taking whose name the devotees attain purity and peace.'* He had once gone so far as to advise the Congress Governments in different provinces to follow the simple and unostentatious lives of the Caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar, who unlike Rama and Krishna are historical personalities.

Babu Bhagwandas, the renowned savant of Banares, father of

*Tundulkar, *Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, Bombay, Jhaveri and Tundulkar, Vol. VII, p. 149.

H.E. Sri Prakasa, Governor of Bombay, had compiled a valuable work *The Essential Unity of All Religions* with a foreword from Rajagopalachari, Babu Rajendra Prasad and Professor Radhakrishnan, in which he quoted extracts from the Vedas, the Quran and Hadis and Sufi poets, to prove that the Eternal Truth is one and the same for both Islam and Hinduism; He may be called by different names but the Reality is one and indivisible. Baghwandas was indeed, a great protagonist of Hindu-Muslim unity and through his manners, dress and appearance he had been inviting both peoples towards unity. Sometimes he called himself Abdul Qadir.

It was very distasteful to me to prepare myself to go and sit in opposition to my erstwhile Congress friends, but the overall picture of Indian life and politics of the time left me no room to shirk the call of duty.

Before continuing to review U.P. affairs a brief survey of developments in other Muslim provinces may be of value.

Bengal. Khwaja Nazimuddin and Shaheed Suhrawardy had fought the election on the Muslim League ticket but Mr. Fazlul Haq, who was returned from two constituencies, had entered the contest on the Krishak Praja ticket and had defeated Khwaja Nazimuddin in his constituency. Later on he resigned from that constituency and Khwaja Nazimuddin was returned. Altogether the Muslim League won forty seats, the Krishak Praja thirty-nine and the rest were independents. Bengal was following the political situation in the U.P. very closely and as time progressed most of the members, including Mr. Fazlul Haq, veered round to the League.

Punjab. In spite of Allama Iqbal's genuine effort to help the League cause only two members were returned on its ticket, namely Malik Barkat Ali and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and soon after the results were out Raja Ghazanfar Ali joined the Unionist Party. It claimed as its total strength in the Assembly 195 seats; though the remaining members were not always opposed to the Unionist Party.

Sind. After having been declared a separate province by the Communal Award, in the first Sind Assembly Muslims had thirty-five seats out of a total of sixty. The members were divided into four groups, the Sind United Party eighteen, the Independent Muslims twelve, Sind Muslim Party three, and Sind Muslim Azad Party two. With the help of the Hindus of Sind, Sir Hidayatullah formed the first Cabinet.

N.W.F.P. Here there had been a tough fight between Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan's candidates and the Congress, with the result that

the first Ministry was formed by Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan; but after some time he died and it became possible for the Congress to get Dr. Khan Sahib elected as the Premier of the Province.

Assam. Sir Saadullah formed a coalition in Assam. There were thirty-four Muslims in the Assembly but hopelessly divided into different groups, with the result that Sir Saadullah's position remained *shaky till he* resigned *in* 1938.

The Minority Provinces. Interim Governments after the elections were formed in Madras, Bihar, Bombay, C.P., U.P. and Orissa. I have already discussed the U.P. where Nawab Chhatari had formed the Interim Ministry. In Bihar Mr. Yunus and in Madras Sir Osman formed the Interim Ministries. Similarly Interim Ministries were formed in C.P., Orissa and Bombay. When these Ministries ceased to function after the Congress accepted office the Muslims began to face there the same situation as was more acutely felt in U.P.

The night between 26 and 27 July, before the fateful day when I attended the first session of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, brought before my eyes the whole picture of my past life which had sincerely been devoted to the cause of the country and my own people the Muslims. Time, energy and money had never stood in the way of my serving India. Apart from politics, most of my dear friends in Lucknow and in my province were Hindus, some of whom were as dear to me as my own younger brothers. Gopinath Srivastava, Mohan Lal Saxena, Jagdamba Narain, Gopalnarain Saxena, Harkaran Nath Misra, Jai Karan Nath Misra, Pushkar Nath Bhatt and many others had been my constant companions and co-workers in every field of political or municipal activity. Pt. Gobind Ballabh Pant, Dr. Katju, Sampurna Nand, Mrs. Pandit, Mahbir Tiyagi, Kesho Deo Malvia, Ajit Prashad Jain, Lal Bahadur Shastri and several other leaders of the Congress and members of the U.P. Assembly had been co-workers in the cause of freedom for India. Nothing but the call of duty urged me on to sit in opposition to them.

There were occasions when I had been opposed to some of the Congress policies but their nature had been different from the current one. There was danger of bitterness in personal relations however much I might try to avoid it. To alienate old friends and to form new friendships at such an age seemed a very irksome task, yet the call of duty directed that way.

All the avenues of further talks with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had been sealed by the misguided action of the Ulema on 17 May 1937 when they, under the guidance of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, left the Muslim League and unconditionally joined the

Congress, for it gave the Hindu Sabha section in the Congress encouragement to remain adamant against any settlement with the Muslim League. And when, after his first talk with me at Lucknow on 12 July 1937, Maulana Azad went to Allahabad to discuss terms of compromise with the Congress, he was surrounded by men like Dr. Ashraf, Narbada Prashad Singh, Narender Deo and Pershotamdas Tandon, in a strange combination of Communism and Hinduism, who prevailed upon him not to proceed with his idea of any truce with the League unless the League agreed to wind itself up in U.P. My warning to the Congress that they should not be misled by the present condition of the Muslims was misunderstood as a threat. I ran from pillar to post, begging the Congress leadership to realize the dangers that they were courting, but it was taken as a sign of weakness rather than the result of a sincere desire to avert a crisis. With such thoughts I could get no sleep because next morning I had to reverse the past chapters of my life and to sit in opposition to my erstwhile friends and colleagues.

The first thing that I did before going to the Assembly was to inform my brother-in-law Mr. Wasim, my senior in profession, that henceforth he should take someone else as his junior for I would have no time now for court work. He was horrified and tried to dissuade me from that course. But as I saw the prevailing condition of Muslims I could not hope that there would be many who would try to shoulder the burden with me in putting life into the organization, as the Muslims had done during the Khilafat Days when a large number of young men had non-co-operated and left their legal practice to work for the cause. I did not agree to his suggestion and decided to sacrifice my profession for the cause.

In the Assembly most of the members in my party were the old Khilafatists and Aligarhians.* Muslims belonging to the Agriculturist Party sat on my right. The most important of them were the Nawab of Chhatari, Nawab Sir Mohammad Yusuf and Nawab Jamshed Ali Khan of Baghpat. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and the Raja of Salempur sat as independent members.

On the first day of the proceedings there were no occasions for fireworks. Mr. Pershotamdas Tandon was elected as the Speaker from the Congress side while Nafeesul Hasan as Deputy

*Nawab Ismail Khan, Aziz Ahmad Khan of Bareilly, Rizwanullah Khan of Gorakhpur, Karim-ur-Raza Khan of Shahjehanpur, Farooq Dewan of Gorakhpur, Wasim of Lucknow, Dr. Abdul Samad of Cawnpore, Zaheerul Hasan Lari of Gorakhpur, Zaheeruddin Faruqi of Bahreich, Mohammad Ishaq Khan Besti, Zahur Ahmad of Allahabad, Aziz Rasul of Hardoi, Mubashshir Husain Qidwai, etc.

Speaker was taken from my party. From the next day the fight in the legislature started and no bill or motion was allowed to go unchallenged. Adjournment motions were the order of the day. We were being defeated in every case but the fight instead of weakening us was putting more life in my team inside the House and was also infusing spirit into the Muslim community outside the Assembly.

There was only one more defection from our party and the rot stopped. On the recommendation of Maulana Husain Ahmad a ticket was given to Maulana Mohammad Ismail of Sambhal. Besides the ticket I gave him Rs. 3,000 from the League fund, but I learnt later that he took Rs. 3,000 from the Congress Party. He also raised money locally and after the election he asked me for some more money. And when I paid him Rs. 300 more I found him sitting on the Congress benches next day.

One result of the revival of Muslim mass-consciousness was an increase in the number of riots. For soon after the Congress Government came into power the Hindus generally, not only in cities but in towns and villages also, started thinking in terms of a Hindu raj which created ill-will between the communities.

XVIII

THE CONGRESS-LEAGUE RIFT WIDENS

1937—1938

THE PROGRESS of the Muslim League in U.P. from day to day was astounding. A spirit of determination to secure their rightful place in Indian politics had become a watch-word of the Muslims in the province. Both Nawab Ismail Khan and myself had now started thinking of holding a session of the Muslim League in Lucknow. Out of the old guard Maulana Mohammad Ali, the dynamic hero of the Khilafat agitation, was dead; Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and the Raja of Mahmudabad were also no more. Maulana Shaukat Ali was a soldier and disdained the responsibilities of a commander. Mr. Jinnah was the only one alive from amongst the old guard on whom the mantle of leadership could have fallen in spite of the fact that he was not a man of the masses due to the language difficulty for at that time he could neither write in Urdu, Persian or Arabic nor speak the language of the masses. We also felt that Jamiatul Ulema would take it as a direct challenge to its class but we decided to invite him to preside over this League session in 1937; more so because he was the permanent President of the Muslim League. About a week before the opening of the session while I was sitting in Mahmudabad House discussing details for the arrangement of the session with Mr. Ehsanur Rahman Qidwai, Maulana Inayatullah, Jamal Mian and Raja Sahib himself, news was brought to me that an announcement by beat of drum had been made by some Muslims inviting people to attend the Tila Mosque on Friday to advise the Muslim League members in U.P. Assembly to go back to the Congress and after the mosque meeting to take out a procession to my house to ask me to end the fight with the Congress. On Friday I particularly went all alone by myself to the Tila Mosque where generally about a thousand people attended the Friday prayers. Prayers being over, a gentleman stood up to announce that there would be a meeting after a few minutes and that people should not leave the mosque. A few Ahrars dressed in red shirts started reciting

verses and thereafter elected an unknown gentleman to preside over the meeting. Several speeches were then made criticizing the Muslim League policy of opposition to the Congress in the Assembly and advising Muslim members to join the Congress. With the permission of the President I addressed the gathering for about five minutes in which I told them that after listening to the speeches delivered before, I felt that I had been very ill-advised in throwing away the Ministership and deciding to sit in opposition to protect their interests. But nothing was lost if they now wanted me to go back to the Congress ignoring the future of the Muslims; I was prepared to do it if all of those present would give me in writing their decision. I sat down. Thereafter the congregation started breaking up—ten going on one side, five on the other and so on—and within a few minutes in spite of the cries of 'Wait, wait, wait!' from the organizers of the meeting, no one was left in the mosque. As I came out of the mosque I found my uncle who had come there to say his prayers waiting for me outside. He had enjoyed the fun and took me in his car to his house.

Having been warned thus, I took extra care to see that nothing happened in the reception and the procession of Mr. Jinnah and for that purpose I went from house to house to meet the leaders of different *mohallas* and invited them to come and bring their people in large numbers to the station. In addition we had to start enrolling volunteers to work during the session and to guard the Pandal during the night. The response to my call for a few days was poor, but one day my younger brother Mushfiq, Ayub Qureshi, Abdul Aziz and Malik Qureshi dressed themselves in volunteer uniform, and walked from one end of Aminabad to another. This helped to remove the fear of the Congress Government and supplied the necessary impetus to the youth so that within a few days a large number of volunteers were enrolled, who got uniforms made themselves according to pattern.

Mr. Jinnah arrived from Bombay on 13 October in the evening and was given a grand reception by the Muslim public of Lucknow. He was also taken out in a procession which passed through the main streets of the city. There was a scuffle at one place between the volunteers and some hot-headed Congressmen but nothing serious happened. Next day Sir Sikandar Hayat with a large number of M.L.As from Punjab and Mr. Fazlul Haq along with a large number of Bengal representatives also arrived. Besides them most of the leaders of Muslim India attended this session from Sind, N.W.F.P., Bombay, C.P., Madras, etc.

Before coming to Lucknow Mr. Jinnah had already been negotiating for a settlement with Sir Sikandar Hayat, who was anxious to retain a certain amount of freedom from the Muslim League organization for dealing with the special problems in the Punjab in the field of administration, by preserving the Unionist Party intact to ensure minority co-operation. When for the first time the Council of the Muslim League met on 14 October, Sir Sikandar, asked by Mr. Jinnah to explain the significance of his proposal, briefly outlined the conditions prevailing in the Punjab and insisted on the retention of the Unionist Party. Thereafter, Mr. Jinnah asked the opinion of the House regarding the question of entering into a pact between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party. The Council unanimously approved it with thunderous cheers. The solution of the Punjab question put Muslim India in a very strong position in the country. What would have happened if the Punjab and Bengal Premiers had not agreed to come to the rescue of the Muslim League organization in U.P., I need not dilate upon. Briefly, it would have remained merely the Muslim League of the Minority Provinces and in time to come would have had to surrender to the Congress. Sir Sikandar and Fazlul Haq saved Muslim India by throwing their full weight at the crucial hour behind the Muslim cause. It was a historic event for Muslim India, and the enthusiasm of the Muslims on the success of the U.P. League was quite in accord with the tremendous gain for them. Mr. Jinnah's acceptance of Sir Sikandar's viewpoint about the Unionist Party removed all the barriers which could have stood in the way of our march to the desired end. It gave a shock to the Congress and to those elements who had been trying to thwart my effort to make the session a thumping success.

The open session on 15 October was packed to capacity and Mr. Jinnah's address was full of life-giving vigour and hope. There were several speeches made thereafter, particularly those of Maulana Akram Khan exposing the meaning of *Bande Matram* and its anti-Muslim bias and that of Fazlul Haq in which he went so far as to say that for every life in U.P. he would have two in Bengal. Most of the speeches on the first day were in the same strain.

The Subjects Committee again met at night to consider necessary changes in the Muslim League Constitution, in the Raja of Mahmudabad's Kankar Kothi in Hazrat Ganj. The Muslim League up to this time had stood for full self-government as its creed, which was adopted in 1931 under the presidentship of Sir Mohammad Shafi. Later on Mr. Jinnah had in many of his

speeches used the words 'full responsible government.' In the Muslim League session in Bombay in May 1936 a resolution demanding complete responsible government was passed. At the very start I proposed that instead of the words 'complete responsible government' we should have for our creed 'the establishment in India of complete independence in the form of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Muslims and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded.' To my great surprise Mr. Jinnah started opposing this change in the Constitution and a discussion ensued. I sincerely felt that both the Congress and its Muslim allies in Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind would utilize this difference in creed between the League and the Congress to our great disadvantage and might ultimately succeed in defeating us. I was not therefore prepared to give up my point. Nawab Ismail Khan, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and a large number of delegates and representatives of the League were backing my view but Mr. Jinnah continued to argue against it till late at night. The whole House was sitting agog not knowing what to do. Ultimately I made a last appeal to Mr. Jinnah not to be a party to the finishing of the Muslim League and to agree to my proposal to save the Muslim League from disruption. Thereafter he stood up rather excited and said: 'Well, I say "full independence" and not "complete independence".'

This was Mr. Jinnah—it gives one an indication of his whole inner self. He would never accept defeat but would convert it into victory by a supreme nonchalance whether it were on a public platform or on any other occasion. There were cries of *Allaho-Akbar* from all sides and we were completely satisfied. The other big change that was brought about in the Constitution was to open membership of the League to every adult Muslim who paid half of the fees which a Congressman had to pay for being a member of that organization, i.e. two annas. Before we dispersed a Committee consisting of Nawab Ismail Khan, Sayed Zakir Ali and myself was appointed to prepare a draft constitution for the All-India Muslim League and a model constitution for the provincial Muslim Leagues. The Constitution that we framed for the Central League was adopted and the model provincial constitution was sent to different provinces and was adopted with slight modifications to suit local conditions. Next day the daily *Pioneer* made a few remarks about the discussion in the Subjects Committee meeting between Mr. Jinnah and myself, which were rather not in good taste and so naturally were taken notice of by Mr. Jinnah in his speech. The main

resolution on the change of the aims and objects of the Muslim League was rightly moved by Maulana Hasrat Mohani, champion of the cause of independence in Congress as well. Many others, including myself, supported it. In the evening a resolution concerning the economic life of Muslim agriculturists indicating the direction in which improvements could be brought about to raise their living conditions and increase the wages of labourers was proposed by the Raja of Mahmudabad and supported by me. It was an open secret that the entire Muslim social and economic order was bound up with zamindari and the services, military and civil. Their share in business was scanty and practically ninety-eight per cent of trade and business was in the hands of the Hindus. The tenantry was also ninety-five per cent Hindu and, as such, the talk of the abolition of zamindari in U.P. had clearly a communal bias. Were it based on a purely economic or socialistic basis, the Congress would not have been opposing the abolition of zamindari in Bengal where the Muslim tenantry was about the same in proportion as the Hindu tenantry in U.P. The session ended amidst loud cheers and in great spirits.

According to the new provincial Constitution of the U.P. Muslim League, the Working Committee was nominated by Nawab Ismail Khan, the President of the provincial League. From time to time changes were made, but so far as I remember the number of twenty-one members of the Working Committee provided by the Constitution was filled up from amongst the following:

1. Nawab Ismail Khan; 2. Maulana Shaukat Ali; 3. Khaliquzzaman; 4. the Raja of Mahmudabad; 5. Aziz Ahmad Khan; 6. Zahirul Hasan Lari; 7. Rizwanullah; 8. Karimur Rahman Khan; 9. Maulana Jamal Mian; 10. Maulana Inayatullah; 11. Maulana Abdul Hamid Badauni; 12. Maulana Karam Ali; 13. Sayed Aizaz Rasul; 14. Sayed Hasan Ahmad Shah; 15. Shaukat Ali Khan; 16. Ahmad Nabi Khan; 17. Ehsanur Rahman Qidwai; 18. Maudud Ahmad; 19. Abdul Wahid Khan; 20. Kunwar Zahid Ali Khan; 21. Nawab Shamsul Hasan; 22. Begum Aizaz Rasul; 23. Begum Habibullah; 24. Zahiruddin Faruqi; 25. Zahur Ahmad; 26. Hasan Mian; 27. Moazziz Husain Naqvi; 28. Sulaiman Jan; 29. Nawab Mohammad Yusuf; 30. Maulana Hasrat Mohani.

I should have mentioned the letter of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru dated 27 June 1937 before dealing with the later period, but I was so much worried with the cares and anxieties due to the fast-changing political panaroma that I could not reply to it for a long time. Now that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has published it in *A Bunch of Old Letters* I quote both his letter and my belated reply.

'Allahabad.
27th June 1937.

My dear Khaliq,

Yesterday afternoon I read a statement in the Khilafat newspaper dated 25th June, regarding the Bundelkhand bye-election. This statement was signed by six or seven persons including you. I read it with amazement. I could never have associated your name with a document of this kind. Under any circumstances this would have been difficult to believe, but after our talk in April last, I could hardly believe my eyes. During the last two months or more I have been rather out of touch with current events in India, partly because of my illness and partly because of my absence. But the course of events does not make much difference to principles and what you are reported to have done in the Khilafat strikes at the very root of these principles. We may have differed in the past as to the kind of activity we should indulge in, but I have always thought that there was similarity of our general outlook. It appears that I was mistaken. So far as I am concerned I have carried on in the past and I shall carry on in the future thinking more of the principles I cherish than of the results that may follow from my actions. Without that basis of thought and action, I would become a straw upon the waters, blown about hither and thither, without rudder or compass. I have found life often enough a heavy burden to carry, but I have had some consolation from the fact that I have tried to adhere to some fixed principles. I am deeply grieved at what you have done or what you are reported to have done. I owe it to you to let you know how I feel in the matter. I had thought, and I think I had a right to expect, that you would take no such step without reference to me. Your assurance stuck to my mind and I valued it. Now that this assurance has gone, it is natural that I should experience some kind of a shock.

This letter is entirely a personal one. Politically, I had no business to write it.

Yours
Jawaharlal.'

There are some references in this letter which I need not specifically mention after the story that I have given in the pages devoted to the negotiations which had taken place between me and the Congress.

I took a long time to reply this letter because of the fast changes that were taking place in the Congress and League relationship. For the rest, my reply to him speaks for itself. The reply also finds mention in the same *A Bunch of Old Letters* and is reproduced below:

'Lucknow.
November 28, 1937.

My dear Jawahar,

*Asia Publishing House, Bombay, pp. 258-60.

I received your letter along with the enclosure a few days back. You will remember that in May last, when the Bundelkhand election was being fought I wrote to you in detail the dangers which I apprehended in the Muslim mass contact movement, and I think that the present situation is the result of that policy of the Congress. No one can deny the Congress the right to contest Muslim seats even during the existence of the Communal Award and the separate electorates, but in the larger interests of the country I think it would have been preferable to leave the Muslims to send their representatives from their own platform so long as they stood by separate electorates. Unfortunately, I have not been able to persuade you to agree with this view. The unpleasant occurrences are directly connected with these elections and so long as these elections continue, I am afraid, the present situation will not admit of any solution. The Muslim Congress candidate and his supporters must proclaim themselves to be as good and pious Muslims as their opponents, the Muslim Leaguers, and all the religious zeal of the belligerents must be brought into play to carry the electorate with them. Personally, I feel that even though the Congress may be able to have its candidates returned from the separate electorates it is unfair on its part to force the issue so long as the Communal Award is not modified. Recently Dr. Moonje in one of his statements, after the Binjor election, congratulated the Congress for having torn the Communal Award to pieces. I am sure the Congress will not be moved to take part in the Muslim elections under the separate electorate system from any such motive, but the necessary consequence of the Congress policy is to destroy the Award even when the Congress agrees not to alter or modify it except by an agreed settlement. Barring this difference in the programmes of the League and the Congress, I do not find anything else which could have anything to do with the present bitterness amongst the members of the two organizations. And these bye-elections also cannot go on for ever. When they are over and people sit down coolly to think over the programme and the work that lies ahead I hope much of the estrangement will be dissolved and forgotten.

The Muslim League is now wedded to the ideal of independence and it should be its bounden duty to co-operate with any movement which aims at the destruction of Imperialism. As soon as the Congress will embark on any active programme of fight, I hope the League will not lag behind, but will fight in closest association with the Congress. Similarly, in regard to the work inside the legislatures, the League has fully endorsed the Wardha programme and its members are bound to support it.

I am not in a position to give you any detailed information about the statement made by Maulana Shaukat Ali in connection with the exercise of undue influence over the others, but I do however maintain that the action of the Congress Government in having allowed the Hon'ble Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim

to retain his ministership and resign his seat to seek re-election was certainly most improper, if not wholly unconstitutional. The Government of India Act has authorized the Governor to appoint a person as Minister from outside provided he secures a seat for himself within six months of his appointment; but it nowhere allows a Minister to retain his office as a Minister and resign his seat when his appointment was made as a member of the Legislature. Apart from this, you will readily appreciate the fact that eighty years of foreign rule have practically destroyed all power of resistance of the Muslim community and it has became accustomed to respect and fear power. Anyone seeking election as a Minister was bound to have the advantage of this weakness of the Muslims. I had conveyed to the Premier my objection against this procedure, but I did not receive any reply beyond a simple acknowledgment. However, that is a matter of the past now. Nawab Ismail Khan may be able to give you the information you ask for.

As regards the instances of unruly or objectionable behaviour of the members of the League and its methods of propaganda. I believe that what has been conveyed to you must be based on facts and true, but that is only one side of the picture.

The filthy language and abuse that is indulged in daily by the Muslim Congressmen, the Ahrars and the Jamiat people and the baseless propoganda that is being carried on by them does not do credit to the other side either. As an instance, I may inform you that Maulana Ataullah Shah Bukhari in one of his speeches described the delegates of the League as foul smelling dead bodies Similarly, the description of the Muslim Leaguers as *Bhands* and *Madaris* by the *Hindustan*, a Congress organ, was a limit of irresponsible journalism. The attack on a sympathizer of the League in a mosque at Lahore by the Ahrars will show that the tendency to violence is also shared by these supporters of the Congress who, while they proclaim that they do not believe in the existence of a separate political organization, retain Muslim party labels perhaps as a concession to the weakness of the Muslims for a separate group existence. The bitterness therefore is more acute between the Muslims and the Muslims than between the Hindus and the Muslims. I am sure this exuberance of temper and irresponsibility will die out in time to come and we shall be able to work shoulder to shoulder for the freedom of India when the fog and mist of misunderstanding of each other's viewpoint has been cleared up. In the meanwhile, effort should be made by responsible members of the organizations to control their unruly elements by persuasion and true guidance.

Yours sincerely,
Khaliq.'

To meet the objection of the Muslim League that he had violated the pledge, Hafiz Ibrahim resigned and sought re-election. It was a most hotly contested election which in spite of our big guns, Maulana Shaukat Ali and Maulana Hasrat Mohani, with many other Ulema and an army of workers we lost due

Plate 9



Harkaran Nath Misra.



Mohan Lal Saxena



Mrs. Sirojani Naidu.

Plate 10



Maulana Zafar Ali.



Maulana Altaf Husain Hali.



Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung.



Maulana Hasrat Mohani.

to the influence of Maulana Husain Ahmad in the constituency as well as Hafiz Ibrahim's own influence, due mostly to the fact that he remained a Minister even after his resignation.

Thereafter there were three other bye-elections namely in Amroha, Bulandshahir and Saharanpur. We won all the three due to the inexhaustible energy of the great Muslim leader Maulana Shaukat Ali. Practically all these elections were fought during the month of Ramazan and I had often found the Maulana breaking his fast with gram, bread and curd. He himself supervised the Dedoli polling which was in a far-lying area of Amroha where he was staying as a guest of Moazziz Husain, an Aligarhian. Our elected candidates were Akhtar Ali Khan, Shaukat Ali Khan, and Munfait Ali.

After our victory in these bye-elections the Congress leadership appears to have become alarmed. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote me a letter on 10 November 1937:

'My dear Khaliq,

I am enclosing copy of a letter I am sending to Nawab Ismail Khan. The letter speaks for itself. I would like you to give careful consideration to it for it raises important and far-reaching issues.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal.'

After narrating the bitterness and hostility exhibited between the parties he wrote to Nawab Ismail Khan:

'I don't know what our differences are in politics. I had imagined that they were not very great.

I presume that you think that the Congress has acted wrongly or is pursuing wrong ideas. You are perfectly entitled to think so and to say so. We are a political party and criticism is always good and helps in keeping an individual and a party up to the mark. I wish, however, that the criticism was specific and political: this would help us and the public in understanding it and perhaps in meeting it to some extent. I would be grateful to you if you can let me have this helpful criticism. What are the specific points and programme or principles of the Congress with which you do not agree? . . .

On the language and script questions I wrote a pamphlet giving Congress viewpoints. . . .

In the course of speeches on behalf of the Muslim candidates of Bijnor, emphasis was laid on the following:

1. The Congress wanted to suppress and eliminate Urdu.
2. The Congress would stop *tazias*.
3. The Congress would stop cow-killing.
4. The Congress would force people to wear *Chatayas* instead of pyjamas.
5. The Congress bribed the Ulema. . . .'

These letters clearly indicated that the Congress had realized its blunder and was now trying to re-open negotiations. Pandit Jawaharlal had similarly started correspondence with Mr. Jinnah directly and after six weeks of correspondence he wrote to me a letter from Allahabad on 4 March 1938.

'My dear Khaliq,
I enclose copies of correspondence which I have had with Mr. Jinnah during the last six weeks. Sometime back I learnt that you had a grievance against Gandhiji on the score of his not having replied to you. I enquired from him and he said that he had not received any letter from you.

Yours
Jawaharlal.'

His correspondence with Mr. Jinnah has already been published and does not require reproduction here. It confirmed my ideas that the Congress was now keenly anxious to re-open negotiations but in the meanwhile Muslim sentiments had been so excited that any settlement on the old lines would not have satisfied them; and the question was: what should be our demand now? We had already secured our weightage and separate electorates under the Communal Award and after 1936 no demand by the Hindu community as such was made for its abrogation. The Congress policy, nevertheless, of contesting Muslim seats by setting up Muslim Congress candidates was indirectly meant to achieve the same aim which Mahasabha would have wished to secure directly. The 1935 Government of India Act had made separate electorates ineffective because now the Hindu majority had only to face weak and small Muslim minorities in the Hindu-majority areas, there being no official bloc or Governor's powers to afford protection to them. Both Nawab Ismail Khan and I were at a loss to find any substantial logical demand on the Congress to satisfy us and our community. I therefore replied to him on 15 March 1938:

'My dear Jawahar,
Thanks for your letter and the enclosures. I have carefully perused the correspondence between you and Mr. Jinnah and I am glad to find that in spite of some stiffness running through it the door for a talk between you and him has not been banged. As I find that there is a possibility of your discussing the communal question with him, I purposely refrain from giving my own views on the subject.

You may not be the President of the Congress but your unofficial position in the Congress is too well-known to people to protect you from the responsibility of a failure of the move. Now that you have taken it in hand. I hope you will see it

through in spite of the irritation and the annoyance which you may have to suffer at times during the course of the negotiations.

I had told Mahmood at Bombay that I would see you there on your return from Juhu, but I am sorry I could not come down on account of urgent work which delayed me long.

I have not replied to your previous letter, because soon after I came to know that you were in correspondence with Mr. Jinnah and I did not like to open discussion on the same subject so long as your talks continued.

I hope you are enjoying your holiday to your heart's content and not worrying yourself on the exit of Austria and the refusal of Mussolini to help France in any joint action.

Yours sincerely,
Khaliq.'

My letter clearly indicated that I wanted to avoid any discussion with him because I had not till then made up my mind on any definite ideas of demand. To talk of Ministries and coalitions now would have been of little avail. From 1923 to 1937 the Hindu mass-consciousness had stood in the way of Congress leaders coming to a settlement with the Muslims, and now in its turn Muslim consciousness of its right and strength entailed a disinclination to give way to settling matters on the basis of mere Ministries. The opportunity had been lost for ever.

I do not know how Jawaharlal came to know of my complaint against Gandhiji for his not having replied to my letter which I had written to him before the Congress convention in March 1937. Soon after Jawaharlal's letter, I received a letter from Mahadeo Desai, Secretary of Gandhiji, about the same matter informing me that Gandhiji had not received my letter and asked me to send him a copy. I had written only one letter and I had not kept any copy. On the receipt of the above two letters I wrote a letter to Gandhiji on 15 March 1938. I gave the history of the events beginning from G.B. Pant's visit to me in November 1936 and the ultimate failure of the talk of coalition in July 1937. I wrote:

'I need not write to you the pain and suffering which I had to undergo in deciding the course of action for me but in the circumstances given above, I decided to bear the burden on my weak shoulders. I would have been humiliated in my own eyes and would have been unworthy of any trust in future by any group of men, if I had yielded to the demands that were made to me. I believe it is an inherent right of an individual to fight against the will of the majority in matters in which his own conscience is involved. Though not within the Congress fold, I even now rejoice to think of the past association with the institution which I had the honour to serve in my own humble way selflessly and devotedly. And when no more in the Congress,

I feel most honestly and sincerely that I have been driven out of it by circumstances over which I had no control. Since then I am sitting in opposition to the Congress with a clear conscience that the Congress was wrong in having imposed impossible terms and conditions of co-operation on me and my party due perhaps to the slogan of Muslim mass-contact. I am still hopeful that sooner or later, the Congress will try to correct its policy in this respect and restore confidence in the minds of Muslims and assure them that it is not opposed to the maintenance of their separate organization provided we all work together for a common cause and a common ideal.

From the copies of the correspondence which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has sent to me, I infer that it is just possible, you may have to discuss the subject with Mr. Jinnah in the near future. I have, therefore, purposely refrained from giving expression to my detailed views on the subject, but I can say that nothing will please me more than a real understanding between the Congress and the League which may enable the country to put in all its resources in fighting British imperialism.

Besides British imperialism we are threatened with another kind of danger from undisciplined forces within our ranks which aim at the destruction of our social structure and spiritual background. The daily public trials of prominent men and respectable citizens of Red Russia in the name of the country and its communist creed do not offer any encouragement to people of my way of thinking to allow unchallenged the prevalence of ideas of class warfare in our masses, particularly when we require every Indian to join us in our struggle against a common enemy.

I am sorry I have exceeded the limit which I had originally fixed for this letter. I hope you will excuse me for it.

Yours sincerely,
Khaliquzzaman.'

It should be noticed that in my letter I did not make any specific proposal for the solution of Hindu-Muslim problems. Mahadeo Desai wrote to me a letter on 19 March 1938 as under:

'My dear Khaliq Sahib,

Your kind letter along with the long letter for Bapu which he has liked very much. There is no reply as yet from Mr. Jinnah to the letter that Bapu has sent him, but Bapu wishes very much that you could see him before he meets Mr. Jinnah or any one else. We are coming back to Calcutta on the 1st April for the meeting of the Working Committee. Could you possibly make time to come on that date. A line in reply will oblige. We are here until the 24th evening.

Yours sincerely,
Mahadeo Desai.'

Previous to this letter I had received a letter from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad dated 12 March 1938 :*

*See Appendix III.

'Dear Friend,

Have been continuously ill since 3rd February and so I am even now. The wound of the operation performed at Bombay has not yet healed up. Healing of a wound is not a pleasant thing provided the wound is that of the heart. This one is that of the gum.

At Haripura Mr. Shoaib had come to see Gandhiji and he had said something about you to him. Gandhiji had asked him to see me, but the meeting could not take place. Why don't you clearly let me know what is the matter? Why should zigzag paths be taken when a matter can be settled in a minute? Do you want that Gandhiji should talk to you or should send for you? Very good. A most suitable occasion will be Calcutta where he would be coming on the 16th March and would stay on till the 23rd March. You may come to see Siddiqi according to your usual practice. Gandhiji will send for you.

And if you want to meet Jawaharlal or Subash Bose, let me know. Drop out of your mind zigzag paths.

Yours sincerely,
Abul Kalam.'

This letter is a typical example from a Nationalist Maulana. We had known each other for about twenty years and were on most intimate terms. He never posed as a turbaned Maulana with me nor ever did I try to show myself to him a saintly Muslim. We always talked as friends on all subjects of the world, good or bad. I knew that he was more free in my company and enjoyed it much more than the company of many of the old Khilafatists and Nationalists, most of them having nothing else to talk about except politics. It was different between us. How he came to the conclusion from a stray talk between Shuaib and Gandhiji that I was manoeuvring for a meeting with Congress leaders, is beyond my comprehension. It appears to be just a reflection of his own mind. He had seen my attitude in the negotiations in connection with the formation of a coalition Government and knew very well that all through those talks I had no consultation or advice from any quarter, even Mr. Jinnah. If I had cared to meet Gandhiji and Jawaharlal I would not have required Maulana's recommendation. However, soon after I received another letter from the Maulana which convinced me that he realized that he was on a wrong track. This letter, dated 20 March 1938, was couched in a different strain:

'My dear Friend,

I have already sent a letter to you yesterday. I saw your letter to Gandhiji. Mahadeo has already sent a reply to you. It would be better if you come to Calcutta. Your meeting may not necessarily mean nor ought it to mean that it would in any way place any impediment in the correspondence which is being carried

on with Mr. Jinnah. In fact it is a link of the same chain.

Yours sincerely,
Abul Kalam Azad.'

I wrote to Mahadeo Desai as well as to Maulana Azad that I could not meet Gandhiji at Calcutta for unavoidable reasons. No doubt I did think that my talk with the Congress on what was a subject-matter of correspondence between Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah would not be proper and as such I was trying to avoid it. Besides I did not know what I was to talk about. It was a curious situation that when I had run after them begging to avoid a crisis, they had not listened and now they were thinking of re-opening the same sad chapter again, which had in the meanwhile become much more complex and difficult of solution. In reply to Jawaharlal's letter dated 15 March, I had also enclosed a copy of the letter that I had written to Gandhiji. Jawaharlal suspected that in my letter to Gandhiji the words 'We are threatened with another kind of danger from undisciplined forces within our ranks which aim at the destruction of our social structure and spiritual background,' referred directly to Communism but indirectly to him also. He appears to have been very much hurt by this as the whole tone and tenor of his letter dated 22 March 1938 amply discloses :*

'Khalil Almora,
March 22, 1938.

My dear Khaliq,

I have received your letter of the 15th March together with a copy of your letter to Gandhiji. I do not quite agree with the account of past history that you have given, and Pantji, I understand, has also carried away different impressions. However, it is no good discussing the past.

In your letter to Gandhiji you mention the threat and danger from "undisciplined forces within our own ranks which aim at the destruction of our social structure and spiritual background." I do not know exactly to what group you refer. Personally I should have said that the greatest danger in India is from the undisciplined forces which communal organizations let loose and which they feed and which are likely to put an end to any spiritual background that we may have in this country. During the last few months I have watched with astonishment the progressive deterioration of the communal situation and I have wondered that sensible and intelligent persons should be parties to this.

I shall of course meet Mr. Jinnah whenever he cares to meet me but it passes my comprehension what language we can talk with each other which is understood by both of us.

I am not worried very much either by the end of Austria or

*See Appendix IV.

by a few communal riots. I think in bigger terms and play for higher stakes. It is quite possible that I may prove an utter failure in my attempts. If so, I shall make my exit gracefully without shouting or complaining, I hope. But I see no reason why I should give up the ideals which have moved me and driven me to action.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal.'

The tone and temper of this letter was to say the least unpleasant. However, I replied to him on 14 April 1938:

'My Dear Jawahar,

I am sorry for the delay in replying your letter on account of the fact that I was out of Lucknow for most of the time. I certainly regard communalism to be a danger, but I do not think that you will describe the demands of a minority for self-preservation and protection of its legitimate rights as communalism. In fact, this word has been so much misused in the past that it has become now totally meaningless. Many men, I know, have suffered immeasurably on account of the misuse of this word. Any difference of opinion, however well-meaning and honest, if it does not coincide with the views of the majority has been labelled as communal. No one can deny that so long as different communities do exist in the country there will be differences of opinion in regard to their rights. But, if, however, every difference of opinion is to be labelled as communal, none but those who belong to the majority community will be safe from the attack of being communalist. I call this tyranny of the majority. The only communalism that I call dishonourable is the communalism which seeks its protection in British imperialism. There are other countries also in this world where differences do arise in connection with the rights of minorities, but every claim made by the minorities is not termed communal. Communal organizations are bound to exist so long as communities do exist, but no one will justify such activities of the communal organizations which tend to bring about the "progressive deterioration of the communal situation." I have heard speeches from the members in the Legislative Assembly of my province throwing the entire blame of the communal riots on the Muslim League, and you seem to share their view.

I, however, beg to differ with you. My analysis of the situation is quite different. It is equally easy for me to throw the blame on the Congress, but I am not one of those who will pass such a one-sided judgment. My own analysis of the present situation is that increased mass-consciousness in the people of the province finds channels for its activities more in harmony with their past lives, i.e. religion. I am not prepared to conceive that there are Muslims who would try to add to their rights in the changed circumstances in the country. They may find it even impossible to retain what they had.

I am quite sure you are not worried by the few communal riots, or by what has happened in Austria. But I had never

intended to hurt you in any way when I referred to Austria in my letter. An event of some importance had happened and I only casually referred to it. I am sorry if it has given you any other impression.

You have referred to Pantji for having carried away a different impression of the past history that I wrote to Gandhiji. I am very sorry that I have not been apprised of those different impressions. Further it was not a question of impressions at all. I had given with reference to dates the events as they happened; and if I have committed any mistake in my narration, I should very much like to be corrected.

I can well imagine the difficulty which you will be feeling in talking to Mr. Jinnah, but I hope you will try to overcome it.

Yours sincerely,
Khaliq.'

Having now dealt fully with the history of the negotiations which I carried on with the Congress from July 1937, Mr. Brailsford's remarks in his book titled *Subject India** require some comment from me. Some British journalists had made it their business to tour the vast country of India with its four hundred million population, completing it within a few months, meeting a few Congress leaders, decrying the civil service as dull, out-dated, ill-informed, arrogant and anti-Indian and the Muslims as feudal, unprogressive, unorganized, quarrelsome and anti-Hindu. By writing such books on India they were, if not intentionally working for the partition of the country, surely doing a great disservice to India and misguiding the Congress leaders, and could be classed with their ilk the Jamiatul Ulema and the Muslim Nationalists. Mr. Brailsford wrote: 'There was a man,' and gave my differences with the Congress without any inquiry from me, on the basis of information supplied from Socialist sources. However, I am much obliged to him that inadvertently he has given me the credit for having awakened the Muslims of India to stand up and defend their political and economic rights; in his view all because I had failed to get a ministership in the Congress Cabinet. What a conclusion! Further Mr. Brailsford wrote:

'When Provinces attained full self-government an acuter phase of this rivalry opened. Government means patronage and patronage is in the gift of Ministers. On the eve of elections of 1937 in the United Provinces a leading Muslim politician who had hitherto belonged to the Congress party deserted it because he thought it would be defeated, went over to the Muslim League with his following. He was mistaken. Congress was victorious and formed the Ministry. This man then asked to

*Brailsford, *Subject India'* London, Victor Gollanez, p. 100.

be taken back to the fold and rewarded with a Cabinet post. Very naturally, but perhaps unwisely, Congress refused as any British party in a like case would have done. The consequences were unfortunate and to the English mind rather astounding. The Muslim League re-doubled its attack on Congress and on the strength of this and similar cases accused it of being a totalitarian party which sought to monopolize power.'

These officious writers and journalists had their due share in the making of Pakistan.

Mr. Sitaramayya in his *History of the Congress* had to say something on the subject of Congress-League relations prior to and during the 1937 elections and the subsequent disagreement resulting from the vainglorious attitude of the Congress. All the facts given by him are not correct but nevertheless he has accepted certain facts which are sufficient to prove the misguided policy of the Congress:

'In studying *India since Cripps*, Horace Alexander of the Friends' Society, dealing with affairs in U.P. says: "Before the 1937 elections, there had been something like an election pact between the Congress and the Muslim League. In the United Provinces for instance, where the Congress did not expect to get an absolute majority of seats, it was understood that they would act together and that if a ministry was to be formed at all, it would be a coalition ministry." This is a serious misrepresentation of what actually happened. The fact was that Mr. Khaliq-uz-Zaman of Lucknow, an important dignitary in the League and Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of U.P., who was in charge of the elections of the League candidates and the corresponding functionaries of the Congress in U.P., worked in unison with the Congress in the selection of candidates for the Provincial Legislative Elections in 1937. The Congress apparently chose to work in concert with the League, because the other Muslim organization interested in running the elections was the party of Talukdars under the leadership of the Nawab of Chhatari. And the intimacy of consultations and counsels went so far as no League candidate was being run against Mr. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, when he being unsuccessful in the general elections, contested a bye-election and was returned unopposed. All this led some people to believe—not without a show of appropriateness—that there would be a kind of coalition ministry. At least Khaliq-uz-Zaman's accession to it was taken for granted. The Congress came in a clear majority. At the last moment, the zonal member of the Congress Parliamentary Board—Maulana Abul Kalam Azad—consulted the President of the Parliamentary Board, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and obtained his assent to Khaliq-uz-Zaman's being taken into the Ministry. But two difficulties arose at this stage. The latter wanted Nawab Ismail as well to be taken. There was room only for one, there being already two Muslim Ministers—Mr. Rafi Kidwai

and Hafiz Ibrahim. The second difficulty was that there was appreciable and weighty opposition in U.P. Congress circles to the coalition when the Congress had a clear majority. Nor could, it was contended, any blame attach to such an opposition in the absence of a definite promise or pact between the League and the Congress at the time they chose to co-operate in the elections. In any case, the co-operation of two such diametrically opposite parties as the League and the Congress in a particular province, would naturally have led to certain presumptions of the spirit that had animated it being carried even after the elections, and report had it that the failure thus to continue the co-operation resulted in such embitterment that it laid the foundation of a firm demand for Pakistan which evoked no zeal in Bengal or the Punjab but was sponsored by the leaders in U.P.

Out of the 228 seats in the Provincial Assembly, 64 (28 per cent) were reserved for Muslims whose percentage of population was 16, chosen by separate electorates. In 1937, 26 of these seats were won by the League (one being uncontested), 28 by the Independent Muslims, 9 by Nationalist Agricultural Party and only one by a Congress-Muslim.'

All the facts therein given which are not in conformity with what I have already written on the subject are incorrect particularly the statement that one Muslim came out successful on the Congress ticket and the Muslim seats secured by the Muslim League were twenty-six. No Congress Muslim was elected in the general election. The Muslim League won twenty-nine out of sixty-six seats; that should enlighten Mr. Brailsford to the fact that it was I who refused to accept a Ministership, not that it was denied to me by the Congress.

The situation is now ripe for a review of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's statement on the question of the breakdown of my negotiations with the Congress as disclosed by him in his autobiography *India Wins Freedom.**

News had been trickling to the Press that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was writing his autobiography and some important portions of it were published after his death by his Secretary early in 1959. The Maulana writes:

'If the U.P. League's offer of co-operation had been accepted, the Muslim League party would for all practical purposes have merged in the Congress. Jawaharlal's action gave the Muslim League in U.P. a new lease of life. All students of Indian politics know that it was from the U.P. that the League was reorganized. Mr. Jinnah took full advantage of the situation and started an offensive which ultimately led to Pakistan.'

The statement presents some inaccuracies which I feel it

*Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1959, p. 161.

advisable to point out because of their historical importance. So far as the consequences of the breakdown of the League-Congress negotiations are concerned, the Maulana is justified in drawing the conclusion that the foundation of Pakistan was thereafter really laid. But I do not know how he made the mistake in writing:

'After discussion with me a note was prepared to the effect that the Muslim League Party would work in co-operation with the Congress and accept the Congress programme. Both Nawab Ismail Khan and Choudhri Khaliquzzaman signed this document and I left for Patna as my presence was necessary for the formation of the Ministry in Bihar. After some days I returned to Allahabad and found to my great regret that Jawaharlal had written to Choudhri Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan that only one of them could be taken in the Ministry. He had said that the Muslim League Party could decide who should be included.'

I have given the complete story of the negotiations and I do not wish to repeat it here. Suffice it to say that on no occasion did either Nawab Ismail Khan or I ever accept to work with the Congress and to subscribe to the Congress programme. Further it is wholly devoid of any foundation that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to me any letter about the formation of the Ministry in U.P. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself contradicted Maulana Azad in the Lok Sabha on 27 March 1959, in regard to Maulana's claim that he had succeeded in getting from Nawab Ismail Khan or myself our assent to the Congress programme. As such I need not add anything more to it. In fact he went further on that occasion in the Lok Sabha and said: 'There were accounts of certain events which were not correct as the Maulana had recalled them from memory.' I have the same grievance in regard to certain matters against the Maulana.

I must, however, confess that the Maulana was anxious for a settlement between the Congress and the League in the interests of Congress as well as of himself personally because if the feud continued with the League his own position in the community would have become anomalous. He was very unhappy over what had happened and always expressed his regret to his Congress friends over the misfortune. A letter from my old friend and colleague in Congress, Sri Prakas, later Governor of Bombay but at the time when he wrote, Governor of Madras, which I received in Indonesia where I happened to be Pakistan's Ambassador to that country, throws great light on the subject. He wrote:

'I do not know what Tayabji told you but when he passed this

way and spoke to me of his meetings with you I remembered many things of long ago and told him of our old comradeship and expressed regret that you should have left your old home and gone to Pakistan. Apart from personal reminiscences, I really stood out for you before Tayabji and recalled the incidents after the 1936-37 elections; and how the Congress and the League that had worked together in them parted company, for the fault of the leaders of the former. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who was the Zonal Dictator, also never ceased from regretting the incidents which I need not repeat and because of which so many bitternesses were engendered that appear not yet to be over despite the establishment of a separate state....'

But the Maulana in his anxiety to serve Congress had created a situation by taking away the Jamiatul Ulema from the League on 17 May 1937, which practically sealed the fate of the negotiations, for thereafter the Hindu Sabha wing in the Congress became very powerful and at the right moment stood in the way of the Maulana's making a compromise with the Muslim League. I strongly feel that if on that occasion when he went from Lucknow to Allahabad for discussing terms of settlement, he had put down his foot and threatened to resign from the Zonal Dictatorship if he was thwarted in his efforts at settlement, things would have perhaps changed. But his courage failed and thereafter he was completely in the hands of the Hindu communalists.

XIX

SEARCH FOR FORMULA AND IDEOLOGY

1938

THERE WAS a rush of events piling one over the other which was too taxing even for my otherwise strong nerves. Not only had I to run about from place to place conducting propaganda of the Muslim League but I had also to show my face from time to time in the Assembly. It was during this period, about February 1938, that Nawab Sir Mohammad Yusuf one day requested me to include in my party all of the Muslim members of the Agriculturist Party but I refused.

The reason for my refusal was not in any way personal because I had great regard for Nawab Chhatari and Nawab Yusuf who were both straightforward and honest gentlemen and had tried to serve their community in the past according to the best of their lights and had spent large sums of money to keep the Muslim League organization alive in the sense in which they understood it. They had a large stake in the country and had naturally to be very cautious in the steps that they took for the protection of their community without antagonizing the British Government. A large part of the salaries that they got from the Government was spent on various political activities whose volume could not be questioned but whose utility was certainly doubtful. They had stood in the elections on the Nationalist Agriculturist Party ticket because they sincerely believed that in the absence of any strong Muslim organization the Muslim ticket would not serve the purpose and, there being separate electorates for Muslims, they would not be able to take advantage of the strength of any Hindu organization in the elections. In these, due to the revised franchise, which raised the number of voters for each constituency to at least four times the number of voters under the 1919 Constitution, old tactics of electioneering were impossible.

Agreeing with Sir Malcolm Hailey, the Governor of the Province, they thought that if both the Hindu and Muslim taluqdars and zamindars co-operated together in the election then the

storm of the Congress threatening their extinction might yet be averted. As for the Muslim interests they thought that they would be safe in their hands. No harm would be allowed to be done to zamindari and services which were the two main planks of the Muslim economic life in the Province. With all this I felt that the Muslim League Party would lose the respect of the Muslim tenantry by associating taluqdars with our party. As for their support to the Muslim League, I was receiving it fully even though they sat on the Agriculturist Party benches, and even after my refusal they continued to offer their support ungrudgingly and unflinchingly.

A few weeks later Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan one day made a similar request to me. I told him that I had no personal objection because he had not stood on any other party ticket. 'However, I shall have to consult some important members of my party like Nawab Ismail Khan, Zahirul Hasan Lari, Shaukat Ali Khan and a few others,' I said. They all agreed with my idea and he started sitting on our benches. He was a forceful speaker and very good at repartee with plenty of humour. His admission to our party gave it great advantage and freed me still more from confining myself to Assembly work.

The Muslim League in U.P. was rising like a tide. The Jamiatul Ulema had begun to recede and the Ahrars who had a strong centre at Meerut had been silenced, when in a meeting held by them Sayed Ahmad Ashraf, who was the Secretary of the Meerut Muslim League, snatched the loudspeaker from the hands of an Ahrar as a protest against his violent abuse of the League. The public was found to be with him and the Ahrars retired. Mr. Ashraf died recently at Karachi.

We had also to send speakers to all other provinces and our Muslim League Ulema, Maulana Jamal Mian, Maulana Hamid Badauni, Maulana Karam Ali, Maulana Siddiq Hasan and Maulana Sibghatullah were constantly on tour. Professor Inayatullah from Punjab was surely a very effective and forceful speaker who generally went to meetings accompanied by Aminuddin Sahrai. But above all these, Maulana Shaukat Ali so long as he lived and Maulana Hasrat Mohani contributed with all their might and with many sacrifices to their credit to keep the League flag high and moving ahead. Later on we got within the League fold the best speaker in Urdu I have ever heard, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang. The Muslim League organization had by this time been properly formed in every province with more or less varying strength. By the beginning of 1938 a certain amount of control had begun to be exercised by the Council of the League

over its branches and to some extent on Muslim members of the provincial Assemblies.

The Congress session was held at Haripura on 19 February 1938, under the presidentship of Babu Subash Chandra Bose. On the communal question he said: 'The Congress will concentrate on bringing about National Unity by trying to settle the communal question.' He averred that they would do everything in their power during the following year, consistent with Nationalism, to meet Musalmans and try to come to an understanding with them. He affirmed that there was anxiety on the part of the Congress to come to terms with Musalmans but regretted that no specific demands on behalf of the Musalmans had been placed before the country. He assured all concerned that the Congress would do its utmost to meet all reasonable demands of the minority community, provided the Congress was assured that a policy of consistency was maintained.

After the session he also started correspondence with Mr. Jinnah and as a result he met him at Bombay in May 1938. In his first letter dated 15 May 1938 after his meeting with Mr. Jinnah he asked him to proceed to the appointment of a representative committee which would jointly settle terms and come to an understanding. Mr. Jinnah in reply assured him that the matter would be placed before the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League to be called in the first week of June.

In the course of conversation with the Congress President, Mr. Jinnah had suggested that any agreement which might be arrived at should be based on a clear understanding of the position of the Congress and that of the League. He had proposed that the conversation should proceed on the following basis:

> 'The All-India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Indian Muslims and the Congress as the authoritative and representative organization of the solid body of Hindu opinion, have hereby agreed to the following terms by way of a pact between the two major communities and as a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question.'

After further consideration the formula was modified by deleting any reference to the Congress representing Hindus. It ran thus:

> 'The Congress and the All-India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Muslims of India have hereby agreed to the following terms of the Hindu-Muslim settlement by way of a pact.'

Mr. Bose while agreeing that the Muslim League was an organization representing a very large body of Muslim opinion

expressed the view that the Congress would be bound to consult with existing Muslim organizations which had co-operated with it in the past. He further said: 'In the event of other groups or minority interests being involved, it will be necessary to consult the representatives of such interests.' The talk with Mr. Bose thus ended for the time being.

It was a piece of good luck for us that Congress fought shy of accepting the Muslim demand for the recognition of the League as an authoritative representative organization of Muslims on such a flimsy pretext while yet at the same time wooing and running after the League. If Congress had accepted the position at the time when the demand was made by the League I wonder what positive demands we could then have made. Such impolitic tardiness of the Congress was paving the road to Pakistan, for which besides the Hindu Sabha who served as the main block to a settlement we have also to be thankful to Muslim Congressmen.

The first meeting of the Working Committee* of the All-India Muslim League was held on 4 June 1938 at Bombay. In this meeting I not only proposed the subject but drafted Resolution No. 3 as a rejoinder to the note of Mr. Bose to Mr. Jinnah mentioned above. I thought it was very unfair for the Congress

*The first Working Committee under the new Constitution of the League consisted of the following members:

(1) Mr. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League, (2) Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Secretary of the Muslim League, (3) Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon, Karachi, (4) Maulana Shaukat Ali, U.P., (5) Abdul Majid Sindhi, Karachi, (6) Sayed Abdul Rauf Shah, C.P., (7) Malik Barkat Ali, Punjab, (8) Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim, Bombay, (9) Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, N.W.F.P., (10) K.B. Sadullah, N.W.F.P., (11) Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Punjab, (12) Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, U.P., (13) Raja Amir Ahmad Khan, U.P., (14) Choudhri Khaliquzzaman, U.P., (15) Haji Abdul Sattar Seth, Madras, (16) Abdul Matin Choudhri, Assam, (17) Sir A. M. K. Dehlavi, Bombay, (18) Mr. Fazlul Haq, Bengal, (19) Abdul Rahman Siddiqui, Bengal, (20) Sir Nazimuddin, Bengal, (21) Sayed Abdul Aziz, Bihar, (22) Mohammad Ashiq Warsi, Bihar.


These were the first twenty-two members nominated by Mr. Jinnah in June 1938. From time to time, due to death or retirement or changes made, the following became members:

(23) Qazi Mohammad Isa, Baluchistan, (24) Mr. Hasan Ispahani, Calcutta, (25) Sir Saadullah, Assam, (26) Nawab Iftikhar Hussain, Punjab, (27) Choudhri Karamat Ali, Punjab, (28) Mian Bashir Ahmad, Punjab, (29) Begum Mohammad Ali, U.P., (30) Mr. Husain Imam, Bihar, (31) G. M. Sayed, Sind, (32) Mr. I. I. Chundrigar, Bombay, (33) Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, (34) Maulana Akram Khan, Bengal, (35) Latifur Rahman, Bihar, (36) Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, (37) Mr. Ayub Khuhro, (38) Mr. M. H. Gazdar and (39) Khan Bakht Jamal.

If I have missed the names of anyone of the members of the Working Committee, it is not intentional. Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan remained the President and Secretary of the Muslim League from 1936 to 1947. The Joint Secretary changed hands many times; but so far as I remember the following held the office from time to time.

(1) K.B. Abdul Momin, Bengal, (2) Mahbub Ahmad, Punjab, (3) Maulana Jamal Mian, U.P., (4) Husain Malik, Delhi, (5) Yusuf Haroon, Karachi.


Plate II



Sir Abdullah Haroon.



H. H. The Aga Khan.




Sir Mohammad Shafi.



The Nawab of Bhopal.

Plate 12



Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan.



Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana.



to secure favour with the 'other minorities' at the cost of the Muslim League. As such my view that we should also court them was accepted and the Resolution went through.

As I could not meet Gandhiji despite his expressed desire I wrote to him after the Bombay meeting explaining the reasons which precluded me from meeting him. It appears that he was very much dissatisfied with the Muslim League Resolution on the question of the minorities. In reply to my letter he expressed his great surprise at the reference in the Resolution to the 'other minorities'. He wrote:*

'Segaon, Wardha,
15-6-1938.

My dear Khaliq,

I have your letter, and I have just got from Maulana Sahib the Resolutions of the Muslim League. I must confess that I do not like them. The Muslim League should surely have rested on its own strength. The question was raised by Mr. Jinnah himself. I pleaded with him that it was so wholly unnecessary. The fact that the Congress was negotiating with the League should be regarded as all-sufficing. It seems to me that the first resolution itself bars the door against any further negotiations. It is so unfortunate. The second resolution is either meaningless and therefore superfluous, or if it has a meaning, it must be sinister. The third resolution is unexpected. For the Muslim League to bring in other minorities is to court or create mischief. Do you not agree with me? And if you do, I expect you to undo the mischief so long as it lies in your power.

This is not intended to be a polemical letter . . . you are at liberty to show it to anybody you like, in the interest of the common cause. I do not want to enter into any public controversies. I cannot bear the idea of us appearing as belonging to different camps.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.'

Gandhiji did not know that the Resolution was my draft and the entire responsibility for raising the question was mine. I knew Gandhiji was very touchy on the question of the Depressed Classes and no amount of reasoning would have convinced him of the justification for the League's Resolution.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad sent a telegram and through a common friend, Maulana Mohammad Mian of Allahabad, also sent a message for me to meet him at Calcutta. Mohammad Mian's letter dated 19 June 1938 is as follows :

'My dear Khaliq Sahib,

On my return from Lucknow I have informed Maulana Abul Kalam Azad of the talk I had with you and also telephoned to

*See Appendix V

him today. I have strongly urged upon him to proceed to Wardha via Allahabad so that I may inform him of the talk I had with you, if in the meanwhile you are not able to meet him. I now sincerely request you to go to Calcutta as requested by Maulana in his telegram and you should try to keep this meeting secret.

Yours sincerely,
Mohammad Mian.'

A few days later I went to Calcutta to attend a meeting of Lucknow Electric Supply Corporation which had its Head Office there. I met the Maulana whom I found very much worried over the turn that the political phase in India had taken. Unlike many other Ulema he had a strong and far-sighted political sense and could very well realize that in the absence of a Congress-League settlement his own personal position would greatly suffer in Muslim society. He asked me whether I could suggest any formula which might perhaps be acceptable to the Congress and meet as well the Muslim League demand that it should be considered the authoritative representative organization of the Muslims. I told him that the Bose formula would have been acceptable to the Muslim League if he had not subsequently brought in the question of other Muslim organizations and the 'other minorities'. He wanted me to give him my idea in writing which I did.

There were talks between Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah a few days later, after my return from Calcutta. But after two days they had to be postponed to give Gandhiji time to keep up his programme of visiting the N.W.F.P. Miss Padmaja Naidu, a cultured and delightfully sweet daughter of the revered poetess of India, Mrs. Naidu, phoned to me from the residence of Mrs. Pandit (Pandit Jawaharlal's sister) in Lucknow, asking me to see her to receive a message from Gandhiji. She informed me that on his return from N.W.F.P., Gandhiji had very much desired to see me at Delhi. I asked her to inform Gandhiji that if he passed through Bhopal on his way to Bombay I would be able to meet him there at the station. Accordingly I met Gandhiji along with Shuaib and as there was very little time for talk at the station both of us travelled with him to Hoshangabad, about an hour's journey. The talk with him centred round the question of the 'formula' and I told him that when the Congress had no Muslim party which could legitimately claim to represent the Muslims, it would be sheer tardiness on its part not to recognize the claim of the Muslim League. There were further talks between Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah which also foundered on the same issue.

I then started visiting most of the U.P. towns to explain to the people there the reasons which had induced me to lead the opposition to Congress, as the leader of the Muslim League party in the Provincial Assembly. Among the towns which I visited, particularly due to its importance and its reputation throughout Muslim India, I must mention my visit to the Aligarh University. I knew that if I failed to get support from the students of my alma mater, which had played a leading role in the past in all Muslim movements, I could not succeed in my fight against the Congress. Therefore about the second week of August 1937, I went to Aligarh and stayed with my cousin Professor Mohammad Habib who commanded great respect from the students for his knowledge of history. A meeting was announced to be held in the afternoon at the Strachey Hall and when I went inside I found it full to the brim. Professor A. B. A. Halim, the Pro-Chancellor of the University at the time (later Chancellor of the Karachi University) presided over that historical meeting which won the University to the Muslim League cause. It was a happy coincidence that Mr. Sayed Husain who was my senior in the College and later became the Editor of the *Daily Independent* of Allahabad was also present and introduced me to the students. I was feeling a little nervous because the students had known me as a Khilafatist and a Congressman and they might not appreciate the circumstances in which I had undertaken the opposition to Congress. I began slowly narrating to them step by step the negotiations carried on by me with the Congress, resulting ultimately in the terms and conditions imposed by the Congress for a coalition with the Muslim League and finally took out a copy of the document which had been handed over to me by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. While reading it I could see the effect on the boys. By the time I had finished I felt that I had won the day. The boys took me out of the Hall on their shoulders, loudly clapping all the time.

After the death of Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan in early 1938 a Congress Ministry was installed in the North-West Frontier Province. There was no Muslim League organization there. Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, K. B. Saadullah Khan, Mian Ziauddin, Khan Ali Quli Khan, Sajjad Ahmad Jan of Abbottabad, Mir Alam Khan and Samin Jan Khan and some other important Khans decided to hold a Muslim League conference at Abbottabad in July 1938 and invited me to preside. I got down at Rawalpindi where a large number of Khans with their revolvers started walking with me and guarding me as if I were a

prisoner being taken from one jail to another. On inquiry I found that they feared violence from the opposite party. As we approached the town a large procession was taken out with similar precautions. At night the camp was duly guarded. That was the only occasion when I read a written address in Urdu and it would be superfluous to dilate on what I said there for most of it has already been covered in these pages.

The stalemate in the League-Congress talks had begun to trouble the Muslim mind in the absence of any clear-cut basic ideology. I feared that if the present aimless struggle were continued we might have to suffer the same fate as the Khilafat Committee after the break-up of the Khilafat, or the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1932 which dissipated itself as soon as it was allowed to grow stale by repetition of the same old and outworn cry of British cruelties on the one side and from a persistent and determined effort on the part of Lord Willingdon's Government to suppress the mass movement, on the other.

With the Congress being in power in the provinces seeking to beguile the Muslim masses through influential Ulema and other self-seeking Muslim politicians, there was a great danger of the rising tide of Muslim enthusiasm receding and their falling into despondency, particularly when we had not at the time framed any specific demand which we could place before our people or the Government, in a language which our own people and those of the world could understand.

Allama Iqbal before the League session of 1937 had thought of holding a Muslim convention of Ulema at Delhi but this for various reasons could not be held. In the League session of 1937 no new policy, beyond expressing our irritation against the Congress for treating us merely as a helpless minority, had been laid down. The clarion call of Allama Iqbal in the 1930 session of the Muslim League at Allahabad had failed to attract the attention even of the intellectual classes, much less of the masses, because the Muslim League had not considered it worth while even to take notice of it in its proceedings by drafting any appropriate resolution. In the Lucknow session of the League I had pinned my faith on 'the establishment in India of complete independence in the form of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Muslims and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded.' But within a year the trend of political development in the country made me very doubtful whether that creed would give any guarantee for the safeguarding of Muslim people's rights in a free India.

What was to be done now, that was the question. Would the Muslims ever agree to a minority status with their history in the land, with their enormous numbers, with their geographical position and with their own majority areas? And then what about Islam; would it not become poorer by a hundred million Muslims were they cut adrift from the Islamic polity for ever, being only a territorial minority? If the British could use Muslim armies for the conquest of Palestine and the disruption of the Khilafat why would not the Indian Government a century later similarly use Punjabi and Pathan soldiers for the conquest of Middle East countries if they chose to do so? Should we be able to say at that time, as the Ali Brothers had in the Karachi trial, that it is sinful for Muslims to fight as soldiers of non-Muslim countries? Obviously not so, as by that time our progeny might have become completely Indianized and nationalized. It did not mean that Muslims could never live in a country as a minority. There are many countries in the world where they once ruled but have now, particularly after the first World War, had to accept a minority status because of their small numbers and geographical and economic disabilities. Could the same disability be invoked in the case of India?

Democracy is the creature of numbers and the Muslims in India had both numbers and geographical advantages. So far as I could see they would never be prepared to accept that status but would fight to the last man to avert it. The consequences would be perpetual bitterness, disturbances and fights within India. Then why should we not separate? I could see that the Hindus would never agree to that, while so far as the British were concerned they might or they might not. Finally I came to the conclusion that separation would perhaps be the best remedy for both the Hindus and the Muslims. But I had to wait for some proper opportunity to take up the matter in right earnest.

XX

PROPOSAL OF PARTITION

1938—1939

MOHAMMAD Ali Alooba Pasha of Egypt invited Indian Muslim representatives to the Palestine Conference which was being held there in October 1938. Together the Muslim League and the Khilafat Committee decided to send four delegates, Rahman Siddiqui, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Maulana Irfan and myself. The decision was taken during my absence and I was not prepared to go. When Rahman came to know of it he started moving heaven and earth to persuade me to proceed to Egypt. At his instance Shuaib appealed to me to go and soon after Maulana Shaukat Ali sent a frantic telegram to the same effect, which was delivered to me at Bhopal. The Delegation was to leave from Allahabad only two days later. I wired to Mushfiq, my younger brother, to bring members of the family and some more clothes to Allahabad. They all arrived in time to see me off, this being my first experience of an aeroplane flight. With night stops at Jodhpur and Baghdad we reached Alexandria and travelled from there to Cairo by train. Although the work of the Conference was not very heavy, nevertheless it took us about a month to finish it. The main question before the Arab world at the time was to save Palestine from partition, in which we all agreed. It was decided to send a delegation to London to represent the Palestine Muslims' cause before the British Government alongside the Arab representatives from different countries. Rahman and myself were nominated to represent the Indian Muslims in London.

Before my onward journey to London I met Mustafa Nahas Pasha, who had for a long time been the Prime Minister of Egypt, although at the time he did not hold office.* I found that Nahas Pasha was singularly ill-informed about the history of the Muslims in India or their differences with the Congress and applied his experience of life in Egypt to India so literally as

*Maulana Irfan a senior student of Al-Azhar and now the Principal of Nadwatul Ulema of Lucknow was with me at the time of the interview.

to make the Muslim problem of India exactly as the Jewish or Christian problem which Saad Zaghlol Pasha had to face in Egypt, thus completely ignoring the difference in the size of the two countries and the magnitude of the minority of one million, five times the total Muslim population of Egypt. I implored him to leave us to our fate if he found himself unable to sympathize with us. He promised not to send the proposed delegation on behalf of the Wafd Party to India to support the Congress till he had had another talk with me on my return from London to Cairo. But on my return from London I learnt that Mr. Abul Fateh, the Editor of *Al-Misri*, with some others had gone to attend the Ramgarh Congress and to advise the Muslims to give up the fight against the Congress.

During our stay in Cairo there was some talk of the Khilafat of King Farooq, who at the time had endeared himself to the people, being then only nineteen years of age. There were certain stories current depicting him as the Haroonul Rashid of Cairo. Some young Egyptians actually asked us what would be the reaction of Muslims in India if Egypt agreed to make him the Khalifa. We naturally told them that we had no instructions from the Muslims of India to speak on their behalf on the subject. Rahman, for no rhyme or reason, suspected that H.H. the Aga Khan who had been in Egypt a few months before might have raised this question with the Egyptians to please the King and the British. As we were interested to know more about this matter we talked to Professor Habib of Azhar College who was an old friend of Rahman in Oxford University. He invited us to tea and showed us from his notebook his record of the talk between the Aga Khan and Sheikh Al Maraghi, the Rector of Al-Azhar, on the subject of the Khilafat, he having been the interpreter at these talks between them. It turned out that it was Sheikh Al Maraghi who had asked the Aga Khan to help Farooq, particularly in India, to being acknowledged as the Khalifa of the Muslims. The Aga Khan however had advised him not to proceed in the matter any further, because it was likely to create great division amongst Muslims generally and in the Arab world in particular. We were greatly disillusioned. Next day we met Sheikh Maraghi to talk over the matter with him. I had my own views on this question and told the Sheikh that King Farooq did not enjoy the confidence of the Muslim world and would not therefore, so far as I could see, be acceptable to the Muslims of India. The Sheikh then asked me whether he might have the title *Amirul Mominin* in the Muslim world. I replied that this word had invariably been associated with the Khilafat and as

such it would create great confusion in the Muslim mind if this title were given to him. Our talk thus ended.

Alooba Pasha, Rahman and myself left Cairo for London on 1 November 1938. We found that an Arab-Palestine Centre was already working under Mr. Izzat Tannus, a Palestinian Christian. We became regular visitors to the Centre, waiting for other Arab delegates to arrive after a fortnight. Alooba Pasha went back but we stayed on. For months together we had nothing to do but roam the streets of London waiting for the Arab delegations. We had in the meanwhile met Mr. McDonald, the Dominion Secretary, and expressed the extreme concern of the Indian Muslims regarding Palestine and informed him that Muslim India was not prepared to accept the partition scheme for Palestine. We had to talk separately because as Indians we could not sit at the Round Table Conference of free countries.

While waiting day after day for the arrival of the delegations we were invited to tea one evening by Choudhri Rahmat Ali, the originator of the word 'Pakistan'. This was my first meeting with him and I took a sincere liking for this tall, graceful and well-cut figure. When we started talking about the scheme of Pakistan I found that not only had he thought deeply over the question but was earnest about its realization. It was very well known to us in India that he had placed this scheme before the Muslim leaders of the first Round Table Conference but no one took any notice of it. After meeting him I felt sad that a man of his calibre and attainment was being reviled by his own people in India, without any justification, as a British stooge. After some discussion I informed him that I was already a convert to the idea but I told him that I was not ready to use the word 'Pakistan' for partition of the country because that would make the British suspicious on the one hand and antagonize the Hindus on the other. Why should we not claim the right of self-determination for our areas instead of bringing in the name 'Pakistan'? But this did not appeal to him. We had many other talks on the same subject later on. On one occasion I had asked him to send me details of his scheme, which he did in a letter to me on 12 December 1938:

'My dear Choudhri Sahib,

Assalamo Alaikum! As requested by you I am enclosing herewith a statement giving full figures relating to the population of Pakistan. These are taken from the report of the latest census held in 1931* . . . .

I do hope this will help to remove any doubts you may have

*See Appendix VI for table of statistics.

had on the numerical strength of the Millat in Pakistan. Let us forget that what we rightly term as Hindu raj in the bi-national sub-continent of India is primarily based on the Hindu population which is 68 per cent of the total population of the semi-continent. From the enclosed statement you would realize that our numerical position in Pakistan in no way compares unfavourably with that of Hindus in India.

One word more, at the moment the Millat in the whole of the bi-national sub-continent counts 77,677,545, which is twenty-two per cent of the total population. Whatever our present representation in the Central Legislature, ultimately it will depend on our population. Now, if the whole Millat supports the creation of Pakistan as separate from India it will, by doing so, be reducing its representation in the Central Legislature from twenty-two per cent to sixteen per cent at the lowest. Whether we should suffer this reduction of six seats in order to lay the foundations of a Muslim nation in Pakistan is a question that I leave to the judgment of all those who, like yourself, have always tried to safeguard the future of the Millat both within India and without it.

With kind regards.
Yours sincerely,
Choudhri Rahmat Ali.'

In this scheme Bengal was excluded while the whole of the Punjab including Delhi found mention. Among others this was also one of the reasons why I was unwilling to give the scheme of partition the name of Pakistan. I preferred the idea of having two Muslim Federations, one in the East comprising Bengal and Assam and the other in North-Western India composed of Sind, Punjab and the North-Western Frontier Province.

Long after my first meeting with him in London in 1938, I met him after partition in 1948 at Lahore. He invited me to lunch and expressed his great resentment against the partition of Punjab and Bengal which he called a betrayal. I found him very unhappy as he suspected that in his home town he was being watched by the C. I.D. In sheer disgust he went back to London, wrote a pamphlet *The Great Betrayal* and died some little time afterwards. What a shame that the people in Pakistan do not offer even *Fateha* for one who gave them the name of the State by which they swear! Is it not indeed the height of ingratitude? The least the people of Pakistan can do is to bring back his remains and bury them in some corner of Karachi or Lahore.

The Arab Delegation reached London in February 1939. It consisted of representatives from Egypt, Ali Maher Pasha and Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha; from Iraq, Nuri-us-Said Pasha; from Syria, Faris Bey Alkhory; from Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal and

from Yemen Prince Saiful Islam. The Palestine contingent consisted of Jamal Al Hussaini, Mosa Al Alami, Ouni Abdul Hadi, one of the oldest leaders of the Pan-Arab movement, and Alfred Bey Roque. By this time the Peel Commission Report recommending partition had been nullified by the Wood Commission and there was a likelihood of settlement between the Arabs and the British Government.

We had occasion to meet the Turkish Ambassador, Taufiq Rushdi Aras, whom we knew very well from the days of the Medical Mission to Turkey. We had advanced in age by then by over two decades, nevertheless we recognized each other at first glance. Both Rahman and myself felt overjoyed at this meeting after such a long time. We complained to him about the Turkish policy of abolishing the old historical institution, the Khilafat, with no gain to themselves but a great loss to the Muslim world for whom it formed a rallying centre. He was deeply moved and replied: 'Whose caliphs had we remained? You came from India to fight us at Quttul Amara, the Arabs killed us in Hijaz and Syrians sniped at our army while returning to Turkish lands. The small portion of Turkey that was left with us could not be strong enough to justify a claim to retain the Khilafat of the Muslim world. It was not we who abolished it but the Muslim world which made us incapable of retaining it.' We had no answer and were ashamed to talk about it to him.

On the first day of the Palestine conference it appeared that a settlement would come about and the Arabs were quite satisfied with the remarks of Mr. McDonald, the Colonial Secretary. The Delegation was also invited by him to a lunch which was boycotted by Israel. In political circles this action of the Israel Delegation was very much resented for it was taken as an insult to the Crown.

Later on the British Government proposed to the Arabs a scheme for the transfer of power to the people of Palestine, both Muslims and Israelis, who happened to be at that time about two-thirds and one-third in numbers respectively, within five years. There was an additional clause that the transfer of power would begin immediately, to be developed into a full-fledged Government within that period. The Arabs were fully satisfied with the proposals but the next day however, Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, under some pressure from other Governments raised the time limit from five to ten years, which the Arabs rejected outright. When we reached the Dorchester Hotel we found our Arab friends unhappy and dejected. My life-long friend Rahman also joined in the chorus of 'Reject!' I,

however, argued that five years were nothing in a nation's life, and they should not reject the proposal but accept it with a good grace. I appealed to them to see that the fight of the Nationalists with the British Government was a very unequal fight and could not be maintained for long. A settlement would at least give some power to them to see illegal immigration stopped which otherwise would go on uninterrupted. Then again they had to bear in mind that when once the British created a democratic organization they became a slave of their own creation and began to dance to its tune. They might well fight an army but they could not stand against Press propaganda. Let them take advantage of their weakness as the Congress in India was doing successfully at the time.

I was laughed at and my ideas pooh-poohed. I knew it for a fact that both Ali Maher Pasha and Nuri-us-Said Pasha and many other delegates of the Arab countries were for the acceptance even of a ten years' period but they did not want to disappoint and displease the Palestine delegates and as such they had to toe their line.

About this time we learnt that the Israelis had represented to the British Government that the Turks were in their favour and were opposed to a settlement with the Arab Delegations. We immediately met our friend the Turkish Ambassador in London and narrated to him the news we had received. He denied it and asked us to propose something which we thought proper to remove this impression from the British Government. We suggested a lunch to the Arab Delegations to which the British Foreign and Colonial Secretaries would also be invited, to remove the misunderstanding. Accordingly a lunch was given but a settlement could not be arrived at.

During all the months from September 1938 to March 1939 I had very little news from India except that of the death of the lion-hearted, giant fighter for Muslim causes, Maulana Shaukat Ali, and the other of a Muslim League session held at Patna in December 1938. So far as the death of Maulana Shaukat Ali was concerned the news, conveyed to me by Rahman's cousin Dehlavi, practically stunned me. I had left India for Cairo mostly at his instance, feeling sure that the League propaganda work in his hands was safe and the tempo of activity would not be allowed to suffer. After him I felt very doubtful whether the work of organization would go on as vigorously as I had left it. Muslim affairs at the time had become very complicated and required a brave man to face opposition and adversity. For the Maulana the greater the number of opponents the greater

was his calmness and composure. He was a leader who would accept orders even from younger men like me in the name of discipline, but on questions of principle would go even to the extent of discarding the friendship of Gandhiji who was so fond of Shaukat.

I had started the Khilafat organization from Lucknow but until he came out of jail in December 1919, it had had no real existence. He organized it and made it the biggest Muslim organization of the world. Nothing less than eight million rupees were sent to Turkey as aid mostly from the masses and a few business men and what was spent on the organization itself was a sum apart. He loved Maulana Mohammad Ali more than his own children, sent him to England for education and felt proud at his success. The younger brother was impatient and irritable; the elder calm and sweet, nevertheless a firm believer in the efficacy of his methods. For me the news was too heavy to be borne without tears.

As regards the Patna session of the Muslim League I had received from friends the news that it was very well attended but so far as any visible advance or change in political ideology was concerned, nothing spectacular had been done. As I had already been talking with Choudhri Rahmat Ali on a different basis altogether, the same old line of policy adopted at the Patna session disappointed me as I expected something more dynamic to come out of it.

After the breakdown of the Palestine Conference there was no reason left for our staying on in London and nearabout 10 March we decided to go back to India. A few days later I read a news item in the Press that the Under-Secretary of State for India had returned after a tour of the country. I therefore thought it might be helpful to see him to find out what impressions he had brought back of the Muslim League strength and our policy. I discussed it with Rahman and we asked for an interview with Col. Muirhead, the Under-Secretary, which was fixed for 14 March 1939. As soon as we sat down we naturally inquired from him as to what impressions he had formed after meeting our leaders in India about our strength and policies. Here I give the conversation between Col. Muirhead and myself as accurately as I can. (I believe the name of the Under-Secretary was Col. Muirhead.)

Col. Muirhead: Yes, I have met your leaders and have heard their case. We have got great sympathy with you but we do not know how to help. You say that the British democracy does not suit you and I see that it does not, but we do not know of

any other kind of democracy. We apply the same principles in India which we apply in our own country, and you do not suggest any alternative.

As soon as he finished this sentence, I went up to the map of India which was hanging in his room, and pointed out the two areas, north-west and east, which were Muslim areas which might be separated from the rest of India. When I returned to occupy my chair, he said with a smile: 'Yes, that is an alternative. Have you talked about it to Lord Zetland?'

I : No. we have met the Colonial Secretary, Mr. McDonald, but not Lord Zetland.

Col. *Muirhead* : Why don't you see him?

I : I am leaving on the 21st March for India, and I do not know whether he will have time to give us an interview.

Col. *Muirhead* : Oh, no, I shall see that he gives you time. You just write a letter to him and you will get time.

Thereafter, we left our chairs. He came to see us off to the door when I said to him, 'I do not know whether he (Lord Zetland) knows our credentials.'

'Don't worry about that,' he replied. 'He will have everything before him.'

So my idea about the British attitude was coming true.

In reply to our letter for interview, we were informed that the Secretary of State for India would receive us in the afternoon of 20 March, just one day before I was to leave England for India.

Lord Zetland was very cordial and after a few preliminary exchanges of views about the weather I started by giving him a brief survey of the Muslim relationship with the British Government extending over one hundred and fifty years and brought it down to the Government of India Act 1935. Thereafter I said. 'Now that you are transferring more powers to India, you are doing it in such a manner that one hundred million Muslims might find themselves the slaves of the majority when you have completed the task.' At this stage he interrupted me and made the same remark which was made by the Under Secretary, namely, 'But you do not suggest any alternative.' It did not require any searching of my brain for I had already suggested the alternative to Col. Muirhead. Therefore, as soon as Lord Zetland raised the question of an alternative, I immediately replied, 'You may partition the Muslim areas from the rest of India and proceed with your scheme of federation of the Indian provinces without including the Muslim areas which should be independent from the rest.'

Lord Zetland: What would happen to the States?

I: They ought to follow their geographical situation. If they are in the Hindu zone, they must go with them and if they are in the Muslim zone they must go with that zone.

Lord Zetland: What about Defence?

I: For what period, my Lord? If you want to know for the period that you are associated, in some form or the other, with the administration of India there would be no difficulty in the defence of India, because you can use the armies of both these areas, according to your needs. But if you want to know for the period that you are not in any way connected with the administration of the country, then I beg of your Lordship not to put that question to me, for God only knows what would happen to us then.

Lord Zetland: Do you want an answer from me?

I: It would be presumptuous on my part to ask for an answer to this big question just after mentioning it to you. I have brought it to your notice that this is going to be thestand of the Muslims in the next session of the Muslim League. There is ample time for you to think about it.

We were with Lord Zetland for one and a half hours, and when he rose to take leave, he informed us that there was a very important Cabinet meeting which he had to attend. He thought that the world situation was very grave and nobody could say what would happen. There might be a war in the near future.

This was a very important event but I kept no record of the talk; when a few years back I thought of writing the history of Muslim movements in India, it occurred to me, while I was the Governor of East Bengal, to talk to Mr. Hampshire, the Deputy High Commissioner of England at Dacca, about it, and to request him to find out whether any note of my talk with Lord Zetland was in the achieves of the British India Office or Colonial Office, adding that I refused to believe that there would be no record of such an important talk as the British system of administration was perhaps the best that the world has known. He asked me to give dates, etc., and promised to help. After about two months, he handed over to me the following:

'Office of the High Commission
for the United Kingdom in
Pakistan, Dacca.
5th September, 1953.

'My dear Governor,

You wrote me on the 12th July asking if I could obtain from the Commonwealth Relations Office certain information about two interviews you had at the India Office in 1939.

2. I have now had a reply from the Department, in which they inform me—

(i) that they confirm that an interview did take place between Lord Zetland, Mr. Siddiqi and yourself in March 1939.

3. Lord Zetland recorded the main points of his talk with Mr. Siddiqi and yourself in a letter which he subsequently sent to the Viceroy. He reported:

(i) That you and Mr. Siddiqi evidently wished to discuss with him the position of the Muslim Community in India in the event of a scheme of federation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1935 coming into existence.

(ii) that you spoke very strongly on the question and told Lord Zetland that you did not think that it would be possible for the Muslims to acquiesce in the introduction of the scheme.

(iii) that in response to Lord Zetland's request for alternative suggestions of a constructive character you replied that you would propose the establishment of three or four federations of Provinces and States which would be co-ordinated by a small Central Body, the object of this scheme being to give the Muslims as great a measure of control at the Centre as the Hindus.

(iv) that Lord Zetland gathered that the idea in your minds was of a federation of Muslim Provinces and States in North-West India; a further federation of Bengal and Assam, and possibly more than one further federation of the other Provinces and States in the remaining part of India.

(v) that you reported that many Muslims were thinking on these lines.

(vi) that he deduced from the talk with Mr. Siddiqi and yourself that there would now probably be greater difficulty in bringing the Muslims into the federation than the Congress. . . .

5. I hope that the above material will be of some use to you and I shall, of course, be glad to ask the Commonwealth Relations Office to have another look for a record of your talk with an Under-Secretary if you care to write to me again about this.

Yours sincerely,
G. P. Hampshire.

H.E. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman,
Governor of East Bengal,
Government House, Dacca.'

Lord Zetland, in his letter to the Viceroy correctly states that we opposed the Scheme of Federation which, for other reasons, had already been rejected by the Muslims in 1934. He also rightly reported that, on this occasion, I talked of more Federations than two. It was necessary for me to do so at that stage, because I wanted to bring in Assam and Bengal in one Federation and N.W.F.P., Punjab and Sind in another and to leave the rest of India for the Congress to decide.

Now it becomes clear from the document that Lord Linlithgow knew before the Pakistan Resolution was passed what next step the Muslim League was likely to take. My own impression, after my talk with these two British officials, was that they

would not oppose the demand seriously because it was in itself a democratic right of particular areas to keep themselves out of a Federation to which they were opposed. I could not help being thankful to Col. Muirhead for having given me encouragement to discuss the question with Lord Zetland who in his turn was quite sympathetic.

I brought back with me from London hopeful dreams for the future of the Muslims of India. I left London on 21 March 1939 for Paris, where Rahman joined me two days after and then we left for Turkey by the Simplon Express. We broke our journey at Milan, where Iqbal Shaidai met us. I met him for the first time since 1919 when he had brought a letter to me from the Ali Brothers to Lucknow and, on his account, the C.I.D. had increased its vigilence in observing me and my house. From Lucknow he had gone to Lahore and then to Kabul where he stayed for some time. He then went to Soviet Russia, where he was the counterpart of M. N. Roy and other Hindu Communists. If they said to the Communist leaders that India would do this or that, he would with equal certainty proclaim that Muslims would not allow this or that to be done. The three or four of them individually and collectively represented India in Soviet Russia in those days without the knowledge of Indian leadership or its acquiescence. I do not know how and why he left Soviet Russia, went to France, married there and at the moment was an influential figure in Italy. He took us to the highest State functionary at Milan and through him arranged for our interview at Rome with Count Ciano. Realizing that the fight in Palestine would be resumed and the Mujahadeen would require arms, we thought of meeting Count Ciano and requesting him to supply arms to the Palestinians. We had great hope of success because the relations of the British Government with Italy in those days were not happy. At Rome we were received by a doctor friend of Count Ciano and were lodged in a hotel as State guests. When two days passed and no interview with Coun Ciano could be arranged, we began to be impatient and wanted our worthy doctor, the host, to tell us exactly what was the matter. He informed us that he was very sorry that some urgent work outside had taken Count Ciano away from Rome and that he would not be able to return for a few days. We did not believe this story and concluded that the interview with us was being avoided. So we left for Turkey. Before we reached Istanbul we learnt that Italy had attacked and occupied Albania. That was the reason for Count Ciano's avoiding an interview with us.

Mustafa Kamal Pasha before his death in 1938 had invited Rauf Bey to come back to Turkey from his exile and offered him a seat in the Ministry, but Rauf Bey requested him to be excused as he preferred to live a retired life. We stayed in Istanbul with Assad Fuad Pasha, the son of the renowned General Fuad Pasha, for three days and then left for Ankara where we were the guests of Rauf Bey. Here we had the good fortune of meeting Rafaat Pasha, a General of the Turkish Army, who had played a great part in the formation of the National Army to save the country from foreign domination. We met another great and renowned figure of the Turkish Freedom Movement, Kazim Kara Bekir Pasha, who was the Commander of the Erzerum forces at the time when Mustafa Kamal Pasha had gone to Asia Minor to find out whether the Turkish forces had sufficient spirit to continue the struggle or if Turkey would have to submit to the appointment of a mandatory power. At that psychological hour Kazim Kara Bekir Pasha along with Rafaat Pasha and Fuad Bey assured him that the armies under their command were prepared to fight to the last man and advised him not to return to Istanbul to say that all was over with Turkey.

Following the Lausanne Conference Turkey had retained its hold in Asia Minor and a part of European Turkey. The famous battle of Sakaria was fought by the armies of these generals but unfortunately some years later some of the young heroes of that historical battle were tried for treason and hanged. Kazim Kara Bekir Pasha was also brought in chains before the Military Court presided over by Ali Gunja. The military officers present in the Court to witness the trial stood up to give him a salute. Ali Gunja seeing the high respect of the Army for the Pasha adjourned the case that day and later the Pasha was allowed to live in peace in Istanbul with a 'Not at home' board at the gate. After the death of Mustafa Kamal Pasha, he became a member of the Turkish Parliament and was at Ankara when we visited the town. I had always pictured him in my mind as a short, solid, thick, oldish and bearded Pasha, but I was greatly surprised to find him so different to my idea. He was tall with a very fair colour, grey eyes and greyish hair. We had a long talk with him about the future of Turkey and its relations with the Muslim world.

From Ankara we went to Aleppo and from there we motored to Beirut, with the idea of meeting Haji Aminul Husaini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine, who had been interned by the French Government after his flight from Palestine due to the fear of

arrest by the British and had suffered great hardship and starvation on the sea on a small boat which brought him to a French port. The French Government interned him in a town about twenty miles from Beirut. During our stay we met the Grand Mufti several times and on one occasion when I was alone with him I expressed my disagreement with the policy that brought about the failure of the London Conference. He caught hold of my hands and asked me to come with him to the lawn outside to explain to the young enthusiasts who were sitting there, but my pleading there also did not succeed.

From Beirut we went to meet Abdul Qadir Husaini, the leader of the Nationalist forces, who had been picked up from a battlefield half dead and secretly carried to Damascus. He was living secretly in the small house of a friend but we were able to see him because we had with us Saleem Al Husaini, a cousin of the Mufti. Abdul Qadir Husaini was a brave young man and showed his love for his country when a few years before 1948 he threw himself into the arms of death as he found that he was not receiving any support or encouragement from the Arab States.

Another Palestine Muslim Conference was held in Cairo, over which Mohammad Mahmood Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt, presided. As we had also been invited to be present, we travelled by boat to Egypt to attend the Conference. Mohammad Mahmood Pasha was a contemporary of Maulana Mohammad Ali at Oxford and we had heard about his devotion to his country and to Islam from the Maulana. In opening the Conference he expressed his great regret at the break-up of the London Conference and offered the Palestine Delegation one million Egyptian pounds to enable them to protect their lands from sale to the Jews if they accepted the British terms. The Palestine leaders asked for time to enable them to have telephonic conversation with the Grand Mufti; but the next day when the conference met they expressed their inability to accept the London terms. The second conference also ended thus.

We returned to Bombay on 12 May 1939. My dear friend Abdullah Brelvi, Editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*, was present to receive me at the dock and soon after embracing me he said 'Khaliq, I congratulate you on your success. The whole body of Congressmen now admit their mistake and are prepared to go all out to satisfy you. Fresh negotiations will be opened with you on your arrival in Lucknow.' I said, 'My dear Brelvi events have travelled much faster than expected and now partition of India appears to be the only solution.' He was horrified and said, 'Are you in your senses?' I replied, 'With all the

sense that I possess.' He started arguing with me but I assured him that it was our destiny rather than our choice.

In the evening both Rahman and myself went to see Mr. Jinnah and narrated to him the talk that we had had with the Under-Secretary and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, and gave him our impression that the British would ultimately concede partition. I also gave him my view as to why I was opposed to the use of the word Pakistan for the scheme. He carefully heard every word of the talk, at times asking me to repeat certain words, and thereafter he said, 'Have you weighed the consequences? I replied, 'There being no alternative open to us we cannot go on talking on the old basis without any result.' He assured us that he was not opposed to it but it had to be examined in all its bearings. I said, 'There is ample time for you to form your opinion.' I left the same evening for Lucknow reaching there on 14 May 1939 after an absence of over eight months.

XXI

FACTIONAL DISPUTES AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1939

ON MY return to India, in 1939, when I alighted from the train at Lucknow I found the streets of the city deserted and in a ghastly state, even though a few days had passed since the occurrence of a riot. The Congress Government, whether for want of administrative experience or due to the pressure of Congress Sunni Ulema, had allowed a *Madhe-Sahaba* (Praise of the *Sahabas)* procession to be taken out in the city, for the first time in its history, on the birthday of the Prophet, to the great chagrin and annoyance of the Shia community. The Shias retaliated by openly reciting *Tabarra,* i.e. curses, on the first three Caliphs, and courting jail in defiance of the law. The Shias from the Punjab and some other places came to help the Shias of Lucknow.

I immediately started contacting the U.P. Government to find out why a novel right, and this too under police protection, had been allowed to the Sunnis. Rafi Qidwai informed me that the Sunni agitation had been getting beyond control, so much so that a Sunni mob had entered the Council Chamber during my absence and found their way into the Council Hall, cursed the Ministers and Government officials and threw away files from the tables so that the police had to be called to clear them out of the hall. He argued that the 'Praise of the *Sahaba*' could not be ruled out by the Government and it had done nothing more than uphold the civil right of the Sunnis. I suspected that the action of the Government was not so much to favour the Sunnis as to divide the Muslims of the city into two armed camps. I believe my strong opposition to the Government was conveyed to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who came down to Lucknow to discuss the problem. I met the Sunni leaders of *Madhe-Sahaba,* Shah Mohammad Usmani and a few others to find out whether a settlement of the vexed question was possible, but having

secured the right from the Government it was not possible to dissuade them easily from following this up. Maulana Zafarul Mulk, one of the leaders of the Sunnis, was even prepared to allow Shias to take out a procession of *Qadhe-Sahaba* (criticism of *Sahabas*) on a given day, provided their right to take out a procession was not interfered with by the Government. Mr. Bishop, the Commissioner of Lucknow Division, was trying to bring about a settlement of this vexed question but a letter which he wrote to me after my talk with him on the subject on 6 June 1939 did not give me any hope of his succeeding in his efforts.

Pandit Jawaharlal soon after my arrival in Lucknow wrote to me a letter dated 15 May 1939:

'My dear Khaliq,

So you have come back after your long wandering. I wanted to see you in Lucknow yesterday but I heard you were fully occupied as of course you must be on the day of your return. I shall be in Lucknow again for a few days and I hope we shall meet then. I hope you have returned fit and strong and are keeping well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal.'

This letter reminded me of what Brelvi had told me at Bombay soon after my return, that the Congress was now prepared to re-open negotiations with me. I was confirmed in this view by a letter from Pandit G. B. Pant also, dated 16 May 1939:

'My dear Khaliq,

I called at your place on Sunday evening but you were out. I greatly regret that I could not see you before leaving Lucknow. I expect to see you when I get back to Lucknow. I wish to offer you cordial welcome on your return after prolonged absence. I need not worry you with a long catalogue of the incidents that happened while you were away. You will come to know all about these soon and I will have occasion to speak to you when I come to Lucknow. Hope this finds you well.

Sincerely yours,
G. B. Pant.'

I think some of my very close friends in Lucknow had conveyed to the Congress leadership my attitude about the future basis of discussions, i.e. favouring partition. When I met Pandit Jawaharlal he asked my opinion whether I would agree to the proposal of Maulana Zafarul Mulk to allow a day for *Qadhe-Sahaba* as a means of settlement between the Shias and Sunnis. I told him that he had already committed a great mistake in allowing the *Madhe-Sahaba* procession and he would be doing

a much greater harm to Muslims by conceding to the Shia demand of *Qadhe-Sahaba* even though the Sunni leaders of Lucknow might agree to it. He did not discuss any other political issue. After my talk with him the *Qadhe-Sahaba* question was dropped. That any section of Sunnis, particularly Congress Ulema of Lucknow, should have been a party to bargaining for *Madhe-Sahaba* as against *Qadhe-Sahaba* was nothing but a shameful display of their mental imbalance. The controversy hung on for a few months and no end appeared to be in sight.

Some time after Khaksars entered the scene. Allama Mashriqi, leader of the Khaksar Jamaat, declared in August 1939, through the Press, that if the two communities did not settle their dispute he would come down to Lucknow to force them to accept his decision. Within a few days of his announcement the Allama arrived with a large number of his Khaksars to see the end of the Shia-Sunni dispute. His arrival was actually heralded by impressive military exercises by the Khaksars in Aminuddaulah Park, where thousands of Muslims used to assemble in the evening to see the parade. After the parade punishments were awarded to those guilty of indiscipline, by flogging them in the open before the eyes of a large gathering. One day Mr. Wahiduddin, Bar-at-Law, who was practising at Bahreich, offered himself to receive the punishment in public. After waiting for a few days the U.P. Government started interfering with the march of volunteers through the city park in the evening, which resulted in a lathi fight between the police and the Khaksars. The Muslim public after a few days became restive and started openly supporting the Khaksars in the skirmishes with the police. One night at about 2 a.m. some Khaksars came to my house, knocked at the door and sent word to me that a serious situation had risen. They asked me to see Allama Mashriqi immediately but I told them that I could not do so at that hour of night; they should come in the morning and I would have no objection to seeing him. In the early morning I learnt that the Allama had been arrested and sent to jail. A day later a meeting of the Council of the Provincial Muslim League was held in Mahmudabad House, in which Maulana Jamal Mian of Firangi Mahal moved a resolution that the members of the provincial League Council should march to the house of the District Magistrate with Khaksar badges on their arms and offer themselves for arrest. Mr. Jinnah at that time was in Delhi and when contacted on the 'phone by Nawab Ismail Khan advised us to observe caution with the result that the resolution was withdrawn.

Next day Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant complained to me in the Council Chamber, inquiring why the Muslim League, for no rhyme or reason, had started backing the Khaksars, and asked me to settle the matter amicably. He wanted the terms of settlement from me but I replied that only the Khaksar leader could speak on the subject with authority. But I offered to send Mr. Mubashshir Husain Qidwai, at that time the Secretary of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly and later a judge of the Allahabad High Court, if proper facilities were given to him, to meet and discuss the question with the Allama. When Mr. Mubashshir Husain returned from a talk with the Allama he was greatly annoyed, asking me why I had sent him to the Allama who had said the Muslim League had no business to meddle in his affairs and that it was a matter between him and the U.P. Government, in which he would not like any interference by any other party or group. I advised Mubashshir Husain not to issue any Press statement or to do anything more in the matter. A few days later the U.P. Government released the Allama and issued a statement that he had offered an unconditional apology. The Government on its side continued to declare that an apology had been submitted in writing and the Khaksars on their side continued to deny it.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad came to my house on 29 September 1939, and told me that he had come to Lucknow to bring about a settlement of the Shia Sunni dispute and asked for my support in that cause. I assured him that whatever political differences might exist between us, on this question I would go all out to offer my support. Next day a meeting was held in the Council Chamber where representatives of both sects were present. Maulana Azad started the proceedings by laying emphasis on the necessity of bringing about a settlement of the issue which was doing incalculable harm to Muslims themselves. One of the Sunni leaders asserted that if a right of the Muslims was interfered with it was their duty to fight for it. The Maulana in a forthright retort said, 'First create a *fitna* (mischief) and if one objects to it then say that it has now become a duty.'

I did not doubt that so far as the Maulana was concerned he was really very sincere in his attempt to end the miserable situation but a few Muslim Congressmen in the Assembly for party considerations were secretly undermining what Maulana Azad was doing openly. I could see from the trend of their talk in the meeting that they were quite out of tune with the Maulana's attempt. However, some tentative decisions were

reached which we were to discuss amongst ourselves. Before the meeting on the next day, as I feared, the whole confidential talk of the meeting had become public property. Maulana Inayatullah of Firangi Mahal informed me that a section of the Congress Muslims were playing a farce and were not for a settlement. In my mind I had no doubt that Maulana Azad was genuinely anxious to end the affair; but the other Sunni Ulema were not prepared to toe his line. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad wrote a letter to me dated 31 October 1939:

'Dear Friend,

I have just seen your statement in the Press. I am sorry last night you said something which you did not want to do. It is not a fact that what the member had said in that connection was conditioned on the opinion of the Ulema. What was said was not an opinion but was a definite responsible lead. It is also not true that there was no agreement on issuing a statement. You yourselves had insisted that the statement should be issued and that all should sign it.

Yours sincerely,
Abul Kalam.'

During my absence a Congress session was held at Ramgarh, which was to have been presided over by Subash Babu, who had been elected by the A.I.C.C. in spite of Gandhiji's opposition. Subash Babu had arrived at Ramgarh in a very precarious condition of health and had to be carried to his tent on a stretcher. He could not even attend the open session and owing to his absence most ugly shouting scenes were enacted by the adherents of the parties with the result that the first session had to be postponed. In the next session only the delegates were allowed to enter the Pandal to finish the proceedings. Subash Babu went back to Calcutta and could not announce even his Working Committee because many of the Congress leaders were not ready to accept the honcur, due to Gandhiji's opposition. After a month or two Subash Babu resigned and Rajendra Babu was elected President of Congress.

Gandhiji had started a fast unto death on a breach of the promise made by the Thakore Sahib of Rajkot, a State in Kathiawar, to Sardar Patel to accept his nominees for a State Committee. The Viceroy became perturbed and appointed Sir Maurice Gwyer to give his verdict on the matter. He decided in favour of Gandhiji and thereafter Gandhiji gave up his fast.

Soon after the Rajkot affair, Hyderabad State came in for an attack by *Jathas* from British India, calling for the protection of Hindu and Sikh temples in the State. This interference in the States from outside was clearly meant to incite States' people

against their rulers with a view to weaken their control on the administrative machinery of the States and to force elective systems in their councils wherever they existed or to coerce them to nominate such persons to the Federal Legislature, when it came into existence, on whom Congress could rely. On the British side the rulers were being hustled to sign the instruments of accession to the Indian Federation. The princely orders of India were under double fire during this period of their history.

Realizing the consequences of the Congress activities in the States a meeting of the Muslim League was held on 8 April 1939 which condemned Congress for its interference in the internal administration of the States with the manifest object of coercing the rulers of the States to submit to Congress dictatorship. The foregoing Congress policy was dictated by the consideration that in the event of Federation, on which, in spite of Congress and League alliance in the Central Assembly on the relative debate, the British Government had not modified its attitude but had incorporated the provision relating to Federation in the 1935 Government of India Act, the Congress should have the control of the States' people's electorate. In this situation the League had also to modify its attitude of neutrality towards the States and to cry halt to Congress activities. I was, therefore, of the opinion in the League meeting of 3 July 1939 that *Jathas* should be sent from British India to help the Hyderabad administration. It was however learnt that Sir Akbar Hyderi, the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, did not favour the idea as he thought the State Police were strong enough to deal with the situation. As it happened the Hindu Sabha movement after a few months died down.

While Lucknow was still busy with its sectarian quarrels, the world was preparing for one of the greatest catastrophes of the age. On 24 August 1939 a treaty of mutual help between Germany and Russia had been signed and to counteract this move Britain guaranteed protection of Poland on 25 August 1939. The stage was thus set for a world-wide conflict and everyone could see that war was imminent. On 3 September 1939 came the broadcast from the King, the British Prime Minister and the Viceroy informing India that war had broken out between Germany and England and urging the people of India to help the British cause which was based on justice and was undertaken for the protection of the right of smaller nations to live in peace and harmony without danger of harm or extinction from powerful neighbours.

The reaction in India was very different from that of the war

of 1914. Up to that time the Congress had not learnt to be aggressive and had been following a peaceful policy, claiming only self-government under the aegis of the British Crown. The people of India before the first World War had no experience of what a world war implied and what opportunities of employment, of titles and of corruption it could bring in its wake. That war gave them the first experience of how the miseries of the few on the battlefield could be utilized by the many living ones for ill-gotten gains and for expansion of unlawful dominion over weaker peoples and nations. On the contrary on this occasion, the declaration of war immediately made goods scarce in the market, raised expectations in the minds of the people for more and better employment in military and allied services and a golden opportunity to political parties for the realization of their aims. New methods of corruption, securing of permits and adulteration of every imaginable thing started being practised from the very beginning. Public honesty became the first victim of the war. Selfishness, greed and unbridled ambition for greater riches captivated the Indian mind, they believing in the invincibility of British Arms and feeling no responsibility for winning the war. Unlike the belligerent nations the Indian people received the news with complete indifference as to its result and absence of any sign of dismay or shock.

Gandhiji was immediately invited by the Viceroy to meet him in Delhi. Soon after his talk with the Viceroy, Gandhiji issued a Press statement giving his personal reactions to the event:

> 'I told H.E. that my own sympathies were with England and France from a purely humanitarian standpoint. I told him that I could not contemplate without being stirred to the very depth, the destruction of London which had hitherto been regarded as impregnable. As I was picturing before him the Houses of Parliament and Westminster Abbey and their possible destruction, I broke down. I had become disconsolate.'

I became very apprehensive after reading Gandhiji's statement, for I felt that if the Congress shared his views, with Congress Governments in eight provinces and a host of Hindu Indian States and a large number of Hindu millionnaires, the British in their anxiety to win them over might be inclined to ignore the Muslims and leave them high and dry. My only hope was in the ingrained habit of Congress of picking holes in everything which emanated from the British side.

The Congress meeting was immediately held at Wardha, lasting for a week from 9 to 15 September, and as a result of its deliberations the Congress made a demand that the Government should

define its war aims before expecting Congress to help in the war effort. It also seriously objected to bringing India into the vortex of war without consulting the Legislature. It may be interesting to note here Mr. Sitaramayya's remarks on this Working Committee in his *History of the Indian National Congress*,* wherein he wrote:

'Gandhi was of the view that we must offer our moral support, allow the Ministers to function and he had the confidence that through the Ministers he could manoeuvre a declaration of *Purna Swaraj* or Dominion Status, a declaration of the next step, the same that Jawaharlal expected by negotiation. In both cases the contingency of the promise not being fulfilled did exist, but under Gandhiji's technique the chance of the fulfilment of such a declaration was certainly greater. For then a moral obligation would have to be fulfilled, not one arising from negotiation.'

Babu Rajendra Prasad, the Congress President, had invited Mr. Jinnah to attend this meeting of Congress but he expressed his inability to go there although he offered to have a talk about the political situation with him on 13 September 1939 at Delhi.

The Viceroy on his side, after meeting Gandhiji, met Mr. Jinnah, representing the Muslim League, and fifty-two other leaders and informed them of the circumstances in which the British Government had been obliged to enter the war. The Viceroy also addressed the Legislature on 11 September 1939, in which he made some weighty pronouncements.

Mr. Jinnah called an emergency meeting of the All-India Muslim League at New Delhi on 17 and 18 September. After discussion a committee consisting of Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Nawab Ismail Khan and myself was appointed to draft a resolution in the light of discussion in the meeting. It should be borne in mind that up till now the Congress Governments in the provinces were still functioning and the resolution passed at this meeting of the League should be read in that light, and with the consideration that thinking in the League regarding Muslim policy was changing. Briefly the resolution contained the following points:

1. The League expressed an appreciation of the course adopted by the Viceroy in inviting to consultation Mr. Jinnah, President of the Muslim League.
2. It reiterated its views against the policy of forcing the scheme of federation.
3. It expressed great dissatisfaction with the provincial administrations for their hostile attitude to the Muslims' religious,

*Vol. II, p. 130.

political and economic rights and interests and the indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors in the Congress-governed provinces by failing to exercise their special powers to protect and secure justice to the minorities.

4. It expressed concern about Palestine and the Arab question and advised the British to enlist the sympathy of the Muslims of the world by accepting their demand.

5. It expressed its satisfaction at the declaration that the Federal Scheme of the Government of India Act 1935 had been suspended and urged upon the Viceroy the complete abandonment of it. It called upon the Government to examine the whole constitutional problem of India *de novo* in the light of the experience gained by the working of the provincial constitution of India and the developments that had taken place since. The League pointed out that the organization stood for free India and free independent Islam in which they could play equal part with the majority community with complete sense of security for their religious, political and economic rights. It said that the experience of two years of Congress rule in the provinces had convinced the Muslim League that a permanent communal majority had injured minority interests in all spheres of life. The Committee condemned unprovoked German aggression and the doctrine that might is right and upheld the principle of freedom of humanity.

6. The Committee felt that real and solid Muslim co-operation and support to Great Britain in this hour of her trial could not be secured successfully if His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy were unable to secure to the Musalmans justice and fairplay in the Congress-governed provinces where at the time their liberty and personal property were in danger. It also urged upon the Viceroy to direct the Governors to exercise their special powers whenever necessary.

7. The Committee urged upon the British Government to assure the Muslims that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the Muslim League.

In the foregoing Muslim League Resolution hesitation to join the war effort was due only to the continuance of the functioning of the Congress Ministries in the provinces, against which the Muslims had accumulated grievances as stated in parts 3 and 6 of the Resolution mentioned above.

Gandhiji had a second talk with the Viceroy on 26 September in which he expressed great surprise at the statement of Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India, wherein he had complained of Congress at this juncture, when Britain was engaged in a life-and-death struggle, asking for a clear declaration of British intentions. Gandhiji thought that Congress had done nothing strange or less than honourable in asking for such a declaration. He also maintained that the Congress was an all-

inclusive body and without offence to anybody it could be said that it was the only body that had represented, for over half a century, vast masses of Indians, irrespective of class or creed, and that it had not a single interest opposed to that of the Muslims or of the people of the States. Jawaharlal replying to Lord Zetland said: 'He speaks in terms of yesterdays that are dead and gone. He might have delivered his speech twenty years ago.'

The Viceroy again spoke on Britain's policy regarding India on 10 October 1939, reminding India 'of the differences in view deeply and sincerely held.' Replying to the Congress demand for clarification on war aims he went on to say:

'His Majesty's Government have not themselves defined with any ultimate precision their detailed objectives in the prosecution of the war. It is obvious that such a definition can only come at a later stage in the campaign, and that when it does come it cannot be the statement of aims of any single ally. There may be many changes in the world position and in the situation that confronts us before the war comes to an end, and much depends upon the circumstances in which it does come to an end and on the intervening course of the campaign.'

In regard to future constitutional development, the Viceroy said: 'The natural issue of India's progress as it is contemplated is the attainment of dominion status.' Referring to the question of minorities he pointed out that 'the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within our Empire may be furthered to the end that India may attain its due place amongst its dominions.' The Viceroy promised 'consultations with the representatives of several communities, parties and interests in India and with the Indian Princes with a view to securing their aid and their co-operation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable.' He recognized 'the Muslim League as the only organization which can speak on behalf of the Muslims and represent them.'

With regard to the Congress resolution of 9 October 1939, Sir Samuel Hoare, in a debate on India on 22 October 1939, said:

'Dominion status is not a prize that is given to a deserving community, but recognition of a fact that does exist. . . . The Congress in my view with undue haste has assumed that the Viceroy's Consultation Committee means nothing, that it is merely a device for the purpose of postponing constitutional advance.'

Speaking of the other alternative of nonco-operation he said:

'It might put the clock back for years. . . . It leads to civil disobedience, to breaches of law and order and to a vicious circle of rioting and repression from which we had hoped to escape for ever.' Finally he said: 'We have long ago set aside Imperialist ambitions. We believe that our mission in the world is not to govern but to help the people govern themselves.'

Gandhiji's comment on the Viceroy's speech was: 'The old policy of divide and rule is to continue.'

Following this the Congress Ministries of Madras, Central Provinces, Bihar, U.P., Bombay, Orissa and N.W.F.P. were directed by the Congress Paliamentary Board on 22 October 1939 to resign, after passing a resolution in the Provincial Assemblies that Congress Governments could not associate themselves with British policy, the Muslim League members voting against it.

The Muslim League Working Committee met again on 22 October 1939 and expressed its appreciation of His Majesty's Government for having emphatically repudiated the claim of the Congress that they alone represented India; their having recognized the fact that only the All-India Muslim League truly represented the Muslims of India and could speak on their behalf and the assurance that their rights and interests would be safeguarded. In this meeting the Working Committee for the first time took up the position that, with a view to securing full co-operation on an equal footing in the war effort, further clarification and discussion on matters that were left in doubt and had not been met satisfactorily would be necessary to enable the Muslim League to co-operate in the matter which concerned not only the Muslims of India but the country at large.

On 5 November 1939, the Viceroy issued a very long statement in which, after having discussed the political situation with Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Jinnah and other leaders of public opinion, he assured the people of India that Dominion Status remained the goal for India and that His Majesty's Government were prepared to reconsider the scheme of the present Act at the end of the war, in consultation with leaders of Indian opinion. He also emphasized that the British Government attached great importance to associating public opinion in India with the prosecution of the war and for that purpose they contemplated the formation of a consultative group, the details of which were to be settled after he had further consulted the party leaders. Proceeding further he said that the Congress continued to persevere in the policy which it had chalked out for itself and on 22 October had again presented the demand for a statement from His Majesty's Government about their

war aims and for a declaration of independence for India. Subsequently it had called upon the Congress Ministries in the provinces to resign. About the Muslim League the Viceroy said that, also on 22 October, it had requested that 'certain doubts should be removed and complete clarification of the declaration secured, subject to which they empowered their President, if fully satisfied, to give assurance of co-operation and support, on behalf of the Musalmans of India, to the British Government for the purpose of prosecution of the war.' In these circumstances the Viceroy said that he had invited Mr. Gandhi, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Jinnah to meet him on 1 November and discuss the whole position with them. He told them that if, in regard to the association at the Centre, they had been unable to go further than the proposal for a consultative group it was because of the lack of prior agreement between the major communities such as would contribute to harmonious working at the Centre. He added that the manifestoes issued on 22 October by the Congress Working Committee and the Muslim League had shown only too clearly the gulf that existed between the attitudes of these two great parties.

The pronouncement of the Viceroy was overflowing with sincerity and goodwill in the context of the grave events through which the world was passing, but neither of the major political parties in India was prepared to see any good thing in the other's case—the Congress vehemently urging that the political issue of independence to India should not be mixed up with the communal problem and the Muslim League equally stoutly urging that the two issues were inseparably connected together and should be examined in that light. The British, having had to play the political game in India and in the world for a long time as the foremost world power, were shrewd enough to see what Congress was aiming at, and even in their hour of serious trial and tribulation refused to be browbeaten. They reiterated their call upon Congress to resolve their differences with the Muslims in order to win the freedom of the country, but this Congress was not prepared to do except on its own terms. That necessarily brought in the deadlock which ultimately resulted in the partition of the country. Gandhiji's comment on the Viceroy's speech fell in line with the Congress policy. He said:

'I have read with respectful attention the Viceroy's broadcast and his introductory remarks on the correspondence between himself and Sri Rajendra Prasad and Jinnah Sahib released by His Excellency. I welcome His Excellency's refusal to accept defeat and his determination to solve what seems to have become

insoluble.... I would like to suggest that no solution is possible unless an acceptable declaration of war aims about India is forthcoming.... Believing as I do in the Viceroy's sincerity I would urge fellow-workers not to lose patience. There can be no civil resistance so long as first, the Viceroy is exploring the possibilities of a settlement, secondly, the Muslim League blocks the way and thirdly there is indiscipline and disunity in Congress ranks. The second condition should not offend Muslim friends. So long as there is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League, civil resistance must involve resistance against the League.'

This statement was published when Pandit Jawaharlal and Mr. Jinnah were negotiating for a settlement on such a basis that both Muslim League and Congress could co-operate in the war effort.

Babu Rajendra Prasad in his statement accused the Government of being unwilling to accept and give legal effect to any constitution which the Indians, including all real minorities, would prepare and in which safeguards for the protection of the minorities would be included.

Pandit Jawaharlal expressed surprise at the Viceroy's statement as it conveyed to him 'an entirely different impression of what transpired in Delhi from what I had gathered from talks with some of the principal parties concerned.' The Viceroy, he said, had really converted the question into a communal one in dwelling upon the 'entire disagreement between representatives of the major political parties on fundamental issues,' and added, 'It was agreed between Mr. Jinnah and me that the communal question should be discussed fully by us at an early convenient date. This did not affect the Viceroy's proposals so long as the political difficulty was not got over. Hence it was not discussed in this connection.'

As no further progress could be made in Jawaharlal-Jinnah talks, Gandhiji issued another statement on 19 November 1939, in which he offered a separate vote to the Muslims in the Constituent Assembly and reservation, if required, to every real minority according to its numerical strength. He added:

'The Muslim League is undoubtedly the largest organization representing the Muslims, but several Muslim bodies—by no means all insignificant—deny its claims to represent them.... The Constituent Assembly would represent all of them and it alone could produce a constitution indigenous to the country and truly and fully representing the people.'

In the end he declared that 'all resources must be exhausted to enact the Constituent Assembly before direct action may

become a prelude to the Constituent Assembly. The stage is not yet.'

The Congress Working Committee having condemned Nazi aggression could not logically in the same breath ask the Government to define its war aims, as the taking up of arms against Germany by England was a sufficient indication of the war aims. The Indian problem had been there for a long time before and its settlement between the three parties, the Government, Congress and the Muslims, was being delayed due to India's own internal dissensions between the communities. It ought to have been clear to Congress that with those conditions prevailing in the country war could not be made an occasion for revolt. Congress raised moral issues which anyone could see were not the creation of war but had been there ever since the British rule, which itself was the outcome of our own political differences and dissensions. Congress refused to take notice of the fact that democracy, in whose name it spoke, had never before had to face a situation such as it found in India with a hundred million Muslims dead set against its introduction in the form and manner Congress desired and in its application to Indian conditions and environment.

It would be unfair to the British people to suggest that democracy was introduced in India with the deliberate purpose of dividing the Hindus and Muslims into majority and minority groups. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that quite a large body of British administrators and civil servants in India, after the experience gained in the Mutiny in which the communities had joined together and nearly succeeded in throwing out the British, found in the fostering of democracy sufficient justification for the hope that, although affording the people of the country opportunities for constructive criticism of Government actions and policies, it would also contribute to the awakening and rekindling of the dormant historical feuds between Hindus and Muslims; that it would stir up the still undiluted cultural antipathies, spreading from the villages to the towns and cities so as to cover the vast expanse of the country.

British administrators could clearly visualize the impossibility of governing the sub-continent with five hundred British civilians and about an equal number of British personnel in Police service. No doubt they had 70,000 British soldiers well armed and well equipped but there were also more than twice the number of Indian soldiers, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, making up the Indian Army. Even if the oft-repeated claim of the British may be accepted, that the purpose of the British occupation of

India was to prepare India to take over the administration as soon as it was competent to discharge the onerous responsibilities of governing the sub-continent, the intervening period had to be kept peaceful and orderly to serve the purpose in view. How else could it be done than with one or the other of the two political factions willingly co-operating with the British in their task, for in the alternative there was great danger of the two standing up together to throw off the foreign yoke without reaching the stage of progress set before them by the so-called trustees? The Congress found in democracy a chance for the domination of the majority over the minority through the same instrument by which the British aimed to keep the two divided, to enable them to keep the balance between them. As soon as Mr. Hume, the father of the Indian National Congress, after consultation with Lord Dufferin, unfolded the scheme for starting the Congress, the Hindus heartily welcomed it and the Muslims equally heartily rejected it. This happened only twenty-five years after Parliament had directly assumed the responsibility of governing India.

Within this period Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, father of the Muslim people in India, had on several occasions described the Muslims as a separate community with its own history and culture, and had opposed the idea that the Muslims and Hindus formed one nation in the modern sense of the word. Knowing the great influence that Sir Sayed Ahmad had on his people, Congress immediately reacted by providing in its constitution a clause that no decision would be taken or resolution passed by the Congress which was opposed by three-quarters of the members of the minority or the majority groups. And this provision continued to remain in the Congress constitution for a very long time, also finding a place in the Congress-League Pact of 1916 which, *inter alia*, provided that 'No bill nor any clause thereof nor a resolution introduced by a non-official member affecting one or the other community, which question is to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative Council concerned, shall be proceeded with if three-quarters of the members of that community in the particular Council, imperial or provincial, oppose the bill or any clause thereof or the resolution.' This was clearly an admission by the old guard of the Congress that democracy of the British type would not suit Indian political conditions and they had to think of adjusting democracy to the facts of Indian life. Further, in 1916, the Congress leaders went so far as to accept separate electorates for the Muslims and agreed to incorporation of a clause to that

effect in the Lucknow Congress-League Pact. Democracy was thus made by those old guards of the Congress subservient to the larger interest of the country to pave the way for a joint demand on behalf of the people of India which, when made and placed before Mr. Montague in 1917, had to be accepted by the British Government in all its essential features. When, however, the time for a fresh demand on the Government for a larger share of power in the administration came, after the break-up of the Khilafat organization, the entire mental outlook of Congress had undergone a violent change, due on the one hand to the pressure of the Hindu Sabha and on the other to the woeful lack of unity or discipline in the Muslim camp. Now Congress, forgetting its own policies of the past towards the Muslims, began to look to the British raj to impose Hindu rule on the Muslims rather than to winning the freedom of the country for the entire people with Muslim help and co-operation. In the name of democracy, the pet child of the British, it called upon them to hand over power to the majority regardless of any consideration to Muslims whom they began to treat as a minority, with no history or culture of their own. The British were fully aware of Muslim reaction to the Hindu demands and seemed to be faced not only with one moral issue, namely conceding independence to India, but another the abandoning of Muslims to bear the yoke of the Hindu majority in a land where they had been rulers for centuries and still had several areas where they were themselves dominant. In effect Congress desired the British to forget that Indian history consisted of three periods, namely, the Hindu, the Muslim and the British periods, and to go back to the earliest period ignoring others. The British were often shaken from their ground and felt tempted to yield to the clamour of the majority but to the very last they managed to avoid such a false step in the interest of India itself and in the interest of their good name.

The question of establishing a Constituent Assembly to decide the future of India, proposed at this stage by the Congress, could not deceive the Muslims for they had seen evidence enough within the previous two decades of how the majority could ride roughshod over the minority and how it could go back for one reason or the other against its pledged word, as Congress had done under pressure from the Hindu Sabha during the negotiations of the Nehru Report. If the Muslims agreed to go to the Constituent Assembly even on a separate electorate basis there was the danger that the Hindu majority would be able to force its views on the Assembly. The Muslims would not then have been able to look even to the British Government for

interference, for by agreeing to go to a sovereign body like the Constituent Assembly they would have themselves barred the door against the British from playing any part in Indian affairs thereafter. For these reasons the Muslim League rightly refused to associate itself with the demand for a Constituent Assembly.

It was regrettable that Gandhiji in this statement talked about direct action and civil disobedience when he had himself said just a few days before that 'so long as there is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League, civil resistance must involve resistance against the League.' But quite apart from this, he had experience of the civil resistance movements of 1930-1931 and 1932-1934, both of which had ended without achieving their objectives. Here it should be remembered that during the years 1929 to 1934 Muslims were completely out of the field, having been divided into innumerable groups and parties fighting with each other, but now the situation was very different.

As could be expected, Gandhiji's statement very much annoyed the Muslim League and all the more stiffened its attitude towards a settlement with Congress. Mr. Jinnah issued direction that 22 November 1939 should be observed as 'Deliverance Day' on the exit of provincial Ministries in the Congress provinces, and it was indeed observed everywhere by the Muslims with great enthusiasm. Naturally in these meetings most of what was said in the Pirpur Report which had been published at the end of 1939, and the Sharif Report from Bihar published in March 1939 was referred to and dilated upon.

The Muslim League Working Committee had appointed an Inquiry Committee in March 1938 with Raja Sayed Mohammad Mehdi of Pirpur as its chairman. So far as I am aware no other member of the Committee helped him in the gigantic task of collecting material for a report on the conditions of the Muslims in the Congress provinces and the Raja had to travel from place to place in the discharge of his onerous duty. The tone and language used by the Raja in dealing with his subject were very dignified and won praise from Professor Coupland in his report. Soon after partition the Raja died an unhappy man. It is regrettable that the Muslim League had been very unkind and unjust to him. The Sharif Report was prepared on the instructions of the Bihar Muslim League.

Malik Barkat Ali was dissatisfied with the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact and had begun trying to organize the League in Punjab without any interference by the Punjab Ministry. Mr. Jinnah appointed an Organizing Committee for the Punjab on 17 April 1938. As nothing was done by that Committee, Malik Barkat Ali asked the

Central League to appoint a new Organizing Committee. In August 1939 Mr. Jinnah advised me to have a talk with Sir Sikandar and to find out from him the best means of forming a proper Muslim League in Punjab. I wrote to Sir Sikandar that I would meet him and his friends at Simla to discuss the matter. His reply was as follows:

'The Boundary, Simla E.
8th September, 1939.

My dear Bhai Khaliq,

An emergent meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League has been fixed for the 17th instant at Delhi. It would, therefore, be convenient if we also meet in Delhi on the same date so that we can confer with the members of the Working Committee also. I hope you would kindly make it a point to attend. Please let me know your address in Delhi so that I can inform you of the time and place of the meeting. The meeting of the Working Committee will be held at 10 a.m. and I suggest that we should meet immediately after the Working Committee, i.e. some time about 2 p.m. I will let you know the place of the meeting later.

Yours sincerely,
Sikandar Hayat.'

Accordingly we met at Delhi on 17 September 1939 when he informed me that the League branches that had been formed in Punjab were bogus and he would not agree to their recognition by the Central League. I informed Mr. Jinnah of the position and a Committee was appointed at the February 1940 meeting of the League to proceed to Lahore, examine the whole matter and report to the President, the members of the Committee being the Raja of Mahmudabad, Nawab Ismail Khan and myself.

After the resignation of the Congress Ministry in U.P. Sir Harry Haig invited me to form a Ministry and suggested that I might be able to get sufficient members from the Hindu side to face the Assembly session after about six months, for passing the budget. I told him that his expectations were misplaced; but even otherwise a Ministry formed under such conditions would never work satisfactorily and there the matter ended. Section 93 of the Government of India Act was enforced and under its provision the administration passed into the hands of the Advisers with Mr. Mudie as the Chief Secretary.

XXII

THE LAHORE RESOLUTION

1940

THE YEAR opened with two basic issues before the country, namely (1) whether the Viceroy's offer to expand his Council was acceptable to the main political parties, and (2) whether the formation of a Consultative Group of the Indian leaders for the prosecution of the war, would be acceptable to the political parties concerned. The Muslim League Working Committee by its resolution No. 6 of 17 September 1939 had expressed its view that 'real and solid Muslim co-operation and support to Great Britain in this hour of her trial cannot be secured successfully if His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy are unable to secure to the Musalmans justice and fair play in the Congress-governed provinces where today their liberty, person, honour and property are in danger.' In October the Muslim League Working Committee, as already mentioned, further declared:

'With a view to securing full co-operation on an equal footing as desired by His Excellency, further clarification and discussion on matters that are left in doubt and have not been met satisfactorily are necessary with a view to arrive at a complete understanding which alone would enable the Muslim League to co-operate in the matter which concerned not only the Musalmans of India but the country at large.'

Both these Muslim League meetings of the Working Committee had been held while the Congress Governments in the provinces were still functioning and had not resigned. In the circumstances the Muslim League could not contemplate keeping out of the expanded Executive Council if the Congress agreed to it, nor could it refuse to shoulder the burden of administration in the provinces particularly during the war. The Muslim League Working Committee on 18 September 1939 had also authorized the President of the Muslim League to take such steps as he might consider proper to have the doubts removed and secure complete clarification of His Excellency's statement.

After the resignation of the Congress Ministry the question

of Muslims joining the war effort assumed added importance, more so because whatever may have been the views of the political parties on the question, the people of India of all classes and sections had been helping the war affort according to their vocations and status in life. Further the Government began to expect the Muslims, who unlike the Congress made no immediate demand on the Government, except that they should take no step in implementing the Federal Scheme but should make a *de novo* approach to the constitutional problem, which the Government had already done, to wholeheartedly join the war effort.

It was under such circumstances that I wrote to Mr. Jinnah an omnibus letter covering many subjects, particularly one concerning the general feelings of the Muslims towards the war effort.

His reply dated 11 January 1940 contained the subjects on which I had written to him and his replies thereto* :

'Mount Pleasant Road,
Malabar Hill, Bombay,
January 11, 1940.

Dear Khaliq,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 8th January. I am glad you appreciate the unreasonable attitude taken up by the Congress as disclosed by the recent correspondence between Pandi Jawaharlal Nehru and myself. Well, we have to face the situation as best we can.

As regards the question of my appealing to the Musalmans for funds for relief of the Anatolian calamity, the matter is receiving my consideration, and I hope to be able to decide it within a few days. The trouble is who is to be responsible for collecting the funds, otherwise, of course, naturally I am whole-heartedly in favour of doing all we can to help the Turkish people.

With regard to the last matter refered to in your letter regarding the correspondence between the Viceroy and myself, I have already decided to place the matter before the Working Committee before its publication, and I have written to Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan to call, if possible, a meeting of the Working Committee about the end of this month. I hope that you will make it a point to attend it.

With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Chowdhary Khaliquzzaman Esq.,
Lucknow.'

On 10 January 1940 speaking at the Orient Club, Bombay, the Viceroy made another pronouncement expressing his inability

*See Appendix VII.

to secure the presence of Ministers at the Centre, the association of the Indian States in the common Government, the representation of all minorities on duly settled lines and the unity of India. He went on to say that their objective in India was the attainment of dominion status of the Statute of Westminster variety, that they were prepared in the meantime, subject to such local adjustments between the leaders of the great communities as might be necessary to ensure harmonious working, and as an immediate earnest of the intention, to expand the Executive Council of the Governor-General by the inclusion of a small number of political leaders. This speech of the Viceroy again raised some hopes in the Congress circles that there might be a settlement between the Congress and the British Government and a meeting between Gandhiji and the Viceroy was fixed for 5 February 1940.

The Muslim League on its side, as indicated in Mr. Jinnah's letter to me, announced a meeting to be held on 3 February 1940 at Delhi. I arrived in Delhi on the 3rd morning and stayed with Mr. Ghulam Mohammad who conveyed a message from Sir Zafrullah Khan, then a Member of the Executive Council, requesting me to meet him before attending the Muslim League Working Committee meeting. He received me very cordially and immediately started narrating to me the impressions which he had brought back from his recent visit to England. He told me that the British Government was prepared to go very far to appease Congress and as such it was high time that the Muslim League came to some sort of settlement with Congress otherwise 'you may miss the bus.' I replied: 'If the bus is to be missed, let it be; but I cannot take a wrong bus. We are doing our best to secure an honourable settlement with the Congress and that is what can be expected of us.' There was nothing left between us to talk about so I left for the meeting.

Practically all the members of the Muslim League Working Committee had been approached like this by high Government officials to try to keep the Muslim League in good humour and restraint. There was great anxiety on that day in the Muslim League meeting; more so as the late Abdur Rahman Siddiqui had on one occasion in a Press statement said that Mr. Jinnah was suffering from 'senile decay' because of his directive to the Muslim League to observe 'Deliverance Day.' After discussing some other matters Mr. Jinnah left the chair for Nawab Ismail Khan and retired to another room. As soon as Rahman stood up to give his explanation I intervened and said, 'Rahman, you must offer an apology.' He took my advice gracefully and apologised.

After lunch when we were discussing some other question, Mr. Fazlul Huq and Sir Sikandar went to see the Viceroy and on their return to the meeting they informed us that the Viceroy assured them that he was doing his best for the League and advised them to send a League Delegation to London to place its case before the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. Mr. Jinnah paid me a great compliment when on this occasion he said: 'If Khaliq agrees to go, I have no objection.' I thankfully expressed my willingness if the Muslim League wanted me to go. Thereupon a resolution on the subject was passed (resolution No. 6 in the Records of the Muslim League). The members of this delegation were the Hon. Mr. Fazlul Huq, the Hon. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin and myself.

We also discussed the formation of a Muslim League in the Punjab and by another resolution (No. 2 on the League Record) a Committee consisting of Nawab Ismail Khan, myself and the Raja of Mahmudabad was appointed to examine the applications for affiliation to the All-India Muslim League from the Punjab, Assam and Orissa provincial Muslim Leagues and to report to the Working Committee. Later, on 25 February when the All-India Muslim League Council met in Delhi, it gave our Committee full powers to decide the question of the establishment and affiliation of the provincial Muslim League in the Punjab and to announce our decision on or before 15 March 1940.

When the Working Committee met on 4 February I asked the President to give the members of the proposed delegation to London some definite guidance in regard to the matters which it was to place before the British Government for its acceptance. I informed the members of my suggestion to Lord Zetland, for separation of Muslim areas from the rest of India, and told them that the views expressed by me on that occasion were my personal views. But now, I said, the Muslim League should give this delegation its considered view as to the future status of Muslims in India. We had on several occasions been talking of a revision of the 1935 Act but we had not suggested any alternative to the 'Federal Objective'. Now something positive had to be presented, otherwise our visit would yield no result. I also pointed out to the members that recently Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan had published a scheme for the future constitution of India in which he had proposed division of India into seven different zones, and had also provided for a confederal structure. Personally, I said, I would suggest confining our demand to the separation of Muslim zones, viz. N.W.F.P., Sind, Baluchistan and

Punjab in the north-west and Bengal and Assam in the east and would leave the rest to the Congress to deal with. At this stage Sir Sikandar who was sitting to the right of Mr. Jinnah started pleading for his confederal scheme and Mr. Jinnah opposing it. The discussion went on for about two hours when finally, with the concurrence of the members, Mr. Jinnah rejected Sir Sikandar's scheme and entered in his notebook my suggestion with approval. I do not know how many people realize when it was that for the first time the Muslim League Working Committee decided to claim the division of India. It should be noted here that on this occasion also I had suggested the inclusion of the whole of Punjab and Bengal as I had done during my talks with Lord Zetland.

Next day Gandhiji met the Viceroy and within a few hours it was known throughout Delhi that the interview had again misfired. The following day Mr. Jinnah met the Viceroy and on his return told me that the Viceroy informed him that he could not possibly agree to the demands of Mr. Gandhi. It was on this occasion that Mr. Jinnah informed the Viceroy that the Muslim League in its open session at Lahore on 23 March was going to ask for the partition of the country as decided in our meeting two days earlier. The Viceroy, as mentioned in Chapter XX, had already received a letter from Lord Zetland on the subject.

Sir Sikandar had banned armed volunteers and their parades in early March 1940 and thereby created resentment in the Khaksar camp. When we went as members of the Punjab Committee to Lahore, Sir Sikandar came to see us on 10 March at the palace of Nawab Qizilbash. Besides discussing League matters I asked him why he had banned the volunteer organizations. I may here mention that Sir Sikandar was in School at Aligarh when I was in the College and where we met often and were on very friendly terms. He had great respect for me which he maintained throughout his life. He told me that, some time before, 13,000 Sikh volunteers had paraded throughout the city of Lahore creating danger of an outbreak of violence which had obliged him to ban all parades of private volunteers. I said, 'It means that those who are already organized may continue to remain so but those who might begin later will not be allowed to have any training.'

He immediately saw through my argument and asked, 'What do you advise?' I suggested, 'Mr Jinnah's procession will be taken out when he comes on the 18th or 19th of March. If the Khaksars join in the procession the Government should not take any action against them and by stages like this the ban may in

time be allowed to lapse.' He assured me that he would do this.

We examined the papers of every branch of the provincial Muslim League and found many of them totally bogus. Malik Barkat Ali himself admitted some of them to be not up to the mark and was not prepared to back them. We rejected some of those to which objection had been taken by Sir Sikandar and accepted others and after finishing the work we left for Delhi to inform Mr. Jinnah of what we had done about the League and about the Khaksar affair. I had to return to Lucknow because in spite of my repeated requests to Mr. Wajahat Husain and Mr. Hifazat Husain, at the time Secretaries of two departments in U.P., to postpone from 20 March to some other date the marriage of their brother Dr. Riyasat Husain with my most beloved daughter, Anwar, I had not succeeded. There was very little time left at my disposal to make arrangements for the marriage and so I hurried back to Lucknow.

Whatever arrangement I had made with Sir Sikandar about Khaksars joining the procession of Mr. Jinnah was set at naught by developments in Lahore where Khaksars forced the issue on the Government and there was firing in which some of the best and most courageous Muslim youths lost their lives. The Government figures reported thirty-two dead, but the general impression was that many more lives were lost. It was a tragedy that occurred just two days before Mr. Jinnah's arrival at Lahore.

I could not start for Lahore before 21 March due to my daughter's marriage and I reached there just when the main resolution for the session was about to be passed by the Subjects Committee. As soon as I entered the hall Nawab Sahib of Chhatari and Sir Sultan Ahmad called me aside and complained to me that sufficient safeguards for the minority provinces Muslims had not been provided for in the resolution and that I should take up the matter. I replied: 'I have hardly gone through the resolution but even if I find that it requires some further consideration, as a member of the Working Committee, I cannot do anything in the matter. You can raise the issue yourself.' By the time we finished our talk the resolution as follows had already been passed:

'While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th August, 17th and 18th September and 22nd October, 1939, and 3rd of February, 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935 is totally

unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered *de novo* and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them, and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.'

In effect the resolution of the League asked for a federation of Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan with complete autonomy and sovereign powers and of other States in the East with similar powers. The resolution was moved by Mr. Fazlul Haq in the open session and quite unexpectedly I was asked by Mr. Jinnah to second it. I am not reproducing the speeches but they are the only two speeches which have found mention in the proceedings of the All-India Muslim League session of March 1940. I cannot, however, help reproducing one of the paragraphs of my speech in which I said that 'the Muslims in the Minority Provinces should not be afraid as to what would happen to them after the partition of India into

Hindu India and Muslim India. The same thing could happen to them as to the minorities in the Punjab and Bengal.' The reference to the minorities in the Punjab and Bengal was to the Hindus of those provinces. I had been compelled to bring this out because of the clause 'with such territorial readjustment as may be necessary' in the body of the resolution, which did not commend itself to me. I shall have to dilate upon it more as I proceed.

Other speeches followed from the leaders of different provinces and finally the resolution was adopted with great enthusiasm and thunderous applause by midnight of 23 March 1940.

The next morning the Hindu Press came out with big headlines 'Pakistan Resolution Passed,' although the word was not used by anyone in the speeches nor in the body of the Resolution. The Nationalist Press supplied to the Muslim masses a concentrated slogan which immediately conveyed to them the idea of a State. It would have taken long for the Muslim leaders to explain the Lahore Resolution and convey its real meaning and significance to them. Years of labour of the Muslim leaders to propagate its full import amongst the masses was shortened by the Hindu Press in naming the resolution the 'Pakistan Resolution.'

If not earlier, at least from 1862, when the British Government started introducing democracy in its administration, the Muslims had begun to feel that it would ultimately end in their subjugation. Following Sir Sayed's policy against introducing the elective principle in vogue in England to the different conditions of India, Maulana Hali also felt compelled to warn the Muslims against western democracy. he pointed out to them that it would end in making them strangers in the land, in his verse:

رخصت اے ہندوستاں اے بوستان بے خزاں
رہ چکے تیرے بہت دن ہم بدیسی میہماں

'Farewell to thee, oh! ever-green garden of India;
We foreigners have stayed long in the country as your guests.'

The idea of describing Muslims as *Bidesi* emanated from a feeling of strangeness in the land, due to the change of mental attitude towards them of the Hindu majority.

Later, on 1 October 1905 Lord Curzon made a speech in Ahsan Manzil in the Nawab of Dacca's palace in which he outlined his scheme of partition of Bengal and the creation of a new province, consisting of the three divisions of Bengal, viz. Chittagong, Dacca and Rajshahi, and a fourth one Assam to form a

single unit of administration by taking out Bihar from Bengal Province. Describing the scheme he said in his speech, 'I am giving you a Muslim province.' Except for some educated Muslims outside and inside Bengal very few realized the significance of a Muslim province at that time, but amongst Hindus the speech was so much resented that it gave birth to a revolutionary movement ending in political assassinations. Ultimately the partition was annulled by an announcement of George V in 1911 during the Delhi Durbar. Still later Sir Theodore Morrison of M.A.O. College wrote a pamphlet in England in which he suggested that if five million Muslims were to be brought into Northern India a national spirit would be created there and it might solve the Muslim problem. In 1921 a local practitioner of Agra, Mr. Nadir Ali, who was a great admirer of the British and was violently opposed to the Khilafat movement, wrote a pamphlet in which as one of the methods of settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem he discussed partition of India. Three years later Maulana Mohammad Ali in one of his speeches at Aligarh said, 'If the Hindu-Muslim problem is not settled, India will be divided into Hindu India and Muslim India.' He had delivered this speech after the failure of the Hindu-Muslim Conference at Slogra(?) which was attended by Lala Lajpat Rai, Pandit Malvia and many other leaders on behalf of the Hindu Sabha and Dr. Ansari, Maulana Mohammad Ali, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and many other Muslims. In the same year in a meeting at Lahore the Muslim League passed a resolution for the first time claiming federation instead of a unitary form of Government for India.

Lala Lajpat Rai, although a Hindu leader, had prepared a scheme in 1924 in which he had provided for four Muslim states, N.W.F.P., Punjab, Sind and East Bengal, forgetting the existence of Baluchistan. Thereafter in November-December 1930 during the first Round Table Conference Choudhri Rahmat Ali met many Muslim leaders in London and explained to them his scheme of partition, for the first time giving it the name of Pakistan (P for Punjab, A for Afghanistan, K for Kashmir, S for Sind and Istan for Baluchistan), and finally in December 1930 Allama Iqbal himself unfolded the scheme as the President of the All-India Muslim League session held at Allahabad. It is strange that the Council of the Muslim League did not take any notice of the President's address nor put forward any concrete proposal touching the subject. Later on a four-page leaflet, *Now or Never*, by Choudhri Rahmat Ali, Mohammad Aslam Khan, Shaikh Mohammad Sadiq and Inayatullah Khan was

privately circulated from Cambridge, in January 1933, claiming to be 'on behalf of thirty-three million brethren, who lived in Pakistan—by which we mean five northern units of India, viz. Punjab, N.W.F.P., Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan.' The authors of this leaflet were against the federal constitution which had been decided upon in the Round Table Conference to be the future constitutional basis for India. They said: 'The Muslims of Pakistan, a distinct nation, with a homeland of the size of France and a population equal to the French, demand the recognition of a separate national status.' It will be noticed that this was the first clear-cut scheme of partition of India to be presented. The Muslim delegates to the Joint Select Committee when questioned in 1933 about the scheme replied, 'As far as we know, it is only a student's scheme.' Another member said, 'It is chimerical and impracticable.' In 1935 Choudhri Rahmat Ali circulated another four-page leaflet from Cambridge in which he claimed to be the founder of the Pakistan National Movement, as President of which he signed the document.

A few years later, in 1933 Sir Mohammad Shah Nawaz of the Muslim League in the Punjab published a book which he entitled *Confederacy of India*, and anonymously ascribed it to 'A Punjabi'. This scheme divided India into five zones: (1) The Indus Region, (2) Hindu India; (3) Rajasthan; (4) the Deccan States, and (5) Bengal. Unlike the scheme of Choudhri Rahmat Ali, 'A Punjabi' favoured a loose connection between these unions and did not agree with the idea of complete separation of the units. He said, 'Separate countries should be re-assembled in a confederacy of India.' Some time after, as I have already said, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Premier of the Punjab, came out with a pamphlet entitled *Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*. He also proposed division of India into seven zones connected together by a loose confederation.

During my absence from India a Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference was held at Karachi on 7 October 1938, in which the following demands were made:

'(1) That in the interests of the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims the Muslim League should review and revise the entire question of what should be the suitable constitution of India and devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence.

(2) That the scheme of an All-India federation be dropped.

(3) That no constitution will be acceptable to Muslim India which does not conform to the foregoing principles.'

Lastly, as already mentioned, I had the occasion to discuss

the question of partition with Col. Muirhead and Lord Zetland and finally the scheme was accepted by the Working Committee of the Muslim League on 4 February 1939.

It should be noted that the idea contained in the Resolution of 1940 was not a new idea, but coming as it did from the Muslim League platform which had by now the backing of the bulk of the Muslim population of India, it was an avalanche which uprooted all the old fossilized structure of the political shibboleths which had kept the minds of the Indian Muslims engaged for about a century, and paved the way for a direct march towards a definite goal.

XXIII

THE WAR EFFORT CONTROVERSY

1940—1941

FRENCH armies had suffered reverses in the last week of May and third week of June 1940. The Allied armies also had suffered the loss of Danzig. Czechoslovakia had been overrun by Germany and Poland had been conquered. Holland, Belgium and Norway had been attacked and ultimately on 14 June came the news of the fall of France. The whole world was dumbfounded.

In view of such grave events the question of the war effort by the people of India, including the Muslims, assumed very serious importance. The Muslim League in its meeting on 17 September 1939, while the Congress Ministries were still functioning, had emphasized that full co-operation in the war effort would naturally be followed by securing justice from the British Government in the Congress-governed provinces. It had neither offered its co-operation in the war effort nor had it expressed its view against it. However, the Government was now contemplating establishing provincial War Committees and the U.P. Government had invited my opinion on the subject. I had replied to the Governor that in the absence of any guidance from the Muslim League Working Committee I could not commit myself, although the matter would be cleared in the next meeting of the Working Committee at Bombay from 15 to 17 June 1940. Subsequently Mr. Jinnah issued a statement to the Press on 27 May 1940 in which he said:

'Up to the present moment we have not created any difficulty nor have we embarrassed the British Government in the prosecution of the war. Provinces where the Muslim League has a dominant voice have been left free to co-operate with the British Government, pending their consideration with regard to the assurance we have asked for, and in particular that the British Government should make no declaration regarding the future constitutional problems of India and the vital issues that have been raised in that connection without our approval and consent.'

We in U.P. felt that the statement of Mr. Jinnah was unfortunate for it did not take into account the seriousness of the war situation, nor did it take into consideration the vast change brought about by the Pakistan Resolution which displaced all the Muslim League demands made prior to it as of no significance. Besides, we failed to see what difficulty could be created or embarrassment made by the Muslim League except in calling upon the Punjab and Bengal Premiers to resign, as the Congress had done, with the risk at that stage of its hold on those Ministries that the orders might not be honoured. Further, no Muslim could conceive of the creation of Pakistan by the British Government during the war. However before I left for the League Working Committee meeting I received a letter from Nawab Ismail Khan which gave his own mind as well as mine on the question of the war effort:

'Mustafa Castle,
Meerut, June 8th.

My dear Khaliq Sahib,

Thanks for sending me a copy of the correspondence which has passed between you and the Governor on the subject of the formation of a Provincial War Committee and the participation of the Muslim League in it. In view of the non-committal policy so far adopted by the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League on this situation, your reply could not have been otherwise than what it is. I regret that it will not be possible for me to go to Bombay for this meeting. I suppose you are going there for it. If so, please see that some definite lead is given to the Musalmans on this important matter. We cannot afford to sit on the fence any longer. It is no longer a question of co-operation with the British Government in its war effort but of the safety of the country from external aggression and internal disorder. Let the Congress sulk in its camp if it so chooses. We should strike out a policy for ourselves and should not allow ourselves to be worried by what it will think of our action. I was surprised to learn from Mr. Jinnah's statement that he has actually countenanced the co-operation of the two majority provinces while he has reserved his nonco-operation for wretched minority provinces.

If our discipline is to be taken advantage of in this manner, we shall refuse to observe it in future.

Yours affectionately,
Nawab Ismail Khan.'

When the Muslim League met on 15 June 1940 at Bombay under the presidentship of Mr. Jinnah we learnt that he had addressed a letter to the Viceroy, dated 9 April 1940, containing practically the same viewpoint as was expressed by him in his statement of 27 May 1940. In spite of my opinion to the contrary I could not but agree to its approval, so far as the

assurances asked for by the League were concerned, but he had gone further and said that unless a satisfactory basis for close co-operation were agreed, upon an all-India basis and not province-wise, between the Government and the Muslim League and such other parties as were willing to undertake the responsibility for the defence of the country in the face of the emergency, the real purpose and object would not be served or achieved.

I opposed the concluding portion of the policy of conditioning our support to the war effort on an agreement with other parties to undertake responsibility for the defence of the country; for the Congress demands embraced both the war period and the after-war period; but having passed the Pakistan Resolution all our make-belief claims against the British Government had faded into nothingness. What was then the value to the Muslim League of an expanded Viceroy's Executive Council that we should care to go in for it? Because whatever the constitution of the Council might be we were to be only a minority in it. Then again our insistence on co-operation with other parties in the Executive Council could only mean also bringing in Congress in the provinces, against which we had made so much fuss and observed a Deliverance Day. I could not understand why Mr. Jinnah disliked a province-wise effort which gave at least the Muslim-majority provinces some initiative, which would have been lost in the Centre where the Muslim League could have had but a weak voice and no initiative.

But even otherwise our policy of bargaining was not likely to succeed, just as the Congress resignation from provincial Assemblies had not affected the war effort to any appreciable degree or forced the Government to accept Congress demands. All the Princes and Maharajas had not only donated vast sums of money to the British war effort but had also offered help in material and men. The business magnates—Tatas, Birlas, Singhanias and Dalmias—besides investing millions in war bonds, were taking huge contracts for the supply of raw material, hosiery, tents and other finished goods. Our own Muslim Taluqdars and landlords followed the lead of the Princes and business men in their own humble way and were interested in smaller contracts for the supply of wood, charcoal and other small commodities. They could hardly be expected to forego the chance of a lifetime. The recruiting centres everywhere in India had large queues of both Muslims and Hindus vying with each other to get entrance to a job. The result of our staying away from the war effort could only deprive us of our claim that we were with the British war effort although Congress were not co-operating.

Sir Sikandar, who had been much subdued after the firing on Khaksars in Lahore and had suffered in his prestige in the Province, nevertheless suspected that the move to bring the Central League into the picture was aimed at him more than at anyone else. As there was opposition to the words 'the real purpose and object will not be served or achieved,' in his letter to the Viceroy, Mr. Jinnah agreed to have the following as an alternative to his proposal:

'The Working Committee is of the opinion that in view of the immediate grave danger that is facing the country the real purpose will not be served by the Musalmans and others merely joining the proposed provincial and district war committees with their present scope and functions.'

I did not find much difference in the language of this resolution from that of the original standpoint; but in view of the majority opinion in favour of it, I accepted it.

On my return to Lucknow I received a letter from the Secretary to the Governor, Mr. Stevenson:

'Governor's Camp,
United Provinces,
June 19, 1940.

Dear Choudhri Khaliquzzaman,
I sent you yesterday a formal invitation to the inaugural meeting of the Provincial War Committee which His Excellency proposes to hold in Lucknow on July 1st. His Excellency desires me, however, to add that he realizes that present circumstances may not make it possible for you to give him an answer to this invitation and he expects an answer only when circumstances permit you to give one.

Yours sincerely,
Stevenson.'

This letter is a masterpiece of the British sense of realism. Knowing the decision of the Muslim League, the Governor, Sir Maurice Hallett did not wish to have a refusal from me to serve on the War Committee.

During the stay of Sir Sikandar at Bombay I had noticed great resentment in his camp against our resolution, for some of them thought that the attitude taken up by Mr. Jinnah was likely to hurt Sir Sikandar's position in the Punjab, both in the League circles as well as in British eyes. I, however, hoped that this outlook would be changed and Sir Sikandar would not be a party to disturbing the unity in the League organization. To my great surprise soon afterwards a controversy about the import of the League's stand towards the war effort started in the Press. The A.P.I., an Indian news service, published an

item to the effect that the members of the Punjab Assembly construed the Muslim League Working Committee's Bombay resolution to have exempted Punjab and Bengal Muslims and that Sir Sikandar Hayat was of the same view. Sir Sikandar, however, issued a rejoinder and said that only Muslim Ministers in the Punjab and Bengal had been exempted. Sir Nazimnization. I became very anxious about the situation in the Punjab was that the group which had not seen eye to eye with Sir Sikandar after the firing on the Khaksars, were opposing him from all directions, while his friends were manoeuvring to impress upon him that it was not to his interest to remain in the League any longer and had advised him to resign from the organization. I became very anxious about the situation in the Punjab and wrote a letter to Mr. Jinnah on 9 July drawing his attention to the flutter which our Bombay resolution of June 1940 had created in the country and urging upon him to find a way out. As I did not receive any reply from him I again wrote to him on 7 August informing him that certain important personages in the Punjab were utilizing the situation created by the misunderstanding existing between him and Sir Sikandar, and requesting him to clear up the matter in the interests of the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah by his letter dated 9 August 1940 informed me that he was holding a meeting in Bombay. The letter is as follows* :

'Mount Pleasant Road,
Malabar Hill Bombay,
9th August, 1940.

Dear Khaliquzzaman,

I am in receipt of your letter of 9th July as well as of the 7th August and thank you for all the information that you have placed at my disposal. I could not reply to your letter of the 9th July as I was not well and besides, important events have been moving very fast and had occupied all my time.

You must have heard by now about the meeting of the Working Committee in Bombay on the 17th.

As regards the machinations of certain persons in Punjab I thank you for all the information. I shall place before you all things when you are in Bombay. The various points suggested by you will certainly have my very close attention and more when we meet in Bombay as I hope you will attend this very important meeting without fail.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.'

I had also written a letter to Sir Sikandar on 23 June 1940 requesting him not to do anything to create a schism in the

*See Appendix VII.

League for that would be fatal to our cause. I also reminded him that there was no room for any misunderstanding about my advice because I had opposed Mr. Jinnah's stand on the war effort more strongly even than himself. He replied to me as follows:

'The Boundary, Simla E.,
25th June, 1940.

My dear Bhai Khaliq,

Many thanks for your letter of 3rd June. I am not aware to which Press controversy you are referring. If your reference is to the Press statement issued by the A.P.I. saying that the Punjab and Bengal Muslims had been exempted, then perhaps the subsequent contradiction must have escaped your notice, as what I told them was that the Muslim Ministers in the Punjab and Bengal were exempted. A similar statement, I am glad to say, was made by Sir Nazim-ud-Din also in Bengal. Whether the first misleading report was published by the A.P.I. deliberately I do not know; but, in any case, Mr. Jinnah's statement must have cleared the position although it was not in good taste: and my contradiction which was published even earlier leaves no room for any doubt. As you say, we must try to keep our solidarity; but unfortunately people sometimes have not the courage of their convictions and consequently doubts and misgivings are unnecessarily aroused and given publicity merely for the sake of mischief. So far as I am concerned I will continue to bear with every kind of affront and insult so long as it is necessary to do so in the interests of the community and the country; but there is a limit to everything and I hope that God would grant me fortitude to bear all these things in future as in the past for the sake of my co-religionists and my countrymen. Let us hope that Mr. Jinnah's interview with the Viceroy on Thursday next will *satisfy him* because if even now after this interview he does not give the right lead to the country there is an extreme danger of a split and I do not see how we will be able to avoid it; because there is a considerable feeling amongst the intelligentsia throughout the country, particularly in Bengal and the Punjab, judging from the letters and communications I have received. The general impression seems to be that the petty bargaining which has brought the League on a level with the Congress is likely to do inestimable harm to the community, and unless matters are rectified there may be a rift in Muslim ranks which would be most unfortunate. I do hope that you will exert your influence in the right direction. I still believe that the Congress will be prepared to accept all that the League wants; but I may be wrong.

Yours sincerely,
Sir Sikandar.'

The Muslim League Working Committee meeting on 31 August 1940 had to consider the statement of the Viceroy dated

8 August 1940, which was the most important statement issued by him during the eight years of his tenure of office. Briefly it said:

'(1) The expansion of the Governor-General's Council and the establishment of the Advisory War Council should no longer be postponed.

(2) In view of the doubts as to whether the position of the minorities would be sufficiently safeguarded in any future consitutional change the British Government re-affirmed their desire that full weight should be given to the minority opinion. It went without saying that they should not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority was directly denied by large and powerful elements in the Indian national life, nor could they be parties to the coercion of such element into submission to such Government.

(3) Constitutional issues could not be decided at a moment when the Commonwealth was engaged in a struggle for existence but after the war a representative Indian body should be set up to frame the new constitution.'

The only objection that the Muslim League could take to this weighty pronouncement of the Viceroy was to the theory of 'Unity of national life.' The difference, however, arose when Mr. Jinnah proposed to associate the League with the war effort 'with authority and power' as partners in the central and provincial Governments and in the establishment of the War Council. He further thought: 'It [The Muslim League] did not find any specific offer made to it as embodied in the letter of H.E. the Viceroy dated the 14th August 1940, purporting to give effect to and implement the principle of co-operation with Government as partners.' It was for the first time that the Viceroy's latter dated 14 August 1940 which could only be a reply to Mr. Jinnah's letter was mentioned in the meeting of the League. I felt very sad about it for all this happened after our meeting of 15 June, when it had already become known that Congress in its meeting of 9 to 14 June had surprisingly enough waived its opposition to the war effort. The doubtful war situation had shaken Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru also from his anti-Government attitude and so had many other Congressmen been influenced by the bleak war situation, which resulted in an offer from the Congress that, if Britain promised to hand over power to them by expanding the Viceroy's Council and by promising Independence to India after the war, they would offer full co-operation in the war effort. I definitely felt that our demand to associate the League with the war effort with authority and power as partners with the Congress was totally a wrong policy.

We had to bear in mind that we had no arms to win Pakistan for us, and the bargaining that we had started with the Government was bound to leave no room for any difference in policy as between the Congress and the League. The expansion of the Viceroy's Council could have no attraction for us, as we could be at best a meddling minority and in the provincial field the League controlled only three out of eleven provinces. At one stage of the discussion Mr. Jinnah asked me to allow his policy to continue for three months more, to which I did not agree. Thereafter we retired for lunch. When the members re-assembled Resolution No. 5 on the subject, which only partially met my views, was passed.

The Resolution of the Working Committee passed at Bombay on 16 June 1940 had requested Musalmans generally, and in particular the members of the Muslim League, not to serve on the War Committees but to await further instructions from the President, pending the result of the negotiations with the Viceroy. This was not a decision adopting the policy of noncooperation with the Government as has wrongly been represented by the enemies of the Muslim League; but on the contrary was intended to urge upon the Government a line of action and policy which they should adopt to secure more effective cooperation in the prosecution of the war. There were two very vital points for which the Committee had been pressing the Government (1) that no constitution either interim or final would be adopted by His Majesty's Government without the approval and consent of Muslim India and (2) that in order to secure genuine and whole-hearted support of the Musalmans, it was imperative that within the framework of the present constitution Muslim India leadership should be associated forthwith as a partner in the Central and provincial Governments. As a result of the negotiations, the Working Committee were glad to state that the first point had been practically met by the statement of His Excellency the Viceroy of 8 August 1940 and the amplification and clarification of that statement by Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, in the course of his speech on 14 August 1940 in Parliament; the Committee also noted with satisfaction that the Government had accepted the principle of the second point urged upon them, namely 'co-operation with authority and power in order to prosecute the war successfully. In view of these circumstances the Working Committee left those Musalmans who might think that they could serve any useful purpose by associating themselves with the War Committees free to do so.

Due to the foregoing policy of the Muslim League on the war effort we deprived ourselves of the claim that we, in contrast with Congress, were contributing our share in the defence of the country. It was my painful duty to oppose Mr. Jinnah's policy in regard to the war effort which, although others may disagree with me, I am morally certain has caused us great loss in leading to our securing only a truncated Pakistan.

Congress by a resolution passed at Wardha on 15 June 1940, after about a week's discussion in the Working Committee, offered to join a National Government to help the war effort of the British Government subject to a promise to concede Independence to India after the war. Most of the stalwart Congress leaders, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Rajagopalachari opposed Gandhiji's stand on non-violence and his opposition to the idea of Congress recruiting soldiers for the British Indian Army. In a public statement on 17 June he made his position clear by writing an article in *Harijan* to this effect. Gandhiji's surprise at the attitude of some of the Congress leaders found expression in another public statement in which he said, 'Rajaji was the framer of the resolution. He was as certain of his position as I was of mine. His persistency, courage and utter humility brought him converts. Sardar Patel was his greatest prize. He would not have even thought of bringing up his resolution, if I had chosen to prevent him. But I give my comrades the same credit for earnestness and self-confidence that I claim myself.'

After the Wardha resolution Gandhiji got himself relieved from the responsibility of guiding the Congress. However much one may differ with Congress policies one cannot but admire its capacity to differ even with Gandhiji on a matter of policy. On the other side Gandhiji's statement indicates how charitably he took the revolt of his colleagues in the Working Committee against his leadership.

Soon after the Wardha resolution the Congress I.C.C. met at Delhi and endorsed it. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad met Sir Sikandar at Delhi on 8 July 1940 to find out the Muslim League point of view. Mr. Jinnah warned Sir Sikandar by a telegram and a Press statement that the provincial Ministers had no authority to come to any understanding with Congress over the head of the Muslim League. I am afraid that someone had misinformed Mr. Jinnah about the nature of the talks between the Maulana and Sir Sikandar else there appeared to be no occasion for the warning, for both of them knew that none but the President of the Muslim League could negotiate terms for

a compromise with the Congress. Sir Sikandar was very much hurt and bitterly complained to me about it when I met him later at Delhi. As a matter of fact some interested groups in the Punjab were making systematic efforts to misrepresent Sir Sikandar to Mr. Jinnah, not realizing what a great disservice they were doing to the cause of Pakistan.

About the same time Maulana Abul Kalam Azad sent a confidential telegram to Mr. Jinnah:

> 'I have read your statement of July 9. The Delhi resolution of the Congress definitely means by National Government a composite Cabinet not limited to any single party. But is it the position of the League that he cannot agree to any provisional arrangement not based on two-nation scheme. If so please clarify by wire.'

This was a telegram from the President of the Congress on a matter on which the League had been insisting on implementation by the British Government and he was quite certain that Mr. Jinnah would send a favourable reply. But his reply was:

> 'I have received your telegram. I cannot reciprocate confidence. I refuse to discuss with you by correspondence or otherwise as you have completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India. Can you not realize you are made a Muslim Show-boy Congress President to give it colour that it is national and deceive foreign countries. You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus. The Congress is a Hindu body. If you have self-respect resign at once. You have done your worst against the League so far. You know you have hopelessly failed. Give it up.'

At the time when Mr. Jinnah used the word 'Show-boy' for the Maulana the Muslim public greatly appreciated it; but that was a passing phase of public opinion and now reading it on paper the language of the telegram does not appear to be particularly polite. Some of the Jamiat Ulema who were opposed to the League policy were truly learned and had rendered great service to Muslim causes and deserved perhaps more patient treatment. It was our misfortune that we could not get them to our side in spite of our best endeavours to convince them of their short-sighted policy. They had lost their prestige in the community for the time being and that was no small matter for them. Again we have to bear in mind that most of them remained in India with fifty million of their brethren in faith to share with them their destiny whatever it might be.

It is equally regrettable that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has retaliated against Mr. Jinnah in *India Wins Freedom* after two decades, showing his own petulance in objecting to the use of

the word Quaid-e-Azam by Gandhiji for Mr. Jinnah. It is well known that Muslims in India had started calling him Quaid-e-Azam and even if Gandhiji had not addressed him as such Mr. Jinnah would not have suffered in popularity and prestige.

Gandhiji had foreseen that the British Government would not promise complete independence to India and when the Viceroy in his statement of 8 August 1940, referred to by me earlier, assured the minorities of the Government's inability to transfer power to any system whose authority was directly denied by large and powerful elements who could not be coerced into submission to such a Government, Gandhiji stood vindicated. From the Congress point of view it was a damper, as a result of which Maulana Abul Kalam Azad refused the invitation of the Viceroy to see him and wrote to him that he did not find any meeting ground in the terms of the declaration of 8 August, where other questions apart there was not even a suggestion of a National Government.

Those who had opposed Gandhiji's views at Wardha and Delhi and later on at Poona and had relieved him of leading the Congress policy went again to seek his advice. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declared that the 'Poona Resolution was dead and gone.' The only course 'left to the nation was to revert to the Ramgarh resolution along with the path of suffering and sacrifice.' Thereafter on 15 September, the All-India Congress met to reconsider the situation and finally declared that the Delhi resolution no longer held the field; it had lapsed.

Gandhiji met the Viceroy on 27 September and claimed the right to dissuade people from joining in the war effort. The Viceroy did not agree to give him that right because in his country a person had the right not to join the army but not the privilege to propagate his views. Gandhiji did not agree with that view. Ultimately individual civil disobedience started from 17 October when Vinoba Bhave offered Satyagraha by repeating the pledge which said, 'It is wrong to help this British war effort with men and money. The only remedy to war is to resist all wars by non-violent resistance.' This Satyagraha was undertaken in the interests of freedom of speech. Pandit Jawaharlal was arrested on 29 October at Cheoki railway station near Allahabad. He was tried for several offences by the Collector of Gorakhpur, Mr. Moss, who sentenced him to four years' imprisonment which horrified even the Muslim Leaguers for in the severity of the sentence they suspected a spirit of revenge. On 17 November Sardar Patel was taken into custody and thus one by one Congressmen started going to jail.

While the Congress civil disobedience was lingering along, the Muslim League was proceeding with the work of extending its hold on the Muslim League organizations in the majority provinces. Muslim speakers had spread out to carry the message of the Muslim League through speeches, pamphlets and personal contacts, impressing upon Muslims the necessity of maintaining unity in their ranks. In the Muslim-majority provinces the League had started making rapid progress in the cities and towns, winning their allegiance directly to the organization, irrespective of and often divergent from the policies pursued by the Muslim Ministers.

In the Muslim League session held on 15 April 1941 at Madras the Pakistan Resolution was incorporated in the Constitution of the All-India Muslim League. Once it became the objective of the League in its Constitution even the change of a comma or full stop was to require a full session of the League. I could not attend this session because a month before I had been invited by Mr. Manzare Alam to preside over a political conference at Ujjain. This States Peoples' Conference at Ujjain was very well attended and Mr. Manzare Alam made a powerful speech as the Chairman of the Reception Committee. I could very well see that his stay in the State could not be long and had not to wait for long to see my fears come true. Manzare Alam was forced out of Gwalior State, went to Aligarh, joined the Muslim League and in due course became a member of the Council of the U.P. League as well as of the All-India Muslim League.

Having come from British India I did not wish to add to the difficulty of the State and in my speech I tried to be as inoffensive as possible. The condition of the States at that time, as already shown, was very precarious. On the one side the Congress was trying to win over States' people to their side while the Government forces were persuading them to agree to accede to the Indian Federation whenever it came. Although the British Government had made a promise to India that the Federal objective had for the time being been dropped, nevertheless the A.G.G.'s were keeping them in good humour to agree to it if the Government policy changed in that behalf.

On my return I had to stop at Cawnpore to join the Conference for which the Cawnpore Muslim League had invited Mr. Jinnah to preside. Cawnpore Muslim League was a very strong League with its leader Dr. Abdus Samad and his colleagues Hasan Ahmad Shah, Nabi Ahmad Khan, Hakim Nawab Ali, Sharifuddin, Mohammad Yaqub, Sufi Mansur Ali, Mr. Mohammad Farooq and many others. In spite of an illness I had to

make a long speech lasting till after midnight, before proceeding to Lucknow. Next morning Col. Clyde operated upon a carbuncle which disabled me from proceeding to Madras, as I was confined to bed for about a month.

To recuperate my health I went to Mussoorie in May 1941 and had hardly been there a fortnight when I received a telegram from Mr. Jinnah to proceed to Dacca to take up the case of a serious riot in that city on 17 March 1941 the case having been started by the Bengal Government under Mr. Fazlul Haq. Five years had elapsed since I had given up my legal profession and made the service of the League my concern in life. I was very diffident to accepting this responsibility; nevertheless I did not wish to disappoint Mr. Jinnah and I went to Dacca, being accompanied from Calcutta by Khwaja Shahabuddin. Mr. Fazlur Rahman who later became Minister of the Pakistan Government and Mr. Razai Karim, a very clever advocate and a most cultured gentleman, were there to help me. I stayed in the historic palace, Ahsan Manzil, where thirty-five years before Lord Curzon had announced the creation of a Muslim province. To represent the Government Babu Sarat Chandra Bose, the elder brother of the late Subash Babu, had been sent from Calcutta.

When the hearing of the case started it was known that there was a chance that the Government might withdraw the case and so after some preliminary questions and answers the court adjourned the case and gave a long date. I returned to Lucknow where some time later I learnt that the case had been withdrawn, which was the fate of almost all the riot cases in India after 1922, for no Muslim would come forward to give evidence against a Muslim in a riot case nor would any Hindu appear to depose against a Hindu. The Privy Council had very scant respect for oral evidence in India and at that time even the Indian courts, in riot cases, were disinclined to believe the allegations of a Hindu against a Muslim or of a Muslim against a Hindu. This was a most disconcerting development in Indian life brought about by the Hindu Sabha, and its effect was disastrous on the judiciary which had been built up in India by the British on most impartial and healthy foundations.

The riot case of village Chandur Biswa, District Khandesh in Berar, C.P., in March 1939 well illustrates the depth to which communal partiality had gripped the minds of some Indian judges. In this, one Jagdev Patel had been killed and the police had arrested all the male Muslim population of the village, including children, on the complaint of Hindus and had subjected them to inhuman methods of torture, resulting in the

death of two detenus. The Session Judge who happened to be a Hindu, relying on the oral evidence of perjured Hindu witnesses, sentenced six Muslims to capital punishment and forty-three to various terms of imprisonment. When the case went up in appeal before the Chief Justice of C.P. sitting with two other judges, he found all the accused 'not guilty' and delivered a remarkable judgment upholding the best traditions of the British judiciary. He found the evidence of the Hindus against these poor Muslims totally concocted, perjured and unworthy of any credit. He did not spare the C.P. Ministers either who had made a statement in the Assembly soon after the riot, throwing the entire responsibility on the Muslims.

On 21 July 1941 the Viceroy informed Mr. Jinnah through the Governor of Bombay that he had nominated Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Sir Mohammad Saadullah, Mr. Fazlul Haq, Nawab Chhatari and Sir Sultan Ahmad as members of the National Defence Council representing the Muslims. Mr. Jinnah reacted immediately against this action of the Viceroy and called upon the Muslim nominees to offer explanations, and also called a meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee at Bombay for 24 August 1941 to deal with the situation. It was generally felt that Sir Sikandar would refuse to follow the Muslim League policy if called upon to resign from the Defence Council. Support for this view came from a fighting speech which Sir Sikandar had made on 11 March 1941 :

'And let us above all show to the rest of India, that we in the Punjab stand united and will not brook any interference from whatever quarter it may be attempted. Then and then only we will be able to tell meddling busybodies from outside "hands off the Punjab." '

I had gone to the meeting very dejected and apprehensive of the consequences, although I had come to know in the morning that Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikandar had been talking together about the matter till late at night. The meeting, which started with serious forebodings in the minds of all present, opened with the reading of the notice that had been served on the Muslim members of the Defence Council by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and immediately I asked him under what rule or resolution of the Muslim League the notice had been issued; for the Muslim League had, by its resolution No. 5 of 31 August 1940, allowed every individual to join the war effort. Before the Nawabzada could open his lips Mr. Jinnah intervening said, 'Let us hear what Sir Sikandar has to say about it.' To my great surprise and jubilation, Sir Sikandar said, 'I am in the hands of this

Committee and will abide by its decision whatever it may be.' Everyone was dumbfounded, including myself. The discussion on this subject was dropped for the time being and we passed over to other subsidiary matters.

Both Nawab Ismail Khan and myself took our lunch with Sir Nazimuddin at the Taj and behind us was Sir Sikandar's table where many of his friends of the Punjab Assembly were also taking their lunch. After finishing his lunch Sir Sikandar came to me and Nawab Ismail Khan and whispered in our ears not to go away without seeing him in his room. There he asked Maqbool Mahmood, his secretary and brother-in-law, to show us the signed pledges, numbering seventy-three, of the Punjab Assembly members assuring Sir Sikandar that in case he resigned from the Muslim League they would follow him. Thereafter Sir Sikandar had a telephone conversation with Fazlul Haq, in our presence, in which he told him that he had decided to resign from the Defence Council and asked him to follow suit. Fazlul Haq wanted time to consider it, but from his talk Sir Sikandar gathered that he was not playing the game. He then dictated a letter to the Viceroy, expressing his inability to serve on the National Defence Council because the Viceroy had represented to him that he was to be included in that Council as the Premier of the Punjab but had written to Mr. Jinnah that he was included as a representative of his community. He signed the letter in our presence and gave it to Maqbool Mahmood to be posted. We left his room after the letter had been dispatched.

The reason which Sir Sikandar gave to the Viceroy for his resignation was obviously not very convincing but was meant to keep up the prestige of the League in the eyes of the British Government as well as Congress. How it pains me to find that in certain quarters he is remembered only as a Unionist.

Along with Sir Sikandar, Sir Mohammad Saadullah also resigned from the National Defence Council. When the Working Committee met again next day it decided to give ten days to Fazlul Haq to consider the matter and authorized the President to take such action as he considered appropriate in case of his refusal. Nawab Chhatari had been offered the Prime Ministership of Hyderabad State and had indicated his mind to resign, so no action was taken against him. Sir Sultan Ahmad was expelled for five years from the Muslim League.

In its meeting held on 27 October 1941 the Muslim League considered the letter from Mr. Fazlul Haq tendering his resignation from the Working Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League. Briefly in his letter, dated 8 September,

to the Secretary of the Muslim League he brought forward in his defence the following charges against the Muslim League organization:

'1. That the action of the President was unconstitutional in the highest degree.

2. The Working Committee endorsed the action of the President, because they had no other alternative before them. If they had refused to ratify the President's action it would have amounted to a vote of no confidence in the President and this contingency the Working Committee were not prepared to face.

3. He made an emphatic protest against the manner in which the interests of the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab were being imperilled by Muslim leaders of the provinces where the Muslims were in a minority.

4. The President of the All-India Muslim League had signally failed to discharge the heavy responsibility of his office, in a constitutional and reasonable manner.

5. That principles of democracy and autonomy were being subordinated to the arbitrary wishes of a single individual who sought to rule as an omnipotent authority over the destiny of thirty-three million Muslims in the province of Bengal, who occupied a key position in Indian Muslim politics.'

The Working Committee gave ten days to Mr. Fazlul Haq to withdraw the charges and offer such explanation as he might think fit, failing which necessary action would be taken against him. In the meeting of the Working Committee on 16 November 1941, the second letter of Mr. Fazlul Haq dated 14 November was considered. He briefly stated 'that he had been always a loyal member of the League, had never hesitated to carry out its mandate and once a decision was constitutionally adopted by it, never hesitated to obey it, even though that decision might not personally commend itself to him. If there were any doubt in regard to this point his resignation from the National Defence Council amply proved it.' Further, he regretted that some portions of his letter had hurt the feelings of the President and some of his other friends.

The question before the meeting was whether this letter should be accepted as an apology. I pleaded for him in spite of his accusation against the Muslim Leaguers of the minority provinces of forcing their views on the Punjab and Bengal. This was the only occasion when votes were taken by a show of hands in the Muslim League and out of thirteen members, including the President, seven backed my proposal and the letter was accepted as an apology. The President did not vote.

I was invited that year by Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung to attend the meeting in Hyderabad of the *Ittehadul Muslimeen* of which

he was the President. I went there and attended the Conference. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung belonged to a very high family of Hyderabad. He was possessed of considerable organizing capacity and in spite of serious pressure brought on him from time to time by His Exalted Highness the Nizam he carried on his work of organization not only amongst the Muslims of Hyderabad but also amongst those of other States, giving them life and vigour. But all his other qualities of head and heart were overshadowed by his oratorical gifts. During the Khilafat days Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Maulana Abdul Majid Badauni were our best platform speakers, the former more thoughtful and the latter more fiery, but the subjects with which they had to deal and the programme of struggle against the British which they had to support gave them additional advantage to keep the public mind enthused. On the contrary Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung had to speak on a far more complicated and intellectual subject which hindered the natural flow of language. But by his sweet effective delivery, extraordinary command of language and his knowledge of Muslim history and theology he used to keep the people enraptured for hours. In the Muslim League sessions he spoke generally when regular proceedings were over and gave added charm to their conclusion.

In November 1941, Sir Francis Mudie, Chief Secretary of the U.P., with whom I had by now become very friendly, one day telephoned to me to suggest I should meet the Viceroy. I replied I had never felt the necessity for such a meeting, not being in the habit of hovering round the Viceregal Lodge; besides I did not know what purpose it would serve. He said, 'You know that some of the Muslim League resolutions passed recently have not been well received in Government of India circles and I am sure your visit will be fruitful to your cause of Pakistan.' I therefore agreed. A week later another telephone call from him gave the news that he had already made arrangements with the Secretary of the Viceroy and now I had only to write formally for an interview. I wrote a letter as advised and was invited to meet the Viceroy on 29 November 1941.

However, as I had already learnt from Mr. Mudie that the Viceroy had been considerably aggravated by the war policy of the Muslim League, particularly with their having forced Sir Sikandar to resign from the National Defence Council, I went fully prepared to justify our policy and programme. Acting on the principle that the offensive is the best defence I started with His Excellency by telling him that there was a growing suspicion in the League circles that he was very much dissatisfied

with the Muslim League and did not find any difference between the League and the Congress policy towards the British Government particularly in regard to the war effort. As I expected he said that was not true. I said nevertheless I wished to inform His Excellency that the present Muslim League, in view of the changed conditions in the country, could not afford to follow the old line of policy of the landlord regime which had relied for its strength on the support of British civil and police officials of their district and had had no independent existence of its own. The obvious result was that its prestige among its own people followed the ebb and tide of British strength judged by their capacity to resist the Congress demands. Then within the last two decades so many inconsistent and contradictory statements of policy towards India had been made by the British Government that we had been obliged to develop our own strength, which we could never have gathered if we had been hovering round the bungalows of the District Magistrates and had not realized as a people the value of self-reliance. Whenever we had differed from the British policy it had been to safeguard our own interests rather than to impede the war effort. My interview lasted for about an hour during which I felt that I was talking to a wall. However, I went on in the same strain in which I had begun. When I ended and rose to go he only said, 'You have put your case very moderately and very cleverly. I shall remember what you have said.' Before I left the Viceregal Lodge I had a few minutes' talk with Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

I hardly thought that I should ever meet Sir Gilbert again but it did happen. More than twelve years after, Sir Gilbert, who was at the time the High Commissioner of U.K. in Karachi, came to stay with me at Dacca in December 1953, when I was Governor of East Bengal and we talked about India of the pre-partition days, of the effects of partition, and the world situation. I told him of my intention to write my memoirs. On his return to Karachi he wrote to me a very pleasant letter encouraging me to do so.

'United Kingdom High Commission,
Karachi,
17th January, 1934.

My dear Mr. Khaleeq,

May I send my cordial and sincere thanks to your Excellency not only for your generous hospitality to Bottomly and myself for which we are both deeply grateful but for our most interesting conversation. None in this country has your unequalled knowledge of past political events in which your own part has been

so prominent and distinguished and your book to which I greatly look forward will be a real contribution to the political history of the sub-continent and to the reading of the circumstances in which Pakistan came into being.

I am most grateful for the efficiency of your Government for their unfailing courtesy and kindness which have enabled me to cover so much ground and see so much of interest in such a short time.

Every good wish again to you and to East Bengal for further consistent progress.

Yours sincerely,
G. Laithwaite.'

Mr. Rajagopalachari came to Lucknow to deliver the Convocation Address at the Lucknow University on 3 December 1941. He sent word to me that he would like to come and see me. Poor Rajaji had to climb three stories to meet me along with Babu Mohan Lal Saxena as I was suffering from fever and could not go down. After some general talk I reminded him of the objective of the Congress *vis-a-vis* Hindu-Muslim Unity which had been accepted at the Bezwada session of the Congress in 1920 and regretfully pointed out to him that instead of achieving that objective we had drifted far apart. In examining the question, I reminded him, one had to bear in mind that the Muslims were a minority, and a minority everywhere in the wide world required and demanded safeguards for their protection, while a majority because of its own strength should make no demands on them such as that for their utter subservience which would be undignified and unreasonable for any majority to impose. Congress since Bezwada had gone back on its policy of correlating the freedom of India with Hindu-Muslim Unity. Experiences gained during the civil disobedience movements of 1931 and 1933 and the present one undertaken in the name of freedom of speech ought to have been enough, I said, to convince Congress of the utter futility of fighting the British with a vast section of Muslims looking upon Congress movements with suspicion and distrust. The Pakistan movement was the inevitable result of a feeling in the Muslim community that independence of the country secured by one section of the people was bound to result in an overbearing and pugnacious attitude of the majority towards other sections in every phase of life in a free India. It was this acrimony existing between the two communities which had encouraged Mr. Churchill to make the announcement in Parliament on the scope and application of the Atlantic Charter, excluding India from its purview. Here Babu

Mohan Lal Saxena wanted to interrupt me, when Rajaji intervening said, 'There is much truth in what Khaliq says. The fight through civil disobedience without Hindu-Muslim unity could not bring us near our goal.' Thereafter we reviewed the past for a few minutes more and then he departed. Rajaji is a man of few words. He speaks little but when he does speak he is always original and stimulating.

News was carried to the city that I had won over Rajaji for Pakistan. Pakistan came in the talk only casually but the questions discussed between us were far wider than merely one issue. At page 290 of his *Congress History* Mr. Sitaramayya writes, 'Mr. Rajagopalachari was reported in private conversations in Lucknow to have made a rather detailed exposition of his stand in regard to non-violence as applicable to the present political situation.' I do not know whether Mr. Sitaramayya knew of my relations with Rajagopalachari and his visit to my house and my talk with him on that occasion.

I held a League conference in Lucknow in November 1949, and invited Nawab Shah Nawaz of Mamdot, President of the Punjab Muslim League, to preside over this gathering. Lalbagh ground was again chosen for the holding of this conference. All Muslim League stalwarts, Ehsanur Rahman Qidwai, Maulana Jamal Mian, Ayub Qureshi, Salim Qureshi, Nawab Shamsul Hasan, Mustansarullah, Badaruzzaman, Nasim Qureshi, Abdul Wahid Khan, Mushfiquzzaman, Mahmud Sulaiman, son of Sir Shah Sulaiman the Chief Justice of Allahabad and a great scientist, were determined to make the conference a success. Students, led by Shaikh Ali Raza, Akbar Mirza and Mehdi Masood Raza of Firangi Mahal and Mohammad Abdullah, were working hard for the success of the conference. Now for the Muslim League conference the only work left was to reiterate the demand for Pakistan which was done in this very well-attended conference. The Hindu Sabha lodged a protest against the Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, Mr. Lloyd, for having allowed the Muslim League procession when only a month before he had disallowed a Hindu procession. As a compromise a Hindu procession was also allowed, which was taken out with great show and enthusiasm but resulted in a small riot in which one Muslim was killed.

About the middle of April 1941 I was invited by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani to preside over a conference at Barpeta, a sub-division in Assam, this being held for the purpose of protesting against the Line System which had been imposed by the Government since 1908 with a view to keeping away

immigrants from Mymensingh, a district in Bengal having six million population. The pressure on the land in this district of Bengal was so great that the overflowing population was moving to Assam in large numbers by crossing over the Brahmaputra river dividing Bengal from Assam. Mr. Abdul Matin Choudhri who was the leader of the Muslim League in Assam, not being himself a good speaker or a man of the masses, relied upon Maulana Bhashani to supply this deficiency in the Assam League armoury. The local leader Mr. Rauf of Barpeta, although a very sensible man, suffered from the same drawback as Matin Choudhri. The Maulana spoke in the conference in perfect oratorical style. I could only guess at the trend of his speech, not being conversant with the Bengali language myself, but he seemed to be emitting fire and warming up the illiterate masses to fever heat. From then until 1946 I had to go to Assam practically every year to agitate against the Line System.

I have already mentioned my association with Aligarh University as well as of my visit there in 1937, soon after I had taken up the fight with the Congress, sincerely believing that without the help and association of the Aligarh students my struggle against the Congress would not bear fruit. The response had been not only encouraging but stupendous. In due course not only did a University Muslim League organization come into existence, but also a separate Student's League was formed under the presidentship of Noman Zuberi, son of Mohammad Ameen Zuberi, a well-known author and an authority on the history and progress of the Aligarh movement.

Noman arranged to hold a Muslim student convention at Nagpur in December 1941 over which Mr. Jinnah presided. A meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee had also been called there by the President. In this meeting Mr. Jinnah informed me that Sir Sikandar was very angry with me for having passed some remarks against him in connection with the occupation of Iran by the British forces. I told him that I had had no intention of injuring his feelings and would take the earliest opportunity to remove the misunderstanding. Soon after my return to Lucknow I wrote to Sir Sikandar about it and he accepted my explanation. As no new situation had arisen, the Working Committee at this meeting passed a resolution reminding the Government once again of the political stand of the Muslim League.

I had been mainly responsible for the resolution of 16 November 1941 accepting Mr. Fazlul Haq's letter as an apology. Nevertheless he lost the confidence of his colleagues and the Muslim

public of Bengal, so much so that a demonstration was organized against him in Calcutta and a violent clash between two Muslim groups was narrowly averted. When the legislature met at the end of November 1941 a new party bearing the name of the Progressive Coalition Party came into existence and this included many of Mr. Fazlul Haq's supporters, Forward Bloc and other minor elements. Mr. Fazlul Haq continued to deny for a time that he was inclined to join the new party but ultimately he went back on his promise and on 16 December 1941 the formation of a new Ministry was announced. The Ministry consisted of nine members, five Muslims including the Premier, and four Hindus. Among the four Hindus two were from the Forward Bloc, one a representative of the scheduled castes and Dr. Shyama Prashad Mukerji, Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, as the Finance Minister. Dr. Mukerji was the President of the Bengal Branch of Hindu Mahasabha and had been recently at loggerheads with Fazlul Haq.

The fact that members of the Forward Bloc had been included in the Ministry was still more surprising. Its leader Mr. Subash Chandra Bose had been arrested in the summer of 1940 for having provoked disturbances in Calcutta and in the following January, while he was on temporary release for reasons of health, he had made his way to Japan in disguise. His brother was arrested on 16 December on the charge of having contact with the Japanese. These arrests were made by the Fazlul Haq Government and yet within two months of Sarat Bose's arrest two members of his party were included in the Fazlul Haq Cabinet. While Mr. Fazlul Haq was continuing to hold office against the wishes of the Muslim League, the shock of his life came in the Nadia election where the Muslim League secured 10,843 votes against his party's 840. The Fazlul Haq Ministry was shaken to its very core but continued to hang on to Dr. Mukerji for some time more.

The Council of the Muslim League in its meeting on 22 February 1942 condemned Mr. Fazlul Haq for having become merely a puppet in the hands of the Hindu Mahasabha. The Muslim community of students of Bengal with Mr. Fazlul Qadir Choudhri, a most energetic and dynamic worker, was also alienated from him. The Muslim League leaders Sir Nazimuddin, Shaheed Suhrawardy, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Mohan Mian, Nurul Amin, Fazlur Rahman, Tamizuddin Khan, Khwaja Shahabuddin, Hamidul Haq Choudhri, Hasan Ispahani, Nuruddin, Maulana Akram Khan and Mohammad Ali Choudhri were the main pillars of the Muslim League both inside and outside the legislature in campaigning

to bring down the Haq Ministry. K. B. Momin, a retired Commissioner of Bengal, had also joined the League and was twice elected as a Joint Secretary of the Central League.

XXIV

COUPLAND REPORT AND CRIPPS MISSION

1942

THE individual civil disobedience started by Gandhiji was not making any headway. I am inclined to believe that Gandhiji had begun this form of Satyagraha to save the Congress from disruption, as since the outbreak of war he had not been inclined to create difficulties for the British Government, but when after the Wardha resolution he was relieved of the responsibility of leading Congress and then subsequently at Poona Congress reversed the decisions taken at Wardha and Delhi, he had to steer a midway course to reconcile both groups, namely those who had outvoted him in the Working Committee at Wardha and those who had followed his lead at the time, and that midway course took the direction of resorting to individual civil disobedience. Gandhiji himself must have foreseen that if that form of Satyagraha undertaken in 1932, when there was no war, had to be given up in 1934, there was little chance of success for a movement of the same type when amongst other forces against it there was the Muslim League, now a powerful organization whose adherents would give it no support. There were many Congressmen also who were dissatisfied and disappointed with this form of Satyagraha. Dr. Satyapal of Punjab, a hero of the Amritsar tragedy and an ex-member of the Working Committee of Congress, resigned his membership on 14 July 1941 and in his statement he said that he was extremely disappointed with the inactivity and inertia that dominated the Congress policy at that moment. After dealing with the dangers with which India was faced, in respect of internal security and the danger of foreign invasion, he said that the offer of his services to the Government was a token help to the British so that we might be saved from the evil fate of foreign invasion. He also charged that a number of breaches of nonco-operation rules had been committed by leaders of the Satyagraha movement in the

Punjab and proceeded to add that he was not a Satyagrahi and had no faith in that movement. Mr. K. F. Nariman, also an ex-member of the Working Committee who had genuinely served Congress, taunted the Congress for its treatment of Subash Bose and ridiculed the movement. As a matter of fact it was freely discussed amongst Congressmen that the prolonging of Satyagraha was like flogging a dead horse. Mr. Rajagopalachari also was not keen upon the continuance of Satyagraha and had doubts about its efficacy or even its appropriateness at this particular juncture. Bhulabhai Desai and Rajagopalachari had long discussions with Gandhiji trying to persuade him to end the movement.

While things stood thus, the Government by a Press communique announced that civil disobedience prisoners whose offences had been formal or symbolic in character might be set free, including Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad who were forthwith released. This disclosed the confidence of the Government in the futility of the Satyagraha movement and faith in its own strength to deal with the situation if and when it became necessary. Besides the atmosphere in the country amongst all sections of the people in view of the threatening Japanese menace, which had reached the borders of India to the extent that air raid sirens in Calcutta had to announce the peril, called for peaceful conditions in India. Nevertheless on his release Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru issued a statement declaring his adherence to his policy. Gandhiji, while asking the Congress President to hold a meeting of the Working Committee, advised the members of the A.I.C.C. and of the Working Committee not to court arrest pending the decision of the Congress on future policy.

When the Working Committee met on 23 December 1941, at Bardoli, it expressed its appreciation of Gandhiji's leadership and went on to declare:

> 'While there has been no change in Britain's policy towards India, the Working Committee must nevertheless take into full consideration the new world situation that has arisen by the development of the war into a world conflict and its approach to India. The sympathies of the Congress must inevitably lie with the peoples who are the subject of aggression and who are fighting for their freedom, but only free and independent India can be in a position to undertake defence of the country on a national basis and be of help in the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the storm of war.'

The Working Committee amended the Independence Day pledge by deleting portions relating to individual civil disobedience.

This change of attitude of India towards the British war situation encouraged members of the Labour Party in the House of Commons to convey to the Indian people the sincerity of purpose of the British Government to confer real self-government and dominion status on India at the end of the war. Lord Hailey in the debate in the House of Lords asked what place was to be assigned to the Indian States and 'were we now to agree at the instance of the Muslims, to divide up united India?' There was, he said, compelling urgency to end political differences and attempt some form of reconciliation if the war effort was not to be seriously impaired. He asked: 'Is it not possible that the position could be readjusted by making the provinces themselves constituent units of construction in the Central Legislature?' The Duke of Devonshire, representing the Government in the House of Lords, in his speech in reply to the debate said: 'The Muslim League seems definitely to be growing in power and influence and at the moment the power of the Congress Party is diminishing. The claim of the Congress Party is contested and always will be contested by the great Muslim community.' The truth is that such statements as the one made by the Duke of Devonshire from the British side gave added weight to the Muslim League and its leadership and we would not be honest to ourselves if we did not recognize this fact.

In early February 1942 I received a telephone call from H. E. Sir Maurice Hallett, that he had brought with him from Allahabad Professor Coupland to discuss the political situation in the country with me and whether next day I would come to the Government House to have a talk with the Professor. I at once expressed my thanks to him for arranging this meeting. Professor Coupland had been awarded a scholarship by the Nuffield Trust and had been sent to India to study the Indian constitutional documents of the past, survey the conditions of the present and the future constitution and report the results of his inquiry. I had five hours' meeting with him. On one occasion during the talk he asked, if the Hindu-Muslim relations were so acute and unbridgeable, why then had the demand for partition come so late as the year 1940 while the British had laid the foundations of their administrative system on democracy ever since the Mutiny. I replied that in all fairness to the Muslims they could not be held responsible for the lethargic and indolent mentality of the British people who had lived from day to day deciding matters as they came before them, without taking into account the effect of those decisions a decade or two later. Having accepted Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan as the Muslim leader of India and having

nominated him as such to represent his community in the Viceroy's Council they should have taken a more serious note of what he had said in his speech on 16 January 1883, only twenty-three years after the establishment of British rule in India. It should not surprise him if I said that the two main contentions, firstly regarding a geographical term being used in the political sense that India is a continent or sub-continent, and secondly that India had more than one *Qaum* or people, were not the creation of Mr. Jinnah or any one of us in the Muslim League but had been urged by that great man, Sir Sayed, while defending the nomination of a certain number of Municipal representatives as against the Hindu proposal of total representation by election. If the British had failed to take notice of such a clear pronouncement on the subject of Hindu-Muslim relations they could not turn round now and tell us that the demand for partition had come very late in the day. Besides, following the policy of his leader Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, his successor in office, Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, on the occasion of the Simla Deputation to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, in October 1906, had claimed separate electorates and weightage for Muslims; and these had been conceded in 1909 by no less liberal a politician than Lord Morley and were subsequently also accepted by Congress in the Hindu-Muslim Pact of 1916 which formed the basis of the 1919 Constitution. Was it not for the British to see then where the Muslims were leading them to and why had they not realized the significance of separate electorates which was unknown in a democratic constitution?

With British power and prestige so strongly rooted in the soil, such safeguards for the protection of the minority against the oppression of a majority in the Legislature and in local bodies with an official bloc were considered by their leaders quite sufficient. However, by the time of the first Round Table Conference in London, the Muslims had lost faith in the capacity of the British Government to continue to govern India for long, after having seen the continuous changes in policy, particularly during the term of Lord Irwin. They not only insisted thereafter on the separation of Sind from Bombay as a separate province and the grant of full provincial status to the N.W.F.P. but also demanded the introduction of a federal constitution for India as the first step to separation at such time as a suitable opportunity might arise. After the experience gained by them of the mockery of provincial autonomy in the Congress provinces they lost all faith in British democratic institutions and even in the federal objective because of the power of a hostile majority

to nullify every attempt of the Muslims to secure the safeguard of their interests in the country and they finally decided to ask for partition. In the Parliamentary Committee report in 1934 it is definitely stated that the Muslims demanded the separation of Sind from Bombay and its creation into a separate province to counterbalance the number of Hindu provinces. The British Government ought to have seen what counter-balancing meant. He could not deny that it did include partition also. In the face of all this past history he was surely not justified in saying 'Why the demand for Pakistan in 1940?' In the five hours' talk so many other things were discussed but this was the most crucial point and I thought I had placed before him incontrovertible facts on the issue.

A few days later Nawab Chhatari came to see me and asked me what I had told Professor Coupland that he talked very highly of me to Sir Maurice Hallett and thought that no one whom he had met in India had explained the Pakistan claim so thoroughly. Sir Francis Mudie telephoned to me a few days later, to find out whether I had the speech of Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan to which I had made reference in my talk with Professor Coupland and if so whether I could send it to him. I replied in the affirmative and he sent Mr. Wahajuddin Abbasi who was at that time Secretary in the Information Department of U.P., to get it from me. It was in Urdu and was translated in the Secretariat of U.P. to be sent to Professor Coupland in Delhi.

It may surprise many people as to why some high British officials were out to help the cause of Pakistan but the reason was quite understandable. Whatever may have been the attitude of British officials in India prior to the 1935 Government of India Act, thereafter they had begun to lose faith in themselves and in the object and purpose of their Government. They did not know the basic policy on which they had to carry on their local administration: was it to be mainly in the interest of the majority which claimed to represent the nation or had it to protect the minority which disputed its claim, or was it to be in the interest of their own country which by now appeared to them to have ceased to think of India in terms of an Empire? In this predicament they were more confounded than the people themselves. Generally their sympathy in U.P. lay with the Muslims but there were many who went to the other extreme.

My reference to the speech of Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan had made so much impression on Professor Coupland that he has made it a part of his Report as Appendix I in Part III and I hope the reader will bear to read a few passages from it. The Bill

referred to in the speech of Sir Sayed was a Bill for providing the method of elections for the Municipalities.

'My Lord, I intend to vote in favour of the passing of this Bill, but, in explanation of my vote, I am anxious, with your Lordship's permission, to make a few observations on some features of this Bill. My Lord, I am one of those who believe that the success of local self-government will, in a great measure, depend upon the amount of independent power to be conferred upon the local boards and the district councils. . . . I rejoice to feel that I have lived long enough to see the inauguration of the day when India is to learn at the hands of her rulers those principles of self-help and self-government which have given birth to representative institutions in England, and have made her great among the nations of the world. My Lord, I sincerely believe that all the intelligent classes throughout India sympathize with the feelings which I have expressed, that they feel grateful to the Government for the privileges which the scheme of local self-government will confer upon them, and that the effect of those privileges will be to enhance the popularity of the British rule, and to inspire the feelings of loyalty and devotion among the vast population of British India. The more real those privileges are, the more beneficial will be the result.

Having such views and feelings as these, I cannot possibly have sympathy with those who deprecate the withdrawal of Government from the direct management of local funds and local affairs; and it is natural for me to wish, as a matter of principle, that the local boards and the district councils should consist, as far as possible, of persons whom the voice of the people has elected as their representatives. But, my Lord, I feel that I am not acting inconsistently with my feelings and views in cordially supporting those provisions of this Bill which reserve to Government the power of appointing one-third of the members of the local boards and district councils. I am convinced that no part of India has yet arrived at the stage when the system of representation can be adopted, in the fullest scope, even in regard to local affairs. The principle of self-government by means of representative institutions is perhaps the greatest and noblest lesson which the beneficence of England will teach India. But, in borrowing from England the system of representative institutions, it is of the greatest importance to remember those socio-political matters in which India is distinguishable from England. The present socio-political condition of India is the outcome of the history of centuries of despotism and misrule, of dominancy of race over race, of religion over religion. The traditions and feelings of the people and their present economic and political conditions are in a vast measure influenced and regulated by the history of the past; the humanizing effects of the British rule have not yet demolished the remembrance of the days of strife and discord which preceded the peace brought to India by the British supremacy. *India, a continent in itself is inhabitated by vast populations of different races and different creeds*: the rigour of religious institutions has kept even neighbours apart:

the system of caste is still dominant and powerful. In one and the same district the population may consist of various creeds and various nationalities, and whilst one section of the population commands wealth and commerce, the other may possess learning and influence. One section may be numerically larger than the other, and the standard of enlightenment which one section of the community has reached may be far higher than that attained by the rest of the population. One community may be fully alive to the importance of securing representation on the local boards and district councils, whilst the other may be wholly indifferent to such matters. . . .

Under these circumstances, it is hardly possible to deny that the introduction of representative institutions in India will be attended with considerable difficulty and socio-political risks. In a country like England, where the distinctions of race no longer exist, where the differences of sectarianism in religious matters have been mitigated by the advance of toleration, the matter does not present such difficulty. . . .

I have dwelt upon this matter at such length in order to explain why I, a sincere admirer of the representative system, have given my cordial support to such provisions of this Bill as appear to militate against the system of election, pure and simple. Government, in reserving to itself the power of appointing one-third of the members of the local boards and district councils, is adopting the only measure which can be adopted to guarantee the success of local self-government, by securing and maintaining that due and just balance in the representation of the various sections of the Indian population which the system of election, pure and simple, would fail to achieve.'

This speech was delivered almost sixty years before it came under discussion between Professor Coupland and me; but in content, appropriateness and vigour it appeared as fresh as if delivered a day previously. If foresight and vision are the crowning jewels of leadership, Sir Sayed himself amongst leaders of Muslim India answers the test.

Although after my talks with Professor Coupland, I met Sir Maurice Hallett several times before he retired in 1946 he never made any reference to that occasion. In 1947, however, he wrote to me a letter from England after reading my speech in the Constituent Assembly of India on the question of 'Flag', which contained Professor Coupland's views about my talk with him:

'Ashdene,
St. Giles Hill,
Winchester (Hants),
27-7-1947.

My dear Chaudhry Saheb,

I have meant to write to you for some time to congratulate you on the attainment of your object—Pakistan. I know how

whole-heartedly you have striven for the object and what work you have done, yourself rather behind the scene. If I am not giving away an old matter, may I tell you how very favourably you impressed Professor Coupland when you met him at the Government House, Lucknow? You had a prolonged interview with him and after the interview Professor Coupland thought that you argued the case for Pakistan far better than anyone else, he had met. I made a point of getting him to Lucknow to meet you and others when he first came to stay with me at Allahabad. I felt that in that Centre, he merely heard the Congress and the Liberal point of view and there was not much difference between the views of the Congress and the Liberals. I felt he must hear the Muslim point of view and so I got him to come to Lucknow and meet you with results which were, I think, on the whole satisfactory. Professor Coupland, even if you did not like his compromise, did much to make people here in England realize the strength of the Muslim feelings. Now I am most interested to hear how things will go for the Muslims in the Indian Provinces. I was glad to see that *The Times* quoted today a speech which you had made in the Constituent Assembly in support of the Congress Flag, which I am glad to see has dropped the Charkha and taken the old emblem of the Ashoka wheel. You are reported as saying that you hoped that people would forget the bitterness of the recent months and would work jointly to carve out new history for a land in which every one would enjoy a place of respect. I fully share your hope. There are plenty of most difficult economic problems both in India and all over the world and they can only be solved by joint action and co-operation. I sincerely hope there will be this co-operation in U.P. I know you and the Muslims are prepared to co-operate. I trust the Congress will not be led by extremist Hindus or by the left wing, to refuse your co-operation. If they do accept, the U.P. will make rapid progress and the people will be free from fear and free from want.

I send you all my best wishes and wish prosperity and well-being to the Muslims specially there in the United Provinces. I am confident you will make a success of Pakistan. God bless you all.

Yours very sincerely,
Maurice Hallett.'

Besides referring in this letter to the impression which I left on Professor Coupland, Sir Maurice Hallett has also used a very significant phrase, viz. 'yourself rather behind the scene,' which at least indicates his surprise at my shyness of Press propaganda. I do not find this extraordinary because a few years later my son Jamaluzzaman who was in England for his studies wrote to me in 1950, 'A Press and camera-shy politician like you should never have been in politics.' I accept the charge for I had a natural aversion to the limelight and appeared in the Press only when it was absolutely unavoidable. How can I

explain the pleasure which one gets from the success of his political aspirations whichever name they may be associated with.

But at the time of my talk with Professor Coupland and also in subsequent years the requirements of the situation had further added to my temperamental disabilities. Since 8 February 1936, when I entered into a pact with Mr. Jinnah not to set up candidates from the Unity Board platform and to leave the entire field to the Muslim League, I willingly surrendered whatever political status I had to Mr. Jinnah, because I had been feeling for the previous few years that in the Congress fold with overwhelming numbers of Hindu communalists there was no regard or sympathy for Muslim rights and claims, and a strong Muslim organization had therefore become a paramount necessity. Ever since then I tried to exert all my energies to add to his popularity as the only leader of Muslim India who could be their accredited spokesman and to that end it was necessary for all of us to accept his views and directions without questioning. It became all the more necessary after we had made a demand for the partition of India in 1940; for without discipline in our ranks and unity in our organization there was grave danger of Congress succeeding in its attempt to coerce the British to reject our demand. Although the phrase in the Pakistan resolution 'with such territorial readjustment' was contrary to my cherished views I never proclaimed my opposition to it for the fear that once a rift in our ranks started even the truncated Pakistan might be lost. My opposition to the war policy of Mr. Jinnah, related in the foregoing pages, brought some unpleasantness in my relations with him but beyond ventilating my views in the Working Committee of the Muslim League I never made them known publicly or even to some of my dear friends and colleagues.

Professor Coupland was later associated with the work of the Cripps Mission in Delhi and following its failure he appears to have continued his work independently. His report, in three volumes, is a monumental work in pleasant language, laudably objective in approach and abundantly fair in criticism and remarks. Any unbiased observer will find in it most useful material for understanding and appreciating the cross-currents of Indian politics during the crucial period of the pre-freedom decade. To a student of history it would be interesting to read a few remarks he made on the reaction of the Muslims to the Congress Government.

Professor Coupland's report was published in October 1943

coinciding with the arrival of Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India. He did not recommend partition of India but pleaded for regional States as intermediate bodies between provinces and the centre and suggested the Swiss system of elections for India. Speaking before a gathering in England, he frankly stated that the solution to the Indian problem was possible 'only on the basis of the acceptance by the Congress of Pakistan in some form or other.' Further, he said that the Government of India Act of 1935 was dead and no further advance could be made in that direction. The Act was based on two wrong assumptions, namely that India is a nation, whereas the truth is she is not a nation; secondly that Parliamentary Government was possible in India. Both these assumptions, he said, must be abandoned immediately.

Characterizing the present deadlock in India as mainly communal, he remarked:

> 'Stupidity of Congress was the cause of the growth of the Muslim League and its growing power. In fact the Congress made the Muslim League a great power. After the election of 1937 "drunk with victory" the Congress went for complete power and decided to smash the Muslim League in the U.P. It gave an ultimatum to the League to merge itself with the Congress, threatening that there would be only Congress Government in the Province. It then started the mass contact movement to bring the illiterate Muslim masses within its fold.'

I really fail to understand how Professor Coupland after having said all this could persuade himself to recommend anything else except a clean-cut partition of the country. How could he believe that regional States would work when the provinces within the region would almost certainly fail to work the Constitution in the spirit in which it could prove to be useful, the communal parties being divided as before? It is no use now going into a detailed discussion of the weakness and shortcomings of Professor Coupland's proposals. Nevertheless he has been generally very fair in his conclusions on all the complicated questions which were facing the country at that time. His analysis of the Indian situation proved a great help in providing a true background to the Pakistan demand in England.

After the debacle of France, the Nazi pincer movement had assumed dangerous proportions. Not only was Africa threatened but Turkish neutrality had begun to shake and the air raids in England night after night had put the doggedness and tenacity of the British people to a severe test. Such were the

conditions when it was announced on 9 February 1942 that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek had come to consult the Government of India and in particular the Commander-in-Chief on matters of common concern to China and India. In those days Chiang Kai-Shek was the idol of Congress and Jawaharlal and Maulana Azad had several interviews with him. Banquets, dinners and interviews were heaped on the Generalissimo and he was taken from place to place, sometimes Jawaharlal accompanying him, as the Great Man of China who, according to the great poet Tagore, personified the indomitable spirit of 'deathless China'. Chiang Kai-Shek had come to India in the hope that he would be able to persuade Congress to help the war effort unconditionally. He met Gandhiji at Calcutta but could not move him to alter his opinion on non-violence. Mr. Jinnah also met him at Calcutta but the interview was very short for there was not much to talk about between them. This was a period when the Japanese peril was on everybody's mind both in India and in England, particularly in view of the fact that the Indian armies had been sent outside India to fight in different sectors and the armed forces left in India were comparatively small in numbers.

An announcement was made in the House of Commons by Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister, that Sir Stafford Cripps was proceeding to India on a political mission. Mr. Churchill's declaration is included in great part in the declaration brought by Sir Stafford with him to India. However, a small passage from Mr. Churchill's speech is reproduced here. He said:

'In August 1940 a full statement was made about the aims and policy we are pursuing in India. This amounted in short to a promise that as soon as possible after the war, India should attain Dominion status in full freedom and equality with this country and other dominions, under a constitution to be framed by Indians, by agreement amongst themselves and acceptable to the main elements in the Indian national life. This was, of course, subject to the fulfilment of our obligations for the protection of minorities, including the depressed classes and all our treaty obligations to the Indian states, and to the settlement of certain lesser matters arising out of our long association with the fortunes of the Indian sub-continent.'

Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India on 23 March 1942, and issued the following Declaration on behalf of the British Government:

'His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to

lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic and external affairs.

His Majesty's Government therefore make the following declaration :

(*a*) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India in manner described hereafter an elected body charged with the task of farming a new Constitution for India.

(*b*) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation of Indian States in the Constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to :

(i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides.

With such non-acceding provinces, should they s6 desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.

(ii) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the Constitution-making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in future its relationship to other member States of the British Commonwealth.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangement so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(*d*) The Constitution-making Body shall be composed as follows unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities.

Immediately upon the result being known of provincial elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower House of provincial Legislatures shall as a single electoral college proceed to the election of the Constitution-making Body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion as to their total population as in the case of representatives of British India as a whole and

with the same powers as British Indian members.

(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the Defence of India as part of their world war effort but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the peoples of India. His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.'

Maulana Azad met Sir Stafford on 25 March and discussed the proposals with him. The reaction in Congress to these proposals was purposely kept secret with a view, perhaps, to finding out what the Muslim League thought about them. Congress started trying to elicit from Sir Stafford the proposed relationship of the new National Government with the Viceroy, and the division of functions between the Defence Ministry and the Commander-in-Chief, which clearly indicated that it might not be possible for Sir Stafford to go back to England as a successful negotiator. The Congress, however, by a resolution on the Cripps offer, accepted the long-term plan with certain limitations. In reality however it was not so much concerned with the future long-term plan as with the present transfer of power at the centre.

Mr. Jinnah invited the Working Committee meeting to consider the Cripps Proposals on 27 March 1942, but the meeting broke up from 1 April till 6 April to enable him to preside over the Allahabad session of the Muslim League.

During the meeting of the All-India Council of the Muslim League, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan informed me that Mr. Zahirul Hasan Lari was going to contest his election as the Secretary of the Muslim League and asked for my support, failing which he would not stand for election. I dissuaded Mr. Lari from contesting the seat and at Nawabzada's urging I proposed his name in the open session. I went back from Allahabad with a heavy heart for I was anxious regarding Mr. Jinnah's response to the Cripps Proposals which he described as most unsatisfactory and meant to take the Muslims 'to the altar for sacrifice.'

It should be noted that the Cripps Proposals consisted of two distinct parts, viz. (1) the setting up of a National Government at the centre and (2) the establishment of machinery to frame a constitution for the Indian Union with a provision that

any province which did not accept the constitution framed would have the right to stand out, and that such provinces could, if they so chose, have their own separate Union. Congress willynilly accepted the principle of self-determination with the limitations announced in the Cripps Proposals but continued throughout the negotiations to doubt the sincerity of the Proposals in regard to the National Government.

In explaining the details of the conditions under which the provinces could have the right to stand out of the Union, by his letter dated 2 April 1942 to the President of the Muslim League, Sir Stafford stated that any province which should secure sixty per cent votes in its Assembly for accession to India would have the right to do so. In case of its failure to secure the required percentage a party could then claim a plebiscite of the whole population of the province. This clearly envisaged Pakistan and afforded us a clear chance to get the full Pakistan of our conception without danger of a claim for the partition of the Provinces of Punjab and Bengal for which unfortunately the language used in the Lahore Resolution 'with such territorial re-adjustment as may be necessary' left a wide loop-hole. Who was responsible for the drafting of the Lahore Resolution is yet a mystery to me. In my absence on 21 March 1940 a Committee was appointed to draft the Pakistan Resolution in Lahore, of which both the President, Mr. Jinnah, and Sir Sikandar were members, and I find it difficult to comprehend how they could have been parties to the Resolution as it emerged with the phraseology which completely undermined the concept of Allama Iqbal and Choudhri Rahmat Ali.

A few years later, in 1946, the Cabinet Mission in rejecting partition of the provinces advanced the argument that it would be regarded by the Muslim League as quite unacceptable because it would entail the exclusion from Pakistan of (*a*) the whole of the Ambala and Jullundur Divisions in the Punjab; (*b*) the whole of Assam except the District of Sylhet; and (*c*) a large part of Western Bengal, including Calcutta.

It is extraordinary that the Cabinet Mission saw through the grave consequences for the Muslims of the partition of Punjab and Bengal and as such rejected this idea altogether, but we on our part not only failed to realize the great dangers to the Millat but ourselves paved the way for the division of Bengal and Punjab by the use of the phraseology 'territorial re-adjustment' in the main body of the Lahore Resolution. In consequence we were liable to be deprived of large, fertile and strategic areas with big cities, populations, rivers with a network

of irrigation system, and mineral resources, when up till that time there had been no demand from the Hindu side for the partition of provinces. If I had been present on the occasion at Lahore when this draft was passed by the Drafting Committee, I would never have subscribed to it.

However, I thought that there was now a chance provided by the Cripps offer to undo the wrong that we had done to our cause, by agreeing to a joint plebiscite in Punjab and Bengal. Punjab had four million more Muslim votes than the combined strength of the Sikhs and Hindus, and Bengal had six million votes more than the Hindus according to the 1941 census figures.*

Placing my faith in the sterling common sense of the Muslims and their loyalty to Islam, I strongly urged upon the Working Committee of the Muslim League to accept the long-term plan of the Cripps Proposals. The implementation of the Cripps Proposals was conditional on the acceptance of both the parties and on rejection by Congress it would have automatically lapsed; nevertheless, I thought our acceptance of the Proposals would morally bind the British Government to respect it in any future settlement of Hindu-Muslim differences. In any case we were not losing anything by accepting the long-term plan. It is true that for that purpose we had to agree to sit in a joint Constituent Assembly, if the Congress agreed to the plan, but that should not have deterred us from accepting the welcome offer. After all, on the occasion of the Cabinet Mission negotiations four years later, we did agree at one stage to sit in a joint Constituent Assembly with Congress.

My voice was ineffective for most of the members of the Working Committee were taken in by the idea that Pakistan should be established on the basis of the right of self-determination by Muslim votes alone which, to say the least, gave a new meaning to the right of self-determination of an area with the vote of one community alone and formed a demand without parallel in world history.

If Sir Sikandar had been present in the meeting my hands

*1. PUNJAB	
Muslims	1,62,00,000
Hindus and Sikhs	1,22,00,000
Excess of Muslims over Non-Muslims	40,00,000
2. BENGAL	
Muslims	3,30,05,434
Hindus	2,73,01,091
Excess of Muslims over the Hindus	57,04,343

would have been strengthened, but by this time he had resigned from the Muslim League Working Committee and so had not attended even the Allahabad session of the Muslim League. However, in an interview he said, in reply to a question, that he himself was strongly in favour of self-determination for territorial units and that the success of the scheme involved in it would lie in an understanding between the units. So far as he was aware, he added, Mr. Jinnah had not defined Pakistan. From his point of view the principle of self-determination did not differ from the Cripps offer. The League resolution rejecting the Cripps offer was passed on 12 April 1942. The seeds of partition of Punjab and Bengal were thus firmly sown.

Sir Stafford did not succeed in satisfying Congress which had also rejected his Proposals on 11 April 1942. Before his departure for London, Sir Stafford Cripps had gone at night to see Mr. Jinnah, completely heart-broken and disillusioned. After his departure from India his erstwhile friends among Congress leaders cursed him in the Congress Press as a bungler, machiavellian and reactionary.

Even during the period of Sir Stafford's stay Gandhiji had described his proposal as 'a post-dated cheque on a bank in liquidation.' Soon after his departure Gandhiji said, in April 1942:

> 'Whatever the consequences, therefore, to India her real safety and Britain's too lies in orderly and timely British withdrawal from India. . . . Why do not British statesmen admit that it is after all a domestic quarrel? Let them withdraw from India and I promise that all other parties will find it to their interest to come together. . . . Complete and immediate orderly withdrawal of the British from India in reality will at once put the Allied cause on a completely moral basis.'

The Cripps offer to India, whatever may be said to demonstrate its hollowness, was definitely an advance on what had been so far offered to India by the British Government. There seemed to be no justification for such hasty and ill-timed advice by Gandhiji to Congress, when he had himself remarked some time before that, so long as there was no workable arrangement with the Muslim League, civil resistance must involve resistance against the League and he fully knew that no such arrangement with the Muslim League had been arrived at. Even in some responsible quarters of the Congress it was considered that a mass non-violent campaign at that time amounted to inviting Japan to invade the country.

About six months after his visit to Lucknow, Rajaji addressed

his old Congress supporters in the Madras legislature on 23 April 1942 and gained their assent to the acceptance by Congress of Pakistan in principle as the basis of a settlement between the Congress and the League and the restoration of a responsible Government in Madras. When the A.I.C.C. met at Allahabad on 29 April 1942, with only two hundred members present out of three hundred and eighty-nine, Rajaji moved a resolution on a Congress-League accord which was rejected by one hundred and twenty votes to fifteen and a counter resolution moved by Jagat Narain Lal declaring that 'any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federations will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different States and provinces of the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal,' was passed by ninety-two votes to seventeen. In a Press statement on 4 May Rajaji expressed his determination to continue his campaign. He was of the view that to obtain freedom from Britain, India must be united, and that end could not be achieved without a settlement with the Muslim League. He started the campaign in his province, during the course of which he challenged Gandhiji's lead directly and severely criticized his advice to the British to leave India in a welter and chaos and as a prey for foreign aggression. He resigned his membership of the A.I.C.C. as well as his membership of the provincial legislature on 15 July 1942.

It had been decided by the Muslim League session at Allahabad to form a Defence Committee to tour throughout India to prepare the Muslims to make such defence arrangements themselves as could protect them in the event of a Japanese attack and the break-up of civil administration. Nawab Ismail Khan, Sir Nazimuddin, Qazi Isa and myself with Sayed Zakir Ali as our Secretary were nominated members of the Committee. Soon after the return of Sir Stafford Cripps to England, we started our tour and after visiting U.P., Bihar, Assam, Bengal, Orissa, C.P. and Madras we reached Bombay on 27 May 1942. The public meeting there was presided over by Mr. Jinnah. Before leaving Bombay for Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P., Mr. Jinnah asked me to persuade Sir Sikandar to withdraw his resignation from the Working Committee of the Muslim League; but knowing Sir Sikandar's mind I did not give him any hope of succeeding in my effort. When I talked to Sir Sikandar he detailed a long list of grievances against the Muslim League, some of which I have already mentioned.

During this long and arduous tour of India undertaken in the worst months of summer and covering about sixteen thousand miles, all of us had to make hundreds of speeches, contacts with thousands of people and leaders of the Muslim League and to convey the message of Pakistan to strengthen the League organization. Qazi Isa, being the youngest among us and full of energy and vigour made powerful speeches to keep the audience in good humour. In Baluchistan we were also joined by Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang who had been invited by Qazi Isa to open the confeıence there.

XXV

THE 'QUIT INDIA' MOVEMENT

1942—1943

A CONGRESS Working Committee meeting was held at Wardha on 14 July 1942 followed by a declaration which, after narrating the history of India and its relation with the British Government, continued:

'In making the proposal for the withdrawal of British rule from India, the Congress has no desire whatsoever to embarrass Great Britain or the Allied powers in their prosecution of the war, or in any way to encourage aggression in India or increase pressure on China by the Japanese or on any other power associated with the Allied groups. Nor does the Congress intend to prejudice the defensive capacity of the Allied Powers. The Congress is therefore agreeable to the stationing of the Armed Forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression and to protect and help China.'

In this resolution emphasis was repeatedly laid on the Congress demand for the independence of India. In its last paragraphs a threat was posed that in the event of the non-acceptance of the Congress advice it would:

'Reluctantly be compelled to utilize all the non-violent strength it might have gathered since 1920, when it adopted non-violence as part of its policy for the vindication of political rights and liberty. . . . The Congress realizes that there may be risks involved in such a course. Such risks, however, have to be faced by any country in order to achieve freedom and, more especially at the present critical juncture, in order to save the country and the larger cause of freedom the world over from far greater risk and perils. . . . Such a widespread struggle would inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji. For this purpose the A.I.C.C. will meet at Bombay on 7th August 1942.'

I happened to be at Bhopal about the end of July when Mr. Jinnah also came there and we discussed the 'Quit India' movement and its possible effect on Muslims and our attitude towards it in case the Congress should ultimately decide to launch the campaign. We were in the throes of a dilemma: if we allowed

the campaign to succeed, so enabling Congress to coerce the British Government to yield to its demand to concede independence without any settlement of the Pakistan issue, the Muslim cause would go under for ever; but on the other hand if we opposed the movement there was a great risk of communal riots and widespread violence. After great cogitation we came to the conclusion that complete neutrality in the fight should be observed by the Muslims and no attempt should be made from their side to disturb the peace of the country.

I left Bhopal next day for Lucknow where I was invited by a friend to a tea party soon after my arrival. Nawab Ismail Khan and some other friends were also there; so also were Sir Tennant Sloan, the Home Adviser, and Sir Hugh Inglis, the Inspector General of Police, among the invitees. While I was sitting there Sir Hugh asked me, 'What help will the Muslim League offer to us in this "Quit India" campaign?' I replied, 'Would it not involve grave disturbances in the country if the Muslims openly came out to oppose the movement and surely in that case you would not guarantee that they would not be run in under criminal law for arson and murder?' Sir Tennant raising both hands exclaimed, 'How could we do it!' To those who believe that the communal riots in India were fanned and encouraged by British officials, Sir Tennant's reply may serve to lighten their minds and disclose their error.

The Congress Committee passed the 'Quit India' Resolution, moved by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and seconded by Sardar Patel, in their meeting held on 7 and 8 August 1942 at Bombay.

Apart from many other things Pandit Jawaharlal referred in his speech to the communal tangle also and described how Congress had been denied the right to select its own representative; for the League would not agree to there being a Muslim on the Congress Committee of negotiation. He described this as an insult to Congress and its President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. He also remarked that Congress had made mistakes in its attempt towards the settlement of the communal problem but its conscience had been clear for the attempts that were made had been both strenuous and sincere although they were frustrated. If Pandit Jawaharlal had considered the Congress attitude in regard to the choice of non-Congressmen in a National Government as indicated in the Viceroy's offer he would never have agreed to the inclusion of persons whose loyalty to the Congress was not assured. Was it fair on his part then to expect the Muslim League to agree to negotiate with persons on whom it had no reliance, especially when the question was

connected with the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem? However, it must be admitted that on this occasion Pandit Jawaharlal accepted that Congress had bungled negotiations for a settlement with the Muslim League, but now he had become more informed about Muslim sentiment and feelings. I know he was never a communalist nor did he think in terms of the Hinduism of the Vedic age, but for a long time in his political career he tried to side-track the communal issue as insignificant and one which he hoped would resolve itself by a continued indifference towards its resolution. He was attached to his Muslim friends particularly because in his outlook on life generally he was culturally closer to them, but his early education in London and early association with the national movements in India blocked his vision from seeing the gulf that was growing wider as a result of Congress activities which encouraged thousands and thousands of Hindus to pursue a crude form of nationalism and democracy, drowning the views of reason and fairplay. He had seen the treatment that was given to his father, Pandit Motilal Nehru, in the 1926 elections but even that failed to convince him that if his father, with his sacrifices for the country, could be so ruthlessly attacked as a pro-Muslim, the fate of a Muslim in an election in a democratic India would be no happy one.

I know many Congressmen of the olden days of the Khilafat movement who were certainly not communalists and looked upon the deteriorating relationships between the two communities with disfavour, but the fear of the 'Junta' seemed to have stifled their voices and their consciences.

In spite of my love and great regard for Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru I had to part from Congress when I found that for reasons best known to him even he was not prepared to give my views the importance which they deserved. If he, on the proper occasion, had broken through the iron curtain round him, including some number of petty-minded Hindu socialists or communists and a few Ulema posing as nationalists, with his influence in Congress, on Gandhiji and on Muslim India he might have been able to have averted the crisis.

Gandhiji's speech also referred to the Hindu-Muslim problem. He said:

'I have no mental reservation on the issue of Pakistan. Whatever happens Pakistan cannot be outside Hindustan. Let all of us strive for the independence of India. I am very impatient. It is freedom for all and not for any particular community we are striving for. I whole-heartedly endorse the Maulana Sahib's

offer to the British that India may be handed over to any community. I would not be sorry if the authority is transferred to the Muslim masses, for they are Indians after all. India is the homeland of the Indian Muslims. The door is open for the Muslims. They can capture the Congress and change the policy. The Congress is a democratic body. Let the Hindus also know that they will have to fight for all including minorities. Let them be ready to lay down their lives for saving the lives of the Muslims. It is the first leason in *Ahimsa*. One must be tolerant towards his neighbour. Let the Muslims and others also follow this advice.'

It is true that Maulana Azad was the President of the Congress at that time but surely neither he nor Gandhiji nor anyone else had the right to hand over India to one particular community. Considered coolly it amounted to a mere slogan. Politics is made of much sterner stuff than mere platitudes and Muslims could not be lured by such a meaningless offer. No sensible Hindu took it seriously either. Nevertheless it shows that before launching the 'Quit India' campaign the Congress leadership was particularly keen to cultivative Muslim goodwill. But it came at an inopportune moment. Having given a challenge to the British, the Congress campaign of appeals to the Muslims, started by them from a position of advantage, was too transparent to be taken seriously.

From the outbreak of war as I have previously mentioned, Gandhiji on several occasions had said, 'Without a workable arrangement with the Muslims, civil resistance will be resistance against the Muslims.' He was aware that such a workable arrangement had not been arrived at and that the relations between the two communities had become more strained after the visit of Sir Stafford Cripps. But in spite of that knowledge and in spite of the fact that the Muslims were aware that Rajaji's proposals in the Congress to negotiate with the Muslims on the basis of Pakistan had been rejected, Gandhiji had decided to launch such a campaign, particularly dangerous when the country was threatened by Japanese attack and the fortunes of war were hanging in the balance. Nevertheless, the Muslim League directed the Muslims to remain completely peaceful and not to indulge in any anti-Congress activities, during the whole campaign.

Gandhiji and all the members of the Working Committee were arrested on 8 August and some were put in the Aga Khan Palace. From next day rioting broke out particularly in Bihar and Eastern U.P. where Muslim police sub-inspectors were killed and police constables were burnt alive. Police stations were pulled down,

railway bridges and roads were destroyed and several Europeans were killed on different stations while travelling by train. In Balia, the worst affected district in U.P., for about two weeks there was no law and order. This is how the 'Junta' carried out the advice given to them by Gandhiji in his speech concerning non-violence as well as their love for the Muslims. Within two months the upheaval was brought down to normal. It is regrettable that Gandhiji, after so many trials of strength against the British without Muslim aid and support, thought of making this last fight of his life on such a vast scale only to see it peter out in a very short time. A few years later, a Congressman wrote the history of the Congress fight which was read by me as well as the Governor of U.P., then Sir Francis Wylie. Describing the strength of the Congress movement the Governor with some pride said, 'Balia was re-conquered by Mr. Moss, the Collector of Gorakhpur, with only eight armed cyclists behind him.' This may have been a little exaggeration, but the fact remains that on the whole this episode was a very poor show on the part of Congress.

After the arrest of Congress leaders, Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth of Kotra, at that time Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, came to see me in the first week of October 1942 and during the talk told me that he had met Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan at Delhi and had discussed the possibility of a coalition between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League at the Centre and in the provinces. He informed me that the Nawabzada was agreeable to exclude Ambala Division from the Pakistan area and there was only the question of the Jullundur Division left for settlement between the Hindu Sabha and the Muslim League in terms of the Lahore Resolution. He said if I could also agree to exclude Jullundur Division from the North Pakistan area, a settlement between Hindus and Muslims could be arrived at without much difficulty. I replied:

> 'Raja Sahib, do not try to grab some land from this side and some from the other to expand your area. You do not seem to realize the fact that by creating such preponderating Muslim areas in the north and north-west you would be doing a great disservice to India. The Muslim League resolution aims at having two States within Indian geography but you want to create a Pakistan State outside India. We want partition of administration within India; you on the other hand propose partition of the geography of India. I would never agree to it.'

Raja Sahib upon that left disappointed. Soon after, on 7 October 1942, I wrote a letter to Mr. Jinnah pointing out to him the consequences which would flow from the partition of

the provinces, completely upsetting the balance between the Hindu and Muslim populations in India and in Pakistan. I also expressed apprehension that it might end in giving India a passage to Kashmir and deprive us of vast and valuable areas. Although I did not get any reply from Mr. Jinnah, yet due to its historical importance I am reproducing this letter in Appendix VIII. However, I had read the letter over before despatch to some of my trusted colleagues of the Lucknow League as it was a very important matter and concerned all of us. Out of those friends Mr. Ehsanur Rahman Qidwai is no more but Mr. Rizwanullah, Secretary U.P. Muslim League, Maulana Jamal Mian, Mr. Abdul Aziz, and Mr. Ayyub Qureshi are still alive and all of them are now citizens of Pakistan.

The Draft Committee to which I have referred in this letter was appointed to draft the Working Committee resolution for the meeting held at Bombay on 16 to 20 August, after the arrest of Congress leaders in the 'Quit India' movement, to explain to the Government as well as to Congress the Muslim point of view. The Drafting Committee so far as I remember consisted of Nawab Ismail Khan, Abdul Matin Choudhri and myself and one or two other members about whom I am not certain.

Whether Pakistan without the partition of provinces or with the division of the provinces into two Punjabs and two Bengals would have been more beneficial to the Muslims is a moot point on which people may have different opinions. I was nevertheless pleading for my own views and continued to do so all through the struggle and accepted the partition of provinces only with a heavy heart, for the Working Committee was overwhelmingly in its favour. The census figures for Bengal that I have given in my letter were subsequently altered after a protest from the Hindus of Bengal that the Fazlul Huq administration had tampered with the figures. After a few months' inquiry the margin of majority of Muslims was reduced from seventy-five lakhs to sixty lakhs. But in any plebiscite in which the decision was to be made on a bare majority both in Punjab and Bengal we were absolutely secure as even the oft-repeated fear of indebtedness of the Muslim masses to Hindu moneylenders had been mightily mitigated by the golden laws passed by the Punjab Assembly under Sir Sikandar Hayat's premiership. Further, by now Muslim consciousness had been sufficiently aroused there to assure a League victory in any plebiscite.

As I did not receive any reply to my letter I brought up this matter in the Working Committee meeting held at Delhi on 8 November 1942. Before Mr. Jinnah took it up, Mr. Husain

Imam said, 'There will be no harm done in my opinion if Ambala Division is taken away from the Pakistan Area.' I replied, 'Partition of provinces will be made under some principle and we shall have to part with Jullundur Division also on the principle of there being non-Muslim majorities in those areas.' In the meantime Mr. Jinnah intervened and told me, 'I know your views and there is no idea of giving up of our claim.' And there the matter ended.

The Muslim League Working Committee in this meeting also reiterated its demand for the establishment of a National Government at the Centre. I could never reconcile myself to the idea of the Muslim League asking for a National Government; for, among other reasons which I have already given in these pages, it failed to give any dynamic lead to our intelligentsia to prepare themselves for big sacrifices if and when the British Government should perhaps ignore their claim for a full and complete Pakistan and to warn the Congress of our determination to have our just and fair claim accepted. Since the Lahore Resolution for Pakistan no change in our mental attitude towards life had been visible, due on the one hand perhaps to the war situation which would not allow the British to favour one community whatever its strength at the cost of the other, and on the other to a policy of political bargaining with Congress and the British which did not immediately call upon them to revise their programme. This attitude had become so engrained in the minds of the Working Committee members that once, on 20 August 1924, they went so far as to express their willingness 'to consider any proposal and negotiate with any party on a footing of equality for the setting up of a provisional Government of India in order to mobilize the resources of the country for the purpose of the defence of India and the successful prosecution of the war, provided the demands of Muslim India are accepted unequivocally.' When this resolution was passed, the Congress leaders were behind the bars and obviously the only non-Government party available to cooperate with the League in a National Government was the Hindu Mahasabha which at the time was making attempts to enter the political field during the absence of the Congress leaders. The Hindu Mahasabha would never have agreed to the Muslim terms and no occasion for a coalition with them would have arisen, but the very fact that we offered to work with the Mahasabha in the National Government should have been beneath the dignity of the League. The fault for this exuberance of dislike of the Congress lay with us, as some of our own

members were wont to put forward unreasonable views to spite the Congress, forgetting the fact that most of the weaknesses in the Congress ranks came from the inroad of the Hindu Sabha mentality in the organization. The matter was taken note of by the Press and one of their representatives asked Mr. Jinnah what was meant by 'Any Party'. He replied, 'Any party including the Government.' By his careful reply Mr. Jinnah succeeded in giving a new turn to the idea and thus saved the Muslim League from a downright attack on it.

During the year 1942 we suffered a great loss in the Muslim League leadership on account of the death of Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, the President of the Punjab provincial Muslim League and a member of the All-India Muslim League. He was throughout a supporter of the re-organized Muslim League from 1937 and was the main pillar of its strength in the Punjab. He had a passion for doing service to the League cause. The Muslim League passed a resolution of sympathy on his death and applauded his services to its cause. Later on in the same year Sir Abdullah Haroon also departed and was laid to rest. I had known him for a very long time since the Khilafat days and he was one of those whose munificence was well known to the Khilafatists. He was consulted on every important question and the Muslim League after 1937 was really organized by him in Sind. In his private life he was very simple and never allowed his riches to overweigh his humility and moral sublimity.

Yet another great and irreparable loss was suffered by the Muslim League by the death of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan in December 1942, leaving a big vacuum in the Punjab politics. He was the first Premier of the Punjab under the 1935 Constitution with over seventy-two Muslims and many Hindus and Sikhs in his Unionist Party which had been founded by Sir Fazle Husain. This party in a re-organized form was started in 1936 before the 1937 elections under the new Constitution with a view to consolidate Muslim strength in the Punjab Assembly on a non-communal basis. It was to serve as a link between the rural classes purely on an economic basis.

On the death of Sir Fazle Husain, in July 1936, Sir Sikandar, who was the Vice-Governor of the Reserve Bank, joined the Assembly again and became the Punjab Premier. Unionism was forced on Sir Fazle Husain as much as it was forced on Sir Sikandar Hayat due to the conditions prevailing in the Punjab at the time. In understanding and appreciating the difficulties of men in authority and power one has to take full account of the conditions in which they found themselves.

The necessity for the Unionist Party was felt so strongly in the Punjab that practically all the Muslim leaders of the Province, Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Nawab Muzaffar Khan, Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz of Mamdot, Nawab Qizilbash, Mr. Gurmani, Malik Khizar Hayat Khan and several others not only joined it but were actually associated in its formation. After the 1937 elections in India within a few months the entire face of politics started undergoing a change. In the Muslim majority provinces the Premiers formed their Governments with such Hindu and Sikh Ministers as their colleagues as had the confidence and trust of their people, but in the Muslim minority provinces the Congress Ministers imposed impossible conditions for the real representatives of the minority community, i.e. Muslim Leaguers, to share power with them. As it should have happened, Muslim India all over the country was flabbergasted and a Muslim League session was called at Lucknow to meet this critical situation. Sir Sikandar was faced with a very difficult problem—he could not allow Muslims of minority provinces to suffer inequities under Hindu domination, nor could he at that stage bring about a communal split in the Punjab by throwing overboard the Unionist Party. He, therefore, started negotiations with Mr. Jinnah to find a solution of this knotty problem.

After some correspondence both Sir Sikandar and Mr. Jinnah agreed to a compromise that the Unionist Party was to function in the Assembly in the Punjab and side by side the organization of the Muslim League was to proceed with the help and cooperation of Muslim legislators. In the Council of the Muslim League this announcement of agreement between the two leaders was welcomed with thunderous applause. No one can deny that without this action on the part of Sir Sikandar the Muslim League fight would have been confined to minority provinces alone and sooner or later they would have had to go under. Sir Sikandar saved Muslim India by coming to the League session in Lucknow and by infusing life into the organization. His association with the Muslim League at this crucial hour in the fate of Muslims of India is an event in history and must live for ever to remind us of his greatness. Professor Coupland in his report* gives his estimate of the help of Sir Sikandar Hayat to the League organization in 1937 in the following words:

'On the day of Mr. Jinnah's speech Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan announced that he was advising all the Muslim Members of his Unionist Party in the Punjab to join the League, and shortly afterwards Mr. Fazlul Haq and Sir Mohammad Saadullah made

*Vol. II, p. 182.

similar declarations in Bengal and Assam. The action of these Muslim Premiers did more than any speeches to put new life into the League.'

On another occasion when the Muslim League called upon him to resign from the Defence Council, Sir Sikandar did so, again to keep the prestige of the Muslim League High Command undisputed and he took this step after his differences with Mr. Jinnah on the war policy of the Muslim League. He was definitely of the view that the policy which was being pursued by the Muslim League would prove disastrous to the cause of Pakistan and feared that ultimately it would secure only a truncated Pakistan after the partition of Punjab which he considered to be very harmful to the Province. He several times remarked to me that partition of Punjab would create hundreds of problems particularly in regard to canal waters and Kashmir. Thus there was a clear conflict of view between Sir Sikandar and Mr. Jinnah which can only be explained by reference to the political conditions then prevailing in the Punjab.

It is a great tragedy that the great leader, Sir Sikandar, is now remembered only as a Unionist and as opposed to League ideals; but for his support to the League cause, even the Pakistan Resolution would not have been passed at Lahore. All his services to the cause of the Muslims of the sub-continent seem now to be forgotten but I hope that Pakistan will acclaim him some day as one of the great men coming from the land of the five rivers.

Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, who was the Minister of local Self-Government in the Sikandar Cabinet and came from a very respectable family of Rajputs enjoying an influential position in the Province, succeeded Sir Sikandar as the Premier of the Punjab in the first week of January 1943. His election was unanimous and was hailed by every section of the Assembly. He decided to include Sir Sikandar's son Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan in his Cabinet as Minister of Public Works, although the Governor and at first Mr. Jinnah were not in favour of his appointment. Nawab Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot who had become President of the Punjab Muslim League on the death of his father was dissatisfied with the appointment of Shaukat Hayat as well as with the general attitude of the Unionist members towards the Muslim League organization.

Early in 1943 Mr. Jinnah found it necessary to tell Malik Khizar Hayat Khan that the Muslim League could not tolerate dualism in the Punjab which was the corner-stone of Pakistan. While Punjab politics were thus entering into a new phase, a

meeting of the Council of the Muslim League was held on 9 March 1943 at Delhi, and Punjab affairs came up for discussion. Maulana Abdul Hamid Badauni proposed a resolution that the Muslim members of the Assembly should form a Muslim League Party as soon as practicable and act in accordance with the League policy. I may recall here that before the meeting Malik Khizar Hayat Khan had met Mr. Jinnah twice to discuss the Punjab affairs and an understanding had been arrived at between them which found expression in the Council meeting.

The Punjab Premier pointed out that the resolution was unnecessary as a Muslim League Party existed in the Punjab Assembly under the terms of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. He said that he did not wish to enter into a controversy as to whether that Party had been working as efficiently as was expected of it, but he assured the House that he would endeavour to put life into the Party to consolidate it and bring it up to a standard worthy of the great organization of the Muslim League and the Muslims of the Punjab. Proceeding further he said, 'We in the Punjab feel proud of the great services rendered by the All-India Muslim League under the leadership and guidance of the Quaid-i-Azam to the cause of Muslims. You will never find me and my Muslim colleagues failing in our loyalty to the cause of the Musalmans and their sole representative body, the All-India Muslim League.'

The Premier stressed the fact that the Muslim League Party as envisaged in the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact had been in existence since October 1937 and that it had been meeting from time to time and considering all important questions concerning Muslims. The pact, he said, had *inter alia* laid down that Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was to convene a meeting of the Muslim members of his party and advise them to join the Muslim League and, as such, they were to be subject to the rules and regulations of the central and provincial Boards of the All-India Muslim League, and this was not to affect the continuance of the coalition of the Unionist Party and the existing combination was to maintain that name.

The Punjab Premier also explained the circumstances in which he had been invited by the Governor to form a Government after the death of the late Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan. He said that he had an opportunity of consulting a large number of Muslim members of the Assembly before accepting the invitation. The action of the Governor had been unanimously approved at a meeting of the Muslim League Party held during the last week of January. The decision of the Party was subsequently

endorsed by the Unionist Party and the Ministerial coalition.

The President, Mr. Jinnah summed up as follows:

'The main object of the resolution is that a Muslim League Party in the Punjab legislature should be set up. As explained by Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, a party already exists. It is a different question whether it has been functioning efficiently or not. But now a definite assurance has been given that efforts will be made to make the Party worthy of the prestige and honour of the sole authoritative and representative body of the Musalmans, namely the Muslim League. Therefore, might we not wait and see what efforts are really made. I wish Malik Khizar Hayat Khan godspeed in his mission.

Perhaps we may see the result before the next session of the All-India Muslim League. If there is again nodding or neglect, then it is open to you to move a resolution on the subject at the next meeting, but I hope the occasion will not arise.'

Recalling the terms of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact, Mr. Jinnah said that the essence of the whole arrangement was that Muslim members of the Unionist Party were to function as a separate party. Actually, eighty-six members had signed their pledges and given them to him. Constitutionally, he said, the Party did exist, but it did not function properly as it ought to have. Many things would have to be done to make it really efficient and strong.

The resolution was withdrawn by Maulana Abdul Hamid Badauni. From the proceedings of this Council, expectations were raised that the tussle in Punjab politics between the Muslim League organization and the Unionist Party might end but as we proceed we will observe that the Muslim League organization in the Province on the one hand and the adherence of the Unionist Party to the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact on the other stood in the way of both parties.

XXVI

PROVINCIAL LEAGUE PERSONALITIES

1943

PERHAPS the biggest annual session in the life of the Muslim League was held at Delhi on 24 April 1943. The President, in his usual forceful style reviewed the whole political situation existing at the time with particular reference to events of 1942, e.g. the Cripps Proposals and their rejection, and the Congress 'Quit India' campaign which was meant to stifle the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. For the first time, in this session the Muslim League delegates showed dissatisfaction with the pacifist policy of the Muslim League and in their not forcing the Pakistan issue on the Government and the Congress. I proposed the main resolution dealing with the situation and assured the gathering that if and when the Government should take any steps to impose the all-India federation on Muslim areas, necessary action would follow. The resolution was seconded by Malik Khizar Hayat Khan and supported by many others. It gave a further indication that the Punjab Premier stood solidly behind the demand for Pakistan. Before I pass on to the 1944 session of the Muslim League a survey of the political conditions and personalities in different provinces at this period may be found useful.

The Punjab : I have in the last chapter dealt to a great extent with Punjab affairs, but may mention here some of the leading personalities who supported the Muslim efforts in that Province.

Maulana Zafar Ali Khan of revered memory belonged to that group of Muslim politicians like Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali who had a burning faith in the future of Islam and could never reconcile themselves to the slavery of Muslim people either to the British or to the Hindus. From the time that he started his paper *Zamindar* and entered the political field, Muslim India had in him a champion to stand firmly against the domination of the British or the Hindu communalists' attempts to undermine Muslim interests. In the pursuit of his policy, he suffered incarcerations, long and short with unflinching

faith in the cause which he had espoused. He enthused millions of minds by his patriotic effusions, full of point and humour. His writings in the editorial columns of *Zamindar* served as an impetus to the rising tide of Muslim regeneration in India. He supported the demand of full independence of India as the goal and objective of the Muslim League in 1937 and since then helped it in its fight for Pakistan, as a necessary corollary to the demand for independence. In the controversy between the League and the Unionist Party he backed the Muslim League and gave it added strength. He died about five years ago at an advanced age, having been one of the earliest students of the Aligarh College and having had direct contact with the Father of Muslim India, Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan.

The phenomenal popularity of Maulana Zafar Ali's paper *Zamindar* was also in great measure due to his two young friends on the editorial staff, Maulana Ghulam Rasul Mehar and Abdul Majid Salik. The former besides being a great student of Muslim Indian history took a leading part in politics and was a great friend of Sir Sikandar who valued his opinions on political questions. During the years 1930 and 1935 he joined some of the peace conferences which were held one after the other seeking a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem. Similarly Maulana Salik had a facile pen and so long as he was associated with *Zamindar* his humorous notes were read with great interest in the journalistic world. Both of them, however, severed their connection with the journal about the year 1930 and started their own daily paper *Inqilab* which till 1937 enjoyed a great reputation.

Malik Barkat Ali was a very sedate and honourable person. He had been the editor of the *Observer* for a long time and throughout his association with that paper had studiously supported the Muslim cause. It may be said to his credit that at no stage of his political career did he divert his attention from the Muslim League organization. In the 1937 elections, apart from Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, he was the only candidate who succeeded in winning a seat for the League. From the very beginning he was opposed to the formation and the activities of the Unionist Party. He spearheaded the fight against this party in the Punjab Assembly.

Mian Abdul Aziz, a great Khilafatist, gave his full support to the Muslim League and with his influence on the people he added to its strength and solidarity.

Mian Amiruddin belonged to a very old family of Lahore Muslims in the walled city. From the very beginning in the

struggle for Pakistan he was one of the most ardent supporters of the League and worked day and night to raise its prestige and strength in the Province. Sayed Khalilur Rahman, for some years Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League, served the organization at great personal loss to himself. He led the Majority Provinces' delegation soon after the resignation of the Congress Ministries and in that tour he also came to Lucknow. Amongst the younger group, Mr. Abu Said Anwar, Mahbub Ahmad, Zafar Ahmad, Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi and Mian Mohammad Shafi played very important roles and gave their whole time to the organization. Mahbub Ahmad was elected Joint Secretary of the League twice.

I have already mentioned Nawab Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot who had become President of the Punjab Muslim League on the death of his father Sir Shah Nawaz. He was not a man for the public platform but during his presidentship of the provincial League he discharged his duties with devotion and loyalty. But a great gain to the Muslim League was Mian Mumtaz Daultana who began to take an interest in League affairs on the death of his father Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana in June 1940. Gifted with the art of public speaking and endowed with natural affability and a great sense of realism, he placed at the disposal of the League his erudition and knowledge which went a long way to make the League a real and effective force in the Province.

This list would not be complete without mentioning the name of a very old Muslim Leaguer, Shaikh Sadiq Hasan of Amritsar. I first met him and his brother during a session of the League at Amritsar in 1919 and since then Shaikh Sahib had been a pioneer of the League in the Province. He used to help the organization with money and moral support. Recently he also departed from amongst us.

Mian Abdul Bari of Lyallpur joined the Muslim League after mature consideration. When I visited Lyallpur in 1942, I returned with great hopes that the Maulana would come over to the League to give it strength and solidarity. He is a man with whom one may not agree on many questions although realizing that his views come from his sincerity of purpose. Another great gain to the League was Mustafa Shah Gilani. He is a forceful speaker and always made valuable contributions to debates in the Council of the Muslim League.

Bengal: In Bengal the Fazlul Haq Ministry had to vacate office on 29 March 1943. Fazlul Haq who had become Premier in 1937, resigned in 1943 after six years' tenure of office. The

Governor had become afraid that his continuance in office might result in a riot in Calcutta as previous to his resignation, on 24 March, a hostile motion on a budget grant was moved on behalf of the Muslim League but the Government managed to secure 116 votes to 86 and defeated the motion. But on 27 March, only three days later, another motion brought the Government only 109 votes to 99 which gave Fazlul Haq warning that the end of his Ministry was near. The Muslim public had become very impatient and uncontrollable and he finally decided to resign. The time being short and many money grants still remaining undisposed of by the Assembly, Sir John Herbert, the Governor, took over the administration under section 93, certified the grants and called upon Khwaja Nazimuddin on 24 April to form a new Ministry. Khwaja Nazimuddin had been a Minister even before the 1935 Constitution and enjoyed the confidence of Bengal due to his lovable personality, religious-mindedness and honesty.

The Nazimuddin Ministry consisted of six Muslims, excluding himself, and six Hindus. A Ministry formed under such circumstances was bound to be a house divided within itself; the Hindu Ministers, unhappy over their position as the camp-followers of the Muslim League and the Muslims suspicious of their Hindu colleagues as saboteurs. Nevertheless the cart rolled along.

In dealing with the Bengal Ministry it is to be borne in mind that under the Communal Award the Muslims got only 119 seats out of a total of 250 in the Legislative Assembly in spite of being 55 per cent of the population. In fact they were entitled to 138 seats from separate electorates, excluding seats from labour and other organizations of particular denominations. The Muslim League Ministry of Fazlul Haq, as later that of Nazimuddin, had therefore to rely on votes from the thirty European seats in case of division between the Muslim groups themselves. Fazlul Haq's resignation from the premiership did not mean his exit from the Assembly for he was there with a group, now of course very much depleted, to join hands with the Congress or the Hindus to topple the Nazimuddin Ministry. The Secondary Education Bill was a very ticklish subject both for the Hindus and the Muslims because the Muslims thought that since the advent of the British rule, their education had suffered on account of the fact that neither the British officials who controlled the Education Department, so long as they were in office, nor Sir Ashutosh Mukerjee, had allowed Muslims from 1920 onwards to have any say in the Education Department, with the result that they were not receiving a fair deal. The

Hindus on their side were afraid that if they once lost on this issue of the Secondary Education Bill they would lose the monopoly of the policy on education in Bengal as well as the monopoly in the services.

There were many occasions on which it appeared that the Ministry would not be able to secure a majority of elected members except with the help of European votes, which it always succeeded in getting but that was not a very happy position for the League. A vote of censure in connection with the Education Bill was moved against Mr. B. P. Pain and the motion was defeated by 119 votes against 106, including 19 European votes. On another occasion the Ministry was saved by the Speaker's casting vote, which was secured by the belligerent attitude of Yusuf Ali Choudhri alias Mohan Mian who ran to the rostrum with a threatening attitude as if he was going to throttle the Speaker and got his vote to save the Ministry.

The Governor, Sir John Herbert, had been blamed by Congressmen for having forced Fazlul Haq to resign although he had a majority in the Assembly. So also Mr. Casey is blamed for having extended his support to the Nazimuddin Ministry when obviously it had no majority except with the support of the European votes in the Assembly. These critics forget that the European voting strength was the result of taking away a large slice from the Muslim share and also the fact that so long as the Constitution was in force Europeans were legally entitled to vote according to their conscience.

On the Muslim side Maulana Raghib Ahsan and Mohammad Usman, President of the Calcutta Muslim League and at one time Mayor of Calcutta Corporation, served the organization with great ability and devotion. In the stress and strain of the Calcutta riots which came three years later they risked their lives in saving Muslims from the butchery of Hindu mobs. Maulana Raghib Ahsan also contributed to the awakening of the Muslim mind to the realities of the Indian situation.

Mulla Jan Mohammad better known as Mulla Jano came from Peshawar, but had become a permanent resident of Calcutta and was the backbone of Muslim resistance to aggression, from whatever quarter it came. He led Muslim processions, organized self-defence parties, supervised National Guard activities and protected defenceless and weak Muslims. I do not know if Mulla Jano is still alive. Likewise the services of Abdul Wahid, editor of a daily Urdu paper of Calcutta, will be remembered for his work during the riots.

Sind : Sind became a separate Province under the Government

of India Act 1935. In the first election in Sind in 1937 the Muslims were hopelessly divided into several small parties, not surprisingly because it was the first experience in democracy and the leaders, mostly big landlords, had no love for political affiliations or party loyalty. It may also be due to the fact that until then they had been a minority and suffered from that complex.

Fortunately for them the Hindus in Sind were also not a united group—eight were Congressmen and the rest were divided into Independents and the Hindu party. Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah formed the first Ministry with two Muslims, including himself, the third being a Hindu, Congress being in opposition. In March 1938 a motion of no-confidence was passed and the Ministry resigned.

Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh formed a new Ministry with the aid of the Sind Congress party and to save his Ministry from going under followed the All-India Congress policy, forgetting the fact that the Muslim League was taking long strides to extend its hold on the Muslims of Sind. Sir Abdullah Haroon who was the backbone of the Sind Muslim League, helped by his Secretary, Pir Ali Mohammad Rashidi, spared neither labour nor money in putting the organization in a strong position. In October 1938 the position of the Muslim League appeared to be so strong that Mr. Jinnah made attempts to bring in a Muslim League coalition Government in Sind, although he did not succeed. Shortly after Sir Hidayatullah himself accepted a Ministership in the Allah Bakhsh Cabinet and resigned the membership of the Muslim League which dealt a great blow to the League cause in the Province.

Due to this action of Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah a new leadership was thrown up to offer a challenge to the Allah Bakhsh Ministry. Mr. Ayub Khuhro, who was a member in the Bombay Council also and could make good contribution to the debates in the Assembly, rose as a strong political figure in the Province. Mr. Abdul Majid Sindhi and G. M Sayed were influential personalities in Sind and both of them threw their weight into the Muslim League cause. Qazi Fazlullah, who had 'non-co-operated' in the Muslim University, Aligarh, had joined the Jamia Millia and was practising at that time at Larkana, joined the League. Similarly, Agha Ghulam Nabi Pathan returned to his Province to devote his overflowing energy to awaken his people.

When I met Allah Bakhsh in 1942 in Karachi I felt pity that such a sensible and intelligent person should be trying to stick

to office against his better judgment. He was even taken to Delhi by his Congress party to preside over a so-called Azad Muslim Conference on 27 April 1940 to denounce the Pakistan demand of the Muslim League.

As early as August 1939 the Muslim League had started an agitation for the return of the Manzilgah Mosque at Sukkur to the Muslims. Allah Bakhsh was fully aware that this agitation was organized and led by Mr. Ayub Khuhro and his group, and that if he failed to satisfy the Muslims on this issue his Ministry was bound to fall. On the other hand he feared that he would lose Hindu support if he accepted the Muslim demand. Being between the devil and the deep sea he decided to let the agitation drag on. While this agitation was continuing there was a riot at Sukkur caused by the speeches of Dr. Moonje and the forcible removal of Muslims from Manzilgah through the help of Indian troops. Ultimately the Governor intervened and Mr. Justice Weston was appointed to investigate and report to the Governor on this subject. He found that a portion of the Manzilgah was a mosque and should be returned to the Muslims and the rest should remain with the Hindus.

In the wake of such events, in March 1940 the Allah Bakhsh Ministry went out but was succeeded by Mr. Bandey Ali who had been the Revenue Minister in the previous Government. This was a Nationalist Party Government, i.e. a coalition between the League and the Hindu Independents. It was during this Government that joint electorates in Corporations were introduced against the declared policy of the Muslim League. In November 1940 Allah Bakhsh accepted a Ministry in the Bandey Ali Cabinet, but on 6 March 1941 he and two Hindu Ministers resigned and Bandey Ali lost his majority and resigned. Allah Bakhsh came back again as Premier with Sir Hidayatullah as one of his colleagues in the Cabinet. No other province in India can show such a sorrowful record in Muslim instability and political vagaries and alliances.

Allah Bakhsh wrote a letter to the Viceroy on 26 September 1942 renouncing his titles of Khan Bahadur and O.B.E. as a protest against the British Government's policy in arresting Congress leaders. The Governor reacted by removing him from office on 10 October 1942 on the ground that he no longer enjoyed his confidence. Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, on 22 October 1942, formed a new Cabinet with Mr. Gazder and Pir Ilahi Bakhsh as his Muslim colleagues and joined the Muslim League.

N.W.F.P.: The Pathans are politically conscious people but

unfortunately were very ill-informed about the conditions of Muslims beyond Attock river and as such they could not realize the numerical domination of the Hindus on Muslim minorities elsewhere for they had seen Hindus in their midst eating beef, speaking Pushto, dressing like themselves, both males and females. On the other side they saw their Khans generally hovering around Government House and the bungalows of the Commissioner or the D.C. and so they developed a strong dislike for them. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a very keen observer and he saw the feeling of his people against the British and taking advantage of the Pathans' sentiment in favour of the Khilafat and Congress he joined the civil disobedience movement of 1930 and lost thirty Pathan lives, shot by the British Army.

The Khan came to Lucknow in 1930 and stayed there with me for three days during which he asked me to introduce him to Gandhiji. Ever since his return to his Province he had followed the Congress creed and policies, but only to the extent to which he could safely go without arousing suspicion in the minds of his Khudai Khidmatgars that he was serving the Hindu cause. Although the elder brother Dr. Khan Sahib was very much in the movement yet the real brain behind the Red Shirt movement and Khudai Khidmatgars was the younger, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Dr. Khan Sahib, the elder brother, was of a different make. He, no doubt, was a man of the masses but he did not believe in blindly following the Congress policies. After Sir Abdul Qayyum Khan died, Dr. Khan Sahib formed the Ministry in 1938, resigning at the behest of the Congress in 1939 when the section 93 regime was introduced.

Sardar Auranzeb Khan was given permission from Mr. Jinnah to explore the chances of forming a League Ministry in the N.W.F.P. where at the time eight Congress M.L.As. were in jail. When Sardar Aurangzeb Khan told me during the League session of 1943 at Delhi that he had been allowed by the President to form a Ministry. I advised him to be cautious because I had serious doubts of his success, remembering that in 1942 when I was visiting Peshawar I had met both Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan and pleaded with them to join the League but both had given the cold-shoulder to my proposal. They had influence in their province and I felt doubtful whether Aurangzeb Khan would succeed in forming a Ministry there without the help and assistance of at least one of them. But the lure was too great for him to resist and in May 1944 he succeeded in forming his Ministry with Sardar Abdur Rab Nistar as his Finance Minister.

Soon after the Ministry was formed there were three bye-elections which the Muslim League had to win to keep the League Ministry going. During the hot summer months of June and July, Nawab Ismail Khan, Sayed Zakir Ali, Maulana Jamal Mian, Maulana Hameed Badauni and I went to help the League candidates. Surprisingly enough the gentleman who had been set up by the N.W.F.P. League from Peshawar was never introduced to us nor was he ever brought to the League platform to show his face to the public. When one day I complained about this to Mian Ziauddin, a very successful barrister and Secretary of the Muslim League of the Province, laughingly he said that 'the fellow was not worth it.' Mian Ziauddin is a great conversationalist and as Secretary of the League in the Province he served the organization with great distinction. He was one of the leading men in the League Conference at Abbottabad, aided by many Khans and Sajjad Ahmad Jan of Abbottabad. His contributions to the debates in the Council of the League were full of lucidity and tact.

Bombay: Sir Ali Mohammad Dehlavi had become the leader of the Muslim League Assembly party of Bombay in 1937. For me it was a great pleasure for he was the maternal uncle of my dear friend Rahman, but that apart his career had been very successful in the Province of Bombay. As already mentioned he was earlier the Prime Minister of Palanpur State, later became President of the Bombay Council and thereafter Minister under the 1919 Constitution. Besides him in the early days of the Muslim League Mr. I. I. Chundrigar was the most ardent Muslim League leader of the Province. Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim had joined the Muslim League with a determination to serve it in spite of some serious limitations from which he suffered for public service. Aziz Lalji was also an ardent Muslim Leaguer, and Mr. Mohammad Ali Maniar another asset for the organization, being very much in the confidence of Mr. Jinnah. Abdul Ghafoor Qazi served as Secretary of the Muslim League for a number of years and Maulana Fazlullah also contributed largely to the building up of the organization. Bombay being the permanent residence of Mr. Jinnah himself the League had the added advantage of his advice on all important matters. On the retirement of Sir Ali Mohammad Khan Dehlavi, Mr. Chundrigar replaced him in the Working Committee of the Muslim League in 1942.

Bihar: Mr. Abdul Aziz who had occupied a very prominent position in the Province for a long time was an old Khilafatist. I had stayed with him in 1924 as his guest along with Maulana

Shaukat Ali. He loved mangoes perhaps as much as I did. He was profuse in the praise of the *Langras* of Hajipur, while I expressed my bias for our *Khajori* and *Desehri* of Lucknow. In 1937 he became the leader of the Muslim League organization in Bihar. With a host of young Muslim workers to back him up he made the Patna session of the Muslim League in 1938 a very successful session of the rejuvenated Muslim League. He was also a member of the Working Committee of the Muslim League but unfortunately for the Province he agreed to become a Minister in Hyderabad State and was succeeded in office as President of the League by Nawab Mohammad Ismail alias Nawab Hajjan Sahib who, with all his desire to serve the cause sincerely, lacked the personality and the vision of Mr. Abdul Aziz.

Mr. Husain Imam confined his activities mostly to the Legislative Council of India and on the retirement of Mr. Abdul Aziz he replaced him in the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, becoming a member of the Central Parliamentary Board appointed in 1943, after the Karachi session. The Muslim League of Bihar had a large number of young men who had made the Muslim League popular and strong, such as Mr. Latifur Rahman and Jafar Imam, Secretary of the League. Amongst others Badrul Hasan and Mehdi Hasan of Bihar Sharif were very influential and popular leaders.

The Central Provinces : The Muslims of the C.P. with a population of only four per cent passed a very difficult time during the Congress regime. I have already given details of the Biswa Chandur riot and the harassment that was caused to the Muslim population of the Province in connection with that episode.

Although the basic education scheme proposed by Congress was the cause of great resentment to Muslims in every minority province yet the full force of it had fallen on C.P. where it was described as the Vidya Mandir scheme. The Muslims started agitating against it and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had to go to C.P. to bring about a settlement with Congress in which he succeeded for the time being and the matter was shelved. Hakim Israr Ahmad played a leading role in the language agitation.

The leader of the Province was Mr. Rauf Shah, an old Khilafatist and a very hard-working Muslim gentleman of advanced age. K.B. Abdur Rahman was his closest associate in the Working Committee of the Muslim League of the Province. Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan, who had organized a conference and invited me and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan to be his guests in

1941, was serving the Province to the best of his capacity. Later on Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan became the *Salar-i-Ala* of the All-India Muslim League. Mohammad Asghar, the Secretary of the Muslim League, had great influence in the Province and also rendered great service to the organization. Hakim Israr Ahmad had contributed to the building up of resistance against the Vidya Mandir scheme and the protection of the Urdu language in the Province. He had come out with a deputation of Scheduled Castes to Lucknow and while there had made very convincing speeches.

Assam: Sir Saadullah, as stated before, had to resign in 1938 due to quarrels between his own party-men, and Bardolai formed a Congress Ministry. When this Ministry resigned in 1939 Sir Saadullah was again invited by the Governor to form the Ministry. His Muslim colleagues in the Ministry were Munawwar Ali and Abdul Matin Choudhri, both from Sylhet. Assam is divided into two areas, Assami and Bengali. The Sylhet District which forms part of the Bengali area itself had a population of two million as against the total Muslim population of three and a half millions, and therefore most of the Muslim Ministers and zealous League workers came from Sylhet. Moinuddin Choudhri and his cousin, Dewan Abdul Basit, were in the vanguard of the Muslim League organization. Mahmud Ali, nephew of Munawwar Ali, the Revenue Minister, had always had leftist tendencies, even while he was a staunch Leaguer, and had the confidence of Maulana Bhashani who was generally the guest of Abdul Matin Choudhari Mudabbir Husain, Abdul Bari and Abdul Hai were also great figures in League circles. As I have said before, I used to go to Assam every year after 1941 and in 1943 I went again to see the damage that had been done to immigrants by the police treating them as squatters. The Government supplied me with an elephant to go round the area of fourteen miles infested with high grass and bushes. I asked Maulana Bhashani to ride the elephant with me but he preferred to walk all the fourteen miles with the files of the immigrants in his arm-pit, making me ashamed of myself. He has great energy for doing both good and harm to his people. Although his politics are always made for him by others yet once he starts moving his own momentum carries him along.

Madras: Of all the provinces of India, Madras was the one where relations between Hindus and Muslims had been comparatively most cordial. Far removed from the north, the Tamil-speaking people of the south had not that hatred for the Muslims which had become the cult of political success in northern

India. The south-west of Madras, Calicut and its suburbs is mostly populated by Moplas, i.e. descendants of early Arab settlers who had, in the early days of their contact with the Hindus of the south, exercised great influence in the spiritual sphere of the people of the country. Zamorin, a Raja of the south, is supposed to have gone to Mecca and died there and certain ceremonies are still held in one small area to commemorate his departure. The extent of the influence of Islam in the south may be disputed as it is very difficult to prove by reference to any historical evidence but the fact that since the days of Sankracharia most of the reformers who had preached the unity of Godhead and belief in Monism and Monotheism, such as Ramanuja and Ramananda, have come from the south, gives support to this theory.

In the early Khilafat days besides the Mopla leaders, Nawab Murtaza Bahadur, Seth Yaqub Hasan, Mr. Jamal Mohammad, a big businessman, and Mohammad Ismail, his young manager and relation, were the most well-known public leaders of the Province. Later on they were joined by Mr. Abdul Hamid, who was also once a Mayor of Madras, and Mr. Badshah. Since 1937 when Seth Yaqub Hasan opposed the Muslim League at the Lucknow session and retired into the wilderness Abdus Sattar Seth and others kept the League organization healthy and strong. Mr. Abdus Sattar Seth was also a member of the Working Committee of the Central League.

Baluchistan : With an area of 1,40,000 square miles, the Province has a population of about one million only. The only big city is Quetta but after the great earthquake in 1934 its population considerably decreased. But whether Quetta League or Baluchistan League, it was Qazi Isa's League. I had met him for the first time in the Woking Mosque in London on the Eid prayer day. He looked like a big grown-up doll with a red chubby face, his small hands and burly body. Our meeting there was very short and formal. On his return to India after doing his Bar he took to politics or to put it more correctly politics enveloped him. Very soon he became a member of the Working Committee and being the youngest had to undertake many odd jobs. Even while at Quetta I doubt very much whether he ever went to court; he held Muslim League court in his house where he decided League cases. With his great organizing capacity he had the whole of Baluchistan under his thumb to the great chagrin of the Sardars who looked upon him as an interloper, as he was not himself a Sardar. In the early days of the Muslim League, Khan Mohammad Khan Tarin of Pishin, Mir

Qadir Bakhsh and Nabi Bakhsh, Mr. Mohammad Azam, Salahuddin, Malik Jan Mohammad Kansi, Sardar Usman Jogezai, and Shaikh Mirak were his main colleagues but he went on adding to their numbers as well as organizing a well-trained corps of National Guards. Being himself a sweet and thoughtful speaker, he was in demand in other Muslim League provinces also. But most of his time was spent between Quetta and Delhi. Very few Muslim Leaguers in the majority provinces can claim to have put in so much time and sacrifice to the League cause as Qazi Isa. The Province can be proud of his services to Pakistan; more so because it was so selfless and so engrossing.

The Muslims of U.P. had made many charitable Waqfs in the past, but it was regretfully disclosed that the *mutawallis* or the trustees generally converted them into their personal assets or were wasting away the income of the Waqfs on their personal comfort and spending nothing on the purposes of the Waqf. Hafiz Hiyadat Husain had moved a Bill in the U.P. Council for the formation of a Central Waqf Board to supervise the Waqfs so that their income might be spent in accordance with the wishes of the donors. It hung for years in the Legislative Council and was not passed until 1936 when by it two Waqf Boards—Sunni and Shia—were created. Under this Act a Commissioner, Azizuddin Khan, was appointed to make a survey of the Waqfs and get them registered after inquiry. A Sunni Waqf Board was appointed by the Muslim members of the Assembly of which I was the Chairman with eleven other members. This meant additional work on my shoulders. A Shia Board was also created of which the Raja of Salempur became the President.

In August 1943, I suffered from a violent attack of bacillary dysentery and had to be removed to the Medical College, Lucknow, under the advice of Dr. Abdul Hamid, Professor of Pathology, my class-mate in Aligarh College and an affectionate friend. I feel it my duty to record my thankfulness for the attention and care which he showed as a friend and which saved my life.

I had now been the Chairman of Lucknow Municipal Board for seven years and was in my third term of office. At this time I had brought in Mr. Misbahuddin, who had served the Board in several capacities, as the Executive Officer and Manmohan Nath Chakbast as the Secretary.

For some time Dr. Panna Lal, Adviser for local self-Government of U.P. under the section 93 administration, had been greatly worried at the support of the Hindu majority in the Board to a Muslim Chairman who was leading the Pakistan fight. I had certain grievances against the attitude of the Government

towards the Lucknow Board and had asked the Government to appoint an Inquiry Committee concerning the finances of the Board. Dr. Panna Lal found an excuse to advise the Governor to include also a clause for an inquiry into the administration of the Board, particularly my refusal to increase the house tax as incessantly demanded by the Government. In my defence I had always pointed out that most of the owners of big dilapidated mansions were the Nawabs who had inherited them through their forefathers and were now living only on Wasiqas and as such the tax on house property would affect one section of the population very hardly. Therefore other sources of revenue had to be tapped but not house tax.

The Governor appointed a Committee of Inquiry presided over by Choudhri Niamatullah, a retired judge of Allahabad High Court and a very respected citizen of Lucknow. When I once met him he told me that Government's time and money was wasted on that inquiry and 'now it was in cold storage.' I remained Chairman of the Board for three years more after this inquiry and the Hindu members of the Board continued to support me loyally and steadfastly. Now that I am at the fag end of my life I have to thank them for the willing co-operation which they offered to me under very difficult conditions. Pandit Rahasbihari Tiwari, who was the President of the Lucknow Hindu Mahasabha and had always opposed my election as Chairman, asked me to see him in the hospital where he had been removed for treatment. I went to see him and found him very weak, suffering from consumption. He took my hands in his with tears in his eyes and asked his son, Bhirgudat Tiwari, to touch my feet and treat me as his father after he had gone. On the way back to my house I felt very miserable. I was meeting nothing but affection from my Hindu friends personally, but in matters of political policies I had miserably failed to convince them of the dangers that their leaders were courting by discarding Muslim sympathy and co-operation.

XXVII

THE RAJAJI FORMULA

1944

GANDHIJI being behind the bars and all other important leaders having gone to jail the country was comparatively quiet. Nevertheless, Gandhiji was intending to start a fast in jail from 10 February 1943 which naturally had created a flutter in the country. The Viceroy in his letter dated 5 February 1943 wrote to Gandhiji:

'You may rest assured that the charges against the Congress will have to be met sooner or later and it will then be for you and your colleagues to clear yourselves before the world if you can. And if meanwhile you yourself by any action, such as you now appear to be contemplating, attempt to find an easy way out, the judgment will go against you by default.'

I wish Lord Linlithgow had not used this language and given expression to such heartless feelings for a man like Gandhiji. During the course of the fast Sir H. P. Modi, Mr. N. H. Sarkar and Mr. M. S. Aney resigned from the Executive Council of the Governor-General as a protest against the Governor-General's failure to release Gandhiji. In this connection Mr. Aney's conduct throughout had been inconsistent. As stated by the Viceroy the decision of the Executive Council to arrest Gandhiji was unanimous. Mr. Aney in one statement said that he was not present in that meeting but after having seen the havoc that was wrought in the country as a result of the Bombay Resolution of the Congress he felt quite sure that if he had been present, he would have voted for the arrest of the Congress leaders. Now he had joined Modi and Sarkar in resigning from the membership of the Executive Council in protest against the Government's action.

I will not narrate the efforts that were made by leaders like Sir Tej Bahadur Supru, Dr. Jayakar, Sir Maharaj Singh, Mr. Ghanznavi, Dr. Shyama Prashad Mukerji, Master Tara Singh, Mr. Joshi and others to bring about the release of Gandhiji to save his life. They sent a telegram to Mr. Churchill pleading for the release of Gandhiji to which Mr. Churchill cabled back:

'There can be no justification for discrimination between Mr. Gandhi and other Congress leaders. The responsibility, therefore, rests entirely with Mr. Gandhi himself.' On 3 March 1943, Gandhiji broke his fast after having well stood the strain at his age.

On 9 March 1943 Sir Tej Bahadur Supru, Mr. Jayakar, Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, Mr. Rajagopalachari and Sir Jagdish Prasad and many other Congress leaders issued a statement asking for permission to meet the Viceroy to explore avenues for reconciliation. The Viceroy agreed to receive the deputation on condition that only the statement would be read and no discussion would be allowed. The Viceroy informed the leaders who met him that, 'neihter from Mr. Gandhi nor from any Congressman is there, nor had there been, a suggestion of a change of mind or heart.... They had the opportunity and have the opportunity still to abandon that policy.'

After the failure of the deputation, on 12 April 1943 Rajaji reiterated his faith in Pakistan on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday celebrations in Madras and said:

'I stand for Pakistan because I do not want that State where we Hindus and Muslims are both not honoured. Let Muslims have Pakistan. If we agree then our country will be saved. If the British raise further difficulty, we will overcome those difficulties.... I stand for Pakistan but I do not think the Congress will agree to this.... There are flowers in the Congress ranks which I want to pluck but the gates are closed and I am not allowed to go near the Congress to plead my cause.'

In his presidential address in that year's League session Mr. Jinnah invited Gandhiji to write to him instead of knocking at the other doors. Mr. Jinnah said:

'The position of the Congress is exactly the same as ever. Only it is put in different words and in different language but it means Hindu raj—Akhand Hindustan basis—the position which we can never accept. Nobody would welcome it more than myself if Mr. Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you that it will be the greatest day, both for the Hindus and Musalmans. If he had made up his mind, what is there to prevent Mr. Gandhi from writing direct to me? He is writing letters to the Viceroy. Why does he not write to me direct? Who is there that can prevent him from doing so? What is the use of going to the Viceroy and leading deputations and carrying on correspondence? Who is to prevent Mr. Gandhi today? I cannot believe for a single moment—strong as this Government may be in this country—you may say anything you like against this Government—I cannot believe that they will have the daring

to stop such a letter if it is sent to me. It will be a very serious thing, indeed, if such a thing is done by the Government. But I do not see evidence of any kind of change of policy on the part of Mr. Gandhi or Congress or the Hindu leadership.'

Gandhiji wrote a non-committal letter for Mr. Jinnah and sent it to the Government to be forwarded to him. On 26 May by a Government communique it was announced that a request had been made by Mr. Gandhi to forward a short letter from him to Mr. Jinnah expressing a wish to meet him. In accordance with their known policy in regard to correspondence or interviews of Mr. Gandhi, the Government of India had decided that this letter could not be forwarded and had so informed Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah.

The Congress naturally wanted to utilize this opportunity by calling on Mr. Jinnah to do something now in accordance with his promise made from the Muslim League platform. Mr. Jinnah replied, 'This letter of Mr. Gandhi can only be construed as a move on his part to embroil the Muslim League to come into a clash with the British Government solely for the purpose of helping his release so that he would be free to do what he pleases.' He said that there was no genuine desire on the part of Mr. Gandhi to bring about a change in his policy.

Reading Mr. Jinnah's speech one can see for oneself that he had asked from Mr. Gandhi something more explicit in regard to the Hindu-Muslim problem than a merely non-committal reply. It may be that the wording of his extempore speech reported by the Press did not convey his meaning fully but the reply received from Gandhiji was quite inadequate to meet Mr. Jinnah's condition.

The thirty-first session of the All-India Muslim League was held in Karachi from 24 to 26 December 1943. Sind was now fully behind the Muslim League with Mr. G. M. Sayed as the President of the League and Khuhro, Ghulam Nabi Pathan, Qazi Fazlullah, Yusuf Haroon, Mohammad Haroon and others all determined to make the session a big success. The Muslim League was now in a position to establish a Central Parliamentary Board to supervise the activities of the Legislators of the Muslim provinces, to watch the activities of the Ministers and to nominate candidates for the Legislature wherever necessary. it was also thought necessary to have a Committee of Action As the work of the Muslim League had increased enormously, to meet from time to time to supervise the organizational work of the Muslim League and control the activities of the National Guards, who had now been organized in all the provinces and

whose number had become enormous. The Muslim League had started enrolment of volunteers after the meeting of the Working Committee held on 15 June 1940. Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan of C. P. who had been supporting the movement from the beginning and who was one of the leaders of the Province had been appointed *Salar-i-Ala* of the National Guards and in U.P. we had appointed Mr. Sulaiman Jan of Muzaffarnagar as the *Salar* of the Province, he being also a well-known figure in the district and a member of the Working Committee of the provincial Muslim League. Similarly many other provinces had appointed their *Salars*. In view of these developments several problems had been created which required vigilance and control. It was therefore thought necessary that a Committee should be appointed which could meet, listen to and dispose of all matters connected with the organization of the League and the Volunteer Corps.

Originally I had proposed in my draft resolution the formation of only one committee both for parliamentary and organizational supervision but the Working Committee decided to have separate bodies. I moved a resolution in the open session also for the appointment of a Committee of Action and a Parliamentary Board which was passed unanimously. The following were the members of the Committee of Action : Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, Convenor, Mr. G. M. Sayed, Haji Abdus Sattar Ishaq Seth, Nawab Iftikhar Husain of Mamdot, Qazi Mohammad Isa and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan.

Rules for the guidance of the Parliamentary Board were also passed by a resolution and the following became members of the Parliamentary Board: Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr. Husain Imam and myself.

One of the worst journeys ever undertaken by me was to Tanjore in the extreme south of India. The Muslim League requested me to preside over a conference there. I left Lucknow in the summer of 1944 by G.I.P. for Madras via Nagpur. Railway reservation during the war period had no value left and the compartments were always overcrowded. In a compartment meant for nine there were fifteen passengers travelling. With great difficulty I got just a small space to sit uncomfortably in the first class. By the time I reached Bhopal at 12 p.m., after sitting in that condition for fourteen hours I had no courage to continue further. I got down at Bhopal and phoned to Shuaib to send his car to take me to his residence. I rested there for a day and then again started on my journey. This time it was not so bad and after travelling for two nights and one day I reached Tanjore. I

had never before been to this side of India and had occasion to see many old temples. The relations between the Hindus and Muslims were very cordial. Many Hindus attended the Muslim Conference which was very successful.

On my return I stopped at Hyderabad to meet my son Atiquzzaman who was the Manager of the State Mint. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang invited me to dinner at which we discussed and reviewed the political situation in the country. We had decided to travel together to Bombay next morning by train. There was a large party of friends there at the station to see us off but Nawab Sahib did not come. I thought that he had missed the train. When I reached Bombay I learnt that he had died. It gave me a great shock for besides being a great leader of the States people, he was also an asset to Muslim India and had contributed a great deal in adding strength to the Muslim League. I have already mentioned his oratorical gifts and services to the Anjuman Ittehadul Muslimeen.

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had been returned to the Assembly on the death of Maulana Shaukat Ali as a Muslim League candidate and he was now the Deputy Leader of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly. At the time, the policy both of Congress and the Muslim League on the question of formation of a National Government at the Centre was common. The difference, if any, was in regard to the number of seats to be allotted to each in the Executive Council and the British Government had kept this question hanging over since the declaration of war. In the 1944 budget session of the Assembly both the Congress and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan started hitting at the Government and defeating it on some important items on the agenda as well as on the budget. The Congress was naturally very happy that the Muslim League was coming nearer and nearer every day and the time, it seemed, might come when some settlement might be reached between the two. It was in this atmosphere that Gandhiji was released on 6 May 1944.

After the retirement of Lord Linlithgow and the arrival of Lord Wavell as Viceroy on 8 October 1943 the Government made a great gesture to Congress by releasing Gandhiji. Even before his release Congressmen had been busy in explaining the 'Quit India' resolution and emphasizing the fact that Gandhiji could not be held responsible for what followed after his arrest and detention, and in the same strain the Press continued to play up such explanations. With due respect to those who pleaded before his release and after that Gandhiji could not be shouldered with the responsibility of infructuous rebellion and tried to

explain away the exhortation to 'do or die', I am constrained to think, now that India is free and the British have gone back home, it behoves Congressmen to read important historical movements of India in their true perspective, uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations. The vain attempt to put forward far-fetched interpretations of Gandhiji's speech on this question manifestly derogates from the splendour of the chivalrous movement, started by him at the advanced age of 72 years—the last in his life—to break the British might in India. He could not have chosen a better time for it. The British Indian armies were fighting in other war sectors and the few divisions left in India were scattered over Assam and East Bengal; and he was absolutely certain that even if the Muslims did not join the Congress movement they would under no circumstances start Hindu-Muslim riots. No better opportunity could offer itself to India if this were allowed to be missed. I am fully conscious that outworn stories supported by Gandhiji's statement from jail will be hurled at my head to disprove my theory. I am prepared to concede that Gandhiji had not laid down any programme of violent activities, but no further. He had read what Jawaharlal had said about his decision in suspending the Satyagraha movement in 1922 after Chouri Choura and was not prepared to repeat it again in case sporadic violence broke out. His whole speech was meant to convey to the Congressmen that while he still adhered to his non-violent creed, he was prepared to risk it at the altar of Indian independence.

On several occasions in this book I have criticized some of Gandhiji's utterances as being quite irreconcilable with previous ones and I can therefore forgive Mr. Sitaramayya for having wasted much ink and labour in trying to reconcile Gandhiji's statements, including the last one in relation to the 'Quit India' movement. Gandhiji at least on one occasion definitely remarked that he might not be quoted against himself. With an immense store of initiative and sound judgment he went on creating new situations to justify new theories and new policies. If the movement failed, it failed because Hindu India failed him, lest Muslims should run away with titles, permits, offices, contracts and services.

Rajaji had discussed the Pakistan question with Gandhiji when he was fasting in the Aga Khan's palace in February 1943, and it appears that he had been able to secure Gandhiji's consent for his formula. About this time Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth of Kotra, ex-General Secretary, All-India Hindu Mahasabha, issued the following statement to the Press:

'The proposals made by Mr. C. Rajagopalachari for communal settlement with the approval of Mahatma Gandhi are none other than those which Mr. Jinnah himself had proposed and are in accordance with the famous Pakistan Resolution of the Lahore Muslim League session of 1940.

I may take the public into confidence and state that the Working Committee of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha in August 1942 appointed a special committee to negotiate with the leaders of the principal political parties and to mobilize public opinion in support of the national demand. I was then the General Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha and on behalf of this special committee carried on negotiations with Mr Jinnah and through the help of a common friend who holds a very important position in the Muslim League the following terms were offered for compromise with the Muslim League:

"The leader of the Muslim League endorses the national demand for freedom as adumbrated in the resolution of August 30, 1942, of the Working Committee of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha and expresses the League's readiness to join other parties to fight for and win freedom immediately, provided a settlement is reached with the Muslim League guaranteeing certain broad principles. In the event of such a settlement being reached the Muslim League will co-operate in the formation of a Provisional Composite Government.

The broad principles to be agreed to are that after the war:

(A) A commission shall be appointed to mark out contiguous areas in the north-west and north-east of India where the Muslim population is in a majority. (B) In those two areas there shall be a universal plebiscite and if the majority of the population vote in favour of a separate sovereign state such a state shall be formed. (C) In the event of separation the Muslims shall not demand any safeguards for the Muslim minority in Hindustan. It will be open to two Indias to arrange on a reciprocal basis safeguards for religious minorities in the respective states. (D) There shall be no corridor between the two Muslim areas in the north-west and north-east of India but the two areas shall constitute one Sovereign State. (E) Indian states shall provide for giving due facilities for transfer of population absolutely on a voluntary basis."

So it will be seen that there is practically no change in the proposals made by Rajaji.

Of course, neither I nor the Hindu Mahasabha could accept these proposals as we cannot possibly be a party to any proposal for the vivisection of the country in any shape or form but at the Conference held by Sir Tej Bahadur Supru at his place at Allahabad in December 1942 which was attended among others by Mr. Rajagopalachari, I simply read out the terms offered on behalf of the Muslim League for settlement and I gave a copy of it to Mr. Rajagopalachari as well, who showed it to Mahatmaji during his twenty-one days' fast in March 1943 and got his approval to the proposals. Rajaji called me to Delhi on 26 March 1943, and I again got in touch with Mr. Jinnah through another

common friend holding an equally important position in the Muslim League but, to my great surprise, Mr. Jinnah was unwilling to accept the terms for compromise which he himself had offered in September 1942. It has been very clear to me since then that Mr. Jinnah does not want a settlement at all. I must not be understood to say that I ever supported these proposals. I do not at all approve of the idea of the vivisection of the country. I mention the above facts to emphasize that the stand taken by the Hindu Mahasabha that no efforts should be made to appease Mr. Jinnah is absolutely correct.'

I was not surprised at the publication of the statement of Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth for he had already conveyed to me in the first week of October 1942 the gist of the talk that he had with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan. There was so much excitement amongst Muslims against Congress and the Hindu Sabha that they did not take any notice of the statement. What was most painful about it was that neither Mr. Jinnah nor Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan ever took the Working Committee into their confidence about it. And even after the statement of Maheshwar Dayal Seth no denial from either of them was made.

I now take up the Gandhi-Jinnah talks and the Rajaji Formula. In February 1943 when Rajaji had met Gandhiji he had obtained his consent for a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Gandhiji authorized him to signify his approval to the terms contained in his proposal. Rajaji met Mr. Jinnah in April 1944 and handed over to him his formula:

'(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the Constitution of free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a Provisional Interim Government for the transitional period.

(2) After the termination of war a Commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India wherein the Muslim population is in an absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated the plebiscite of all the inhabitants, held on the basis of adult franchise or other practicable franchise, shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to join either state.

(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their point of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation mutual agreements shall be entered into in respect of defence, commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolute voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.'

Now reading the Formula as it is and comparing it with what we ultimately succeeded in securing through the actual partition under British Government, one may be inclined to think that but for the last clause (6) all the other clauses offered by Rajaji for a compromise were far better, inasmuch as the important subjects like defence, commerce and communications were not to be imposed on the outgoing area or the Muslim sovereign state but depended upon agreements by the free will of the parties. Then again the transfer of population was not to be wholesale but absolutely on a voluntary basis. Above all in the areas where the Muslim population was in an absolute majority we had every chance of winning in the plebiscite, for after the exclusion of border districts the Muslim population in the remaining part of West Punjab would have been increased to more than sixty-five per cent. In the other area where we were not in an absolute majority, namely border districts, the choice was given to those areas to join either State, which left a chance for getting some districts to come to the Pakistan area, particularly the whole of Kashmir.

As regards clause (1) the Muslim League was as anxious to get into the Provisional Government as the Congress and, further, there was no demand for partition during the continuation of war

Mr. Jinnah informed Rajaji that he could place his formula before the Working Committee but he could not commit himself at that stage. On 17 April, Mr. Rajagopalachari wrote to Mr. Jinnah again to reconsider the terms of his proposal. Later Rajaji sent a telegram to him on 30 June 1944:

'My letter dated 17th April touching matter personally discussed on April 8th remains yet unanswered. Have now met Gandhiji who still holds by Formula presented to you by me. I would like now to publish the formula and your rejection.'

On 2 July 1944 Mr. Jinnah repudiated the charge by telegram:

'Your wrong version our talk that I rejected your Formula is unfair, surprising. True facts are I was willing place your Formula before Working Committee Muslim League although it was not open to any modification but you did not allow me to do so. Hence no step was taken. My reaction was that I could not personally take responsibility of accepting or rejecting it and my position remains same today. If Mr. Gandhi even now sends me direct his proposal I am willing place it before Muslim League Working Committee.'

As private negotiations between Mr. Rajagopalachari and Mr. Jinnah failed, the correspondence was released to the Press.

Later on Gandhiji himself moved in the matter and wrote a letter to Mr. Jinnah on 17 July expressing his desire to meet him. After some correspondence a date was fixed and Gandhiji met Mr. Jinnah in Bombay on 9 September 1944, for talks which lasted till 27 September 1944. It will serve no useful purpose to reproduce these talks in detail, particularly when nothing came out of them. The initial objection taken by Mr. Jinnah which he had repeated many times since the year 1937 was that Gandhiji did not represent even the Congress and had no capacity to speak on its behalf and that he spoke rather for Hindu India.

This attitude was very much resented by Congressmen who felt that while even the British Government did not raise such objections to Gandhiji's capacity to speak for the country and the Congress, the Muslim League leader questioned his status. Mr. Jinnah might have avoided taking this attitude particularly when he, in his telegram to Rajaji himself, had said that 'If Mr. Gandhi even now sends me direct his proposal I am willing to place it before the Muslim League Working Committee.'

The real difficulty, however, in the way of the Muslim League accepting the Rajaji Formula was clause (6) that 'these terms shall be binding only in case of transfer of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.' It was capable of being interpreted to mean that all steps for partition would remain on paper pending transfer of powers to the Congress by the British Government. However, later on, during the course of his talk with Mr. Jinnah, Gandhiji in his letter dated 11 September 1944 to Mr. Jinnah used the words 'Provisional Government' for the appointment of a Commission, which is also in accord with the words used by Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth. However, if it was the intention of Mr. Jinnah to agree to a truncated Pakistan, he might have discussed the difficulties which stood in the way of settlement by further negotiation.

The main point concerning the Lahore Resolution was the claim of Rajaji 'to have clothed that indefinite resolution with flesh and form.' What he thereby meant perhaps was the provision in the resolution, 'with such territorial readjustment as may be necessary' which made the scheme uncertain and indefinite. In his letter to Mr. Jinnah dated 11 September, in para. 3, Gandhiji said, 'The Commission will be appointed by the Provisional Government. Absolute majority means a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or Frontier

Province. The form of plebiscite and the franchise must be a matter for discussion.' In reply Mr. Jinnah said:

'You say the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. You never asked me for any clarification or explanation of the terms of the Resolution but you really indicated your emphatic opposition to the very basis and fundamental principles embodied in it. I should therefore like to know in what way or respect the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. I cannot agree that Rajaji has taken the substance and given it shape. On the contrary he has not only put it out of shape but mutilated it.'

On 14 September, Gandhiji wrote:

'I should clarify your difficulties in understanding the Rajaji Formula and you should do likewise regarding yours, i.e. Muslim League Lahore Resolution of 1940. With reference to the Lahore Resolution as agreed between us I shall deal with it in a separate letter. Perhaps at the end of our discussion we shall discover that Rajaji not only has not put Lahore Resolution out of shape and mutilated it but has given it substance and form.... As to 5th supposing that the result of the plebiscite is in favour of partition the Provisional Government will draft the Treaty and agreements.'

By 15 September, Gandhiji's main objection as regards the two-nation theory was brought out. He said that he did not find anything in the Lahore Resolution itself to justify the claim of the two-nation theory. Mr. Jinnah defended it strongly and ultimately the talks broke down on 27 September 1944, without specifying what Mr. Jinnah meant by 'territorial readjustment' and what Gandhiji understood by that phrase. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah did not call a meeting of the Working Committee of the Muslim League before breaking up talks on this very important and crucial subject.

In his very widely read book *Islam in Modern History*, Mr. Wilfred Cantwell Smith has taken notice of a special feature of Muslim Nationalism when he wrote:

'The third basic point in this matter is that whatever nationalism has been adopted in the Muslim world and in whatever form, the "nation" concerned has been a Muslim group. No Muslim people have evolved a national feeling that has meant loyalty to, or even concern for a community transcending the bounds of Islam.'*

He has mentioned† my name in connection with the Muslim conception of unity of the Islamic world by reference to my tour of the Middle East in 1949 as President of the Pakistan

*New York, The New American Library, p. 77.
†Op. cit., p. 82, f.n. 69.

Muslim League. His remark, 'due to perhaps the rather discouraging reception that he received, led him to relax his thesis somewhat' does justice neither to the object of my tour nor to its result.

In the same strain is a letter from Lala Lajpat Rai, an ex-President of the Indian National Congress and a great Hindu leader, to Mr. Das (reproduced in a pamphlet by one Indra Prakash) in which he has said:

'There is one point more which has been troubling me very much of late and one about which I want you to think carefully and that is the question of Hindu-Mohammadan Unity. I have devoted most of my time during the last six months to the study of Muslim history and Muslim law and I am inclined to think that it is neither possible nor practicable. Assuming and admitting the sincerity of Mohammadan leaders in the nonco-operation movement I think their religion provides an effective bar to anything of the kind. You remember the conversation I reported to you in Calcutta with Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Kitchlu. There is no finer Mohammadan in Hindustan than Hakim Ajmal Khan but can any Muslim leader override the Quran? I can only hope that my reading of Islamic law is incorrect.'

The reference to Calcutta may be in connection with the special session of the Congress there during which an attempt was made by some of the Hindu leaders like himself and Mr. Bipendra Chandra Pal to dissuade Mr. Das from supporting Gandhiji on the Khilafat issue.

I will not try to deal with other Muslim countries but so far as India was concerned the remarks of both Mr. Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Lala Lajpat Rai cannot find support from a history of Muslim rule of 800 years. That they came as conquerors is an admitted fact but no one can deny that they brought unification of the country, restored law and order, established proper administration of justice and never tried to impose their religion on the Hindus as the only twenty-five per cent Muslim population in the country at the time of partition confirms. Yet during one century and a half of British rule the Christian Church claimed sixty lakh converts. Besides, the languages of the Muslims—Arabic and Persian—had given way to the evolution of a common language, Urdu, which contained about seventy-five per cent words of Hindi and Sanskrit origin. Similarly a common culture and a common social life had also been evolved which were prospering until the British came on the scene and whether intentionally or not tried to introduce their own democratic system in the country, one to which the Muslims did not subscribe. Sir Sayed Ahmad

Khan, the father of the Muslim people of India, always described them as a religious community as distinct from the Hindus. Nevertheless he always supported the claims of the country for the introduction of a liberal constitution. Again when Gandhiji offered help to the Khilafat cause the Muslims willingly accepted Swaraj as their creed in the special session of Calcutta on 8 September 1920, and many of their leaders offered great sacrifices in the cause. The Congress before the Khilafat agitation had been wedded to a claim for self-government, and made the demand for independence only in 1929. The Muslim League also accepted the creed of independence in 1937, which clearly meant the acceptance by the Muslims of India of a sub-national status. And but for that decision of the Muslims to see their country free from domination the British rule might have been prolonged indefinitely.

It would be futile to argue that Muslims have no extra-territorial loyalties but that only confirms the view that territorial nationalism has failed to cover the entire human self, and as the world progresses the shortcomings of that creed are becoming more and more obvious. The entire trend of future politics is assuming an extra-territorial aspect. Federalism and Confederalism, common markets and so on are only an indication of the future shape of things. The U.N.O. is the biggest proof, if proof were needed, that territorial nationalism is a dying force. African states are contemplating having one common Government for all the African peoples and who knows if after some time such a move will not be started in Europe and other continents. Why should Muslims alone be made the target of having extra-territorial loyalties? The difference between Islam and other religions arises from the fact that Islam does not believe in the division of church and state, which necessarily throws the entire burden of maintaining its religious solidarity on Muslims collectively and individually and for the protection of their laws and their special interests in the world.

The demand for Pakistan was in the nature of the right of self-determination of a people and whether the two-nation theory was right or wrong the fact that fifty million Muslims are living peacefully and loyally as citizens of India, is a complete answer to the charge of Mr. Cantwell Smith and Lala Lajpat Rai.

Mr. Jinnah himself realized the grave dangers to Muslims who after the partition were to be left in India. I remember that on 1 August 1947, a few days before his final departure for Karachi, Mr. Jinnah called the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly of India to his house at 10 Aurangzeb Road to bid

farewell to them. Mr. Rizwanullah put some awkward questions concerning the position of Muslims who would be left over in India, their status and their future. I had never before found Mr. Jinnah so disconcerted as on that occasion, probably because he was realizing then quite vividly what was immediately in store for the Muslims. Finding the situation awkward, I asked my friends and colleagues to end the discussion. I believe as a result of our farewell meeting Mr. Jinnah took the earliest opportunity to bid goodbye to his two-nation theory in his speech on 11 September 1947 as the Governor-General designate of Pakistan and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan:

'Now if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.... I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and the minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community —because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishyas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed, if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long ago.... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the State.'

XXVIII

THE SIMLA CONFERENCE

1945

THE READERS will remember that soon after the Lucknow session of the Muslim League in 1937, differences had arisen regarding the Constitution of the Punjab provincial Parliamentary Board. Sir Sikandar in an interview had claimed that Mr. Jinnah had agreed to give a majority to the Unionists in the Board, which the Punjab Muslim League disputed. In one of his letters to Mr. Jinnah dated 1 November 1937 Allama Iqbal wrote:

'Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan with some of the members of his party saw me yesterday and we had a talk about the differences beween the League and the Unionist Party. Statements had been issued to the Press by both sides. Each side is putting his own interpretation on the terms of the Jinnah-Sikandar agreement. This has caused much misunderstanding. As I wrote to you before, I will put you in possession of all those statements in a few days time. For the present I request you to kindly send me as early as possible a copy of the agreement which was signed by Sir Sikandar and which I am told is in your possession.'

I have already discussed the terms and conditions disclosed by Sir Sikandar in the meeting of the Council of the Muslim League which had given Sir Sikandar the right to continue his non-communal party, the Unionist Party, intact; but he had also undertaken to advise all Muslim members of the Assembly party to join the Muslim League. From the very nature of the terms of the agreement disputes were bound to crop up between the Muslim League organization and the Unionist Party. During the lifetime of Sir Sikandar the differences had not assumed any ugly shape but, in spite of what had been achieved during the Muslim League session at Delhi in 1943 in the talks between Mr. Jinnah and Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, the situation later became very tense. Mr. Jinnah went to Lahore on 20 March 1944 to bring an end to the strife.

In his talks with Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, he unmistakably

demanded that he should persuade his Hindu and Sikh colleagues to join in a Muslim League Government in the Punjab when they could continue to associate in the Ministry as before. The Punjab Premier consulted his Sikh and Hindu colleagues and Mr. Jinnah himself had several interviews with them but nothing satisfactory came out of the talks. The position of the Hindu and Sikh minorities represented in the Cabinet as disclosed to Malik Khizar Hayat Khan was the following:

1. The formation of such a Ministry in the Punjab is a part of an all-India understanding.
2. The idea of Pakistan is abandoned for the period of the war and in order to enable all concerned to judge the merits of the scheme, its precise political and constitutional implications are fully explained and the geographical boundaries of the Punjab under the scheme of Pakistan as well as the principles to be adopted for the fixation of such boundaries are indicated as clearly as practical, and
3. An unequivocal assurance is given in a resolution formally adopted by the League that the League will give unconditional support to all forms of war effort until final victory is won.

Mr. Jinnah was of the opinion that the minorities in the Punjab had no right to urge upon the League a compromise on issues of an all-India character. Those matters did not come within their rights as a provincial minority.

With this attitude on the part of Mr. Jinnah, the Premier of the Punjab could not expect a settlement. He informed Mr. Jinnah accordingly. Thereupon Mr. Jinnah wrote a formal letter on 27 April 1944, calling upon him formally to inform him whether he himself agreed to the proposal made to him to form a League Government. As no reply was given by the Premier to this letter, another letter was handed over by Mr. Jinnah to be delivered through the Nawab of Mamdot and Mian Mumtaz Daultana to Malik Khizar Hayat Khan with instructions to get an acknowledgment of the letter. The Premier resented this demand and the two gentlemen who had delivered the letter went back. In the meanwhile Mr. Jinnah had a telephonic talk with Malik Khizar Hayat Khan. Mr. Sitaramayya has made a long comment on the version of this conversation received from Congress sources describing Mr. Jinnah as haughty and impetuous in using very strong language against the Premier of Punjab, but from the statements of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan the Congress story appears to be greatly exaggerated.

On 27 April 1944, Mr. Jinnah issued a statement to the Press, published in *Tribune* on 28 April in which he strongly criticized the refusal of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan to acknowledge

the receipt of his letter which he had sent through the Nawab of Mamdot and Mian Mumtaz Daultana. The proposals which Mr. Jinnah had made for the acceptance of Khizar Hayat Khan and his other Ministers were:

'1. That every member of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assembly should declare that he owed allegiance solely to the Muslim League Party in the Assembly and not to the Unionist or any other political party.

2. That the present label of the coalition, viz. Coalition Party, should be dropped.

3. That the name of the proposed coalition should be the Muslim League Coalition Party.'

But no reply was given by Malik Khizar Hayat Khan to these points.

When Mr. Jinnah was asked what course of action he thought could be taken by the Muslim League in the matter, he said whatever course of action that would be in accordance with the Constitution of the Muslim League. Even as the President of the All-India Muslim League he did not like to say anything beyond that.

On 29 April 1944, Mr. Jinnah presided over a very big conference held at Sialkot in which he said, 'Khizar has violated the discipline of the party of which he is a member. He has adopted a course which is unprecedented and unheard of in the history of any political party in the country.' In this conference he again narrated the whole history of his four weeks' talks with the Punjab Premier.

Malik Khizar Hayat Khan issued a rejoinder on 28 April 1944. His points briefly were that in the first general elections under the Government of India Act 1935 no Muslim League Ministry could be formed, which had severely handicapped the Muslim League and its leader Mr. Jinnah in all discussions and negotiations of an all-India character. To meet the criticism questioning Mr. Jinnah's status as the accredited Muslim leader and to enable him to represent the whole of Muslim India and settle terms with other parties in all-India matters Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan concluded the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. References to this Pact had been repeatedly made in responsible League quarters since 1937, without any repudiation from Mr. Jinnah. Under the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact it was clearly understood that the formation of the Muslim League party would not affect the continuance of the present coalition of the Unionist Party and also that the existing combination should maintain its present name, the Unionist Party. Mr. Jinnah now desired that the

name should be changed to 'Muslim League Coalition.' This would be a violation of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact which had been in the field for well over six years. He and his non-Muslim colleagues, he said, stood by that Pact. He continued:

> 'It is to the credit of my non-Muslim colleagues that they agreed to co-operate with the Muslim League as the only Muslim party in the Punjab and to co-operate with it in running the Government of this Province for the duration of the war. The proposed agreement would have secured the wishes of the Muslim League and its greatest merit would have been to maintain complete unity within the Muslim community which has been the most significant feature of the political life of the Punjab. The Unionist Party during its existence passed agrarian legislation which helped the backward Muslim community in the Punjab to compare favourably with any other in India.
>
> The fact that I have found it impossible to accept Mr. Jinnah's demand does not mean that our ultimate objective, viz. the cultural protection and economic betterment of the Muslim masses, is different. The All-India Muslim League Resolution of 1940 is the sheet anchor of the Muslims in the Punjab as elsewhere. The Muslims of the Punjab must have the right of self-determination.'

Mr. Jinnah referred the matter to the Committee of Action which decided to call upon the Premier of Punjab either to appear in person before the Committee on 7 May 1944, if he desired to do so, or to send his replies to the charges enumerated against him. After a long interchange of letters between the Committee of Action and the Premier they ultimately expelled him from the Muslim League. Thereupon the Premier of Punjab issued a Press statement on 6 June 1944, in which he stated:

> 'The Pact was regarded by Sir Sikandar as a joint agreement between him and Mr. Jinnah equally binding upon Sir Sikandar's followers and the Muslim League of which Mr. Jinnah was the leader. That fact was accepted by the All-India Muslim League as is shown by a statement issued to the Press on 28 October 1937, by the Secretary of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, which said, "after Sir Sikandar had made the statement, the drafting of the agreement was entrusted to Sir Sikandar and Malik Barkat Ali, M.L.A. The agreement so drafted was accepted by the Council of the All-India Muslim League."'

The Premier further referred to the letter of Allama Iqbal already mentioned and to another letter of Allama Iqbal, dated 10 November, in which he wrote: 'In your Pact with him [Sir Sikandar] it is mentioned that the Parliamentary Board will be reconstituted and the Unionists will have a majority in the Board. Sir Sikandar tells me that you agreed to their majority

in the Board.' On these facts, the Premier of Punjab said that it was not worthy of Mr. Jinnah to declare that there was no Pact but only a unilateral declaration made by Sir Sikandar.

Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, in the concluding portion of the statement, said:

> 'So far as the Muslim ideal of self-determination as embodied in the Lahore Resolution, popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, is concerned the Committee of Action's present decision does not affect in any way my whole-hearted support for it. Whether I remain in the Muslim League or not I shall do all I can to help my community's efforts to realize that idea.'

The point of importance in Malik Khizar Hayat's statement is 'The Muslim ideal of self-determination as embodied in the Lahore Resolution.' It is the same language as Sir Sikandar had used about the Lahore Resolution.

On 20 April 1945 Mr. Amery moved in the House of Commons for the extension of authority of the Governors for the continuation of section 93 for another year. Two days after, on 2 April 1945 speaking in the Political Conference at Peshawar, Bhulabhai Desai informed the gathering that he had already submitted a proposal before His Majesty's Government for the formation of an Interim Government at the Centre and that he hoped it would be accepted by Britain and approved by other political parties. Already for some time past there had been whispers in political circles that an agreement had been arrived at between Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Bhulabhai Desai in January 1945, although the Muslim League Working Committee had no knowledge of it. My Hindu friends often questioned me about it and when I pleaded ignorance, they thought that I was not inclined to give them the information.

Lord Wavell returned to India from London after staying there for about two and a half months, on 4 June 1945. On 14 June Lord Wavell's plan was broadcast to India and simultaneously a statement was made in the House of Commons by Mr. Amery. The Viceroy announced that a conference would be held at Simla on 6 July 1945 in which the political parties would be represented, to settle terms for the formation of a new Viceroy's Executive Council. He stated that there would be an equal number of Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled Caste and parties in the Council. He asked for a panel of names in a joint or separate list—Congress and the League. The broadcast also announced the release of the Congress Working Committee.

Immediately thereafter a meeting of the Muslim League was announced to be held at Simla on 6 July 1945. Mr. Jinnah stayed

at the Cecil Hotel, Simla. I reached there a day later and stayed along with Nawab Ismail Khan in another hotel. Next morning I met Mr. Jinnah who inquired from me whether I knew anything about the Desai-Liaquat Pact. I said that the Nawabzada had never talked to me about it but from my Hindu friends who were also very close friends of Bhulabhai I had come to know that one day in January 1945 when both of them were in the Assembly, Bhulabhai passed a chit to him '40 : 40 : 20.' The Nawabzada wrote down 'Yes agreed.' Later on they met several times to discuss details about the formation of the Interim Government. I expressed surprise and regret at this because I thought that to bring an Interim Government into power without an agreement on our basic demand would be detrimental to us.

The meeting of the Muslim League continued from day to day for a few days. Our first objection was that there was no room for a joint list for a National Government; secondly, we claimed that the list to be submitted by the Muslim League should be final and the Viceroy's demand for a panel of names was unjustified; and thirdly, the most vital point of difference was that we claimed that the five Muslims in the National Cabinet should all be Muslim Leaguers.

On 14 July I had tea with Sir Francis Mudie, who was very friendly to me and whom I considered to be a very efficient civilian with great intelligence and understanding. When he was appointed as the Home Member he had superseded many civilians and that speaks of his qualities of head and heart. While I was taking my tea with him somebody called him on the telephone. Having received the 'phone call, turning towards me, he said, 'Now I think you should agree to the new proposal because you are getting four and a half out of five seats.' I said, 'What do you mean by four and a half? Who is this half?' He replied, 'It is Sir Mohammad Nawaz Khan who has always been in the party of Mr. Jinnah in the Assembly and could be relied upon by him completely.' I told Sir Francis, 'You know that personally I am not in favour of joining the National Council and I hope Mr. Jinnah also will not agree to four and a half.' He smiled and said nothing.

In the last meeting of the Muslim League held on 14 July 1945, the entire correspondence which had passed between the President of the Muslim League and the Viceroy was reviewed. The main points of difference between the Viceroy's proposal and the League's stand were:

1. The League was not prepared to send in a panel of names. In support of its objection it had quoted the instance when

Lord Linlithgow had made a similar proposal which was turned down by the League.

2. The Muslim League demanded that out of twelve seats in the Executive Council five should be reserved for the Muslim League and that it would not accept in this quota any Muslim of another party.

There was complete unanimity in the Muslim League Working Committee about these demands.

As the terms were not acceptable either to the Government or the Congress the inclination of the Viceroy was to by-pass the League and form his National Government by choosing Muslim representatives either from other parties or Independents. He therefore consulted the Secretary of State, Mr. Amery, in regard to his proposal but it was turned down by the latter. This, I believe, was one of the last memorable acts of Mr. Amery before he handed over charge of his office to Lord Pethick Lawrence ten days later.

Malik Khizar Hayat Khan was suspected of negotiating with the Viceroy through the Congress President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, to be given a seat in the Muslim quota, representing Punjab. On this account Mr. Jinnah in his statement blamed Malik Khizar Hayat Khan for having tried to stab the League in the back. In a long statement Malik Khizar Hayat Khan replied that there were unbridgeable differences between the Muslim League and the Congress which could not be resolved and it would be wrong to hold him responsible for the claim of the Congress to have at least one Muslim nominee from the Congress side. He ended his statement by saying: 'Thus the Conference never reached the stage at which I had to press my demand for the inclusion of a Punjabi Muslim nor did it break down on that account.' Closely following Malik Khizar Hayat Khan's statement dated 17 July, Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash, a prominent member of the Unionist Party, issued another statement on 26 July 1945, in support of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, upholding the view that it was not due to Malik Khizar Hayat Khan that the Conference had failed. He quoted Choudhri Khaliquzzaman and Sir Nazimuddin, both members of the Muslim League Working Committee, holding that Congress and the British Government were responsible for the failure of the Conference, statements having been made by them to this effect on 19 July 1945.

So far as I was personally concerned I had no qualms regarding the failure of this Conference, as throughout I had been opposed to the idea of the League's association with Congress

whether it were on a 5 : 5 : 2 or 5 : 5 : 3 or 5 : 5 : 4 basis. In any arrangement the Muslim League on all crucial matters would have been in a minority. Neither the Sikhs nor the Parsis nor the Scheduled Castes could have been expected to stand up against Congress to support the League's representatives in the Viceroy's National Council. Leaving aside my personal view I thought that the main party responsible for the break-up was the Congress. The statement of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad issued from Simla on 17 July 1945 read:

'So far as the Congress is concerned it has repeatedly declared its readiness to take up the responsibility of administration. If the British Government were really anxious to settle the issue they should have foreseen and realized the communal and other difficulties and should have been prepared to meet them. They should not have given the right of veto to any particular group to hold up the progress of the country.... Those who are prepared to go forward should be allowed to go onwards. Those who wish to keep out should be left out.... I should like to emphasize and make it perfectly clear that the Congress is essentially a national organization and it may not be possible for it to be a party to any arrangement, however interim and temporary it may be, that prejudices its national character, tends to impair the growth of nationalism and reduces it directly or indirectly to a communal body.'

In *India Wins Freedom* the Maulana has placed responsibility for the failure of the Conference on the Muslim League and the British Government and expressed the view that if Khizar Hayat Khan had been included the number of Muslims in the National Government would have been seven in a Council of fourteen although they were only twenty-five per cent of the total population of India. Firstly the Maulana ignores the fact that he was claiming a seat from the Muslim quota of five; thus there would have been only four Muslim Leaguers. The other three from the minorities would have been Congressmen or Independents, who could not be relied upon to stand with the Muslim League on any crucial occasion. However, one may ask the Maulana whether when he wrote this in his book* he did not think in terms of communalism?

Three weeks after the breakdown of the Simla Conference Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan issued a statement to the Press in the first week of August 1945, explaining the genesis of the so-called Desai-Liaquat Pact. The gist of the explanation was as follows:

'1. Bhulabhai Desai had told the local press of Bombay that

*Op. cit., p. 114.

the so-called Desai-Liaquat Pact cannot be published as I had desired that it should remain confidential. This statement is bound to create misunderstanding.

2. Mr. Desai met me at the last autumn session of the Legislative Assembly and we informally discussed the prevailing distressing conditions in the country, economic and otherwise, and the terrible hardships and the plight of the people that was created on account of the war.

3. It was recognized all along that the Government of India in its present position was incapable of dealing effectively with the various problems which had arisen and were bound to arise in the future.

4. It was Bhulabhai Desai who asked about the attitude of the Muslim League with regard to an interim arrangement at the Centre and temporary re-constitution of the Governor-General's Council.

5. I explained to him the position in the light of the Resolutions that were passed from time to time by the Muslim League in this connection and told him that my personal view was that if any proposals were made to ease the situation the Muslim League was bound to give very careful consideration to them . . . because the Muslim League had always been anxious to come to the rescue of the people and assist them in their sad plight and help the country in tiding over the difficult period ahead.'

There is no room for doubt that Bhulabhai Desai had started the talks for settlement nor is there any suggestion that in the initial stages of the talk Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had not told Bhulabhai that it was only in his individual capacity that he was negotiating, and ultimately the matter would have to be disclosed to Mr. Jinnah whose decision would be final. But when the Nawabzada talks of the Government of India's incapability to deal effectively with the various problems of India he appears to ignore the fact that in spite of the Congress 'Quit India' movement and its continued opposition to the war effort and of the half-hearted attitude of the Muslim League towards the war effort, the Allies had been able not only to maintain their position but by 1945 to land their armies in France, and were on a fair way to win the war hands down. As such the reason advanced for the necessity of talks appears to be unsound.

Further the reference to 'prevailing distressing conditions in the country, economic and otherwise, and the terrible hardships of the people,' is highly unconvincing. This echoes the old and continuous cry of the Congress. How all of a sudden when in the midst of a struggle against Hindu domination and when claiming Pakistan, these issues should have attracted the attention of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan cannot be easily understood. I am constrained to think it probable that the statement

was issued at the behest of Mr. Jinnah, although the Nawabzada had done nothing more than follow the line of policy which Mr. Jinnah had started since 1940 for a National Government at the Centre in spite of the opposition of Sir Sikandar and myself. However the incident caused the death of Bhulabhai Desai, the loss to India of a very amiable and kind-hearted gentleman and lovable personality. The circumstances under which Bhulabhai came under the cloud of Congress leadership are dealt with by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in *India Wins Freedom*.

For an Indian it was difficult to conceive that soon after the successful end of the war in Europe the Conservative Party led by Sir Winston Churchill, the hero of the Great War, would go down in the elections to the Labour Party. When therefore the results were announced there was great jubilation in Congress quarters and conversely the Muslims were unhappy over the victory of the Labour Party which came into power on 20 July 1945. The replacement of Mr. Amery by Lord Pethick Lawrence all the more convinced the Muslims that the Labour Party did not mean business with them. However, the policy which was to be pursued by the Labour Government in relation to India was indicated in the King's speech on the opening of the new Parliament, which read: 'In accordance with the promise already made to My Indian peoples, My Government will do their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion early realization of full self-government in India.' The use of the word 'peoples' in the King's speech gave some hope to Muslims that after all the Labour Party might not turn out to be wholly hostile to the Muslim cause. Shortly after this Lord Wavell was again summoned to England on 25 August 1945, and during his presence there fresh elections were announced for India to both the Central and provincial Legislatures. Lord Wavell returned on 18 September and broadcast a speech containing an assurance that the general elections which had been withheld due to the war would be held in the forthcoming cold season. Many other matters in his broadcast were forecast; one of them being with regard to the formation of a Constituent Assembly after discussion with leaders of the parties about the number and the system of election to that body.

XXIX

THE ELECTIONS AND CONVENTION

1946

IN THE ISSUE of elections in 1946, the Muslim League was on its trial. It had to disprove the Congress claim that several Muslim groups and parties, like the Nationalists, Ahrars, Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind, Muslim Majlis, Azad Board, etc., who were opposed to the League ideology, constituted a strong Muslim bloc by themselves. So far as the Congress was concerned there was not the slightest doubt that it would sweep the polls. As such, the Muslim League alone had to vindicate its claim. As the Convenor of the Parliamentary Board, the task of supervising the elections was to fall mainly on my shoulders. Besides fighting my own election I had to go from province to province to distribute League tickets or to hear appeals in different provinces, including my own.

Before proceeding further we have to examine the position of the Muslim League in majority provinces in particular.

The Punjab : The Khizar Ministry was still in power but I was certain that the League would be able to secure a convenient majority.

N.W.F.P. : On the release of eight Congressmen from jail, the Aurangzeb Ministry which from its inception had been very weak and unsteady had gone out and Dr. Khan Sahib had formed a new Ministry in March 1945.

Sind : In Sind the situation was very weak. G. M. Sayed and Sir Hidayatullah could not see eye to eye on any matter. Some of the grievances which Sayed used to allege against Sir Hidayatullah were substantial. But Mr. Jinnah feared that any change there would be disastrous for the Muslims at that stage. Sir Francis Mudie had been appointed the Governor of the Province in July 1945, soon after the breakdown of the Simla Conference. Whatever may have been his views about Pakistan in the early days of the Congress regime in U.P., when he was the Revenue Secretary under Rafi Ahmad Qidwai as Minister, by now I could safely say that he had been convinced of the Muslim cause. He

was the only steady element in Sind. The parties there were so evenly balanced that if the Assembly session had been held, the League Ministry would have gone out. Two Muslim Parliamentary Secretaries had gone over to the other side and even the Speaker had given notice that if he was not made a Minister he would join the Opposition. Sir Francis Mudie telephoned to the Viceroy informing him of the situation in Sind. The Viceroy suggested that he might find some independent man in Sind to preside over the session of the Assembly, to which Sir Francis replied that he could not find anyone on whom he could rely for being impartial. As such Sir Francis proposed dissolution and re-election. There being disagreement between the Viceroy and the Governor, the matter, according to Business Rules, was referred to the Secretary of State for India, at that time Mr. Amery. He agreed with the Governor and the Assembly was dissolved. I have stated all this on the information given to me by *Sir Francis Mudie himself. He saved Sind for Pakistan* at a very crucial time in the history of the League.

Bengal: There was a group struggle going on between Shaheed Suhrawardy, backed by the Secretary of the Muslim League, Abul Hashim, and Khwaja Nazimuddin, supported by the President of the Muslim League, Maulana Akram Khan. There had been section 93 rule in Bengal since 1945. In the minority provinces also there were party factions based on personalities but not so acute as existed then in Bengal.

Sind Elections: After the dissolution of the Sind Assembly, while staying with my brother, Dr. Salimuzzaman, in Delhi I was visited by Mr. G. M. Sayed. He complained to me that all sorts of rumours were being spread by his enemies, and also about the unjust treatment of the Central Muslim League in having supported his opponents in the Muslim League elections, and he asked me to help him. I told Sayed that in spite of my differences with the Muslim League policy on certain matters I continue to serve the party loyally and I advised him to follow my example. I pointed out to him that for a bigger cause we should submit to Mr. Jinnah's leadership and that was the only policy which could lead us to the attainment of our objective. I asked him to eliminate himself from politics for some time and let things take their own course, particularly as he was a young man and could afford to wait.

In the election campaign the first province visited by me was Sind. I had hoped that after my talk with G. M. Sayed he would not oppose the Muslim League in the forthcoming elections, but from a message I received through a friend of his my hopes were

dashed to pieces. I stayed with Khuhro and started my talks with all the group leaders in Sind. After about fifteen days I got their unanimity on thirty candidates. After a few days two more agreements came. I was in favour of giving a League ticket to Rahim Bakhsh Soomro, son of the late Allah Bakhsh, but it was not palatable to Khuhro and his group. However, there again I succeeded. As regards the inclusion of Agha Ghulam Nabi Pathan, I failed because at the last moment Jafar Khan Jamali, a very important and influential leader of Jacobabad, upset my scheme by proposing another name. In the meanwhile Liaquat Ali Khan also arrived. We discussed the list and without any change announced the names. I selected Qazi Akbar to contest G. M. Sayed. All thirty-four candidates of the League succeeded; the joint electorates' seat also was secured.

About the Sind elections, Maulana Azad, in *India Wins Freedom,** writes: 'In Sind the Muslim League won a large number of seats but could not achieve a majority.' The Muslim League had not only won all the Muslim seats but formed a Ministry with Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah as Premier. There was a dispute between him and Khuhro as to who should be the Premier. I had to run over to Sind to settle the dispute and, in consultation with the Governor, I decided in favour of Sir Ghulam Husain and recommended to Mr. Jinnah his name, to which he agreed.

N.W.F P. : A few days after my return to Lucknow I received a telegram from Mr. Jinnah asking me to come over to Delhi. He was staying with Liaquat Ali Khan and I took my morning breakfast with him. He asked me to proceed immediately to N.W.F.P. along with Liaquat Ali Khan to give tickets there as things were not going very well in the Province. The same night we left for Peshawar.

By now Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan had also joined the Muslim League. I had come to know of his intention when he came to Lucknow after the breakdown of the Simla Conference. He was at the time the Deputy Leader of the Congress Party in the Assembly, but appeared to be very much dissatisfied with the Congress. Soon after going back to Peshawar he joined the League. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, as I have already said before, had joined the Muslim League in 1944. Both of them were not in favour of a ticket being given to Aurangzeb Khan but after a few days' contact with the people of the N.W.F.P. I had formed the opinion that the exclusion of Aurangzeb Khan would be detrimental to the League cause. If he could not be given a

*Op. cit., p. 124.

ticket from Peshawar then he might be accommodated from another constituency. Qazi Isa, who was there to help us, did not agree with me in the matter for three or four days, but one evening he came to tell me that he had changed his opinion and believed that elections would greatly suffer if Aurangzeb Khan was completely eliminated. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar also did not agree with me for some time.

There was another complicated case of Sardar Bahadur Khan, against whom well-organized attempts were made to persuade us not to give him a ticket, but we rejected the claims of his opponents. Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif suggested the name of a candidate from his constituency, to which we agreed. After hundreds of interviews we prepared a tentative list which we decided to announce from Lahore where we had to hear the appeals against the decisions of the provincial Parliamentary Board.

At the last moment Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar told me that, after careful thought, he had come to the conclusion that a ticket should be given to Aurangzeb Khan. When I talked to Liaquat Ali Khan about it he informed me that Mr. Jinnah was very much opposed to a ticket being given to him. I said it was unfair to me not to have been told about it at Delhi so allowing me an opportunity to have discussed the matter with Mr. Jinnah. Thereupon he suggested that we should leave Qazi Isa behind to telephone to Mr. Jinnah about my views and to let us know his reply at Lahore. I agreed and we left for Lahore.

Punjab : There were several appeals against the decisions of the provincial Parliamentary Board and we would have faced great difficulty in assessing the chances of the appellants; but fortunately we received great help from Mr. Abdur Rahim and Mr. Hasan Akhtar who were in the provincial service and used to come to us muffled after midnight to give us their opinion about each candidate and the chances of his success. Their guidance proved to be of great value to us. We upset seven decisions of the provincial Board and announced fresh names as substitutes.

Qazi Isa informed us that Mr. Jinnah was not agreeable to a ticket being given to Aurangzeb Khan and so he was not included in the list announced by us from Lahore.

Bengal : Time being short I had also to run up to Bengal and Bihar to give tickets, before taking up the matter in U.P. The Bengal Muslim League leadership had been changed. Khwaja Nazimuddin had retired from the field, leaving the whole ground to Shaheed Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim, the Secretary of the

League. There was a large number of appeals and I had to receive many deputations on behalf of appellants; it took me about a fortnight to finish the work. In this tour Mr. Husain Imam was also with me all through. Liaquat Ali Khan joined us after the preliminary work had been finished. Then a day was fixed to discuss with Shaheed Suhrawardy the list which I had prepared. Shaheed was fighting on every name, nevertheless I pushed through twenty-four names, after which he seemed to be very much upset and as the elections had to be fought under his control and guidance, I thought it proper not to proceed any further and closed my list.

When I inquired from Khwaja Nazimuddin at Delhi as to why he had retired completely from the field, he said: 'Whoever may have won, a fight between me and Shaheed would surely have affected the Muslim League elections in Bengal. This I could not bear.' He was perfectly honest about it, for not only did he not interfere in League elections in Bengal but he left the Province for Delhi to be far away from the scene. Few Indian Muslims at that time could have followed such an honest and loyal course for the cause. A few years after the establishment of Pakistan, when Shaheed came in opposition to the Muslim League, he used to accuse the members of the Bengal Assembly, who were mostly his own nominees, of being unfit and unreliable.

Bihar : On our return from Calcutta, Liaquat Ali Khan and I stayed in Patna with my daughter Anwar (Begum Riasat Ali). Here we were able to dispose of our work within three days.

U.P. : We elected a Board of nine and selected sixty-six candidates for the U.P. Assembly. The first meeting of this Board was held at Allahabad. In this meeting, the most disputed case between me and Maulana Hasrat Mohani was taken up first. Nawab Ismail Khan, who was presiding, asked those who were in favour of Maulana Hasrat Mohani's candidate to raise their hand; three hands were raised; but before he could ask the other side to vote, I intervened and said, 'I withdraw my proposal.' I knew that the Maulana's candidate was not the proper person, as against Nafisul Hasan whom I was supporting, but out of respect for the Maulana I gave in. The result of that action of mine had an overwhelming effect on the Board's future decisions, as all the sixty-five candidates were then selected unanimously.

Rafi Qidwai had decided to seek election from Rai Bareilly District on the Congress ticket. In the 1937 elections he was returned as Congress candidate from Bahreich District under circumstances which I have described before; but now the situation was different and his seat had to be contested. We

selected Mr. Wasim's son, Mohammad Shameem, to contest the seat, fearing that any other candidate might not be able to capture it. This was a distasteful task for me. Apart from many other ties of relationship through Mr. Nawab Ali of Barabanki, the most influential leader of a very important district of U.P., Rafi was the nephew of Wilayat Ali, my dear deceased friend. Even after I had left the Congress, Rafi continued to behave towards me with great respect. I had been opposing the Congress since July 1937, while he was Revenue Minister, but once or twice every week he used to come early in the morning to talk to me on all subjects, including politics. For hours he used to play with my children, and talk with Mushfiq, my younger brother, to whom he was very much attached. In spite of this I had to sacrifice my personal affection in regard to him and put up my own nephew to contest his seat. It was bound to be a very tough election for there was no money consideration, as the Congress candidate was being backed by all the Hindu Taluqdars of the district. My brother Mushfiq was in charge of the election and Dr. Mani was chosen by him to supervise on his behalf. Dr. Mani was a 'mob speaker', particularly for the village folk, and he did yeoman service to the League in winning that election. During the election Mushfiq on one occasion telephoned to Rafi to send his car as his own was out of order. Rafi sent the car full of petrol. I scolded Mushfiq for having placed Rafi in that situation. Shameem won the election by a clear majority after a very hard contest.

Most of those who had been in the former U.P. Assembly were given tickets. But among the new ones were Jamal Mian, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Hasan Ahmad Shah, Nabbu Mian (Ali Haidar Khan), younger brother of the Raja of Mahmudabad, Fayyaz Ali who later became Advocate-General of Pakistan, Sayed Ahmad Ashraf of Meerut, Fakhrul Islam and Ruknuddin Khan. I was sorry to lose the seat of Mr. Umar Farooq from Amroha constituency as I had put him up with great expectations and hopes.

Assam and N.W.F.P.: Having finished the work in U.P. I went to Assam and distributed League tickets there also. After that I started touring different provinces to help them in the League work. At Peshawar I held a meeting for the collection of funds, which was successful thanks to the spirit shown by Arbab Noor Mohammad Khan and Mian Abdullah Shah, both of whom contributed Rs. 2,000 each for the election fund.

Many other donations were received. Khan Mohammad Ali Khan also offered his full support to the League. Not having

been given a ticket, Aurangzeb Khan lost interest in League affairs which cost us many seats, for both the N.W.F.P. leaders, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, were tied down to Peshawar for their elections. However, the Secretary of the League, Mian Ziauddin, worked hard to help the elections.

Punjab : Thereafter I went to the Punjab. From my talk with the Nawab of Mamdot and Mian Mumtaz Daultana I found they were expecting sixty-five out of eighty-six Muslim seats from separate electorates; if that were all we were not in a safe position. In this state of my mind Mr. Jafri, a unique figure at that time in Lahore, with a big flowing beard on his tall body and with a history of service to the cause of Muslim education and a wide circle of friends in every society, came to tell me that Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash wanted to meet me. During my talk with him, Muzaffar Ali Khan, speaking on his own behalf as well as of his Premier, asked for terms of settlement with the League. I told him that this matter concerned the provincial Muslim League but if he could give me some idea as to how far they were prepared to merge themselves with the League organization, I might discuss the question with League leaders there. He told me that they were prepared to join the Muslim League provided a few seats were given to them. I said, 'You have to define the few, because your party cannot offer more than three good candidates.' He replied that if the principle were agreed upon he could then discuss the matter further. On my return I spoke about it to Mian Mumtaz Daultana who seemed agreeable, but later on when I talked to the Nawab of Mamdot, he thought he could secure seventy to seventy-five seats. I therefore did not want to bring any influence on the Punjab Muslim League, although a question arises whether, by a compromise at that time, we might not have been able to have avoided the future fight with Khizar and his group.

U.P. : Having also toured Bihar and Assam, I returned to Lucknow in time to file my nomination paper on 4 February 1946. The Congress put up two candidates against me, one a *Madhe-Sahaba* nominee, Mohammad Nazir, and the other a Shia candidate, Ali Zaheer, both Shia and Sunni candidates meeting at odd places, conspiring together against me with Congress money and help.

After filing my nomination paper I toured practically the whole of eastern U.P., before returning to Lucknow on 28 February, only eleven days before the election. In this tour, Mr. A. H. Hanafi, Mr. Fayyaz Ali and Zahur Ahmad accompanied me.

My work in the city had gone on briskly, for the whole Muslim League organization realized the importance of this election to the League cause. My friends Jamal Mian, Ehsanur Rahman Qidwai, Ayub Qureshi and Abdul Aziz, who had always been my best supporters in the course of my political life, were devoting every hour of their life to my work. Mr. Asim Malik, who hailed from Sialkot and had been educated in Lucknow University, was a Socialist and a great friend of Rafi Ahmad Qidwai. He joined the League in 1946 and with his usual earnestness he served it with unswerving loyalty and in my election proved of great service to me.

Nowhere else in India, only in Lucknow, was I faced with any difficulty on the sectarian line and that was due to the well-known differences between the Shias and Sunnis of the city. It had therefore become necessary for me to invite the Shia leaders to my house for tea, where I appealed to them to consider that some of the issues on which the Muslim League laid special emphasis were the language, culture and religious observances and all three of those concerned the Shia community more than the Sunnis. I am glad to record that it had great effect on them and, both in Nawab Ismail Khan's election and my own, the Shias voted in good numbers for the League.

My term of Chairmanship came to an end, after a full ten years, in January 1946. From 1917 when non-official Chairmen began to hold office to 1946, i.e. twenty-nine years, there had been one Muslim and three Hindu Chairmen in a total period of thirteen years and the remaining sixteen years fell to my lot. It should be no wonder if I feel proud of this record of service to my city under circumstances in which even one successful term may ordinarily be taken as a great achievement. I feel it my duty to express my sincere thankfulness to the citizens of Lucknow for having shown such a personal regard for me.

When the election results were declared the Muslim League had won all round. Out of thirty seats in the Central Assembly all were won by the League and the securities of many contesting candidates had been forfeited.

In Bengal out of 119 seats from separate electorates we had secured 116 and there again in most of the cases the opponents had lost their securities. Similarly in Bihar we lost only seven seats out of fifty. In U.P. out of sixty-six we got fifty-four. In Punjab we got seventy-nine out of eighty-six seats. In Sind we won all thirty-four seats. Similarly in Bombay we got all the seats and everywhere else we had a thumping victory except in the N.W.F.P. where we won only seventeen seats out of thirty-

eight. We even lost the seat of Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar from Peshawar town. I still feel that, if my advice for a ticket for Aurangzeb Khan had been accepted, the position could have been reversed in N.W.F.P.

A Muslim League Convention of elected M.L.A.'s of the Centre and from the provinces was held on 9 April 1946, at Delhi. The Working Committee of the Muslim League had appointed a sub-committee, consisting of Nawab Ismail Khan as Chairman, Hasan Ispahani, Abdul Matin Choudhri, I. I. Chundrigar and me, to draft the resolution to be placed before the Convention. We met in the hotel room of Nawab Ismail Khan, where, as usual, I first prepared a draft of the resolution which was discussed with other members and, after some minor changes here and there, was approved by our committee and then by the Subjects Committee. It was proposed in the open session by Shaheed Suhrawardy, seconded by me and supported by Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Chundrigar, Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah and many others. I do not propose to give the full text of the resolution but will confine myself to some important passages contained in it. The operative portion of the resolution ran as follows:

'This Convention of the Muslim League Legislators of India, Central and Provincial, after careful consideration, hereby declares that the Muslim Nation will never submit to any constitution for a United India and will never participate in any single constitution-making machinery set up for the purpose, and that any formula devised by the British Government for transferring power from the British to the peoples of India, which does not conform to the following just and equitable principles, calculated to maintain internal peace and tranquillity in the country, will not contribute to the solution of the Indian problem:

1. That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay;
2. That two separate constitution-making bodies be set up by the peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective constitutions;
3. That the minorities in Pakistan and Hindustan be provided with safeguards on the lines of the All-India Muslim League Resolution passed on 23 March 1940, at Lahore;
4. That the acceptance of the Muslim League demand for Pakistan and its implementation without delay are the *sine qua non* for Muslim League co-operation and participation in the formation of an interim Government at the Centre.

This Convention further emphatically declares that any

attempt to impose a constitution on a United India basis or to force any interim arrangement at the Centre, contrary to the Muslim League demand, will leave the Muslims no alternative but to resist such imposition by all possible means for their survival and national existence.'

It should be noted that in my discussion with Chaudhri Rahmat Ali I had not agreed to the adoption of the word 'Pakistan', and had also avoided using it in my interview with Lord Zetland, but had used the word 'Partition' instead; but on 24 March 1940 the entire Congress and the Hindu Press described the Lahore Resolution as the 'Pakistan Resolution'. It being both attractive and suggestive of the idea of a State, the Muslims readily and cheerfully accepted the name given by the hostile Press, which became a household word for the community. Mr. Jinnah, who for some time resisted the temptation of using the word Pakistan, changed his mind later and in the Madras session he adopted it in the Creed of the Muslim League.

When therefore I was drafting the Convention resolution, without any intention I used the word 'State' for 'States', which was the original idea contained in the Lahore Resolution. Maybe in my subconscious mind I felt that in the public conception the word Pakistan denoted one single State, federal and confederal. The Committee also did not question the change. In the draft I had also excluded the clause 'with such territorial readjustment' which had found a place in the Lahore Resolution.

So far as I remember I had said nothing in my speech in any way different from other speeches of mine on the subject of Pakistan, but in the Convention no doubt I had for the first time said something about the undemocratic nature of Hindu society based on the exclusive nature of the Hindu Dharma and philosophy of life resulting in a rigid caste system. Gandhiji in his speech reported in the *Hindustan Times* dated 13 April 1946 appears to have taken serious note of it. I am giving here the speech as it appeared in that newspaper:

'Incidentally he referred to some remarks that had been attributed to Choudhry Khaliquzzaman in the Press. Mahatma Gandhi said: "He had great affection for me. If therefore somebody comes and tells me that he who till yesterday was like a blood brother to me has abused the Hindus and called them names, I must refuse to believe it or think ill of him. I would refuse to believe that a person like him who till yesterday was a blood brother to me, could become a hater of all the Hindus all of a sudden. I would rather think that some Hindus have behaved unworthily and made him lose his balance. Similarly, I am quite sure that if Choudhry Sahib were to meet me today,

and if I were to ask him if he really believed that the whole mass of Hindus had turned bad overnight, he would laugh at the remarks attributed to him and dismiss them as absurd. We must neither think evil about others nor suspect others of thinking evil about us. Proneness to lend ears to evil report is a sign of lack of faith."'

I could hardly have believed that Gandhiji, after all that I was doing to oppose his politics, would still have had the will to entertain such affectionate regard for me. The greatest sacrifice that I made for the Muslim cause was my dissociation with my loving and affectionate Hindu friends. Gandhiji was not justified in presuming that my reference to Hinduism as a belief in the caste system was meant to throw aspersion on the entire Hindu community, because he himself on many occasions had expressed his horror at the existence of a caste-ridden society in India without, I hope, meaning to run Hindus down. How could I entertain the idea of running down some of my best friends and co-workers in the Hindu community, who were liberal-minded enough to regard the caste system as an evil and as a great hindrance to the progress of India?

Concerning the Lahore Resolution, the fundamental departure from the original resolution in using the word 'State' in the singular calls for some explanation. In 1953 one Mr. Kifayatullah wrote to me while I was Governor of East Bengal, to enlighten him as to why this change had been brought about and to inquire whether it had been due to the fact that the Eastern zone of Pakistan was found economically non-viable to be made a State by itself. I replied to him that my official position did not permit me to enter into this controversy. About a year later he sent me a cutting from an English daily of Lahore, containing the opinions of Nawab Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot and Mr. I. I. Chundrigar endorsing his point of view. I have nothing to say about Nawab Mamdot's opinion, for he could not be expected to speak with any authority on the subject, but I was rudely shocked to find Mr. Chundrigar supporting Mr. Kifayatullah by issuing a column-long statement to the Press.

The Muslim League convention was held in April 1946 when the Muslim League officially stood committed to the maintenance intact of the whole of Bengal and the whole of Punjab, and there could not have been any question of doubting the capacity of Bengal to be a viable state. It being historically a very serious matter I wrote to Nawab Ismail Khan in India to give me the benefit of his recollection in connection with

the change from 'States' to 'State'. He replied as follows:

'Mustafa Castle,
Meerut,
Oct. 20th, 1953

My dear Choudhry Sahib,

Pray forgive the undue delay that has occurred in replying to your registered letter which was received during my absence from here. I had gone to Lucknow on a week's visit and on return from there I dropped at Rampur, where I was held up for several days. On my return I became rather indisposed and so was prevented from writing to you earlier.

From the cutting you have sent with your letter, I note that a controversy has arisen, rather late in the day, about the difference in the wording of the Lahore Resolution and the Resolution passed at the Convention of the elected Muslim representatives of the Legislatures, held in Delhi after the Central Election, on a particular point, undoubtedly an important one but meaningless now. It is quite true that the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League appointed a sub-committee consisting of yourself, Messrs. Hasan Ispahani, Chundrigar and Matin Choudhry, under my Chairmanship, to draft a resolution for being placed before the Convention. I am not quite sure whether Husain Imam was a member of this Committee or not. This Committee held its sitting in my room at the Western Court. After the preliminary discussion of the subjects to be included in the resolution, you were asked to prepare a draft of it. At the subsequent meeting when it was considered, a certain number of amendments were made to it after an exchange of views. You are perfectly right that for the word "States" in the original resolution, the word "State" was substituted without any comments from anybody. It was later placed before the Working Committee and approved by it. After the first meeting of the Convention, a Subjects Committee elected by it considered the resolution at its sitting and made several amendments and modifications. But no one to the best of my knowledge objected to the substitution of "State" instead of "States". Neither in the Subjects Committee nor in the open session of the Convention, not a word was uttered to protest against this fundamental change. The Lahore Resolution having become the basic creed of the League could not possibly be amended by a subsidiary body, working under its Constitution. If an objection had been taken at the time undoubtedly this change could not have been effected except at an open session of the League which was never called. Later when the Council of the All-India Muslim League met to consider the proposals of the British Government which contemplated a single State no objection was raised that it was contrary to the basic creed of the League. The distrust and suspicion which exists between the two wings is responsible for this kind of controversy, and the recent agreement reached in Karachi only serves to give official recognition to these feelings instead of combating and ignoring them. It is the very

negation of the whole conception of Pakistan. The papers were taken by Qaisar [Nawab Ismail Khan's second son, Ikram]. Please ask him to bring them to you. Hope this finds you well. With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
M. Ismail Khan.'

I was very glad that Nawab Ismail Khan confirmed in every particular my recollection of the change which was brought about in the Delhi Convention of the Muslim League. But there was one more point, which I did not touch on in my first letter, which required clearing up. It had been asserted in Delhi after the Convention that Mr. Abul Hashim, the Secretary of the Bengal Muslim League, had raised the question of the change from 'States' to 'State'. It was stated that Mr. Jinnah, presiding over the Convention, said that 'States' was a misprint and there the matter ended in the Convention. Since then Mr. Abul Hashim has continued to assert that he had definitely raised the point in the Subjects Committee and has also personally talked about it to me. As I was not myself present when the objection was raised, I again sought Nawab Sahib's assistance. In his next letter he says:

'Mustafa Castle,
Meerut,
Nov. 12th, 1953

My dear Choudhry Sahib,

Many thanks for your letter.... I am afraid I have no recollection of the objection raised by Mr. Abul Hashim at the Subjects Committee meeting and of the ruling delivered by Mr. Jinnah. It is possible that I was out of the room when this point was raised, or that his remarks were not audible to me, because I remember I was sitting right at the back. What has really astounded me in your letter is that Mr. Jinnah ruled that the word "States" was a misprint. How can a Chairman disregard the phraseology of the written Constitution and base his ruling on unrecorded memory of his own. If the word had been a misprint, as is contended, how was it that it was not rectified when this resolution was converted into the creed of the League. Surely particular care should have been taken at the time that the language employed was not dubious and vague. In the subsequent editions of the Constitution, which were many in number and were published under the direct supervision of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, the same words were repeated. I have by me the last edition of the Constitution published before partition. The word "States" occurs. For your reference I reproduce the relevant phrases from it. They are "The Establishment of completely independent States.... the Mussalmans are numerically in a majority as in north-western and north-eastern zones shall be grouped together to constitute independent States as a free national homeland." The whole context vitiates the ruling of

the President. Had the objection been pressed vigorously I feel sure the substitution could not have been effected.

Anyhow the whole controversy, after accepting the proposals of the British Government, appears to me to be meaningless and uncalled for. It is perfectly true that the word "State" was substituted for the word "States". Whether it was done validly and legally has only an academic interest....

With kind regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Mohammad Ismail Khan.'

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THE CABINET MISSION PLAN

1946

ON 17 February 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, announced in the House of Commons the decision of the British Cabinet to send to India a Cabinet Mission, consisting of the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, the President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. V. Alexander, to discuss with the representatives of India the positive steps to be taken for giving effect to a programme for the implementation of a new constitution for India. Mr. Attlee in the House of Commons announced:

'It is the Government's intention to let the mission put forth every effort to help India attain her freedom as speedily as she can. We are mindful of the rights of minorities and the minorities should be able to live free from fear. On the other hand we cannot allow a minority to place their veto on the advance of a majority.... You cannot make Indians responsible for governing themselves and at the same time retain over here the responsibility for treatment of minorities and powers of intervention on their behalf.'

Many other speakers took part in the debate of the House of Commons on this occasion. Sir John Anderson, a former Governor of Bengal, expressed the hope that there was:

'no question in anybody's mind but that the future constitution of India must be framed in India by Indians. We have made it clear that the British Government and Parliament will accept any constitution framed by Indians in India which is acceptable to the main elements in India's national life. This fundamental position seems to me to be absolutely clear. We have said that India shall have, as far as we are concerned, the constitution she wants. That means that the responsibility for enforcing law and maintaining the constitution passes from the British Government and from the Parliament of this country to Indians. It is on them that the responsibility must rest. It is they and they alone who must decide what the constitution must be. Similarly the stipulation that a new constitution must be acceptable to the main

elements in India's national life is fundamental. We cannot simply throw the apple of discord into the Indian arena and run away. To do that would be unworthy of ourselves and our past and would be gross betrayal of those interests in India for which we have been responsible. There will be no room anywhere for any lingering suspicion that we in this country are relying on the prospects of disagreement in India to maintain our position there. Let that be made absolutely clear; it is emphatically to our interest that a solution acceptable to Indian opinion should be found speedily.... In the Cripps offer what was contemplated was that the discussion should be initiated on the setting up of a Constituent Assembly with certain terms of reference. Once that had been agreed upon and the process of Constitution framing had been initiated, then, according to the declaration, the British Government might make a change in the Government of India at the Centre.'

After reading such speeches great hopes were entertained that the British Government was now genuinely anxious to concede power to Indian hands and leave the country free. The Congress might have felt that it was due to their strength in the country and to the nonco-operation movements which it had undertaken from time to time. But there were many other factors which had made the continuance of foreign rule over India increasingly difficult. On one occasion Lord Hailey had said in the House of Lords: 'There is not much to choose between the Congress and the Muslim League.' Obviously he meant to refer to the decision of the Muslim League to claim the independence of India, in its session of 1937. From the very beginning of British rule, it was apparent that it depended on the capacity of the British to keep one of the two communities on its side, to support their administration. From 1857 to about the end of the century, the British continued to treat the Hindu community, particularly in Bengal, with favour at the cost of the Muslims. For about a decade after the Mutiny the Muslims had been the butt of British vengeance for their part in the Mutiny, and East Bengal had been denuded of Muslim landlords, replaced by the Hindus. Everything in their power was done to crush Muslim society. It is true that Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan had received adequate support for starting the educational institution at Aligarh but that was all. Individual British officials in different provinces and districts were not prepared easily to forget the Mutiny. In 1872 the Lt.-Governor of Bengal issued orders to the Education Department of Bengal not to recognize the Urdu language and to stop Urdu being taught in schools or colleges. Similarly, Sir Anthony McDonald had started encouraging Hindi in Bihar and favoured suppression of the Urdu language when

he came to U.P. as Lt.-Governor of that Province. Nawab Mohsinul Mulk, at that time Secretary of Aligarh College, had to take up the cause of the Urdu language to the great chagrin of Sir Anthony who asked the Nawab Sahib to resign the Secretaryship of the College if he wished to take part in politics. These are only some instances to show that, till the end of the nineteenth century, the British had not completely forsaken their aversion to the Muslims, in spite of many attempts made to win their favour.

Mr. Hume's idea of starting the Congress may have been the outcome of his desire to introduce democracy as a means of suppressing Muslim influence in the country. When however Lord Curzon found in 1901 that the policy of supporting the majority community in India had been most harmful to the British interests in the country he started backing up the Muslims, who needed time for the healing of their economic and political wounds. They ran a marvellous race, the like of which is not to be found in the recent Muslim history of any other country. Within forty years of their unhampered life of progress they were able to declare in 1937 that their goal was nothing short of independence of the country. If by 1946 the Congress had gathered strength, it is just as true that the Muslims were equally strong and quite able to maintain their own if the British withdrew without partitioning the country.

That the British were now prepared to leave India was further due to the effect of the second World War and the demand of independence both from the Muslims and the Hindus. What follows next is to be viewed against this background. Mr. Jinnah issued a statement against Mr. Attlee's speech announcing the decision to send a Cabinet Mission to India, in which he remarked that Mr. Attlee, though in a guarded and qualified manner, had done some rope-walking when he said, 'On the other hand we cannot allow a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority,' yet he had fallen into the trap of false propaganda that had been carried on from time to time:

'There is no question of veto or holding up the progress or advancement of a majority. However, I note that the Prime Minister in the same breath says "we are mindful of the rights of minorities and the minorities should be able to live free from fear." I want to reiterate that the Muslims of India are not a minority but a nation, and self-determination is their birthright.'

In Congress circles Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru felt satisfied and declared that 'there is certainly a change in the tone and approach in Mr. Attlee's speech—a pleasant change if I may say

so and I welcome it.' Gandhiji in his interview with Mr. Brailsford said:

'But I cannot forget that the story of Britain's connection with India is a tragedy of unfulfilled promises and disappointed hopes. We must keep an open mind.... This time I believe the British mean business.'

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel found:

'an undoubted ring of sincerity about Mr. Attlee's recent declaration. . . . The Congress is prepared to provide adequate safeguards to protect the legitimate minority interests. But it is not prepared to accept Mr. Jinnah's demand for the division of India. . . . Congress does not envisage any serious trouble if real power is transferred. . . . Partition as proposed by Mr. Jinnah will not only be unfair to Hindu and Sikh minorities in the Punjab and Bengal but actually endanger the safety of both the constituent parts.'

Mr. K. M. Munshi stated:

'Pakistan creed . . . the creed of separation must die. If it is a symbol of Muslim autonomy, partition of the Punjab and Bengal is inevitable. The war of nerves in those two provinces will disappear once the Muslims and Hindus will be in an overwhelming majority in their respective territories and not till then.'

I need not point out here that by now Congress was preparing the country for the partition of India, along with the partition of Punjab and Bengal. The statements of Vallabhbhai Patel and Mr. K. M. Munshi cannot lead to any other conclusion.

The Cabinet Mission arrived on 23 March 1946 and immediately started contacting leaders of different parties and officials. On 2 April, the Mission interviewed the Nawab of Bhopal, Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes; the Maharaja of Patiala, Pro-Chancellor; the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar and the Maharajas of Bikaner and Gwalior. Later the British Ministers had talks with the opposition leaders, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Sir Saadullah, the Nawab of Mamdot, and Mr. G. M. Sayed, from the N.W.F.P., Assam, Punjab and Sind respectively. The Cabinet Ministers visited Sir Tej Bahadur Supru in the afternoon, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, accompanied by Mr. Asif Ali, met the Cabinet Mission on 3 April to discuss the viewpoint of Congress regarding the future of India. The same afternoon Sir Stafford Cripps called on Maulana Azad at his residence. Mr. Jinnah's interview with the Cabinet Mission lasted for three hours on 4 April. Khizar Hayat Khan on 5 April had an interview with the Cabinet Mission and Mr. Suhrawardy on 18 April. The members of opposition parties in the Congress Provinces jointly met the Cabinet Mission on 14 April 1946. To start with, Sir Stafford Cripps asked me why the U.P.

Muslims, who throughout their history in India had been enjoying a special position in the political and cultural life of the country, should be supporting the cause of partition which was bound to deprive them, in consequence, of many advantages and rights which they had so far enjoyed. I said:

> 'Partition or no partition, U.P. Muslims, after the independence of India, cannot expect to continue to enjoy those rights. Why then should we stand in the way of those areas to enjoy freedom where the Muslims happen to be in a majority, on the basis of the principles of self-determination? Unfortunately India is a country where communities are so divided that there is neither possibility of intermarriage and interdining between the Hindus and Muslims and these disabilities do not proceed merely out of enmity but are the result of religious and customary laws of each to which adherence is obligatory. Do not please carry away an impression that it is out of sheer cussedness that we have demanded partition. But the sheer force of necessity to protect our political and cultural interests has obliged us to make that claim.'

Thereafter Mr. Chundrigar took up the thread of our conversation and he expounded the need for separation in his own language, as did other Muslims from minority provinces.

The same evening I was invited to dinner with the Cabinet Mission at the Viceregal Lodge, where they were staying. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was already there. After dinner we retired to a small room by the side of the dining room. I sat with Mr. A. V. Alexander on my right and Lord Pethick Lawrence on my left. The Nawabzada was seated to the left of Lord Pethick Lawrence. While I was talking to Mr. Alexander, Sir Stafford Cripps dramatically closed all the doors and windows of the room and then came and sat on a chair on the right of Mr. Alexander. Quite abruptly he then asked me: 'Why don't you accept some kind of a loose centre?' I said: 'What do you mean by a loose centre?' He replied: 'A centre with no Legislature, a kind of Board or Agency of twelve, four Muslims, four Hindus and four States.' I retorted: 'The States will upset the balance.' He said: 'No, there will be two Muslim states, Hyderabad and Bhopal and two Hindu states Kashmir and Mysore.' I replied:

> 'If you can establish such a centre with only three subjects, viz. defence, foreign affairs and communications, I think you will be able to bring round the League to consider your proposal. But I am very doubtful whether you will succeed with the Congress. They would perhaps not look at it.'

Thereafter, we started talking about the British connection

with India, its administrative system, its faults and follies. The talk lasting for about two hours, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan did not open his lips even once. I never asked him the reason nor did he ever talk to me about it.

As a result of discussions with leaders of all shades of public opinion, Lord Pethick Lawrence sent a letter to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Mr. Jinnah on 27 April 1946 asking them to send four of their representatives to discuss the possibility of an agreement between them, upon a scheme based on the following fundamental principles:

> 'The future constitutional structure of India to be as follows: a Union Government dealing with the following subjects, foreign affairs, defence and communications.
>
> There will be two groups of Provinces, one of the predominantly Hindu Provinces and the other of the predominantly Muslim Provinces, dealing with all other subjects except those which the Provinces in the respective groups desire to be dealt with in common. The provincial Governments will deal with all other subjects and will have all the residuary sovereign rights.
>
> It is contemplated that the Indian States will take their proper place in this structure on terms to be negotiated with them.
>
> I would point out that we do not think it either necessary or desirable further to elaborate these principles, as all other matters could be dealt with in the course of the negotiations.
>
> If the Muslim League and the Congress are prepared to enter into negotiations on this basis, you will perhaps be so good as to let me know the names of the four people appointed to negotiate on their behalf. As soon as I receive this I will let you know the locus of the negotiations which will in all probability be in Simla, where the climate will be more temperate.'

There were numerous questions which the Congress and the Muslim League raised in their replies, but both of them agreed to nominate representatives and to meet at Simla for discussion. Congress nominated Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the President of the Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. The Muslim League nominated Mr. Jinnah, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar.

The meetings of Congress and the League with the Cabinet Mission started at Simla on 2 May 1946. I went there along with many other members of the Working Committee to be at hand for consultations. The progress of negotiations was naturally very slow, and at times it appeared that this conference would also break up without achieving any tangible result. At one stage when there was a deadlock, at the request of the Cabinet Mission direct negotiations were held between Mr.

Jinnah and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, but they could not agree between themselves. Pandit Nehru thought that Mr. Jinnah had agreed to refer the disputed matters to arbitration. Mr. Jinnah on the other hand thought that there was no commitment. At long last on 12 May 1946 the Muslim League sent a memorandum to the Cabinet Mission embodying demands by way of an offer which was as follows:

'(1) The six Muslim provinces, Punjab, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam shall be grouped together as one group and will deal with all other subjects and matters except foreign affairs, defence and communications necessary for defence, which may be dealt with by the constitution-making bodies of the two groups of provinces—Muslim provinces (hereinafter named the Pakistan Group) and Hindu provinces—sitting together.

(2) There shall be a separate constitution-making body for the six Muslim provinces named above, which will frame constitutions for the group and the provinces in the group and will determine the list of subjects that shall be provincial and central (of the Pakistan Federation), with residuary powers vesting in the provinces. The method of election of the representatives to the constitution-making body will be such as would secure proper representation to the various communities in proportion to their population in each province of the Pakistan group. . . .

(4) After the constitutions of the Pakistan Federal Government and the provinces are finally framed by the constitution-making body, it will be open to any province of the group to decide to opt out of its group, provided the wishes of the people of that province are ascertained by a referendum to opt out or not.

(5) It will be open to discussion in the constitution-making body as to whether the Union will have a legislature or not. The method of providing the Union with finance should also be left for decision to the joint meeting of the constitution-making bodies, but in no event shall it be by means of taxation.

(6) There should be parity of representation between the two groups of provinces in the Union Executive and the Legislature if any.

(7) No major point in the Union constitution which affects the communal issue shall be deemed to be passed in the joint constitution-making body, unless the majority of the members of the constitution-making body of the Hindu provinces and the majority of the members of the constitution-making body of the Pakistan group, present and voting, are separately in its favour.

(8) No decision, legislative, executive or administrative, shall be taken by the Union in regard to any matter of a controversial nature except by a majority of three-fourths.

(9) In group and provincial constitutions, fundamental rights and safeguards concerning religion, culture and other matters

affecting the different communities will be provided for.
(10) The constitution of the Union shall contain a proviso whereby any province can, by a majority vote of its legislative assembly, call for reconsideration of the terms of the constitution, and will have the liberty to secede from the Union at any time after an initial period of ten years.

These are the principles of our offer for a peaceful and amicable settlement and this offer stands in its entirety and all matters mentioned therein are interdependent.'

The Congress as could be expected expressed its solid opposition to most of the demands of the Muslim League. The main contention, at this stage of the negotiations, centred round the method of the formation of groups of provinces. Contrary to the Muslim League proposal, in Clause 2 of its demand, Congress suggested as follows:

'We suggest that the proper procedure is for one constitution-making body or constituent assembly to meet for the whole of India and later for groups, to be formed if so desired by the provinces concerned. The matter should be left to the provinces and if they wish to function as a group, they are at liberty to do so and to frame their own constitution for the purpose. In any event Assam has obviously no place in the group mentioned and the N.W.F.P. as the elections show is not in favour of this proposal.'

The Muslim League position at this stage was that the Muslim provinces including Assam might have a right to opt out if the group constitution did not satisfy them, but in the initial stage they had to come in.

Now great interest centred round the question whether the Cabinet Mission's decision was going to give the right to 'opt in' or 'opt out'. Hasan Ispahani and I were staying at the same hotel and were anxious to know the decision of the Cabinet Mission on this issue before it was made public. After midnight on 14 May he woke me late at night and whispered that he had it from the horse's mouth that it was going to be 'opt out'. Next day I left Simla for Lucknow.

The Cabinet Mission Plan was announced on 16 May 1946. Some of the conclusions reached by them disclosed impartiality although in other cases they seemed to have gone out of their way to reject the demand for Pakistan. As will be seen from a perusal of the Cabinet Mission Plan they say:

'This decision does not, however, blind us to the very real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India, in which Hindus with their greatly superior numbers must be a dominating element.'

In paragraph 5 the Mission further proceeded to say:

> 'This consideration did not, however, deter us from examining closely and impartially the possibility of a partition of India, since we are greatly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule. This feeling has become so strong and widespread among the Muslims that it cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards. If there has to be internal peace in India it must be secured by measures which will assure to the Muslims a control in all matters vital to their culture, religion and economy or other interests.'

Having said all this they rejected partition outright, on the ground that:

> '[a separate sovereign state of Pakistan] would not solve the communal minority problem, nor can we see any justification for inclusion within a sovereign Pakistan those districts of the Punjab and Bengal and Assam in which the population is predominantly non-Muslim. Every argument that can be used in favour of Pakistan can equally in our view be used in favour of the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas of Pakistan.'

In the foregoing remarks the Cabinet Mission had not gone deep enough sincerely to find a solution. The demand for Pakistan did not deny the right of the Hindus to have sway over all provinces where Muslims were not in a majority and did not demand that the scattered Muslims in those provinces should be given an area near the Pakistan borders, to make a homogeneous area where they could exist as a separate people. The Cabinet Mission's argument, that areas within a province where the Muslims were not in majority should be separated, meant for the Muslims not only a loss of population but also of large areas, and a solution of this grave matter should have been found. Congress should have agreed to take away the population from those areas but not the areas themselves. The Muslims in other parts of the country should have been given a choice either to come over to these areas or to stay out. Similarly the Hindus also should have been given such a choice. Ultimately the partition of the provinces was the result of this unfortunate and unfair statement of the Cabinet Mission, which deprived Muslims of most valuable areas to which they were by every canon of justice entitled. I cannot help feeling that if on the occasion of the Cripps' offer we had accepted the long-term plan, the Cabinet Mission would have been barred from raising these issues and so rejecting our demand.

The Cabinet Mission then proceeded to unfold their plan regarding other provisions for the constitution of the Union of

India and subsidiary matters of which I propose to deal only with those which are basic.

The Cabinet Mission Plan laid down the procedure for election of representatives to the Constituent Assemblies for different provinces and their quantum. They divided the provinces into three separate groups:

Section A, consisting of Hindu-majority provinces, was to have 167 general seats, twenty Muslim seats, making up a total of 187;

Section B, consisting of the Punjab, the N.W.F.P. and Sind, was to have nine general seats, twenty-two Muslim, four Sikh, making a total of thirty-five.

Section C, consisting of Bengal and Assam, was to have thirty-four general seats and thirty-six Muslim seats making a total of seventy.

The maximum number of States' representatives was to be ninety-three.

In regard to Section B and C groups, it was provided in clause 5 of para. 19 of the Plan:

'These sections shall proceed to settle provincial constitutions for the provinces included in each section and shall also decide whether any group constitution shall be set up for these provinces and if so, with what provincial subjects the group should deal. Provinces shall have the power of opting out of the groups in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (8) below.'

Sub-section (8) provided:

'As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into force it shall be open to any province to elect to come out of any group in which it has been placed. Such a decision shall be taken by the new legislature of the province after the general election under the new constitution.'

Lord Pethick Lawrence, in his broadcast of 17 May 1946, explained in detail the circumstances and the compelling necessity to seek a solution acceptable to both parties. Sir Stafford Cripps explained the full import of their statement at a Press conference. Defining the legal character of the statement he said:

'What we have had to do is to lay down one or two broad principles of how the Constitution might be constructed, and recommend those as foundations to the Indian people. You will notice that we use the word "recommend" with regard to the ultimate constitutional form with which we deal.

You may quite fairly ask, "But why do you recommend anything, why not leave it to the Indians?" The answer is that we are most anxious to get all Indians in some constitution-making machinery as quickly as possible and the block at present is in this matter. We are, therefore, by this means trying to remove

the block so that constitution-making may start and progress freely and rapidly. We hope very earnestly that that will be the effect.'

Sir Stafford Cripps, however sincerely he may have made this statement, practically killed the Mission Plan by calling it a recommendation. The attitude of Congress towards the Mission Plan suddenly changed. As a matter of fact, after their statements the members of the Cabinet Mission were running after Sardar Patel and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, only to find them either engaged or having gone for a walk.

The following day, in a Press conference, Lord Pethick Lawrence clarified that fact that what the Mission and the Viceroy had announced was not an award. It was a recommendation as to certain bases of the Constitution and a decision to summon Indian representatives to make their own constitution, and therefore quite clearly there was no question of enforcing an award. Replying to a question as to whether, if any province did not wish to join the group in which it had been put, could it stay out, he said:

'Provinces automatically come into the sections A, B and C which are set out in the statement.... The right to opt out of the group framed by that section arises after the constitution has been framed and the first election to the legislature has taken place. It does not arise before that.'

Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India and Commander-in-Chief, also explained the Mission Plan to the people.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in a letter dated 20 May 1946 to Lord Pethick Lawrence pointed out:

'When the Constituent Assembly is formed, in the opinion of the Congress it will be a sovereign body and it will be open to the Assembly to vary in any way it likes the recommendations and the procedure suggested by the Cabinet delegation. . . . As you are aware some recommendations have been made in your statement which are contrary to the Congress stand as it was taken at the Simla Conference and elsewhere. Naturally we shall try to get the Assembly to remove what we consider defects in the recommendations. For this purpose we shall endeavour to educate the country and the Constituent Assembly. . . .

In your recommendations for the basic form of the Constitution . . . you state that provinces should be free to form groups with executives and legislatures and each group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common. Just previous to this you state that all subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the provinces. Later on in the statement, however . . . you state that the provincial representatives to the Constituent Assembly will divide up into three

sections, and these sections shall proceed to settle the provincial constitutions for the provinces in each section and also decide whether any group constitution shall be set up for these provinces. There appears to be a marked discrepancy in these two separate provisions. The basic provision gives full autonomy to a province to do what it likes and subsequently there appears to be a certain compulsion in the matter which clearly infringes that autonomy. It is true that at a later stage the provinces can opt out of any group. In any event it is not clear how a province or its representatives can be compelled to do something which they do not want to do. A provincial Assembly may give a mandate to its representatives not to enter any group or a particular group or section. As sections B and C have been formed, it is obvious that one province will play a dominating role in the section, the Punjab in section B and Bengal in section C. It is conceivable that this dominating province may frame a provincial constitution entirely against the wishes of Sind or the North-West Frontier Province or Assam. It may even conceivably lay down rules for elections and otherwise, thereby nullifying the provision for a province to opt out of a group. Such could never be the intention, as it would be repugnant to the basic principles and policy of the scheme itself.... Gandhiji has informed my Committee that you contemplate that British troops will remain in India till after the establishment of the Government in accordance with the instrument produced by the Constituent Assembly. My Committee feel that the presence of foreign forces in India will be a negation of India's independence. India should be considered to be independent in fact from the moment that the National Provisional Government is established.'

On 22 May 1946 Lord Pethick Lawrence replied to this letter as follows:

'You are aware of the reasons for the grouping of the provinces, and this is an essential feature of the schme, which can only be modified by agreement between the two parties. . . . There are two further points which we think we should mention. First, in your letter you describe the Constituent Assembly as a sovereign body, the final decisions of which will automatically take effect. We think the authority and the functions of the Constituent Assembly and the procedure which it is intended to follow are clear from the statement. Once the Constituent Assembly is formed and working on this basis, there is naturally no intention to interfere with its discretion or to question its decisions. When the Constituent Assembly has completed its labours, His Majesty's Government will recommend to Parliament such action as may be necessary for the cession of sovereignty to the Indian people, subject only to two provisions which are mentioned in the statement and which are not, we believe, controversial, namely, adequate provision for the protection of minorities and willingness to conclude a treaty to cover matters arising out of the transfer of power.

Secondly, while His Majesty's Government are most anxious to secure that the interim period should be as short as possible, you will, we are sure, appreciate that for the reasons stated above independence cannot precede the bringing into operation of a new constitution.'

On 22 May 1946, Mr. Jinnah issued a statement in which he expressed his regret:

'that the Mission should have negatived the Muslim demand for the establishment of a complete sovereign State of Pakistan which we still hold is the only solution of the constitutional problem of India, and which alone can secure a stable Government and lead to the happiness and welfare, not only of the two major communities but of all the people of this sub-continent.

It is all the more regrettable that the Mission should have thought it fit to advance commonplace and exploded arguments against Pakistan and resort to special pleadings, couched in deplorable language, which is calculated to hurt the feelings of Muslim India. It seems this was done by the Mission simply to appease and placate the Congress because when they come to face realities, they themselves have made the following pronouncement embodied in paragraph 5 of their statement.'

After dealing with the Cabinet Mission Plan Mr. Jinnah in his statement said, 'These are some of the points which I have tried to put before the public after studying this important document. I do not wish to anticipate the decision of the Working Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League which is going to meet shortly at Delhi.'

In the meantime, Mr. Bardoli of Assam approached Gandhiji and after a talk with him, Gandhiji disapproved the scheme. Congress, unmindful of the consequences that might flow from their reckless venture, started clamouring to be put in power as a National Government with the Indian Army under its command, and with the Labour Government in power in England it hoped it would succeed in its objective.

In the Working Committee meeting of the Muslim League at Delhi, Mr. Jinnah invited every member's opinion on the question of the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which indicated that he had an open mind on the subject. There was no dissenting voice and all agreed to accept the Plan, the provision for a revision after ten years being a strong factor in favour of our voting for its acceptance. After the meeting I was asked by Mr. Jinnah to prepare a draft of the resolution, which I did.

On 6 June 1946 the Council of the All-India Muslim League decided to accept the Cabinet Mission's Plan. In moving the resolution, I had laid great stress on the importance of the choice

given to us, to leave the Indian Union after ten years if the Indian Union did not play the game with us. I pointed out that after that period of time the Muslim youth would be far better equipped, not only mentally and physically but also in their devotion to serve Islam.

Since 1923, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had concentrated his whole attention to the Congress to the exclusion of every other activity. In 1937, before the breakdown of negotiations between Maulana Sahib and myself on the question of a coalition Ministry in U.P., he succeeded in taking away the Jamiat group with him, which gave a great encouragement to the Mahasabha wing in Congress to stand in the way of a settlement. For his services to the Congress he was elected as President of the Indian National Congress a second time in 1939, the first having been in 1923, and he remained in that capacity until 1947.

On this background the Maulana in *India Wins Freedom* has attempted to convince non-believers that he was no nonentity in Congress but rather its policy-maker and guide. But knowing India and the Congress, no one would be prepared to give him credit to this extent. So long as Gandhiji, Patel, Jawaharlal and Rajaji were alive, any claim of his to leadership of the Congress would have been futile.

Who does not know in India that it was Gandhiji who was mainly responsible for the rejection of the Cripps' offer which later led to the 'Quit India' movement. It is from the Maulana himself that we know that he was opposed to this movement and when he pressed his opposition in the Working Committee on 5 July 1942, Gandhiji was so irritated that he wrote a letter to the Maulana saying that they 'could not work together.' If some friends had not intervened and tried to pacify Gandhiji, Maulana Sahib would have had to go. But Gandhiji had his own method of composing differences. So next day in the meeting of the Congress Working Committee he said that the 'penitent sinner has come back to the Maulana.' Yes, the 'penitent sinner' (Gandhiji) stood to conquer the Maulana and took him behind the bars for four years.*

Again is it not well known that when Gandhiji had willynilly to accept partition, no amount of opposition of the Maulana to the partition of the country could avail? Instances can be multiplied to show that on all crucial occasions it was Gandhiji whose voice prevailed in the Congress, so long as Patel did not start openly to thwart him. It hardly requires comment that when the Hindu Junta could not tolerate Gandhiji's sympathy

*See *India Wins Freedom*, pp. 75, 76.

for the Muslim sufferers in 1947, which ended in his assassination, they could scarcely follow the Maulana's lead on a communal question.

To take up the Maulana's claim that the Cabinet Mission Plan was largely the outcome of his brainwave, as disclosed by him in *India Wins Freedom,** he says:

'I met members of the Cabinet Mission for the first time on 6th April, 1946. The Mission had framed some questions for discussion. The first one dealt with the communal problem in India. When the Mission asked me how I would tackle the communal situation, I indicated the solution I had already framed. As soon as I said that the Centre should have a minimum list of compulsory subjects and an additional list of optional ones, Lord Pethick Lawrence said that "You are in fact suggesting a new solution of the communal problem." Sir Stafford Cripps took special interest in my suggestion and cross-examined me to a great length. In the end he also seemed to be satisfied with my approach.'

Then again† he says Gandhiji 'in fact complimented me by saying that I had found a solution of the problem which had till then baffled everybody.'

Further the Maulana writes‡:

'He [Lord Wavell] genuinely believed that there could be no better solution of the Indian problem than that outlined in the Cabinet Mission Plan.... Since the Cabinet Mission Plan was largely based on the scheme I had formulated in my statement of 15th April, naturally I agreed with him.'

How could the Maulana bring himself round to believe that he had said something novel or extraordinary in that Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs should be compulsory subjects for the Centre in a federal form of Government? Ever since 1924 the Muslim League had been clamouring for a federal constitution for India, which was clearly meant to give these three subjects to the Centre, other subjects remaining provincial. The same demand was put forward by the League in December 1928 and later, in the Round Table Conference in London, a federal form of Government was proposed. Congress, however, opposed the scheme of federation in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1934 and the Muslim League for particular reasons also voted with the Congress on this issue. During all these years the entire constitutional problem of India in all its phases had been examined by political parties and public leaders. If the members of the Cabinet Mission gave the credit for the idea

*Op. cit., p. 40. †Ibid., p. 41. ‡Ibid., p. 173.

to Maulana Sahib they must have exercised an enormous sense of accommodation and cajolery. Again, how can the Maulana's claim be reconciled with the notes taken by Lord Zetland of my conversation with him on 20 March 1939?

It would serve no useful purpose to reproduce the whole correspondence which passed between the Muslim League, the Congress President and the members of the Cabinet Mission or the Viceroy, as it has lost its value and utility. It may suffice to note that on two points, namely acceptance (1) of the long-term plan and (2) of the basis of the National Government at the Centre, the Muslim League had accepted the long-term plan and also agreed to join the National Government on the basis of 5:5:2. Later on, the Viceroy extended it to 5:5:3 and Mr. Jinnah agreed to that also. On 4 June the Viceroy also assured Mr. Jinnah:

> 'You asked me yesterday to give you an assurance about the action that would be taken if one party accepted the scheme in the Cabinet Delegation's statement of May 16 and the other refused. I can give you on behalf of the Cabinet Delegation, my personal assurance that we do not propose to make any discrimination in the treatment of either party and that we shall go ahead with the plan laid down in the statement, so far as circumstances permit, if either party accepts; but we hope that both will accept.
>
> I should be grateful if you would see that the existence of this assurance does not become public. If it is necessary for you to tell your Working Committee that you have an assurance, I should be grateful if you would explain to them this condition.'

One of the conditions put forward by the Muslim League was that the Congress should not be allowed to nominate any Muslim within its quota. No agreement between the parties in regard to the formation of a National Council could be reached, however, and the Viceroy announced the following names to be included in the interim Government, on 16 June 1946:

> (1) Sardar Baldev Singh, (2) Sir N. P. Engineer, (3) Mr. Jagjivan Ram, (4) Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, (5) Mr. M. A. Jinnah, (6) Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, (7) Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, (8) Dr. Rajendra Prasad, (9) Mr. H. K. Mehtab, (10) Dr. John Matthai, (11) Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, (12) Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin, (13) Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, (14) Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.

Both Congress and the Muslim League decided to reject the decision of the Viceroy. Congress took objection to the name of Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar because he had been defeated at the polls, and as such he should not be nominated. As regards

the long-term plan, Congress decided to accept it with the reservation of putting its own interpretation on the question of the right of a province to opt out initially.

Mr. Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy on 18 June that the Congress was thinking of nominating Dr. Zakir Husain from their quota. As this would be strongly opposed by the Muslims of India, it was expected that the Viceroy would not agree to it. I could never reconcile myself to the approach of the Muslim League on this question.

Mr. Jinnah insisted on the Viceroy's proceeding with the formation of a National Government as stated by him on 16 June. The Viceroy took shelter behind the fact that, as the Congress had not rejected the long-term plan, he would continue to negotiate with the parties and in the meanwhile appoint a non-party interim Government. Clearly it was a reversal of the policy which the Viceroy had given the Muslim League to understand would be followed by him. A meeting of the Muslim League was, therefore, held on 27 July 1946, at Bombay, at which a resolution was passed fully explaining the circumstances which led to the League's withdrawal of its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's proposals of 6 June 1946. A direct action resolution was also passed with great enthusiasm. Many titleholders, like Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Khwaja Nazimuddin, and Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah renounced their titles.

During the course of the discussion of the Bombay Working Committee meeting, I did not agree to the inclusion in the resolution of our objection to the nomination by Congress of a Muslim member from their own quota, because to my mind it would not add to our dignity to show such an utter want of confidence in any Muslim, in his holding an office in Government. Mr. Jinnah asked me: 'Then why did you agree to the Simla resolution of the Muslim League?' I replied: 'At Simla, Congress wanted to nominate a Muslim Nationalist from our share but now they want to nominate a Muslim from their own quota. That makes all the difference.'

XXXI

THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT

1946

EVENTS began to move rather fast after the withdrawal of our acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan but even before the withdrawal, the Viceroy, by his letter dated 22 July, had assured Pandit Nehru that 'His Majesty's Government would treat the new Interim Government with the same close consultation and consideration as a Dominion Government and give to the Indian Government the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of day-to-day administration of the country.' The Viceroy further added: 'It would not be open to either Congress or the Muslim League to object to the names submitted by the other party provided they are accepted by the Viceroy.' On 6 August the Viceroy had written another letter to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru accepting the Congress standpoint that the provisional Government must be in reality a National Government. In this letter he further said:

> 'I have decided with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government to invite you as President of the Congress to submit the proposals for the formation of an Interim Government.... It will be for you to consider whether you should first discuss with Mr. Jinnah. If you were able to reach an agreement with him I should naturally be delighted.'

In reply Pandit Nehru said: 'We would have welcomed the formation of a coalition Government with the Muslim League but in view of the resolution adopted and the statements recently made on behalf of the Muslim League it is not possible to expect that they would agree to co-operate at this stage.' It was rather surprising that the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Jinnah on 8 August, expecting him to make a good response to the Congress gesture. Armed with the letter from the Viceroy dated 6 August, Pandit Nehru suggested to him to make an official announcement that he had invited the President of the Congress to form a provisional Government and it would then be possible for him to approach the League and ask for co-operation. As suggested by

Pandit Nehru the Viceroy made an announcement on 12 August and again sought Mr. Jinnah's co-operation. On 2 September Pandit Nehru invited Mr. Jinnah to join his Government and on 7 September, as the leader of the Interim Government, he made a broadcast speech in which he said: 'The door is open and destiny beckons to all. There is no question who wins and who loses, for we have to go forward and go as comrades and either all of us win or all go down together, but there is going to be no failure.' Previously, on 25 August, the personnel of the Interim Government had been announced. In the absence of the Muslim League, it included three Muslims out of twelve members, Asif Ali, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan and Sayed Ali Zaheer. Two more were to be added later; search for them was still continuing. Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, in the meanwhile, had been attacked by some Muslims in Simla and the injuries proved fatal.

In handing over the entire Government machinery to Congress, the British Government had given a great blow to the Muslims, ignoring the sacrifices of the Punjabis and Pathans who had joined the Army far in excess of their proportion in the country, and ignoring too the smooth working of the administration. When Sir Winston Churchill had appointed Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India, after his failure to dispose of the Italian Colonies in Africa within the Prime Minister's prescribed time, he had said. 'Wavell is a tired man!' That Sir Winston Churchill chose this tired man to dispense with the fate of the people of a vast country is a lone instance of his attempting to jam a square peg into a round hole. It is true that Lord Wavell's task was made doubly difficult by the Labour Government, which inducted the Cabinet Mission without spelling out the respective spheres of the Viceroy and the Mission; but a similar situation had to be met by Lord Linlithgow with the Cripps Mission and who can say that the Viceroy on that occasion did not make his presence felt, even though Sir Stafford had to go back disappointed.

Throughout the negotiations between Congress and the British Government, Lord Wavell allowed the Cabinet Mission to lose dignity in courting the Congress leaders while yet proclaiming that the Mission was not there to give an award or a decision. The Mission went back home on 24 June 1946 but within a period of three months it had succeeded in bringing confusion to Indian politics in lowering the prestige of the Government.

On 16 August 1946 there was a great riot at Calcutta; for three days it was at its peak although it continued for several weeks thereafter, the largest killing having been committed in

its initial stages. I visited Calcutta on my return from Assam about a week after the riot and found the Sealdah Station completely deserted except for a few members of the station staff. There was no conveyance available and I had to phone to the Police Commissioner, Mr. Subhan, who came with a military van along with the Chief Minister, Mr. S. H. Suhrawardy, to take me to my place of residence.

Since the Bombay resolution, I had not met Nawab Ismail Khan to discuss with him the political condition at the time. I went to Meerut and finding that the Nawab of Bhopal was at Delhi we went there to discuss with him the situation which was daily growing worse. I sat with the Nawab of Bhopal, Ismail Khan and Shuaib Qureshi till late at night to draft a formula on the lines of the one which I had suggested to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Ultimately we agreed on a formula to be presented to Gandhiji for his acceptance. This, the Nawab of Bhopal's formula, read as follows:

I. The Congress does not challenge and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative organization of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such, and in accordance with democratic principles, they alone have today an unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that any restrictions or limitations should be put upon the Congress to choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress as their representatives.

II. It is understood that all the Ministers of the Interim Government will work as a team for the good of the whole of India and will never invoke the intervention of the Governor-General in any case.'

It was shown to Gandhiji by the Nawab of Bhopal on 1 October 1946 and with slight modifications was approved and signed by him on 4 October 1946.

While we were busy creating a favourable atmosphere for reopening negotiations with the Government and Congress, Lord Wavell had started realizing the blunder which he had committed, perhaps at the instance of Whitehall, in bringing in Congress and leaving out the League, firstly because of the impetuosity of the Congress team in the Interim Government and secondly by the shock which he had received from the Calcutta riot. Besides this, the British Civil Servants were unhappy with the decision of the Viceroy to push in the Congress Government without the League, which made it possible and easy for Congress to treat their genuine advice as an affront.

We kept Mr. Jinnah informed of the situation in Delhi, and

from direct Government sources also hints were given to him to come to Delhi. He arrived there and met the Viceroy on 2 October 1946 when he was asked by him to submit his proposal for joining the Interim Government.

An urgent meeting of the League Working Committee was called, after which Mr. Jinnah, by his letter dated 3 October 1946, made proposals which briefly stated were:

1. The total number of members of the Executive Council was to be fourteen. [We had never agreed to this number before.]

2. Six nominees of the Congress would include one Scheduled Caste representative, but it was not to be taken that the Muslim League had agreed to or approved of the selection of the Scheduled Caste representative by the Congress, the ultimate responsibility in that behalf being with the Governor-General and Viceroy.

3. That the Congress should not include in the remaining five members of their quota a Muslim of their choice. [In spite of my opposition Mr. Jinnah raised this point again in this letter.]

4. That there should be a convention that on major communal issues, if the majority of Muslim members of the Executive Council were opposed, then no decision should be taken.

5. Alternative or rotational Vice-Presidents should be appointed in fairness to both the major communities, as it had been adopted in the UNO Conference.

6. The Muslim League would not be consulted in the selection of the three minority representatives, that is Sikh, Indian Christian and Parsi, and it should not be taken that the Muslim League approved of the selection made. But in the future, in the event of there being a vacancy owing to death, resignation or otherwise, representatives of the minorities should be chosen in consultation with the two major parties, the Muslim League and the Congress.

7. Portfolios : The most important portfolios should be equally distributed between the two major parties, the Muslim League and the Congress.

8. That the above arrangement should not be changed or modified unless both the major parties, the Muslim League and the Congress, should agree.

9. The question of the settlement of the long-term plan should stand over until a better and more conducive atmosphere were created and an agreement had been reached on the points stated, after the Interim Government had been re-formed and finally set up.'

The Viceroy replied to Mr. Jinnah as follows, in a letter dated 4 October :

'Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter dated yesterday. My replies to your nine points are as follows:

1. This is agreed.

2. I note what you say and accept that responsibility is mine.

3. I am unable to agree to this. Each party must be equally free to nominate its own representatives.

4. In a coalition Government it is impossible to decide major matters of policy when one of the main parties to the coalition is strongly against a course of action proposed. My present colleagues and I are agreed that it would be fatal to allow major communal issues to be decided by vote in the Cabinet. The efficiency and prestige of the Interim Government will depend on ensuring that differences are resolved in advance of Cabinet meetings by friendly discussion. A coalition Government either works by a process of mutual adjustments or does not work at all.

5. The arrangement of alternative or rotational Vice-Presidents would present practical difficulty and I do not consider it feasible. I will, however, arrange to nominate a Muslim League member to preside over the Cabinet in the event of the Governor-General and the Vice-President being absent.

I will also nominate a Muslim League member as Vice-Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee of the Cabinet, which is a most important post. I am Chairman of this Committee and in the past have presided almost invariably, but I shall probably do so only on special occasions in future.

6. I accept that both major parties would be consulted before filling a vacancy in any of these three seats.

7. In the present conditions all the portfolios in the Cabinet are of great importance and it is a matter of opinion which are the most important. The minority representatives cannot be excluded from a share of the major portfolios and it would also be suitable to continue Mr. Jagjivan Ram in the Labour portfolio. But subject to this, there can be equal distribution of the most important portfolios between the Congress and the Muslim League. Details would be a matter for negotiation.

8. I agree.

9. Since the basis for participation in the Cabinet is, of course, acceptance of the statement of May 16, I am sure that the League Council will meet at a very early date to reconsider its Bombay resolution.

Yours sincerely,
Wavell.'

From the Congress viewpoint the only objection against Mr. Jinnah's proposal could be No. 2 which referred to the inclusion of a Scheduled Caste representative. It was already known that out of fourteen members of the Executive Council one would be a Scheduled Caste nominee of Congress. Mr. Jinnah by his letter informed the Viceroy only that the Muslim League should not be taken to have agreed to or approved the selection, because the ultimate responsibility in that behalf was that of the Viceroy. There does not appear to be any reason why the Congress should have taken umbrage at this appropriate attitude of the Muslim League. Then there is the question of nomination

of a Muslim from the Congress quota which is the subject-matter of Point No. 3. In accordance with the formula the Congress Muslims were represented by the Congress but it did not mean that the Congress should go out of its way to nominate a Muslim from its quota merely to defeat the League stand on this question. However, the Viceroy himself did not agree and the matter ended there.

As stated before Gandhiji signed the formula when Mr. Jinnah had already submitted his demands to the Viceroy and the latter had already given his replies to them. The Congress decision on the formula on 4 October was as follows:

'We feel that the formula is not happily worded. We will not question the purpose underlying it. We are willing as a result of the elections to accept the Muslim League as the authoritative representative organization of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India and that, as such and in accordance with democratic principles, they have today the unquestionable *right to represent the Muslims of India, provided that for* identical reasons the League recognizes the Congress as the authoritative organization representing all non-Muslims and such Muslims as have thrown in their lot with the Congress. The Congress cannot agree to any restriction or limitation upon it in choosing such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress. We would suggest therefore that no formula is necessary and each organization may stay on its merits.'

In the first portion of the Congress resolution the only material addition, if any, is made by the words 'for identical reasons' which might be considered an unnecessary addendum. By the operative portion of its resolution the Congress thought that the formula was unnecessary. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his opinion on the formula in a letter to Mr. Jinnah dated 6 October 1946. The next day Mr. Jinnah in reply to this letter said with regard to the formula, 'It was accepted by Mr. Gandhi and me and the meeting between us was arranged on that basis in order to negotiate and settle a few other points remaining for the purpose of reconstituting the Interim Government.' On these facts Mr. Pyarelal in his book *Mahatma Gandhi, the Last Phase** writes that 'Gandhiji without reading the contents of the formula signed it in spite of the fact that Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur and Mr. Pyarelal advised him to read the contents of the document before putting his signature to it.' Proceeding further Mr. Pyarelal writes:

'Jinnah finding that no more could be extracted from the

*Vol. I. p. 280.

Congress preferred to have the same at the hands of the Viceroy without coming to any agreement with the Congress. On 15 October it was announced that the Muslim League had agreed to enter the Interim Government at the Viceroy's invitation. Its nominees virtually became the King's party in the reformed Interim Government with the Viceroy as their leader. The Congress offer to arrive at a just understanding with the Muslim League was thus torpedoed. To Indian experience this was nothing new. Sir Samuel Hoare had done exactly the same even in a more blatant form in 1932. No matter how generous and accommodating the Congress tried to be, the third party could always afford to be more generous at India's expense.'

Mr. Pyarelal ought to know that when he, as the Secretary of Gandhiji, informed Sardar Patel that 'Bapu has signed the document,' he replied, 'He is suffering from senile decay.' If Gandhiji was signing something to which he had not agreed, surely Mr. Pyarelal should have pointed out to Sardar Patel the circumstances in which Gandhiji had been deceived. At no stage before 4 October was there any discussion with the Congress for the inclusion of the Muslim League in the Interim Government. The formula was signed by Gandhiji at a time when the correspondence between Mr. Jinnah and the Viceroy regarding an Interim Government had resulted in complete agreement. In these circumstances such a grave charge against the integrity and honesty of the Nawab of Bhopal could only have been made by Mr. Pyarelal under a misconception.

Besides, Gandhiji himself, in his prayer meeting on 12 October 1946, took the responsibility on his own shoulders by using the word 'nodding' which by no stretch of imagination could mean that he was deceived. He also said in his speech that he did not now desire to live 125 years. Next day reading Gandhiji's speech gave me a great shock for, politics apart, neither had my respect for him waned nor my personal regard for him suffered decline, and I issued a statement to the Press that Gandhiji was 'coerced by his opponents in the Congress to misrepresent facts before him.' (I have no copy of my statement with me but the facts can be verified by Mr. Pyarelal in India.) Mr. Pyarelal will not be unaware of the fact that Sardar Patel was now trying to pull down Gandhiji's leadership and belittle him in the eyes of the Hindu Junta. If there had been any question of deception in regard to the formula, Gandhiji would surely have complained to the Nawab of Bhopal about it, which he never did.

Apart from the Nawab of Bhopal's part in the matter, I was mainly responsible in persuading him to take some interest

in the negotiations with Gandhiji in the interest of the country and I have naturally felt vilified by Mr. Pyarelal's remarks. What a charge, that Nawab Ismail Khan, Shuaib and myself conspired to rope in the Nawab of Bhopal to do a dirty job for the League!

The Muslim League Working Committee authorized Mr. Jinnah to nominate five Muslims to represent the League in the Interim Government and he announced the following names: Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mr. I. I. Chundrigar and Mr. J. N. Mandal.

The names sprang a surprise on many of us. But having given the power to the President no one questioned it except that Nawab Ismail Khan objected to the name of Mr. J. N. Mandal. Khwaja Nazimuddin hurriedly came to me, very excited, and asked me whether I would not persuade Nawab Sahib to withdraw his objection. I did not agree to it. Mr. Jinnah had always been opposed to the nomination of a Muslim by the Congress but on this occasion he himself proposed the name of a Hindu from the Muslim quota. How did it fit in with the Two-Nation Theory? As a matter of fact the exclusion of both Khwaja Nazimuddin and Nawab Ismail Khan was generally disliked because the Viceroy himself, a few days earlier, had given them a place in his list which had been publicly announced.

Mr. Jinnah, during his talks with the Viceroy, had been offered the portfolio of Defence if he himself agreed to take it, otherwise it was to go to a Sikh, Sardar Baldev Singh. When Mr. Jinnah consulted the Working Committee I requested him to jump at it. But there were many who cried: 'No, Sir! You should remain our Quaid-i-Azam,' and so he did not agree. The Finance portfolio had been offered to us but there was great hesitation in the beginning as to whether the Nawabzada would be able to deal with this very technical subject until having been assured by Choudhri Mohammad Ali of all help to him in the discharge of his duties as Finance Member, the Nawabzada accepted. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has given it as one of the main grievances in the discomfiture of the Congress in the Interim Government and has blamed Patel for having preferred the Home portfolio as against that of Finance. But the Maulana ought to have realized that it was not for nothing that Patel was anxious to retain the Home portfolio. He had before his eyes the vital question of the States as well as the preparation for a show-down with the Muslims if partition ever came to be realized. In the disturbed condition of the country at the time, Sardar Patel thought that the Finance Ministry

would not give him that influence and power with the States and the provinces which he desired for although technically the States and the provinces were not directly under the Home Department, yet it had a big say in their affairs.

The Calcutta riots had their repercussions in East Bengal where Hindu-Muslim riots were not usually so frequent as in the northern provinces of India. After the Noakhali riot on 15 October 1946, Gandhiji decided to go to that district to get peace and harmony between the two communities restored. He first went to Calcutta. After a meeting with Shaheed Suhrawardy, the Premier of Bengal, he left for Noakhali on 28 October 1946. Hardly had he set foot in Noakhali when the news of very extensive rioting in Bihar reached him, on 3 November 1946. The Muslim League immediately stepped in and put Khwaja Nazimuddin in charge of the relief operations, with sufficient funds at his disposal to organize relief to thousands and thousands of homeless and shelterless Muslims, whose houses had been burnt down and in many cases all the inmates put to death. The number of casualties was very large. Armed Hindu bands roamed in the villages killing and pillaging Muslims. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Central Ministers, toured Bihar to control the mobs, who were roaming about from place to place and village to village to retaliate for Noakhali. Muslims were now expecting that Gandhiji would try to come to Bihar to allay their sufferings in that province. Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy, Chief Minister of Bengal, conveyed the feelings of the Muslims to Gandhiji in a letter dated 2 December 1946:

> 'I appreciate very much your desire to bring about peace between the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal but the Muslims feel that if you really wish to pursue your objective to establish good fellowship, Bihar should be the real field. Your stay has encouraged many of your followers to manufacture evidence and to place it before you and to carry on the persecution of the local Muslims, particularly the local Muslim League leaders, which will not possibly lead to mutual confidence in the future.'

Nevertheless, Gandhiji stayed on in Noakhali for two months more, before his return to Bihar on 15 March 1947. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan also had made a visit to the devastation in Bihar when Gandhiji came there. Some of the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders who visited Bihar, particularly Bakht Jamal Khan, were completely disillusioned in their estimate of the conditions of Muslims in the minority provinces and when they went back to N.W.F.P. they severed their connection with the Congress.

The British Government could not remain insensible to the happenings in Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar and the Frontier where during the visit of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru there was some stone throwing and disturbance. More so because the public opinion of England was greatly roused at the rising tide of lawlessness and an ominous sign of the breakdown of civil administration. The *London Times* editorially commented on the situation on 28 November 1946 as follows:

> 'The British Government cannot consent to hand over responsibility to a single political party without reference to the rights of the other groups, or place the Governments of the Muslim-majority Provinces at the unfettered discretion of the Hindu-controlled Central Government. If the kind of agreement which is represented by the State Paper cannot be secured, the Unity of India which is a great achievement of the past century must inevitably be sacrificed to the higher interest of elementary justice.'

This gave a clear indication of the opinion of a responsible section of the British public in regard to their complete disillusionment at the attitude of the Congress, in rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan while at the same time pretending that they had accepted it, with a view to hoodwinking the people in both England and India.

Mr. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, invited Mr. Jinnah, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Sardar Baldev Singh to England on 6 December 1946 to try once more to plead for the acceptance of the State Paper of 16 May 1946. During his stay in London, Mr. Jinnah was able to gather from most responsible quarters that in case the Congress did not agree to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan *in toto*, without putting its own interpretation on the document, the British Government would reluctantly agree to partition the country. Mr. Attlee was greatly disappointed when this attempt also failed to bring round the Congress to accept the State Paper. The Mission failed and the members returned to India.

But things did not stop there. The Congress now pressed the Viceroy to dismiss the Muslim League members of the Interim Government for having boycotted the Constituent Assembly session, which was held on 11 December 1946 at Delhi. In Congress phraseology it meant the rejection of the State Paper by the League. A meeting of the Working Committee of the League was held at Karachi on 5 February 1947, where it was unanimously decided that, as the Congress had not accepted the State Paper, it had no *locus standi* to take shelter under it and invoke its aid to hit at the League. It was nothing but sheer

hardihood on the part of the Congress to make such an unreasonable demand on the Viceroy of which, quite justifiably, he took no notice.

After a few days Mr. Bardoli, Chief Minister of Assam, declared his willingness to sit in Group C provided the same guarantee from the League was given in regard to the working in the Group as was demanded by the League from the Union constitution-making body. It was in the nature of a finesse but the League disregarded it.

A few days after Mr. Bardoli's statement a Direct Action movement was launched in Assam by the President of the Muslim League, Maulana Bhashani, without even consulting the Central League. While going to jail himself he had nominated a number of persons to follow him one after the other to jail, by defying certain orders of the Government. Mr. Jinnah asked me to proceed to Assam immediately to study the situation and to take a decision in accordance with my estimation of it. I first went to Shillong and then held a meeting of the Assam Muslim leaders at Sylhet. As a result of our efforts the obnoxious orders of the Assam Government were withdrawn and so was the Civil Disobedience movement.

Storms had been gathering in the Punjab after the riots in Bihar and Calcutta, and material for inciting the masses was supplied by the banning of Muslim League volunteers by the Home Secretary of Punjab, under the orders of the Governor, during the absence of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan in Delhi. A fierce agitation started and when the Premier returned he found the situation completely out of hand. The Muslim League leaders and several M.L.A.s had been arrested. He withdrew the order immediately and released the leaders, but the public refused to be satisfied by this action and demanded the complete restoration of civil liberties. Mian Iftikharuddin, who had been an influential Punjab Congressman and had experience of Congress methods and technique, had now come over to the Muslim League and was guiding the movement with great earnestness.

At his suggestion, a non-violent civil disobedience movement was started by the Muslim League, and this was carried on for over a month with great courage and discipline. Besides this thousands of men and women also played a very significant part in the struggle. Under the guidance of Miss Tazi, daughter of Begum Shah Nawaz, ladies of noble families, such as Miss Mumtaz, Begum Salma Tasadduq, Begum Noon and Begum Fatima paraded the streets wearing the *burqa* in peaceful processions, and held meetings in defiance of prohibitive orders,

facing ruthless attacks of the Punjab Police with remarkable patience and cheerfulness. Even the use of tear gas on ladies was not spared. There were many occasions when Muslims might have lost their balance and taken to rioting but they showed remarkable patience and forbearance to avoid making the movement assume a violent character. It was a sight for Gandhiji to see and admire.

XXXII

INDEPENDENCE AND PARTITION

1947

WHILE such was the condition in the Punjab the British Government announced, on 20 February 1947, its decision to quit India not later than 16 June 1948. The policy underlying this statement was the following:

'If there was no likelihood of a unitary constitution emerging from a fully representative Constituent Assembly by June 1948, then the British Government would have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to the Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way as might seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people.'

This statement gave great relief to the League as it had no intention of joining the Constituent Assembly for framing the Central Constitution, thus keeping the door open for the partition of India and the handing over of power to the provinces, singly or otherwise. Strange as it may seem, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru characterised the statement as wise and courageous; in fact the Congress generally welcomed it. Why Congress should have shown jubilation over the statement appears to be strange, except that they thought that, if the League refused to sit in the Constituent Assembly and the Punjab and Bengal Hindu members took part in its deliberations, the question of the partition of these two provinces would naturally come up. The Muslim League in that situation would either have to accept a truncated Pakistan or sit in the Constituent Assembly for India as a whole. The Congress was deeply hurt when the Viceroy refused to coerce the League to join the Constituent Assembly or to exclude the League from the Interim Government.

On 2 March 1947, Malik Khizar Hayat Khan resigned after making a statement that after the Prime Minister's statement of 20 February a new situation had been created and all parties

in the Punjab must decide how the Province should face the future. He said on his own part he would support the Muslim League demand, as he was convinced that for the purpose of securing a sound provincial administration the best arrangement would be a non-communal party or a coalition, in view of the fact that His Majesty's Government had declared a solemn resolve to start immediately the process of transferring the balance of political power into Indian hands, and to complete it by June 1948. He offered full co-operation to the Nawab of Mamdot, the President of the Muslim League, for the formation of a League Ministry. But it was a foregone conclusion that with only eighty-nine Muslim seats out of one hundred and seventy-five, the Muslim League would not be in a position to persuade the minorities to accept Nawab Mamdot as their leader. The Governor, Sir Eric Jenkins, also was unwilling to allow the Muslim League to form a purely Muslim Government in the Punjab. The Governor therefore suspended the constitution under section 93. As I have often said, it was this attitude of the Sikhs and Hindus which brought about partition of India because even as a big minority they always relied upon British support to keep the majority down in the Punjab. The Congress invariably denounced the Muslim League for their opposition to its policies, conveniently forgetting the fact that Congress itself at one time made a common cause with the Hindus and Sikhs to keep a Muslim League Ministry under its thumb. As we know, after the 1946 elections, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad went to the Punjab to unite Hindu and Sikh landlords and business men, to join hands with the few Congressmen to make a strong bloc against the Muslim League. With ten Muslims and the rest Hindus and Sikhs, the Maulana got the Congress coalition Ministry installed and even claimed it as a great achievement of his, although Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was opposed to this kind of combination. This clearly demonstrates that the minorities in the Punjab were blind to the injustice of demanding majority rule in India but denying the same right to the Muslims in the Punjab.

On the resignation of Khizar Hayat on 2 March, Master Tara Singh, the Sikh leader, standing on the stairs of the Council Chamber by the side of Lala Bhim Sen Sachar, most dramatically unsheathed his sword and shouted, 'The time has come when the might of the sword alone shall rule. The Sikhs are ready. We have to bring the Muslims to their senses.' The Hindu leaders expressed more or less the same sentiments. The threat did not end there. A huge procession was taken out

which clashed with the police and started assaults on Muslims. It was a well-planned scheme about which we had been receiving news from Muslim League quarters in the Punjab. Full preparations had been made for a showdown with the Muslims by collecting arms and ammunition.

In India, great expectations were raised on the declaration made by Master Tara Singh in the Punjab. The *Hindustan Times*, commenting on the attitude of the Sikhs, reported on 5 March 1947:

> 'Sikhs are much better organized and much better armed than the Muslims. For some time now they have been preparing for it. Higher British officials of the Punjab Government told me that if they have to face a similar movement [like that of the Muslim League against the Khizar Government] from the Sikhs they would have four times more trouble. If any such movement began, it would develop quickly into communal rioting.
>
> Since the day the Sikhs saw a civil war coming they have begun to think of the Sikh States in the Punjab as a counteracting factor against Muslim fanaticism; attempts are being made to organize the Sikh States into a federation led by the premier Sikh State of Patiala.
>
> This has met with encouraging response. Those Rajas who were not orthodox Sikhs have agreed to be converted to the orthodox Sikh faith and the ten year old son of the Maharaja of Kapurthala took *amrit* recently at a spectacular ceremony attended by leading Sikh Akali leaders. So when the rival claims of communities in the Punjab are submitted to the arbitration of force, the Sikhs will also have the powerful support of the Rashtriya Sewak Sangh which has also been preparing for the defence of Hindu rights.'

Thus the civil war in the Punjab began and the whole of India was deeply concerned about its future. After a few days of rioting and fighting in Lahore in which the Sikhs did not fare well the scene shifted to Amritsar, the citadel of the Sikhs. There they had great hopes in their fight against the Muslims but, to their considerable surprise and discomfiture, these hopes were dashed to pieces and a large number of Sikhs and Hindus had to take shelter in the Sikh Gurdwara, the Golden Temple, and the fight on 4 and 6 March at Amritsar went against their expectations.

The fire kindled in the Punjab quickly spread to the N.W.F.P. The revered Pir of Manki Sharif and Abdul Qayyum Khan, who had joined the League after the break-up of the Simla Conference and had much influence in his province, made Dr. Khan's Ministry extremely shaky by rallying the masses to the Muslim League side. Many League leaders were arrested by the Khan

Ministry, which added fuel to the fire. The Khan Brothers had lost much of their hold on the Pathan masses who had heard stories of gruesome massacres of Muslims in Bihar. Khan Bakht Jamal Khan who had gone to Bihar with Abdul Ghaffar Khan had returned quite determined to leave the Khudai Khidmatgar movement and the Congress. He was nominated a member of the Working Committee of the Central League for his sincerity and honesty. Ibrahim Khan of Jhagra, Mohammad Ali Khan, Mian Shah Abdullah, Arbab Noor Mohammad, Mian Ziauddin, Samin Jan Khan and many others carried the League banner from village to village. The Muslim League leaders who had been arrested by the Khan Ministry were released after the visit of Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, in April 1947.

The Congress leadership was shocked at the bad show made by the Sikhs in Lahore and Amritsar and its Working Committee made a demand, on 8 March 1947, that in case of partition of India the predominantly non-Muslim areas of the Punjab should be separated from the Province. Gandhiji was in Bihar at the time but he was informed of this decision more than a fortnight after, as he was opposed both to the partition of India and the partition of the provinces. About this time when asked by some Bengali leaders, before his departure from Noakhali, whether he favoured the partition of Bengal, he had replied that, during the anti-partition agitation from 1905-1911, Bengal had offered great sacrifices for the undoing of partition, but if they now desired to separate themselves from East Bengal they could do so, although personally speaking he was opposed to it.

After the Congress decision on partition of the provinces it had become a live issue; for a news item published in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore dated 25 March 1947 reported 'Sir Khizar Hayat Khan, former Premier of the Punjab, is opposed to the division of the Punjab, according to a source close to Malik Khizar Hayat Khan.' Later on Malik Sahib himself, in a statement dated 19 April 1947, said:

'It will be ruinous for all communities to split up the Province into bits. I had, in a Press interview some weeks back, expressed my opposition to any scheme involving partition of the Punjab. I notice now that a section of the Press has doubted the authenticity of that statement. I have in fact on many occasions in the past expressed the view that it would be ruinous for all communities to split up the Province into bits. The present Punjab boundaries make the Province a self-sufficient economic unit. The irrigation system, the electricity scheme, and the extensive development programme of the future, if torn apart, would lead to an impoverishing of both the western and the eastern Punjab.

It will be a catastrophic calamity if this comes about and all sections of the Punjabis should consider its dangerous implications, particularly the Hindus and Sikhs in the west and Muslims in the east of Punjab.'

On 6 May 1947, Malik Feroz Khan Noon also issued a statement to this effect. He said:

'We, the Muslims, are not willing to surrender one inch of the Punjab's territory. If we divide the land of the five rivers with its common irrigation system we are laying the foundation for future wars. An unjust peace is likely to force the two Indias to begin to arm themselves in self-defence. Resources sorely needed for our economic development will be frittered away on unproductive defence channels. We must not allow menace to run away with our reason. The Congress realizing that a division of India is inevitable are now using every device to make Pakistan not worth living. But the Muslim prefers his freedom to everything else.'

Why Malik Khizar Hayat Khan should have waited such a long time before coming out with his opposition to the partition of provinces is inexplicable to me. Sir Sikandar had made some hints against the idea of the partition of the provinces by stressing the unity of the Punjab, but Khizar Hayat Khan had never before given any expression of his views on the subject. If he had on a proper occasion unfolded his mind to the Punjab public, he would surely have created a favourable atmosphere for the reception of his views. It may be said that if he had made any such statement, he might have enhanced the importance of the minorities and given them a trump card to play with the majority without any guarantee of their future policy. But Malik Sahib should have known that, sooner or later, the question was bound to come up in all its seriousness when it might become impossible to avert the crisis.

About the third week of March three Bengal leaders, Nurul Amin, Hameedul Haq Chaudhri and Fazlur Rahman came to see me in Delhi and informed me that they had decided to move a motion of 'no confidence' against Shaheed Suhrawardy, for which they had already secured support of over seventy Muslim members of the Bengal Assembly. I was horrified at this news and tried to persuade them to drop the idea. They informed me that they had already met Mr. Jinnah who had asked them to talk also to me on the subject. Later on Mr. Jinnah asked me to proceed to Bengal at once to settle matters there, as any change in the Cabinet at this crucial hour would be most damaging to the League interest. After a day or two I went to Calcutta and held a meeting in the Premier's office, in which, besides

Shaheed, the aggrieved members were also present. I advised the Nurul Amin group not to proceed with their move as great changes were likely to take place in India soon and any upsetting of the Ministry at such a time would seriously damage the League cause. I further told them that the Central League could not agree to allow them to table a 'no confidence' motion. Everyone appreciated the situation and agreed to drop the move for the time being.

I had heard rumours that Shaheed Suhrawardy was carrying on negotiations with Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukerji for a United Bengal and now, while at Calcutta, the news was confirmed. I did not talk over the matter with Shaheed, because I could foresee that the scheme would fail, for the Bengal Hindus would never agree to it and he was bound to be disillusioned. If, however, the Bengal Hindus did not press for partition of the Province, the Punjab cry would also perhaps die down and thus the Congress idea of the partition of the Punjab would be set at nought. Mr. Jinnah also knew of this move, but he did not advise me to talk about it to Suhrawardy nor did he advise him not to negotiate with Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukerji. Mr. Abdul Hashim, then Secretary of the Bengal Muslim League, now claims that the real move for a United Bengal idea was his and not that of Shaheed Suhrawardy. Where the truth lies I cannot say.

My fourth and last visit to Hyderabad, which I had visited several times before, was in 1947. I went there at the invitation of Sayed Qasim Rizvi, President of the Anjuman-i-Ittehadul Muslimeen, to preside over an Urdu Conference; perhaps because I could not go there under any other pretext. I was to stay as the guest of the leaders of the organization but when I arrived at the aerodrome, besides them, a representative of His Exalted Highness was also present to invite me to be a State guest. I told him, 'I have come here at the request of the Ittehadul Muslimeen and if they agree I have no objection.' They agreed and I was taken to the State Guest House. Next day I had an audience with H.E.H. the Nizam, for the third occasion in my life. I had not long to wait, for H.E.H. came in within a few minutes with two achkans, one over the other and slippers old enough to deserve rest. As soon as I sat down, after salutations he asked me: 'What do you think of Mirza Ismail?' I replied, 'I have met him only once, in 1942 at Bangalore, for a few minutes and as such I am not in a position to give an opinion on his merits but, from what I see of the beautification of Naubat Pahar and the cleaning of the city and

white-washing of the walls all round, I take it that he has a good taste for art.' H.E.H. said, 'Tell Jinnah that I had gone very far when he advised me, against my choice, to take him [Sir Mirza Ismail] as my Prime Minister.' I assured him that his message would be delivered to Mr. Jinnah. Thereafter he asked me whether it would be right on the part of Hyderabad to enter into a separate agreement with the British Government after they had conceded independence to India. I replied:

'As matters stand today the Prime Minister of England has made it clear, by his statement of 20 February 1947, that the British Government does not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under paramountcy to any successor Governments in India and I am not sure whether under these conditions they would agree to enter into fresh commitments with the States. The real question is not whether it would be good for Hyderabad but whether the British would agree to your Exalted Highness's proposal. However there is no reason, when all the rulers of States are making attempts to protect their interests by one or the other means, why Hyderabad should not make an attempt to secure agreement with the British Government.'

Then he questioned me about our chances of getting Pakistan. I replied: 'Your Exalted Highness, Pakistan is there; the only question is whether it will be the whole of it or a truncated one.' Thereafter we talked about his visit to Lucknow, his meeting with the Raja of Mahmudabad and visits to various places. Our interview then ended. As soon as I came out a gentleman with a belt on his sherwani and a pugaree on his head came near and whispered in my ear, 'It was a fine interview.' It appeared to me that the gentleman had been listening to our conversation from some corner of the back room. My son Atiquzzaman, who was the Manager of the State Mint, came to join me for lunch at the residence of Dr. Naziruddin Hasan and told me half truths of my interview with H.E.H. which he had picked up from the bazaar.

At the Urdu Conference I found great excitement among the Muslim public which appeared to be overwhelmed by anxiety as to their future in India. In my speech I tried to eschew politics as much as I could, but when I was followed by Sayed Qasim Rizvi it was all fire. Qasim Rizvi came from Lucknow and had received his early education in Firangi Mahal. After the death of Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, another Muslim gentleman had succeeded him as President of the Ittehadul Muslimeen, but soon after he was replaced by Sayed Qasim Rizvi who had to fight a very hard, but losing fight.

During this visit I learnt that the Bren Gun Factory, which had been established in Hyderabad during the course of World War II, had already been removed to Dum Dum near Calcutta, and the remaining machinery was being packed to be sent there too. I tried to find out the reason for this transfer of the factory but none in the State could give me the reason. I tried to gather information from the Finance Minister, the Prime Minister being absent from Hyderabad. I went to his house, only to learn there that he had gone to supervise the construction of his mosque although it was during office hours. I found him there in his kurta and pyjamas and inquired why this grand factory which had been established in the State was being allowed to go out. He informed me that the Prime Minister was of the view that it was not required by the State and hence the transfer. I asked him whether he would help me to convince H.E.H. that it was a wrong policy, but he told me that unless now the British Army decision were changed I would not succeed in my efforts. On return to Delhi, I made efforts to move Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief, to intervene in the matter. He expressed his inability to interfere at that stage because with the sanction of the Prime Minister of Hyderabad a large portion of the factor had already been sent away and the rest was being packed for Dum Dum. That was the Hyderabad of 1947.

In early January, Qazi Isa had sent me a telegram asking me to come over to Delhi to join a very important discussion. Qazi Isa informed me that the Khan of Kalat was in Delhi and had asked him to request me to meet him. The Khan of Kalat showed me certain papers in connection with the lease of Quetta and some other areas to the British Government by the Kalat State and asked me to advise him whether, if immediate steps were taken to file a case on the basis of the lease deeds, anything would come of it. He also talked to me about some preparations that were being made to fight the British if Pakistan was not conceded to the Muslims. He talked of some guerilla fighting to be organized, for which Mr. Jinnah had secured the services of Iskander Mirza. Before giving any promise to the Khan of Kalat to interest myself in his case, I talked over the matter with Mr. Jinnah who advised me to take up the case and consult Mr. Wasim also in this connection. He expressed his great appreciation of the services which the Khan was offering to the League organization. It took me some time to go back to Lucknow to consult Mr. Wasim, whose written opinion was conveyed to Mr. Jinnah. This all made me anxious to go to Baluchistan to see things for myself.

I was invited to preside over a conference at Larkana, in Sind, by the President of the Larkana League, Qazi Fazlullah. It was a well-attended conference which assured me that Sind was now definitely for Pakistan. I stayed at Larkana for three days in the last week of April and then proceeded to Karachi on my way to Baluchistan where I had to preside over meetings held at different places in that vast and arid area, with a population of only about ten lakhs in an area of 146,000 square miles. I was accompanied by Qazi Isa, Sardar Usman Jogazai, Jan Mohammad, Mir Qadir Bakhsh and others. I toured the whole province including Loralai, Qila Saifullah, Fort Sandeman, Dalbandin and Qila Sufaid on the Persian border. It was a tiresome tour which I completed within ten days and returned to Quetta after making many friends amongst sardars and chiefs of Baluchistan, particularly Shaikh Mirak of Fort Sandeman and Khan Baz Khan. At Quetta I saw a parade by two hundred Muslim League volunteers in uniform, organized under the capable guidance of Qazi Isa.

Meanwhile Lord Wavell, having disagreed with Mr. Attlee's recipe of removing the British Army from India on a fixed date, had been replaced by the new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. Lord Mountbatten arrived in India on 23 March 1947 as the last Viceroy of India, with very wide powers of enforcing his decisions on the political parties if they failed to agree to compose their conflicting views and policies. For the first time the British had thrown a challenge to Indian leadership, both Congress and the League, that if they did not agree between themselves on the Cabinet Mission Plan the British would withdraw from the scene, after either transferring power to India as a single unit or partitioning the country and transferring power to two or more States.

The two offers of the British Government, the Cripps offer in 1942 and the State Paper prepared by the Cabinet Mission in 1946, depended for their success on the agreement of the parties which, in political language, in view of the deep-seated antagonisms of the Hindus and Muslims, meant their rejection by both. The inclusion of Sir Stafford Cripps in the Cabinet Mission was an unfortunate choice. Although he was but one of three, throughout the Cabinet Mission's stay in India he was lording the show. During their talk with me for about two hours on 14 April 1946 the whole conversation was monopolized by Sir Stafford, his other colleagues merely nodding, or silently admiring the slyness of their colleague. Sir Stafford had lost face with Congress in 1942 and was keenly anxious to rebuild his reputation as a staunch Socialist, in the Congress camp. The

State Paper announced on 16 May 1946 was a most intricate document which, with all its exquisite drafting, was bound to fail to elicit any enthusiastic welcome from either side. In spite of this, if the Cabinet Mission had announced it to be their final decision, I have no doubt it would have gone through. Why could Mr. Attlee not have taken up the same attitude towards the Cabinet Mission State Paper which Mr. McDonald, the Prime Minister of England in 1932, had taken in respect of his decision on the communal question, by providing a clause that it could only be altered by the consent of the parties concerned? He ought to have taken note of the fact that although Congress was a very big and strong party, yet within the last decade the Muslim people had also become united on a common platform and the League had become undoubtedly a mass organization of the Muslims.

Lord Mountbatten came with a threat to divide and quit and succeeded in securing the agreement of both the parties to a kind of partition. Pandit Nehru, when he met Lord Mountbatten on 25 March 1947, pointed out to him that Wavell had committed a mistake in inviting the Muslim League to join the Interim Government instead of waiting for a request from the Muslim League to be allowed to come in. Pandit Nehru plainly was accusing Lord Wavell for having brought the Muslim League into the Interim Government instead of allowing it to remain in the wilderness. If however the British had been willing to share power with one or the other of the two major parties they would have long before chosen as their mate the Muslims, rather than the teaming millions of Hindus who would nevertheless have been a problem in any democratic set-up. Lord Wavell had realized his mistake soon afterwards and had made an orderly retreat at the earliest opportunity. Where Lord Wavell blundered grievously was to have brought in the Congress without the League.

Mr. Jinnah met Lord Mountbatten on 5 April 1947 to convey to the Viceroy the Muslim League standpoint. He stressed the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. Dr Rajendra Prasad in his interview argued for the partition of provinces on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, which spoke of Muslim majority areas and provided for 'territorial readjustment'.

Gandhiji in his interview with Mountbatten proposed that Mr. Jinnah might be given all the powers to save partition of the country. But the Viceroy was too matter of fact to fall in with his idea. Gandhiji thereafter informed the Viceroy that henceforth only the Congress leaders would negotiate with him. However Lord Mountbatten succeeded in persuading him to issue

with Mr. Jinnah a joint appeal to the people to keep peace in the country. It was urged on behalf of the Congress that Mr. Kripalani should also be one of the signatories as he was now the President of the Congress, but that request was turned down by the Viceroy.*

There were occasions when Lord Mountbatten wavered as to whether resurrection of the Cabinet Mission Plan would not still be the solution rather than partition, but ultimately he gave up that line of thought and succeeded in obtaining the consent of both parties to the partition of the country.

There was a time when the Cabinet Mission Plan might have solved the Indian problem but it was too late now. I had once voted for its acceptance, at a time when partition of provinces had not been demanded by the Hindus and Congress and there was a possibility of their minorities agreeing to remain in the Muslim-majority provinces; but now feelings had been stirred up by continuous propaganda and the anti-Pakistan movement and it was not feasible to go back to the Cabinet Mission Plan. Congress had thrown away the chance of keeping India undivided and Muslims can say with great pride that, even under great pressure from their people, they had agreed to retain the unity of India under the State Paper.

Lord Mountbatten left for London on 18 May 1947 to inform the British Cabinet of the real situation in India. Before his departure he had seen the strength of the Muslim League in the N.W.F.P., as well as the unity of Muslims in Bengal, and had gone prepared to urge upon the Prime Minister that nothing but partition of the provinces as well as that of India could meet the requirements of the situation. He returned to India on 31 May and unfolded the decision of partition of the country to the leaders on 2 June 1947.

The Declaration of the British Government was discussed by the Working Committee of the League on 3 June 1947. Referring to the partition of India, it provided for a notional partition of the provinces of Bengal and Punjab; the final partition was to be made later.

It was in this meeting that the question of making Karachi the capital of Pakistan was decided upon. As the terms of the Declaration were known to all of us, there was not much to discuss, for every one of us had by now become reconciled to the partition of the provinces. The provision for a notional partition had

*The Author is indebted to A. Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, London, Robert Hale, pp. 44, 52, 54, 56, 59, 61 and 80 for some details mentioned in this and the two preceding paragraphs.

indeed created some suspicion in my mind that it might further end in the loss of Kashmir, but so far as I remember no one openly opposed notional partition.

Shaheed Suhrawardy, while entering the meeting room, complained to me that no one had taken notice of the scheme for a united Bengal, but in the meeting he did not raise the question, perhaps because the Hindus of West Bengal had clearly given indication that they would not agree to separate themselves from the rest of India.

On 8 June 1947 the Council of the Muslim League endorsed the decision of the Working Committee accepting the Declaration. When the meeting of the Council was in progress, on the second day, Khaksar volunteers in great force entered the Imperial Hotel where the meeting was going on and tried to force their way to the Hall. They were turned out with great difficulty by the police and the residents of the Hotel. What was the idea behind this move none but Allama Mashriqi could say.

XXXIII

INDIA IN FERMENT

1947

OMINOUS events cast their unfailing shadows, bleak and grim, perceivable all round in the crushing atmosphere of suspicion and inexplicable inner suffocation. It would have been a wonder if the impending changes in the relationship of the three parties in India, the British, the Hindus and the Muslims, had not evoked a sense of frustration, even in the glow of the dawn of hope for a better future for the Pakistanis and Indians in their new sovereign States, and a sense of satisfaction to the British, that in their decision to quit India lay the glory of their people and the fulfilment of pledges given to the people of India by their successive Sovereigns and Ministers, to prepare them for the day when they would be equipped with the necessary virtues and experience for carrying on their governments in the interest of their people. They had found their respective levels through centuries of mutual adjustment, not always by means of co-operation and understanding but often also through bitter struggles, rivalries, estrangements and aversions. With all the benefits of security, liberal education, railways, telegraphs, canals, and electricity, well-equipped and well-trained Armed Forces backed by a well-organized system of civil administration and police that they had conferred on India, the British were now prepared to part with the land with which they had been associated for about two hundred years. World opinion and the second World War may have had a share in influencing the British decision to quit, but to withhold praise for this well-merited and lofty British action could be nothing short of ingratitude.

Sir Winston Churchill once said that he had not accepted the Prime Ministership of England to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, but in the debate in the House of Commons in which he took part, when the final decision was taken, his only contribution was to attempt to resurrect the Cripps Offer which now lay buried fathoms deep. He did not oppose

the grant of independence to India but by bringing in the Cripps Offer he tried to save the partition of provinces, with a view to concede more space for the Muslims. If the British had chosen to continue they could have done so for a decade more, as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has rightly said.

As between the Hindus and Muslims, the ashes of the British-given democracy, never accepted by the latter ever since the establishment of the Queen's empire in India, were changing hands from day to day. This with a determination matched only by the sorrowful partings of intended emigrants from their homelands to unknown destinies. Tribulation mixed with joy and sorrow could be read on the faces of the people of India generally. Gandhiji, having been relegated to the rank of a burdensome intruder in the affairs of the Hindu nation, his voice to intending emigrants fell on deaf ears. All were waiting to plunge into deadly orgies as soon as the call should come. Preparations had already started; collection of arms and ammunition by fair or foul means had begun. Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad were torn between their loyalty to Gandhiji on the one side and the independence of India fully established, even in a truncated India, on the other. Sardar Patel, the strong man of Hindudom in Congress, was busy reducing Gandhiji's stature, resenting the preference given to Pandit Nehru as against himself who came from the same area as Gandhiji. Finding his position awkward, Gandhiji preferred to be away from Delhi and to bury himself in Noakhali or Bihar to avoid daily conflicts with his erstwhile followers.

Gandhiji had been to meet Lord Mountbatten but, after the Viceroy's rejection of his proposal, he again went back to Bihar to be away from the atmosphere of partition of the country and the provinces which was particularly pronounced in Delhi.

In the course of a conversation with me after our acceptance of a truncated Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah one day expressed his great concern regarding the future of Indian Muslims after the partition and implored me to take up the Indian Muslim leadership after he had left for Pakistan. I told him that I had already decided to stay in India and for that reason I had got myself elected to the Indian Constituent Assembly, in spite of the request of many of my friends in the Punjab and Bengal to represent them in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, but I could not say whether I was the best person in the circumstances to shoulder that burden. When he again insisted on my acceptance of his proposal I asked for time to consider the matter. In a way this was a great compliment to me, but I sincerely felt that Nawab

Ismail Khan would perhaps be more acceptable to India than would I, who had forsaken Congress in 1937, and had been in a way responsible for the Pakistan fight. Further, as for the leadership, whatever claim I could have to that honour it had been laid at the door of Mr. Jinnah ungrudgingly. I was now only a phantom of what I had once been in Indian politics, with no distinct status of my own left to lead the Indian Muslims after the departure of Mr. Jinnah; with these handicaps I felt reluctant to accept his proposal.

On my return to Lucknow I consulted my younger brother Mushfiq who advised me to accept, but in the interests of over forty million Muslims, who were going to be left in India under very peculiar circumstances, I thought that Nawab Ismail Khan, although probably less acceptable to Mr. Jinnah, would have been more acceptable to Hindu India than myself.

In the Indian Constituent Assembly there were eight seats for the U.P. Muslims, out of which one was secured by a non-Muslim Leaguer and the remaining seven came to us.*

The number of elected Muslim representatives from other provinces was: Madras 4; Bombay 2; Bihar 5; East Punjab 4; West Bengal 4.

We met on 11 June 1947 at Delhi, to elect the leader of the Muslim League Party for the Constituent Assembly. On my suggestion Nawab Ismail Khan was elected to preside over this meeting. As some members had not then arrived, the meeting was postponed, first until 12 July and then as some members were still absent, to the 13th.

In the evening I was sitting with Mr. Chundrigar along with some other members of the Assembly when Tajammul Husain, a Bihar representative, requested me to accept the leadership of the Muslims in the Constituent Assembly. I told him that I considered Nawab Ismail Khan to be a better choice than myself and that I would myself support him. When the meeting on the 13th began in Western Court I learnt for the first time that Mr. Chundrigar was also a candidate and that talk of a compromise was going on between him and Nawab Ismail Khan for the leadership of the party. While leaving the meeting place Mr. Chundrigar asked me to lunch with him. As soon as I arrived there he told me he had received a message from Mr. Jinnah requesting me to accept the leadership of the Muslim League party. I told him it was very hard for me to refuse Mr.

*They were: 1. Nawab Ismail Khan. 2. Maulana Hasrat Mohani. 3. Mr. Aziz Ahmad Khan. 4. Nawab Qizilbash of Bahreich. 5. Mr. Rizwanullah, 6. Begum Aizaz Rasul. 7. Myself.

Jinnah's request but it would be letting down Nawab Ismail Khan whom I had been supporting as a candidate. In the meanwhile I thought over the matter again and said: 'No, I will not disappoint Mr. Jinnah although I know my relations with Nawab Ismail Khan will receive a great set-back.' After lunch both Mr. Chundrigar and I went to the meeting where my name was proposed and unanimously accepted. Thus I became the leader of the Muslims of India.

Since acceptance of the Declaration of 3 June 1947, effects of the impending partition had begun to be felt by the Muslims of the minority provinces. Our erstwhile comrades in arms in the fight for Pakistan, belonging to the Pakistan area, were too busy thinking of their own future in the expected new set-up and we, who had to live in the old surroundings, were perturbed at the inevitable hostility of the Hindu majority for our having been the spearhead of the Pakistan movement. As stated before, news of the preparations in the Sikh States in the north and of the Rashtriya Sewak Sangh in many other parts of the country were daily pouring in, to prepare Muslims for violence on a large scale. In fact the exodus of some Hindu and Sikh families had already begun which was adding greater incentive to the already rising pitch of hatred and antagonism of the Hindu masses, particularly in the northern provinces of U.P. and Bihar. The two-nation theory which we had used in the fight for Pakistan had created not only bad blood against the Muslims of the minority provinces but also an ideological wedge between them and the Hindus of India. Gandhiji was in Bihar, nevertheless, and through his daily prayer meetings was earnestly advising his people not to lose their balance of mind but to try to protect the Musalmans from harm so far as it lay in their power. Equally strongly he was advising the Pakistan Muslims to give necessary protection to their minorities, but a whirlwind of pent-up fury which was beyond anyone's control was developing fast and great dangers were ahead for the Muslim minority in India which had been cut off from the sixty per cent of the former India population that now belonged to Pakistan.

Muslim League meetings had stopped since 8 June when the Declaration of 3 June was accepted by the Council of the Muslim League, and a natural barrier, even between Muslims of the majority and minority provinces, had begun to be felt, heralding the future shape of things. Evidence of this change was supplied when news reached us that the Muslim League had agreed to 14 August 1947 as the date of partition whereas Mr. Attlee's statement of 20 February 1947 proposed 16 June 1948; and

no Working Committee meeting of the League had been held to consult the opinion of the members, particularly those of the minority provinces. The other very important decision was that of the Muslim League members of the Interim Government to inform the Viceroy that not he but Mr. Jinnah would be the Governor-General of Pakistan. In the last meeting when the Declaration of the British Government had been accepted by the Working Committee of the League the only question taken up in connection with administrative matters of the Pakistan areas was the selection of Karachi as its capital. The question as to who would be the Governor-General of Pakistan had not been discussed at all, the general impression being that for the interim period Lord Mountbatten would be the Governor-General of both Dominions. The news was received with mixed feelings even in League circles, for there was a section of people who thought that Lord Mountbatten, having become very friendly with Pandit Nehru, could not be relied upon to be fair to Pakistan in the matter of notional partition and allied subjects. That Mountbatten, for reasons best known to him, had no goodwill for Mr. Jinnah was very well known but it was argued that if Radcliffe could be trusted to be fair to Pakistan and be given *carte blanche* in allotting areas in certain districts like Gurdaspur and Ferozepore, Mountbatten's attitude would be of less account. It has, indeed, been advanced that politically it might have been more sound to have thrown responsibility on Lord Mountbatten, when he might have intervened more effectively to control the killings and the holocaust which developed on such an extensive scale. It would have been his duty to maintain peace and security to the fullest possible extent and he might have prevented the Indian advance into Kashmir. Others argued that Mountbatten, having shown his hostility to Mr. Jinnah, might have played havoc with Pakistan which in the event would have fared worse than it did through the Radcliffe Award.

The writer of *Mission with Mountbatten,** Mr. Alan Campbell-Johnson has made a hero of him and has showered encomiums with a profuseness outbidding Boswell, the biographer of Dr. Johnson. As Viceroy, he had been sent by the British Government to India with vast powers vested in him. His main task was to divide, pack up and go. Even in this task, under the pretext of avoiding violence, he reduced the period for the transfer of power to the short time of two and a half months after acceptance of the British Government Declaration. The lives of about a million men lost on both sides of the border through

*See f.n., p. 385.

the Viceroy's haste, impetuosity and inexperience may not count for much with the writer of *Mission with Mountbatten*. Maybe his encomiums are justified and Mountbatten's achievements worthy of praise but there are Englishmen public-spirited and honest enough to express a different opinion of the last Viceroy. I quote Sir Francis Mudie's letter, dated 20 October 1948 which he, as Governor of the Punjab, had written to me as the founder President of the Pakistan Muslim League:

'Government House, Lahore,
20th October, 1948.

Dear Choudhry Sahib,

I have just seen the report in the papers of a speech which you made at a meeting organized by the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, because I disagree with you entirely and because I think that your speech can only have done harm to your cause.... But to identify him [Mountbatten] with the British Government or with the British people generally is entirely wrong. I know that the great body of British opinion, both official and non-official, shares our view of Mountbatten. It is one of his objects to keep himself in the public eye, and with his abilities and position it is easy for him to do so, but it by no means follows that he has the people behind him.... He has definitely sided with India and India accuses Britain of being pro-Pakistan. Mountbatten's object is clearly to see that Britain is not pro-Pakistan or Pakistan pro-British, which is exactly the effect that your speech would tend to have....

The facts of the situation are that Pakistan is situated between hostile—a very hostile—India on the one side and . . . an expansionist and unscrupulous Russia. As long as the relations between Pakistan and Britain are good, and Pakistan remains in the Commonwealth an attack by Russia—and also I am inclined to believe, an attack by India—on Pakistan brings in the U.K. and the U.S.A. on Pakistan's side. If these conditions do not hold. then Pakistan stands alone and sooner or later will be swallowed up by Russia or India or more probably partitioned as Poland was.

Russia is at present concentrating on India as that is the more fertile ground. But she is not neglecting Pakistan.... I cannot believe that we wish to see Pakistan run by police officials and Russian Commissars.

I am sure that you will not mind this letter from an old friend. You and I have worked too long together not to be frank with one another. I can assure you that the feeling in Britain is strongly pro-Pakistan, whatever Mountbatten and Cripps may do, and that it is growingly so. I know this from the letters I receive from Home. This being so it is, you must agree, rather hard to find someone like you identifying us with a person like Mountbatten.

With best regards,
F. Mudie.'

I am ashamed to confess that the Pakistan Government treated Sir Francis Mudie most shabbily by creating a situation for him, while he was the Governor of Punjab, to which he could not possibly agree and he resigned. We owed a debt of gratitude to him for having refused, when Governor of Sind, to hand over the Province including Karachi to the mercy of Congress. If he had agreed we would have faced serious difficulty at the time of partition in choosing a suitable centre for the establishment of our Government of Pakistan, because Punjab was at that time under section 93 administration.

On 6 July 1947, Mr. Jinnah advised the Muslims who were to remain in India that, 'the minorities should be loyal to the State to which they belong.' As a piece of advice it was very sound indeed and I took it seriously to heart. I started leading my party, small but well-knit, in the Minority Sub-Committee which was meeting from day to day to decide the rights and privileges of minorities in India. One day I received a telephone message from Mr. Chundrigar that Dr. Ambedkar was with him and wanted to discuss some very important matters with me. I went immediately to meet Dr. Ambedkar. He took out a note from his pocket dealing with the rights of Scheduled Castes and the Muslims in the Indian Dominion. Briefly stated he wanted Muslim support to the claim of the Scheduled Castes for reservation of seats in the provincial and central Legislatures as well as reservation in the Services, in return for similar support to the League by his group in the Constituent Assembly. Both of us signed the document. I have lost my copy and am sorry that I cannot for that reason produce it here, particularly as Dr. Ambedkar is dead. For a few days the Minority Sub-Committee discussed the question of the Christians and the Sikhs; thereafter it took up the question of the Scheduled Castes. My party supported Dr. Ambedkar's demands but when the case of Muslims came up for discussion and voting, Dr. Ambedkar abstained and his party remained neutral.

On 27 July the Constituent Assembly took up the flag question. So far as I remember Jawaharlal proposed the Asoka Chakr flag for India. Following the guidance given by Mr. Jinnah that 'minorities should be loyal to the State to which they belong.' and the dictates of my own conscience, I made a speech accepting the flag on behalf of the Indian Muslims. After my speech Jawaharlal came to me to shake hands and congratulated me on my speech, as also by letter did the ex-Governor of U.P., Sir Maurice Hallett.

The Minority Committee met under the presidentship of

Sardar Patel. The first item to be taken up was the Sikh question. Looking towards them smilingly, Sardar Patel said, 'Your matter will be taken sometime later when more facts are available to deal with the question.' Then came the Muslim case. I demanded separate electorates for the Muslims, on the plea that the main objection of Congress against separate electorates had always been that they were a help to the third party, the British Government. Now there was no third party to take advantage from the Muslim minority and conceding this right could only give satisfaction to the Muslims that in the Congress-governed India their rights would be safe. Both my demands, for separate electorates and reservation in the Services, were rejected. Sardar Patel closing the debate on this question said: 'Those who want separate electorates should go to Pakistan. They are not wanted in India.' The Scheduled Caste representatives again abstained from voting with us. When lastly the Scheduled Caste matter came up, Dr. Ambedkar claimed reservation of seats in the Legislature and the Services. I was in a temper and opposed both of them on the ground that Scheduled Castes were part and parcel of Hindu society and did not require any separate rights to safeguard their interests. If the Muslims could not claim them, then surely the Scheduled Castes were not entitled to any special safeguards. This happened on 29 July 1947.

I was put in rather an awkward position when I was asked by Mr. Jinnah to proceed to Lahore to preside over the Election meeting on 5 August 1947 for the leadership of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly, as I had already been elected leader of the Muslim League Party in the Indian Constituent Assembly. I agreed however and went to Lahore by the morning plane and breakfasted with Begum Shah Nawaz before going to the meeting. I learnt from her that the opposition would be very meagre because Malik Firoz Khan Noon's candidature was not supported by the central League. After occupying the chair, I asked for the names of the candidates. Nawab Mamdot's name was proposed first and then that of Malik Firoz Khan Noon; but he withdrew his name and I declared Nawab Mamdot elected, and returned by the evening plane.

My brother Saiduzzaman, who had opted for Pakistan, passed through Lucknow from Calcutta on the tenth of August, and his was the last train which reached Lahore without molestation. From 11 August the killings started and no train passed through East Punjab which did not bring maimed, mutilated and dead bodies to Lahore. It would neither be profitable nor possible to give any correct estimate of the loss of lives occasioned by

the widespread inhuman barbarities perpetrated on innocent lives. The news of barbarities in East Punjab spread like wildfire in West Punjab and retaliation followed. In the very nature of things atrocities there, however much they may be deprecated, could hardly have been as widespread or as well-organised as those in the Sikh areas.

I had to go to Delhi again to be present there on the night of 14 August 1947 when the Constituent Assembly was to declare the Independence of India at five minutes after midnight. As soon as I occupied my seat, the President of the Constituent Assembly, Mr. Mavlankar, sent his secretary to suggest to me that it would be a very good gesture from our side if, after Pandit Nehru's speech, I also spoke on the occasion as there were to be only two speeches. I told him he had troubled himself unnecessarily in asking me to do it, because I had indeed travelled from Lucknow, leaving my wife seriously ill, in order to be present to welcome the Independence of India. Lord Mountbatten arrived with all the pomp and show worthy of the unique occasion. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made a very brief speech and I followed after him. Jawaharlal came direct to me and embraced me heartily for the sentiments I had expressed. Thereafter Lord Mountbatten made a brief response and the ceremony ended.

On 23 August some Delhi Muslims came in the evening to inform me that several truck-loads of Sikhs and some volunteers with naked swords had passed through their quarters shouting the slogan, 'Blood for Blood,' and asked for my help. Until then the only help that I had received in connection with the East Punjab disturbances was from Jawaharlal who had always obliged me by sending special envoys to afford protection to the distressed persons but, the disturbances being widespread and sudden, the help secured was very limited. To add to my helplessness during these days the exodus of Muslims who had opted for Pakistan from the Civil, Police, Railway, Telephone, Telegraph and other services had left the country with only subordinate Muslim officers or the rank and file in the Police, which made the situation the worse confounded.

After the complaint of the Delhi Muslims I talked to Sardar Patel the next day in the Constituent Assembly about the affair. I said, 'Will you allow what is now happening in East Punjab to be repeated in Delhi?' He replied, 'I shall not allow disturbances in Delhi at any cost.' When I came out at the close of the Assembly session I learnt that an order under section 144 Cr. P.C. had been enforced for twenty-four hours in Delhi. I thought that at least something good had been done. However before

the expiry of this period another order was issued under the same section for seventy-two hours. The rumour had it that this was to curb the activities of the Sikhs and Jan Sangh in Delhi. On 29 August I left for Bhopal.

On 5 September rioting broke out in Delhi and the killings of the Muslims in the city started. They were defending themselves to the best of their ability, but the odds were against them. Unfounded stories of the collection of arms by the Muslims were circulated among the Hindus, only to offer an excuse for wholesale massacres. Even Sardar Patel carried such news to Lord Mountbatten and to his other colleagues to justify his indifference to the brutal killing of Muslims in the city.

I learnt in Lucknow that the house of my younger brother Dr. Salimuzzaman, who had been nominated by Rajagopalachari as Director of the Indian Scientific Research Institute, had been attacked and one man in the house killed. Who it was nobody could tell me. I telephoned to Miss Padmaja Naidu, daughter of Mrs. Naidu then Governor of U.P., to make an inquiry about the matter. She tried many times but could not get any reliable information. Two days later I received a message from Rafi Qidwai that Salim was quite safe in his house, having been removed by him from a hotel where he had taken shelter just a few hours before the raid on his house. Next day Salim himself came to Lucknow and informed me that, as a result of the disturbances, thousands of Muslims had left their homes and assembled in the Old Delhi Fort where they were under police guard, but without any latrines, lights or water. They were being removed by plane from Delhi to Karachi. The office of the Anjuman Taraqqi-i-Urdu had been attacked and that of the Delhi Muslim League had also been looted and most of the records of the League were lost. The Assistant Secretary, Sayed Shamsul Hasan, who had been associated with the organization since 1911, had departed to Pakistan and like him thousands of residents of Delhi left their coveted houses and lands, emaciated and starved. This was the Delhi of the Mughal Emperors in 1947.

The period between August and September 1947 was the blackest period in Indian history—a period of woe, misery and suffering for the unprotected and the unwary. Neighbours were killing neighbours, friends friends, and human life had lost all significance. Areas which had been their homes for generations and generations were denuded of people. Cities and towns lost their character, for properties and men changed overnight; the old faces disappeared as if they had never existed. Northern India had become a cauldron and it was at this black period of

Indian history that I had become the leader of Indian Muslims. It was a nerve-shattering experience and under its stress and strain I became confined to bed for a few days. It was at this time that I received a letter from Shaheed Suhrawardy in which he raised many issues which I had been cogitating in my own mind.

'40, Theatre Road, Calcutta,
The 10th September, 1947.

My dear Khaliquzzaman Sahib,

We are now all thinking very hard as to what should be the position of the minorities, particularly of the minority Muslims, in the Hindu-majority provinces. We had not thought about it earlier, as we did not expect Bengal to be partitioned and Muslims being reduced to a minority in any part of Bengal. I think that your move and your speech regarding the flag was a very wise one, as any hesitation in accepting it would have created indelible suspicion in the minds of the Hindus regarding our loyalty and bona fides. The good feeling between Hindus and Muslims at present existing here, and let us hope that this will be permanent, is largely due to the whole-hearted acceptance of the Indian Union flag by the Muslims and their adoption of the cry of "Jai Hind". At the same time, we have got to think what should be the policy of the Muslims for the future. And the whole question turns on this, can we rely upon the Hindu Governments to look after the interests of the Muslims or shall we be let down at a crucial moment? We appear to have the following alternatives.

1. Continue to live as Muslims in the best Islamic tradition connected with the Muslim League and holding fast to the two-nation theory. In this alternative we shall have to be very strong and disciplined and must be ready to undergo sacrifices and must look to Pakistan for support and protection. We shall certainly get the respect of the Hindus, but equally their indignation. They will see to it that we do not become strong and I doubt very much whether Pakistan can come to our rescue and support. The theory of hostages has broken down. The fear of reprisal does not prevent a Hindu from killing us although he may be endangering his brother Hindus in Pakistan, but when a person gets mad and becomes insane then he does not think of the consequences to his co-religionists in other parts of the country. Further, in spite of the best efforts of the authorities, the rank and file of the law and order force are intensely communal. They are adopting an anti-Muslim complex and will not move an inch to prevent a Muslim being murdered or his shop looted or his property destroyed. I am, therefore, not in favour of adopting an attitude of aloofness dependent upon the two-nation theory.

2. Be a good Muslim and remain on friendly terms with your Hindu neighbours on the basis of common citizenship of the Indian Union. This obviously is the best position to take up but the snags are the following:

(a) Will the Hindu accept you as an equal and as a common

citizen or will he try and assert superiority in every way and humiliate the Muslims?

(b) Will he treat you with cordiality? What attracts me most to Mahatma Gandhi's mission is his insistence that the majority must not feel a sense of superiority or of domination and the minorities must not be made to feel any sense of subservience. He says that the minorities have rights for which they must fight unto death. They must not adopt an attitude of giving up rights in order to purchase the goodwill of the majorities. In order to bring the majority Hindus to a proper frame of mind it is necessary to have continuous propaganda amongst them and it is going to take time. What I fear is, will they have respect for you if you have not strength, that is to say if you give up your particular group solidarity? At the same time, any attempt to acquire solidarity and strength will raise suspicion in their minds as regards bona fides. Here the question what should be our attitude towards the Hindus is very important. Shall we treat with them as League treating the Congress or shall we create a political party of Hindus and Muslims? They may refuse to accept you as the League treating with the Congress and in a system of joint electorate will support the breed known as the Nationalist Muslims.

(c) Complete subservience and submergence in some places as in Bihar. This is the attitude of Hindus towards the Muslims. In order to prevent this there are three alternatives:

(i) The Muslims should form themselves into strong pockets. In my opinion this should be done even with the best co-operation in the world with the Hindus. It is politically desirable as well as necessary for survival and also culturally desirable.

(ii) Transfer of population while the going is good. Although we have had a bad lesson in the Punjab I still think that transfer of population is an impossibility. It is doubtful how many of those who have been transferred from one side to the other will survive. I think we have to take the risk and stand fast to where we live.

(iii) Annihilation. This is too awful to contemplate not from the personal point of view but from the point of view of Hindus and Muslims as a whole because nothing can then stop a general carnage.

So now the question is what are we going to do next. You must have thought over these problems because these problems have been with you for a much longer time than with us. I would like to have some guidance from you. Personally I think that Pakistan has provided a homeland for the Muslims living in those majority areas, but not a homeland for the Muslims of India. The Muslims in the Indian Union have been left high and dry and must shape their own destiny and the question arises what should be our future organization. The fact that there is a Pakistan Government of course does give a certain amount of reflected prestige to the Muslims of India but at the same time makes them a target for antagonism, and we have to choose between the two. I think that the Muslims of the minority

provinces will have to chalk out their own plan. The Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League in general are too busy with doing nothing in Pakistan. I think the solution lies in finding some ways and means to induce all Governments whether they are Pakistan or Hindustan to accept the minorities as their own and to destroy the complex of superiority in the majority population. For this purpose an all-round effort should be made and we are extremely lucky in having Mahatma Gandhi as the spearhead of this movement, for herein lies peace with dignity and honour and also the dictates of humanity. What do you think, first of all, of a few of us meeting together and then possibly a convention of the Muslim legislators of the minority provinces and ther conventions of Muslim leading men in each province?

As I said above I look to you for guidance.

Yours sincerely,
Shaheed Suhrawardy.'

I received this letter when I was suffering from excruciating pain in my body brought about by a nervous breakdown. My contacts with Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy had been very scanty as I had met him only four or five times casually in Calcutta. He had shown great patience and nerve during the Calcutta riots which had left a very bad legacy in the city and off and on violence erupted on the slightest provocation. A few days before this letter, an attempt was made to do violence to him, and if Gandhiji's presence had not prevented it anything might have happened. In one of his letters to Sardar Patel dated 1 September 1947, Gandhiji wrote:

'A man received stab wounds in Machchwa Bazar. No one knew who inflicted them. The people brought the injured person to parade him here. Maybe they wanted to attack Shaheed Suhrawardy but he was not there. So they vented their anger on me.... There was a terrible noise in the courtyard....

Both the girls (Abha and Manu) went into the crowd. I was in bed and about to sleep. The Muslim hostess came out thinking I was in danger. I was warned but got up. I sacrificed the silence. There was always that loophole. I joined the fray, but the girls would not let me proceed. The others too surrounded me. Then came smashing of the glass panes and also the doors. They tried to tamper with the electric wires and the ceiling but without much success. I started shouting at them but who would listen, besides mine was Hindustani and these people were Bengalis. There were some Muslims near me. I asked everyone not to retaliate. So they all stood motionless. There were two groups, one trying to pacify, another to instigate and riot. There were two policemen. They kept quiet with hands joined together. I raised my voice again but I was dissuaded. One of us by his dress could pass for a Muslim. There was a shower of brickbats. One of them hit a Muslim but no one was injured. It could have fallen on me. Meanwhile police chief arrived....

That is the situation. Tell Jawaharlal all this when you meet him.'

Shaheed for the first time was faced in his own province with a minority problem which I had had to go through all my life in my own provincial surroundings. The letter brought out all the problems facing the Muslims in India after partition but in regard to the solution of those crucial issues it is unpleasantly vague; perhaps because he could not make up his mind to be definite. He doubted the utility of the two-nation theory which to my mind also had never paid any dividends to us. But after the partition it proved positively injurious to the Muslims of India, and on a long-view basis for Muslims everywhere. Many of the queries in Mr. Shaheed's letter are only off-shoots of the first question concerning the two-nation theory. I would have replied to him in detail but certain events intervened.

Gandhiji, whatever may have been the Muslim opinion about him, was exerting himself ceaselessly and sincerely to denounce Hindu violence against Muslims, both including a spirit of determination and resistance in the Muslim minority, and endeavouring to secure for them their rightful place in India as its citizens.

As soon as the Delhi riots started he left Calcutta and came to Delhi in an endeavour to see that order was restored there, even though the Hindu junta had lost much of its respect for him as a Hindu Mahatma. The spirit of revenge against Muslims had gone so deep that anyone who spoke of sympathy with the Muslims was considered to be a renegade. However, at that period my only props were Gandhiji, Jawaharlal, Mrs. Naidu, and in a way Pandit Gobind Ballabh Pant also, to whom I several times looked for help to save Muslim lives in different areas. At one time it was the Meos who had to be saved from the mob attack and at another it was the Bharatpur Muslims numbering three thousand, surrounded by hostile hordes. And then it was in Dehra Dun where, in spite of great courage shown by Mahabir Tiyagi who risked his life in saving the Muslims, loot and arson became rampant. I had to be at my table day and night receiving news and begging and cajoling the Indian leaders to send out rescue squads.

Such were the conditions which we inherited at Partition.

XXXIV

TO PAKISTAN

1947

A SURPRISE was sprung on me while I was thus engrossed in the Herculean task of saving Muslim life. Sir Zafrullah Khan, who had gone as leader of the Pakistan Delegation to U.N.O., issued a Press statement from Lake Success in which he plainly stated that he had not been authorized or asked by the Government of Pakistan to say whatever he had said therein. I was greatly annoyed because without consulting his own Government, or contacting me to ask my opinion about the attitude of the Indian Government at that time, and without having regard for the efforts that were then being made to restore law and order and to save Muslim life and property, such an attack on the Indian Government was made. Even if all that was uttered by him were true, it was most impolitic for Sir Zafrullah Khan to have said things which were bound to affect the Muslim position adversely rather than to give them any relief. I thought over the matter for three days and came to the conclusion that it would be letting down the Indian Muslims if I did not speak the truth but rather allowed Zafrullah Khan's statement to occupy the field. I therefore issued a counter-statement which, as it happened, came to be my last statement from India. Sir Zafrullah's statement was as follows, as quoted in the Delhi *Statesman:*

'Sir Zafrullah Khan, Chief of the Pakistan delegation to U.N.O., who arrived [in New York] from London by air today, gave a warning that unless the Government of India took steps "to end the slaughter of Muslims a formal complaint would be filed with the United Nations. If satisfaction is not obtained the Government of Pakistan may have to resort to direct measures."

He told Press correspondents that the Indian Government had done nothing to control the communal disturbances. Asked whether he was authorized by his Government to make a formal complaint to the Assembly he said: "Not yet, but if the situation is not adequately controlled immediately by the Dominion of India I am expecting any moment to be asked by the Pakis-

tan Government to raise the matter before the United Nations Assembly, as this situation constitutes a grave threat to the peace of the world.... If this deliberate and planned extermination of people continues unchecked by India, Pakistan as a last resort must seek satisfaction through the United Nations and if it fails to get that satisfaction it may have to resort to direct measures.... The killing of Muslims has been going on for more than a month in the Province of East Punjab and latterly in the Province of Delhi. . . . Naturally the delegation is very much concerned at the moment with the happenings in and near our homes, where our dearest and nearest ones may at any moment be destroyed.... The responsibility for this rests entirely on the Government of India which so far has utterly failed to discharge its responsibility or even to face it squarely."

He asserted that the only thing the Indian Government has done so far to control the trouble was to appeal to reason; but the inflamed non-Muslim sections of the population could not be expected to react to these appeals, particularly when the Government's own police force in many instances had abetted and encouraged and even participated in the extermination of Muslims.'

As if the statement just quoted was not enough, to add to my worries further, Mr. Wasim, my brother-in-law, received from Ghulam Mohammad a letter informing him that Mr. Jinnah was very anxious that he (Wasim) should go over to Pakistan as Advocate-General. This was a complex family problem which foreboded splitting up of the whole family, as at that time his father, Mohammad Nasim, was about ninety years old and could not migrate to Pakistan with the rest of the members of his big family. I told my brother-in-law to think seriously of the consequences which might flow from his decision. He owned considerable properties besides his average income of Rs. 10,000 a month and he could never expect to keep his large family on the salary which he would be able to draw as Advocate-General in Pakistan. He was at that time in Zamir Mansions, one of the most valuable buildings in the city of Lucknow and, on hearing my view, he kicked at the walls and said, 'I am not going to sacrifice my conscience for mortar and brick.'

Next day I issued my rejoinder to Sir Zafrullah, which I quote as published in the *National Herald* of September 1947:

'"Sir Zafrullah Khan's statement indicating his personal views in regard to the steps which, in his opinion, the Pakistan Government may be ultimately obliged to take to save the Muslim minority in the Indian Union, coming soon after the West Punjab Muslim League Council's resolution for imparting military training to the youth in Pakistan, expressed a deep sympathy of the Pakistan Muslims for their co-religionists in India, but I do not think Sir Zafrullah has correctly appreciated the situation in

India before making the statement 'without any directive from the Pakistan Government,' " says Choudhri Khaliquzzaman, leader of the Muslim League party in the Constituent Assembly in a statement to the Press.

He adds : "That the Muslim minority has suffered and is suffering serious loss of life and property in some parts of the country does not admit of any contradiction, but it cannot be said that in West Punjab the non-Muslim minority have not also suffered, in such measure that mass emigration has taken place there. In such a state of huge mass upheaval, the matter to be coolly considered is what has been the attitude of the Governments concerned during the short period of their taking office? In my judgment, whatever calamity has come to pass was neither at the instance of the two Governments nor with their connivance. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, has frankly stated, in one of his recent statements in connection with the upheaval, that his Government was taken unawares. What was true of Delhi was true of East Punjab also, where for a time, there was no Government worth the name, and atrocities were perpetrated without any powerful authority to check it.

The decision of the British Government, to transfer complete power to the two Governments before the Radcliffe Boundary Award, has been primarily responsible for what followed. When the Army was being divided on a communal basis, the British Government, before its statement of June 3, should have made the division complete or have handed over power only when passions, which were bound to be excited by the decision of the Boundary Commission, had sufficiently subsided.

In these circumstances it is not correct to say that the Government of India are responsible for what has happened. Most gruesome things have happened in spite of them and their efforts. It should be realized by the Muslims in Pakistan that the whole honour and prestige of the Congress Government, as well as the Congress organization, is involved in the present struggle for the restoration of peace in the country, and the Congress Ministry at the Centre and the Ministers in the provinces are striving hard to shoulder the onerous task. Above all, Mahatma Gandhi is straining every nerve to impress upon the people in India that independence would not be worth anything if the present inhuman and barbarous killing of one community by the other does not immediately end. Who can deny that by his untiring effort and at risk to his life he restored peace not only in Calcutta, but throughout East and West Bengal. If today, the Congress efforts for the restoration of normal life are not bearing fruit to the extent to which they should have, it is because a large section of the people has become anti-Congress for its having been a party to the division of India. Let us hope and pray that the Union Government will soon succeed in restoring normal life throughout the huge country." '

This statement was very well received in India as it ought to have been. The people gave it a welcome which exceeded my

expectations. What effect it had in Pakistan I came to know only later.

Soon after my statement, Mr. Rajagopalachari, who was then Governor of Bengal, perhaps under instructions from Gandhiji, sent a code telegram to Mrs. Naidu, Governor of U.P. She telephoned to me to meet her on 26 September 1947 and read to me the decoded telegram of Rajaji in which he requested me to meet Gandhiji at Delhi. I agreed to go and got my reservation on the plane on the 29th. Rafi Ahmad Qidwai was informed by the Governor of the date of my arrival in Delhi and was asked to make necessary arrangements to receive me at the aerodrome, as conditions in Delhi had not till then reached normalcy.

With a box of clothes and a handbag I left for Delhi intending to return after a couple of days. I met Gandhiji on 30 September 1947 after nine years, the last meeting having been in the G.I.P. Mail Train in 1938 when I had joined him at Bhopal and travelled with him to Hoshangabad. He embraced me very cordially and then both of us sat down on his Khadi mattress nearby a low table on which there was a letter which Gandhiji asked me to read. It was from his son, Ramdas Gandhi, who had spared no curses on his old father. He had reminded him that when Maulana Shaukat Ali had disagreed with him on the causes leading up to the Bannu riot Gandhiji had retired from politics; but when recently in Calcutta Hindus had had a chance to retaliate against Muslim Goondas, he proceeded there and threatened to fast to bring undue influence on the Hindus. To sum up in one sentence, he said, 'Your life has become a curse for the Hindu *jati.*' I was naturally very much touched by this outburst of the son against his father and told Gandhiji, 'This is very painful reading. What do you propose to do about it?' He replied, 'I want to fight it out with my life. I would not allow the Musalmans to crawl on the streets in India. They must walk with self-respect.' I said, 'Gandhiji, this is very heartening. How can I be of any service to you in this laudable cause?' His reply was, 'If you could persuade the Sindhi Hindus not to run away from Sind, my task in India would be easy.' I said, 'Gandhiji, you are aware that I have had no communication with Mr. Jinnah or his party since they left India for Pakistan; but for this work I will have to contact them and find out their views.' He told me that it was for this reason that he had asked me to come to Delhi so as to proceed immediately to Karachi because things there were dangerously developing for the worst. I agreed to go to Pakistan.

After this short talk, Gandhiji of his own accord said, 'Khaliq,

you once told me that Patel was my "yes-man". He is not now my "yes-man", but he comes to me to discuss matters.' Now, although my relations with Congress after 1937 had become very strained, still I had so many friends in the organization that I was able to keep myself fully informed of Congress inner party tangles. I knew that Patel was trying to keep up the show of reverence for Gandhiji although he had now assumed the role of an opposition leader to him. I told Gandhiji that I remembered the occasion when I had made such a statement in 1943 at Wardha, and I also knew that he was not at the time his "yes-man" but a representative of the Hindu Mahasabha in the Congress, balking Gandhiji at every step. After some other conversation I left him, promising to go to Karachi as early as I could manage a seat in the plane.

For some years past it had been very well known to Congressmen that Sardar Patel had lost much of his influence on Gandhiji, after he had voted for Rajaji's resolution in the Congress Working Committee at Wardha on 15 June 1940, which had obliged Gandhiji to say in his statement that Patel was the greatest prize of Rajaji. It was following this incident that, a year or two later, Gandhiji described Jawaharlal as his political heir. This naturally gave a great shock to Sardar Patel who had always been jealous of Jawaharlal. To understand the relationship between Jawaharlal and Patel on one side and Gandhiji and Patel on the other, I am reproducing some correspondence between them, some of which was published in 1952, without any comment, in the *Hindustan Times*.

Letter No. 1 (dated 24 February 1946 from Patel to Gandhiji):

'Sushila has brought your letter. Aruna set things ablaze here and has since been continuing to fan the flames. About 250 were killed by gunfire. Over one thousand were wounded. The police became powerless so the military came out in large numbers. She has issued a very bad reply to your brief statement of yesterday. The Press agency published only a part of it. The Free Press Journal is entirely in the hands of that gang. Achyut and his group are using her and operating from behind the scenes. She sent a telegram to Jawaharlal. She had it published in the Press that in the present situation Jawaharlal is the only leader who can establish control. This she did because she could not get in my support. Jawaharlal telegraphed to me. He said he could come only if necessary but would have to give up other urgent work. I wired back to say that he should not come and he is coming tomorrow. He wires to say that he is ill at ease, and that he is, therefore, coming in spite of my telegram. He will be here tomorrow at three o'clock. I have no objection to his coming but the point is that we should all speak with one voice. I am afraid that Narendra Deo, Sampurnanand and that circle

will side with these people and so Jawaharlal will soften. They have looted shops, looted passers-by, set fire to some public buildings and to railway station buildings and to a railway. In these circumstances it would be idle to criticise them for bringing the military out. The position is easier today but by tomorrow all will probably be quiet. But it is possible that they will not have courage to remove the military at once. There is so much poison in the air and anger against English people and the English custom. These people have made use of students in this.'

This letter was written on the occasion of the Mutiny in the Naval Dockyard of Bombay. It was a doubled-edged sword. He was implicating Jawaharlal, to be tied to the line of Aruna Asif Ali, a Communist leader, to create misunderstanding between him and Gandhiji, on the one hand, and on the other to become a champion of the vested interests in Bombay, who were afraid that continuance of rioting in the city would greatly affect their business and looked upon the Sardar as their saviour. Gandhiji had begun to understand the mettle of the Sardar and was now on his guard.

Letter No. 2 (from Gandhiji to Sardar Patel from Poona, dated 1 July 1946):

'Jawaharlal is to come on the 4th and yet he insists that I should come to the Working Committee meeting. Aruna has already been here. I sent her to the Maulana. If I am to come, you had better put me up in the Bhangi area but I would not like to be again in the same house. It is unfair to displace the residents. Take everything into account before you decide. Think it over and write to me if you feel I must come. I do not like what you told me when you were here the other day. My point is and was more serious. It is nobody's fault. It is the fault of the situation. Neither you nor I can do anything about it. You have to act on your experience, I on mine. You know that I have not been able to understand some of the things which you have done. The election expenses, for example. Nor am I happy about the I.N.A. question. I do not like your speaking heatedly in the Working Committee. I am not complaining, but I see that we are moving in different directions. But why be unhappy over it and in no case should there be any grievance. Only let us be clear in our minds.'

Letter No. 3 (from Patel to Gandhiji dated 2 July 1946):

'About coming to Bombay you are the best judge. I think you should come because Jawaharlal wants you. The papers are already talking about your probable absence. But for that there is no remedy. I have seen Pyarelal's letter and now that you have also written I have hardly anything to say. I must be at fault. My regret is that I do not yet see my fault.

I do not wish to take a different path. In the matter of the

elections you were of the opposite view from the beginning. But the Maulana and the Committee were strongly for it. We felt that the Congress might have been held to blame if we had not fought the elections so we went through it. No one has anything to say about it now. It was because Jawaharlal pressed me that I undertook some relief work in the I.N.A. and there was no politics involved in it. It is true I spoke heatedly in the Working Committee. That is a fault of my temperament. Sometimes that happens in my dealings with Jawaharlal. But the fact is that there is nothing more in it. My health is cracking but there is nothing that can be done about it now. The atmosphere this time in Delhi was charged with mistrust and suspicion. It was also very warm there and there was much disharmony amongst us. God be with us. I am arranging for your stay.'

The foregoing letters by themselves throw great light on the relations which existed at the time when they were written between Gandhiji and Sardar Patel. They were all of 1946 but those of 1947 further confirm my thesis. They are of very great consequence. I reproduce them with the sole purpose of exposing Sardar's negligence in Gandhiji's assassination. Having been included in the Viceroy's National Council, whatever show of reverence he had for his old leader he was discarding in proportion to the added glory which came to him as a staunch Hindu, and as a member of the Government.

Gandhiji was anxious that a Commission should be appointed to inquire into the causes leading up to the Bihar riot, but Sardar Patel was manoeuvring to delay and defeat Gandhiji's attempt. On 17 February 1947 Gandhiji wrote to Sardar Patel regarding this matter :

'You are opposed to the Commission, so are the Governor and the Viceroy. Is that not enough to tie the hands of the Chief Minister? In spite of it, it is my firm opinion that if the Commission is not appointed, it would amount to an admission of the charges in the League's report. I alone know the pressure that is being put upon me.'

Again Gandhiji wrote to Sardar :

'If a Commission is not appointed it will be a bad job. The Bihar Ministers will stand condemned. What harm can the Commission do, if they have a clean bill? Extreme pressure is being put upon me here [in Noakhali] to go to Bihar. But I have faith in the Bihar Ministers and so I am not going there. But if no Commission is appointed, it seems to me I shall have to go there.'

Now Sardar Patel replies; mark the language and the tone :

'Who told you I have a hand in the non-appointment of a Commission of Inquiry in Bihar? I do hold the opinion that there is

no gain but only harm if the Commission is appointed. If in spite of it a Commission is appointed how can I prevent it? It seems to me strange that such false reports are purveyed to you.'

Why was Patel evading the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry? The answer is simple. It would have exposed Hindu high-handedness and the butchery in which they had indulged. Gandhiji was not prepared to shield the wrongdoers but Patel was inexorable.

When the Congress Working Committee had passed its resolution for partition of the Punjab Province into Muslim majority and minority zones, in the first week of March 1947, Gandhiji was not consulted. Not only that, but he was not informed about it for a fortnight. Gandhiji wrote a letter to Jawaharlal on 20 March 1947 on the subject, and on the same day he wrote to Sardar: '... Try to explain to me your Punjab resolution if you can. I cannot understand it.' The Sardar replies:

'It is difficult to explain to you the resolution about the Punjab. It was adopted after deepest deliberation. Nothing has been done in a hurry or without full thought. That you had expressed your views against it, we learnt only from the papers but you are, of course, entitled to say what you feel right.... The situation in the Punjab is far worse than Bihar, the military has taken over control. As a result on the surface things seem to have quietened down somewhat but no one can say when there may be a burst-up again. If that happens I am afraid, even Delhi will not remain unaffected. But here of course we shall be able to deal with it.'

From his own letter it appears that after the February riots in Lahore and Amritsar there was comparative calm but the Sardar was painting a picture as if the whole area was on fire and even Delhi might be affected. He was cleverly using such opportunities to pull down Gandhiji in the eyes of Hindus so as to bring about his exit from Indian politics. One more letter written by Gandhiji to Patel and I have done.

'Birla House, New Delhi,
November 1, 1947.

You were here yesterday but I failed to remember that it was your birthday so I could not give you my blessings verbally. Such is my condition today.

I am writing this for a special purpose:

1. Large numbers of helpless people (Muslims) seem to be congregating near Birla Temple. They cannot all stay there. They are just managing to spread themselves somehow. It is necessary to take them to a camp quickly.

2. Herewith a letter about mosques. That is only a sample. There are other similar letters. There should be a declaration that

these mosques will not be misused and will be protected and that the Government will repair any damage.

3. No Muslim will be compelled to leave the Union.

4. All illegal transactions involving ejectment or compulsory occupation of houses will be regarded as null and void and such houses will be kept free for occupation by their original Muslim owners.

I see need for a public statement on these lines.'

As no one in India has, so far as I know, for political or other considerations, commented on the real cause of the tragedy of Gandhiji's death at the hands of Godse, I have been compelled, due to the respect that I bore for him as my political leader for a long period of my life, to shake off all extraneous considerations to express what I consider to be the real clue to the tragedy. This last letter proved to be the proverbial last straw on the camel's back, for Patel thereafter lost all interest in saving his Guru's life for Gandhiji was too humane to the Muslims of India. The three months that he survived after this last letter were perhaps days of grace. From a statement of Mr. K. M. Munshi it is borne out that months before his assassination such talk had been taking place amongst big Hindu leaders, which encouraged Mr. Munshi to tell Gandhiji that if he suffered violence at anybody's hands it would be a Muslim to which Gandhiji replied, 'No, it would be a Hindu.'

I do not want to suggest that Sardar Patel was in the conspiracy for the assassination of his Guru. But nonetheless it shows a callous indifference for the protection of Gandhiji's life when Patel knew what other people were talking of in the city of Delhi. I refuse to believe that what Gandhiji said to Mr. K. M. Munshi was a solitary remark of its kind in that big city. It is also said that letters had been sent to Gandhiji and the Home Department informing them that some conspiracy of this nature was in the offing.

I had already finished writing this, when in February 1959, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's autobiography *India Wins Freedom*, containing many other facts concerning Gandhiji's assassination and Sardar Patel's attitude towards the gruesome tragedy, both before and after the incident was published. I invite the readers to refer to that book for more material on the subject.

Shaheed Suhrawardy came to see me one day at Rafi Qidwai's house and showed me a document concerning the Muslim minority in India and suggesting means for their protection. On the very first page of this document there was a remark in the handwriting of Gandhiji, 'It can be abridged. The question is whether Quaid-e-Azam would abide by it.' After examining the document

I asked Shaheed whether it had been approved by Mr. Jinnah. He asked me to come with him to see Gandhiji to discuss the matter. I said I had talked with him and I did not see any point in meeting him again.

The same night I had dinner with Jawaharlal where Sayed Husain was also one of the guests. Sayed Husain tried to dig at me for my part in the Pakistan movement but Jawaharlal did not encourage him. After dinner I talked to him about the growing improvement in the communal situation but I told him that there was still hard work ahead to bring a peaceful atmosphere, which could be secured only under pressure of the Central Government on the provinces. In this connection I informed him that in U.P. 8,000 National Guards were to be recruited with instructions not to take any Muslims. If that were done, the proportion of Muslims in the police rank and file would be considerably lowered, and when at some future time they might need Muslim policemen, who more than any other class could be relied upon to support the governmental authority against destructive and parochial forces, they would not be available. Panditji replied that Sardar Patel held the portfolio of the Interior but that he would inquire from him about the situation.

I also met Maulana Azad to tell him that the Jamiatul Ulema-i-Hind had held a meeting on 22 September, only about a furlong away from my residence, to curse and taunt the Muslim League leaders for having left forty million Muslims and gone away to Pakistan to enjoy life there. I said the uncanny haste disclosed an unrighteous ambition on their part for the leadership of Muslim India. The Maulana, I learnt later, told several Muslims in Delhi that I had promised to support his leadership of the Muslims on my return from Pakistan. As a matter of fact what I had said to the Maulana was that on my return we would meet, to discuss the best method of safeguarding Muslim interests in the changed conditions after the establishment of Pakistan.

Next day, 2 October, I left for Karachi and so also did Shaheed Suhrawardy, with General Ismay. Immediately on my arrival I contacted the A.D.C. to the Governor-General and asked for an interview. This was fixed for 5 October and at the time Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy also happened to be there. Mr. Jinnah came with my rejoinder to Sir Zafrullah Khan's statement in his hand and read it to me, expressing surprise that it had been broadcast from India for three days. I reminded him that it was the statement of the Leader of the Opposition in the Indian Constituent Assembly and India had attached great importance to it. Thereupon he said, 'It has hurt us very much!' I asked him how anything said by a Muslim citizen of India could bind down the

Government of Pakistan or have any effect on it. Nevertheless as he was dissatisfied with my answer, I said I would not go back to India but would send in my resignation, to enable someone else who might have his confidence to replace me and serve the Indian Muslims. Thereafter Shaheed Suhrawardy gave him the document which he had shown me at Delhi, to go through it. Mr. Jinnah looked at it and returned it to Shaheed without any comment.

After I came back to my house I searched my heart to find how I had done any harm to Pakistan or to its people by my rejoinder, as I knew that Pakistan was as keen to see peace and quiet restored in the sub-continent as were Gandhiji and Jawaharlal. It was with this view that Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan had gone to stay as a guest in Government House at Delhi on 19 September 1947, three days after the statement of Sir Zafrullah Khan and just a day before my own rejoinder was made. When the two Prime Ministers, Pandit Jawaharlal and the Nawabzada, met Mountbatten, as related by Campbell-Johnson, he said to them:

'"That is not to say that either wants to help the other dominion for its own sake, but both know that, unless they come to grips with the difficulties confronting them there is danger of anarchy that will be disastrous to both." . . . Pandit Nehru stressed that the main problem was economic. "The other trouble will pass but this we must solve or it will solve or dissolve us." . . . The talk of war that was going around was "completely wild and absurd. If war should come all our dreams of prosperity would collapse for a generation." Liaquat was no less explicit: "I agree that talk of war is absurd. If war should come it would be ruinous to both India and Pakistan; even more it would mean another world war. None can contemplate that with equanimity. *Pakistan wants peace for all nations and specially with* India. We are, after all, two parts of the sub-continent. We could never dream of waging war against India." . . .

Asked: "Were both the Prime Ministers satisfied that the other Government was doing all in its power to remedy the situation?" Mr. Nehru replied:

"When society is upset strange elements come to the surface. Sometimes these are fascist or fascist-inclined. These groups take advantage of the situation. Undoubtedly there has been a communal trend in what has happened, but the trend now is away from killings and towards increased looting. There are instances of Sikhs looting Sikh shops, Hindus looting Hindu property and Muslims looting Muslims. In a sense this is worse but in another way it is a hopeful sign. It is something we can deal with by persuasion or force, and that is the way we must deal with it."

Liaquat showed himself to be in general agreement with this

analysis, the only qualification he made was in reply to a question put to both of them as to how these brown shirt elements were to be combatted and the initiative taken back from them. "I do not agree." Liaquat said, "that the young elements in the Muslim League have the initiative. Besides we are taking steps to restore discipline in the League. That is the important point." '*

With this background I fail to see how my statement issued on 20 September 1947 was in any way contrary to the policy initiated by Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan in Delhi. The talks held between the two Prime Ministers in the presence of Lord Mountbatten were known to the public in India and I was no exception. My statement closely followed the line of policy enunciated by Liaquat Ali Khan, with which I fully agreed. If Mr. Jinnah did not approve of the policy of his Prime Minister, I could not be expected to know it. Besides in a democratic form of Government, as in Pakistan at the time, the Prime Minister is supposed to lay down State policies and I felt justified in taking it as the settled policy of Pakistan.

But quite apart from that, during the three days which intervened between my arrival in Karachi and my interview with Mr. Jinnah I had contacted Mr. Khuhro, the Premier of Sind, to find out from him the attitude of Sindhi Hindus towards Pakistan and their opinion on the question of migration to India. He expressed his great resentment against the Congress President, Mr. Kripalani, for not pulling his weight in dissuading the Sindhi Hindus from leaving Pakistan, although he (Khuhro) was doing everything possible to assure them of the safety of their lives and security of their property with the full knowledge and sanction of Mr. Jinnah. About three weeks later, H.E. Sri Prakasa, the Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan, was allowed by the Pakistan Government to proceed to Larkana in Sind, accompanied by Mr. Khuhro, to persuade the Sindhi Hindus not to migrate to India, but the attempt did not succeed.

What pained me most in the Quaid-e-Azam's reception of me was the fact that he had been mainly responsible for putting the burden of the leadership of Indian Muslims on my shoulders, but at the time of my interview with him, which was the last in my life, he did not realize my responsibilities towards the Indian Muslims, who were facing a situation never before experienced in their history of a thousand years. During the course of over thirty years of my close contact with Mr. Jinnah in different capacities and on different forums he had opportunity to know

*Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, London, Robert Hale, pp. 196-7.

that I was prone to attach value to my views in political matters and could not be expected easily to discard them.

In the evening Shaheed Suhrawardy came to see me and asked my view as to whether he should go back to India or not. I said:

> 'So far as I am concerned, I have decided not to go back, because I feel that I shall not be able to render any service to the Muslims of India after my interview with Mr. Jinnah, but you should decide for yourself for you can be the best judge of how far you can be helpful to Indian Muslims.'

I owe it to the Muslims of India to explain the circumstances which obliged me to stay away in Pakistan and not to return to India and now, at the age of seventy-two when I am nearing my grave, I have decided to explain my conduct. Whether I was right or wrong in taking the decision that I did, I cannot be the best judge, but of one thing I am positive, that after the shock that I received as a result of my interview I would not have been able to render any service to my people in India. God alone knows the innermost thoughts of men and He alone shall be my judge.

That apart, I had been feeling a call within me to leave behind me an accurate and faithful record of policies, movements, personalities and events relating to Muslim India leading up to the establishment of Pakistan, in the tradition of Muslim historians who have earned a reputation not only for authenticity but for impartiality and fairness. Pandit Jawaharlal in his book *Discovery of India* has complained about the absence of historical data amongst Hindus and has acknowledged the Greek and the Muslim historians as doing full justice to their subjects. In fact Muslim historians did not confine their attention only to caliphs, conquerors, kings and heroes but covered a much wider range, by introducing the subject of *Asmaur Rijal*, where men of lesser renown and unostentatious and quiet service received acknowledgment and recognition.

Wherever I have expressed my personal opinions on any question, people are perfectly justified in disagreeing with them if they find them unacceptable, for after all they are indeed personal opinions. I know many people in Pakistan would dispute my conclusions and similarly in India also they may be contended, but I consider it my duty to make them known to people for what they are worth, as history is for all time, not only for the present. So far as facts are concerned I have quoted resolutions of different organizations and other documentary evidence in their support.

There are, however, some people who have not liked the news of the proposed publication of my book, lest it might not give due

credit to Mr. Jinnah's personality; as if a strong and living Pakistan is not evidence enough of his solid achievement, and the title of Quaid-e-Azam conferred on him by the people is not a merited tribute to commemorate him! They would perhaps be content with stories, rather than a connected, factual picture of his life, of his failures, reverses, pain and sorrows, his ultimate success and the achievement of his objective; and that written by one who, having had to follow the course of his life often in opposition, in the final analysis accepted his lead. When on 8 February 1936, after a talk with him I agreed to rejoin the League on certain terms, I was not too blind to see that ultimately it would mean the winding up of the Muslim Unity Board, an organization which I had nursed with great labour and sacrifice and which had for the first time fought elections on a party ticket and won a good number of Muslim seats, and that it also implied, as a natural consequence, acceptance of Mr. Jinnah's leadership. In spite of that I was the first amongst the five public leaders of considerable experience and reputation, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Maulana Husain Ahmad, Maulana Ahmad Said, Mufti Kifayatullah and myself, all members of the Muslim Unity Board, to welcome Mr. Jinnah's proposal, which gave the Muslim League a large body of tried mass workers and public platform speakers.

Since then whatever differences I had with Mr. Jinnah had not been of a material character and I continued to follow his lead, even though sometimes I could not bring myself round to agree with him. in particular regarding the clause in the Lahore Resolution reading, 'with such territorial re-adjustment as may be necessary.' This was, in my opinion, wholly uncalled for, even though we might have ultimately had to agree to the partitioning of the provinces. But to put it as a clause in the Resolution when there was no demand for it from any side—British or Congress—was absolutely unnecessary. I differed from Mr. Jinnah on the question of the war policy of the Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah was good enough to modify his attitude. But when, on the advice of Sir Francis Mudie, I met the Viceroy I strongly supported his policy in my own moderate language and amiable approach. For people to think that in the Muslim League there were all nonentities who had no opinions of their own would show a pathetic state of affairs. And so far as history is concerned we know that even the caliphs did not remain immune from criticism by one section or the other. What the public will have to judge is how far the criticism is honest and sincere and based on logical conclusions. That Mr. Jinnah was a great man no one can doubt and when he took up the Pakistan cause he never swerved from it.

After my family arrived at Karachi from India I left for Larkana in Sind to avoid meddling in politics. While I was there, Sardar Patel made a speech in my old city, Lucknow, on 6 January 1948, in the presence of a gathering of thousands in the Aminuddaulah Park, in which he said*:

پاکستان کا بنوانے والا اسی شہر کا باشندہ تھا - بھگوان کی دیا سے
وہ چلا گیا ہم بہت خوش ہیں

'The man who got Pakistan established belonged to this city. Thank God he has left [for Pakistan] and we are happy.'

LONG LIVE PAKISTAN !

*The speech is reported in the *History of India and Pakistan* by Hashim Faridabadi, Vol. II, page 583, footnote.

APPENDIX I

ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE CENTRAL BOARD

POLICY AND PROGRAMME

In accordance with the Resolution passed by the All-India Muslim League on the 12th of April, 1936, at Bombay, I was directed to form a **Central Parliamentary Board** with power to constitute or affiliate **Provincial Parliamentary Boards** of various Provinces to contest the approaching elections on the ticket of the All-India Muslim League. I have taken all the trouble that was possible in doing my utmost to see that the Central Board is made as truly representative of the Musalmans of India as possible.

For this purpose I had long consultations in Delhi with the Members of the Council of the All-India Muslim League and of the various representatives of different Provinces whom I had invited for that purpose in view on the 26th, 27th, and 28th of April, 1936; and further, after four days of my stay in Punjab, I had the opportunity of discussing the matter with the various Leaders of Punjab and after careful consideration I wish to announce the following names as the Members of the Central Parliamentary Board :

BENGAL

1. Nawab of Dacca.
2. Mr. Fazalulhuq.
3. Khan Bahadur Abdul Momin.
4 *Maulana Akram Khan.*
5. Mr. Shahid Suhrawardy.
5. Mr. Abdur Rahman Siddique.
7 *Mr. H. M. Isfhani.*
8. Mr. Majibur Rahman.

MADRAS

1. Syed Murtaza Sahib Bahadur.
2. Mr. Abdul Hamid Khan, Mayor, Madras Municipality.
3. Mr. Jamal Mohammad.
4. Mr. B. Poker.

UNITED PROVINCES

1. Nawab Ismail Khan.
2. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan.
3. Raja of Mahmudabad.
4. Raja of Salimpur.
5. Maulana Shaukat Ali.
6. Mr. Khaliquzzaman.
7. Maulana Hassan Ahmad.

SINDH

1. Sheikh Abdul Majid.
2. Hakim Fateh Mohammad Sharwani.
3. Moulvi Mohammad Sidiq Khadda.
4. *Mohammad Hashim Gazdar.*

N. W. FRONTIER PROVINCES

1. Malik Pir Bux, M.L.C.
2. Maulana Allah Bux Yusuf.
3. Maulana Abdul Rahim Gaznawi.
4. Malik Khuda Bakhsh, B.A., LL.B., M.L.C.

PUNJAB

1. Sir Mohammad Iqbal.
2. Maulana Mohammad Ishaq Khan Mansehravi.
3. Ghazi Abdur Rehman, B.A.
4. Mian Abdul Aziz.
5. Syed Zain-ul-Abddin.
6. Maulana Abdul Qadir Kasuri
7. The Hon. Raja Gazanfar Ali Khan.
8. Sheikh Hisam-ud-Din.
9. Chaudhri Afzal Haq, M.L.C.
10. Ch. Abdul Aziz of Begowal.
11. Khawaja Ghulam Hussain, Pleader.

BEHAR

1. Mr. Qazi Ahmad Husain.
2. Maulana Sajjad Phulrari Sharif.
3. Shah Masud Ahmad, Ex. M.L.A.
4. Mr. A. Hafiz, Advocate.
5. Mufti Kifayat Ullah.

CENTRAL PROVINCES

1. Mr. Rouf Shah, B.A., LL.B.
2. Mr. Shareef, Bar-at-Law.

DELHI

1. Maulana Ahmed Syed.

ASSAM

1. Mr. Abdul Matin Choudhri.
2. Mr. M. A. Razzaque.

BOMBAY

1. Sir Suleman Cassim Mitha.
2. Mr. R. M. Chinoy.
3. Mr. Abubacker Beg Mohammad.
4. Mr. Ismail Chundrigar.
5. Thakore Sahib of Kerwada, M.L.C.
6. Khan Bahadur Salahuddin.

* * *

The Muslim League Central Parliamentary Board adopts the following programme for ensuing elections:

1. To protect the religious rights of the Musalmans. In all matters of purely religious character, due weight shall be given to the opinions of Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind and the Mujtahids.
2. To make every effort to secure the repeal of all repressive laws.
3. To resist all measures which are detrimental to the interest of India, which encroach upon the fundamental liberties of the people and lead to economic exploitation of the country.
4. To reduce heavy cost of administrative machinery, central and provincial and allocate substantial funds for nation-building departments.
5. To nationalize Indian Army and reduce the military expenditure.
6. To encourage development of Industries, including cottage industries.
7. To regulate currency, exchange and prices in the interest of economic development of the country.
8. To stand for the social, educational and economic uplift of the rural population.
9. To sponsor measures for the relief of agricultural indebtedness.
10. To make elementary education free and compulsory.
11. To protect and promote Urdu language and script.
12. To devise measures for the amelioration of the general conditions of Muslims.
13. To take steps to reduce the heavy burden of taxation.
14. To create a healthy public opinion and general political consciousness throughout the country.

APPENDIX II

تار کا پتہ۔ جمعیۃ علماء ہند۔ دہلی

الجمعیۃ المرکزیۃ لعلماء الہند

بازار بلیماران۔ دہلی

نمبر .... تاریخ 6.6.47

[illegible]

APPENDIX III

۱۴ ۳/۳۸ء

صدیقی، ۳ فروری سے برابر بیمار رہا اور اب تک بیمار ہوں
پیٹ میں جو اپریشن ہوا تھا اس کا زخم اب تک بھرا نہیں۔ زخم کا اندمال
کچھ خوف کی بات نہیں بشرطیکہ زخم دل کا ہو۔ یہ دل کا نہیں معدے کا
زخم ہے۔
[illegible] میں مسٹر شعیب علامہ مشرقی سے ملنے آئے تھے اور [illegible]
علامہ مشرقی سے آپ کی نسبت کچھ تذکرہ کیا تھا۔ علامہ مشرقی نے ان سے کہا تھا
کہ مجھ سے ملے ہیں لیکن ملاقات نہ ہو سکی۔ کیوں نہیں مجھے صاف صاف
[illegible] بات کہی ہے؟ یہ بات ایک لمحہ میں ہو سکتی ہے اس لیے
[illegible] کیوں اختیار کی جائیں؟ کیا آپ چاہتے ہیں علامہ مشرقی
آپ سے گفتگو کریں؟ آپ کو بلا لیں؟ [illegible]
[illegible] ہو رہا ہے [illegible]
آپ صدیقی سے ملنے کے لیے [illegible] آ جاتے۔ علامہ مشرقی
آپ کو بلا لیں گے

[illegible]

والسلام

[illegible]

[illegible]

۱۰ ۳/۳۸ء

صدیقی العزیز، ایک خط لکھ چکا ہوں کل آپ کا خط علامہ مشرقی
کے نام دیکھا [illegible] جواب [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

اور اصل مقصود اصلاح حال ہے۔ والسلام

[illegible]

APPENDIX IV

Khali
Almora, March 22, 1938

My dear Khaliq,

I have received your letter of the 15th March together with a copy of your letter to Gandhiji. I quite agree with the account of past history that you have given, and Pantji, I understand, has also carried away different impressions. However it is no good discussing the past.

In your letter to Gandhiji you mention the threat and danger from "undisciplined forces within our own ranks which aim at the destruction of our social structure and spiritual background." I do not know exactly to what group you refer. Personally I should have said that the greatest danger in India is from the undisciplined forces which communal organisations let loose and which they feed and which are likely to put an end to any spiritual background that we may have in this country. During the last few months I have watched with astonishment the progressive deterioration of the communal situation and I have wondered that sensible and intelligent persons should be parties to this.

I shall of course meet Mr.Jinnah whenever he cares to meet me but it passes my comprehension what language we can talk with each other which is understood by both of us.

I am not worried very much either by the end of Austria or by a few communal riots. I think in bigger terms and play for higher stakes. It is quite possible that I may prove an utter failure in my attempts. If so, I shall make my exit gracefully without shouting or complaining I hope. But I see no reason why I should give up the ideals which have moved me and driven me to action.

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal

Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman

[Publishers' note: In the third line of the first paragraph of the above letter a caret will be noticed between the words 'I' and 'quite'. The writer has added the words 'do not' in the margin but, the ink being faded, these have not reproduced in the block.]

APPENDIX V

SEGAON, WARDHA
15.6.38

My dear Khaliq, I have your letter, and I have just got from Maulana Saheb the Resolutions of the Muslim League. I must confess that I do not like them. The Muslim League should surely have rested on its own strength. The question was raised by Shri Jinnah himself. I pleaded with him that it was so wholly unnecessary. The fact that the Congress was negotiating with the League should be regarded as allsufficing. It seems to me that the first resolution itself bars the door against any further negotiations. It is so unfortunate. The second resolution is either meaningless and therefore superfluous, or if it has a meaning, it must be sinister. The third resolution is unexpected. For the Muslim League to bring in other minorities is to court or create mischief. Do you not agree with me? And if you do, I expect you to undo the mischief so long as it lies in your power.

This is not intended to be a polemical letter, but it is to a friend and coworker. Therefore whilst you are at liberty to show it to anybody you like, in the interest of the common cause I do not want to enter into any public controversies. I cannot bear the idea of us appearing as belonging to different camps.

Yours Sincerely
M. K. Gandhi

APPENDIX VI

13.12.38

POPULATION OF THE TERRITORIES

INCLUDED IN PAKISTAN

State	Muslim	Hindoo	Sikh
1. Punjab (British)	13,332,460	6,328,588	3,064,144
2. Punjab States Agency	1,556,591	1,887,249	996,626
3. Punjab States	40,845	383,883	10,854
1. N.W.F.P. (British)	2,227,303	142,977	42,510
2. N.W.F.P. (Agencies)	2,240,212	13,651	5,425
3. Tribal Area between the Agencies and Durand Line	2,500,000 (Estimated)	x	x
1. Kashmir	2,817,636	736,222	50,662
1. Sindh (British)	2,830,800	1,016,704	18,505
2. Sindh States	187,540	39,643	x
1. Baluchistan (British)	405,309	41,432	8,368
2. Baluchistan States	392,784	12,249	57
1. Delhi	206,960	399,863	6,437
	28,738,440	11,002,461	4,203,583

APPENDIX VII

Mount Pleasant Road,
Malabar Hill,
Bombay.
January 11, 1940.

Dear Khaliq,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 8th January. I am glad you appreciate the unreasonable attitude taken up by the Congress as disclosed by the recent correspondence between Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and myself. Well, we have to face the situation as best we can.

As regards the question of my appealing to the Mussalmans for funds for relief of the Anatolian calamity, the matter is receiving my consideration, and I hope to be able to decide it within a few days. The trouble is who is to be responsible for collecting the funds, othersise, of course, naturally I am whole-heartedly in favour of doing all we can to help the Turkish people.

With regard to the last matter referred to in your letter regarding the correspondence between the Viceroy and myself, I have already decided to place the matter before the Working Committee before its publication, and I have written to Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan to call, if possible, a meeting of the Working Committee about the end of this month. I hope that you will make it a point to attend it.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Choudhary Khaliquzzaman Esq.,
Lucknow.

Mount Pleasent Road,
Malabar Hill
Bombay
8th August
1940.

Dear Khaliquzzaman

I am in receipt of your letter of the 9th July as well as of the 7th August and thank you for all the information that you have placed at my disposal. I could not reply to your letter of the 9th July as I was not well, and besides, important events have been moving very fast and had occupied all my time.

You must have heard by now about the meeting of the Working Committee in Bombay on the 17th.

As regards the machinations of certain persons in Punjab I thank you for all the information. I shall place before you all things when you are in Bombay. The various points suggested by you will certainly have my very close attention and more when we meet in Bombay as I hope you will attend this very important meeting without fail.

Yours sincerely

Ch. Khaliquzzaman

APPENDIX VIII

Lucknow,
Dated 7th October 1942.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

You will kindly remember that in the last meeting of the Working Committee of The All-India Muslim League at Bombay, I had casually submitted before the Draft Sub-Committee that any territorial re-adjustment was bound to be prejudicial to our interest. Now recently the Government has published the census figures of 1941 for Bengal, which have confirmed me in my opinion. A perusal of these figures will show that the total population of Bengal comes to 5,61,14,356, out of which Muslims are 3,17,75,825 and non-Muslims 2,43,38,831. The difference in favour of the Muslims in the whole of the Province is 74,40,194. When, however, we look to the figures of the sub-divisions of the Province, we find that in the Burdwan Division the Muslims are 11,82,941 as against 59,13,754 non-Muslims. The percentage works out to 16.7 per cent Muslims and 83.3 non-Muslims. In the Presidency Division, which includes the town of Calcutta, Muslims are 57,31,354, while the non-Muslims are 71,05,733. The percentage of this Division works out to 44.6 per cent Muslims as against 55.4 per cent non-Muslims. In the remaining 3 Divisions, namely, Chittagong, Dacca and Rajshahi, the Muslim population is so overwhelming that even in spite of the excess in numbers of the non-Muslims of 61,05,202 in the sub-divisions of Burdwan and Presidency not only the deficiency is made up but the Muslims exceed in number by 74,40,149.

If the principle of territorial re-adjustment on the ground of the Muslims being in a majority not only in the unit or a Province but also in the sub-divisions of a Province is accepted, the Burdwan and Presidency Divisions will have to go out of the eastern Pakistan. The only area which we can legitimately claim in return will be Sylhet Division, wherein the Muslims preponderate. The result will be that our eastern Pakistan will consist of 4 divisions, namely, Chittagong, Dacca, Rajshahi and Sylhet. Unfortunately, these divisions lie in the eastern-most corner of India with only one undeveloped port of Chittagong. The territory itself lies between the Barhamputra and the several branches of Ganges with practically no possibility of development in future, owing on the one hand to frequent innudations from these big rivers and, on the other hand, to the absence of any mineral resources and high level ground for the expansion of towns and cities. Millions and millions of Muslims in this area depend for their livelihood on the paddy and jute crops, which keep them engaged during the summer months whereafter the rains set in leaving them idle without any work for the rest of the year. All trade in this area is mostly water borne with all its consequent disadvantages. The area between the Bihar and Calcutta, on the other hand, is full of iron and coal with a big Railway system and rising industries. Territorial re-adjustment under such circumstances is bound to be disadvantageous to us.

There is one other serious factor, which has got to be taken into account

in determining the question, namely, contact with the Pakistan zones of the non-Pakistan areas. If large territories on the east and west are to be carved out of Pakistan Zones, they shall either be made part of the present unit of administration or made into separate Provinces. In either case, long and hostile distances will intervene against the cultural influences of the minority Provinces on the Pakistan Zones. To explain my meaning, I will here quote only one instance where the growing cultural contact between U.P. and Punjab has resulted in practically ousting the Punjabi language and introducing Urdu in its place within the last half a century. In the eastern zone Urdu language is making headway so much so that in the Burdwan and the Presidency Divisions, Urdu is not only understood but freely spoken; while the area to the east of Calcutta neither understands nor speaks the language at present. In spite of this, if the cultural contact of the territory lying to the east of Calcutta is maintained with Bihar, Urdu is bound to make headway in time to come. It is, therefore, in my opinion, imperative that the present units of administration should not be disturbed if for no other reason than to keep intact the facilities of contact between the majority and minority Muslims Provinces.

Further, one of the basic principles lying behind the Pakistan idea is that of keeping hostages in Muslim Provinces as against the Muslims in the Hindu Provinces. If we allow millions of Hindus to go out of our orbit of influence, the security of the Muslims in the minority Provinces will greatly be minimised. The illiterate millions of Hindu population in their majority Provinces will be more considerate and regardful of the Muslim minorities, if they know and feel that large numbers of Hindus live happily and peacefully in the Muslim zones of influence. Besides being a political remedy, Pakistan to my mind is also a psychological cure. Complete segregation of the Muslims and Hindu population is, as at present situated, impossible, but there may come a time when it may become feasible. If we allow large territories to go out of our hands in the process of re-adjustment, such an exchange of population will become impossible; because the territories, which will be left over with us, will not be sufficient to receive and maintain large populations migrating from other lands.

Then again, once this principle is accepted, one does not know when it will end. If the population of the sub-divisions is to be taken into account; why not the population of the districts and the Tahsils, the cities, the Mohallas, etc. And what will be the proportion that should be set as the limit for a majority. If 57 per cent in Punjab and 56.3 per cent in Bengal is not considered to be a good majority, what number will serve to entitle the Muslims to call themselves in a majority in particular areas. Majorities are valuable either for the purposes of constitution or physical and historical fitness. In the case of Punjab and Bengal the majority of Muslims in number are strong both for constitutional and other purposes. To think of extending these majorities by surrendering large and valuable tracts of land does not appear to be a good proposition. Whatever has been said above applies mutatis mutandis to Punjab also. The Hindu population in Ambala Division is about 80 per cent as against 19 per cent Muslims. In the Central Punjab, i.e. the area lying between Ambala Division and Lahore, the Sikhs and the Hindus together make the majority. Not being in a majority in the area lying between Saharanpur and Lahore, we shall have to part with it. In this case, we shall not have any portion of any non-Muslim Province to compensate us for the loss as the Sylhet Division in the case of Bengal.

I have read and re-read the resolution of the League on the subject but I do not find anything in the resolution which broadly lays down the principle of territorial re-adjustment of units on the ground of majority and minority. I will here quote the portion which bears on the subject:

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial re-adjustment as may be necessary that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-eastern and north-western zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'independent states' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign; that adequate, effective, and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussulmans are in a minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them."

The League in this passage demands that contiguous units of administration, viz. the Provinces, should be grouped together into regions, but the units which should be grouped together should be such units where the Muslims are in a majority. These regions should be independent states, the constituent units being autonomous and sovereign. The provision for territorial re-adjustment of the regions can not, therefore, mean re-adjustment on the ground of Muslim majority in the sub-divisions or parts of a unit. Territorial re-adjustment contemplates reasons other than those of majority and minority; for, if that were the intention, the very existence of a unit will disappear; while we find that in the whole paragraph unit has been used as a synonym for a Province.

Further, the necessity for a territorial re-adjustment, if at all, has to be established by the party or parties, who want such re-adjustment. If the Hindu can not give us equally valuable territories to compensate our losses, they can not ask us for a re-adjustment. To my mind, therefore, the resolution does not bind us to territorial re-adjustment on the ground of our showing our majorities not only in the Provinces but in the sub-divisions of Provinces.

I am fully conscious of the fact that the achievement of Pakistan with the consent of the Hindus will be greatly facilitated by the acceptance of this principle, but looking to the dangers envisaged herein, I feel that even a direct common plebiscite of Muslims and non-Muslims on the question of accession or non-accession without the intervention of the vote of assemblies as contained in the Cripps proposals will be comparatively more advantageous to the Muslim interest than a truncated Pakistan established by Muslim plebiscite alone. I do not mean that we should not try to secure the consent of all parties concerned to agree to a plebiscite of only the Muslims of Punjab and Bengal; but if in the last analysis we have to make a choice between a common-vote plebiscite of the Provinces as at present constituted and the plebiscite of Muslims alone in the Provinces of Bengal and Punjab, after a territorial re-adjustment, the former

alternative is far more attractive and profitable than the latter. With an excess in population of 75 lacs in Bengal and 35 lacs in Punjab in favour of the Muslims, there can be no room for doubt in the result of a common voting in the Provinces.

There is one other factor which should be taken into account. If the whole of Punjab becomes a part of Pakistan zone, Kashmere and other Punjab native estates will have no direct communication left with the non-Muslim Provinces. They will naturally desire union with them and shall be forced to ask the Pakistan union for a right of transit. In that event the Pakistan Government can fairly claim the same right for Hyderabad and other Muslim estates to establish contact with the Pakistan union. If the southern and central Punjab is out of Pakistan zone not only such an opportunity will be lost, but direct communication between Punjab Hindu estates and the Hindu Provinces will be established without any such advantage falling to the lot of the Muslim estates in the Hindu dominated zones.

As this matter has been troubling my mind for a long time, I have prepared this case for what it is worth for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

P.S. This morning, I read in the "Pioneer" that Allah Bux has after all come round to the view that the units of administration should be divided on linguistic basis and have a right to decide their own future. On linguistic basis, Burdwan and the Presidency Divisions of Bengal will remain with Bengal as at present, for the language of these two sub-divisions is the language of the rest of Bengal. Similarly, Ambala Division and the central Punjab ought to remain with the rest of Punjab on linguistic basis whether the language is taken to be Urdu or Punjabi.

[Publishers' Note: Typing errors in the above, other than those corrected by the Author's Secretary at the time of writing, have been left uncorrected.

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